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CONTENTS

STUDIES

EDITORIAL

In the autumn of 2015, the Centre for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy of the Faculty of History and Philosophy of the Babeş–Bolyai University organised the annual colloquium of the Féderation des Instituts des Etudes Médiévales (FIDEM) on the topic of the "Variety of Readings of Medieval Sources". The topic was chosen with the purpose of proposing a passage, within the research of medieval theories of interpretation, from a classical analysis based on the four senses of the Scripture (treated by Henri de Lubac in a classic monograph) to the analysis of other medieval approaches of Latin, Greek, Arabic or Hebrew tradition which reflect also on the plurality of source interpretation, the rules of its diversity, and the relations between the truth and the plurality of interpretations. The motto chosen for the colloquium recalls Guillaume de Conches in his glosses on Boethius (Ed. Nauta, p. 202, 90-93): « … *de eadem re secundum diversas considerationes diversae inveniuntur expositiones. Sed non est curandum de diversitate expositionum, immo gaudendum, sed de contrarietate si in expositionibus esset* ... ». Furthermore, one of the founding texts of medieval philosophy and theology of Latin tradition, Cassiodorus's *Institutiones* contains an enthusiastic exclamation regarding the variety of interpretations: "*ut expositio multiplicata peritorum copiosam vobis doctrinam et animae felicissimam conferat sospitatem*" (*Institutiones*, I, 3). Nearly eight centuries after this true hermeneutical testament of Cassiodorus, Gregory of Rimini's theology shows an effort to establish an epistemology of the *complexe significabile* in order to map the limits of human knowledge and the ways in which man can approach the transcendent object of theology: "*Non obstante igitur identitate obiecti, quod est totale significatum conclusionum mentalium diversorum habituum, stat diversitas conclusionum ipsarum*" (*In librum Sententiarum*, Prologus, ed. Trapp, p. 67, l. 10-20). Surprisingly, in this context, Rimini states that the very possibility of the object of theology in its relation with the human mind and language opens up the need for a plurality of interpretations of the Scripture. .

I have compiled the contributions with the courtesy of the journal *Philobiblon* which agreed to publish some of the papers presented at the colloquium, together with other studies that focus on the Middle Ages. The order in which the articles are published is conventional, according to the chronology of their subjects,

but they all represent reflections on the interpretable nature of medieval texts and on the medieval theories on interpretations. Thus, Emanuel Grosu conducts a study on the well-known anonymous *Navigatio Sancti Brendani* and on the various interpretations of its symbols; Ioana Curuţ offers a view (and many unique occurrences) on the citations and interpretations of the Aristotelian apocrypha *Liber de pomo et morte*; I and Claudiu Mesaroş approach hermeneutical subjects regarding the editions and the terms used in Gerard of Cenad's *Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum*. Oana-Corina Filip and Vlad-Lucian Ile analyse semantic theories regarding John of Salisbury and Petrus Hispanus, while Andrei-Tudor Man offers a commentary and an edition of some *quaestiunculae* which summarise the philosophical issues of the 9th century in Erfurt. Andrei Bereschi approaches the subjects of Petrarca's hermeneutics and Alexandra Anisie has a similar approach to Giordano Bruno's philosophy. Luciana Cioca's research on Johannes de Wasia offers a unique fragment of the tradition of *sentences*. Maria Lupescu and Florin Crîşmăreanu focus on the late Middle Ages, on their effects on early modernity or on the divergent chronologies of Central Europe. Due to its methodological value, I have placed Mihai Maga's approach on medieval studies from the viewpoint of digital humanities last. Most of the studies compiled here illustrate the recent preoccupations of the community of researchers from the aforementioned Centre for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy.

ALEXANDER BAUMGARTEN
Issue Editor

NAVIGATIO SANCTI BRENDANI ABBATIS: ALLEGORY OF THE CHARACTERS

EMANUEL GROSU*

Abstract *Navigatio Sancti Brendani Abbatis* – a work whose manuscripts date to the 10th century – describes the voyage undertaken by Saint Brendan of Clonfert (cca 484–577) to find the so-called "Promised Land of the Saints". Thus, the anonymous author of this writing reiterates a commonplace of classical literature, which he revisits from a Christian pastoral perspective: the mythical place of ancient Greek and Latin literature is now depicted as *Terra Repromissionis Sanctorum*, thus a place destined to those who follow Christian teachings and the lifestyle promoted by them. The entire imaginary of this *Navigatio...* is constructed starting from both classical and Christian sources, within an osmosis of symbols, literary motifs, and philosophical topics through which the author aims to turn his work into a writing meant to be read by both Christians and those not affiliated to the Church. In my study, I propose an analysis of some of the characters (individual or collective) within *Navigatio...* My hypothesis is that, similarly to other aspects of the work, it does not exhaust its meaning from the narrative perspective, because characters can be interpreted from the perspective of the fundamental themes of the Christian doctrines. Obviously, the interpretation I propose does not exclude others, while sometimes this view seems to be confirmed by corresponding excerpts of *Vita prima...* or *Vita secunda...*, both of them successive re-elaborations (thus reinterpretations) of *Navigatio...*

Keywords allegory, symbol, Christian doctrine, collective characters, Brendan, *Navigatio Sancti Brendani Abbatis*

I. General considerations on the work. Framework

Navigatio Sancti Brendani Abbatis relates the journey made by Saint Brendan of Clonfert (cca 484-577) in his search for the Promised Land of the Saints (*Terra Repromissionis Sanctorum*). The anonymous author reprises a commonplace of classical literature (*The Isles of the Blessed*) and manages to highlight it from a clearly

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Christian perspective: the mythical place of classical Greek and Latin literature[1] is described as a *Terra Repromissionis Sanctorum*. In other words, it is depicted as a place prepared for those who embraced the true faith, by promoting a certain lifestyle, characteristic to Christianity.

Following the description made by Saint Barinthus – who, during a visit paid to Saint Brendan, related his journey alongside his disciple Mernocatus to an amazing island called *Terra Repromissionis Sanctorum* –, Saint Brendan decides to make the same voyage. After choosing fourteen[2] monks from his community to accompany him, and after fasting for 40 days, Brendan first heads towards the Island of Saint Edna. After constructing a small boat, the group chosen by Brendan includes three more monks, whose death Brendan foretells. The first stage of the journey (that would take seven years) occurred 40 days later, when they arrived to an uninhabited island, where they found a table that set itself and beds for all of them. On this island, one of the last three monks died. The journey continued to the Island of Sheep, and then the boat arrived on the back of a whale – Jasconius –, and subsequently on the Island of Birds, on the Island of Albe (whose community rigorously observes the vow of silence), as well as on an island where soporific water made Brendan's crew fall asleep for a long time. Then, they crossed the frozen sea (*mare coagulatum*) and, upon arriving on the Island of Birds for the second time, they were notified on the mandatory phases of the itinerary. They watched the confrontation between two sea monsters; they arrived on the Island of Strong Men, where the second of the last three monks remained forever. Subsequently, they witnessed the fight between a Gryphon and a large bird. They crossed a sea so transparent (*mare clarum*) that they could see various kinds of creatures lying on the seabed. The crystal pillar and the net surrounding it represents the moment before arriving at the gates of Hell, whose presentation seems gradual: the Island of Blacksmiths, (where the last of the three monks was taken and tortured by the daemons) and the rock of Judas Iscariot. After meeting Paul the Hermit (except for the mandatory phases of the trip, which coincide with the most important holidays of the Christian calendar) they arrived to the *Terra Repromissionis Sanctorum*. Following a short stay, they returned to their country, where Brendan's earthly life ended, surrounded by his fellow monks and by his disciples (*inter manus discipulorum*).

II. Allegoric levels

Despite a very simple framework and the linear structure of the work, the intertwining of various literary, liturgical and doctrinal themes and motifs conveys to

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[1] Cf., for instance, Strabo, *Geografia*, I, 5; III, 2, 13; Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis historia*, VI, 202–205.

[2] The first occurrence explicitly states *bis septem*, "two times seven", which may indicate an allegory, as detailed later.

the text a suggestive force that represents the reason for which the text was analysed from different standpoints: in relation to Irish literature (mostly in relation with *immrama* and *echtrae*, which influenced it significantly[3]); in relation to Greek and Latin literature (from which it borrowed certain themes, as previously stated); in relation to Arabic literature (as proven by M. Asin Palacios[4]); as a narrative of the first journey beyond the Atlantic before the Vikings. My opinion is that the best interpretive key is the one of the allegoric reading, and various researchers[5] have already highlighted some of the interpretations for various fragments of the text. It is worth noting that the allegories of *Navigatio...* connect the text to the Latin Patristic literature, which means that the author of this writing had great insight into it. Hence, it is important to outline some common points between *Navigatio...* and the writings of the Holy Fathers.

For instance, the sea (beyond the fact that water is the symbol of purification) can be considered a symbol of our earthly life, a space that we must cross in our way towards the heavenly home. The thick fog that invades the "Promised Land of the Saints" can be seen as a symbol of our uncertainties and of our failure to identify the right path sometimes. Storms are the temptations and challenges that we have to face, while the calm and windless sea is the patience that we must show in our efforts of becoming saints.

We are on the way, *in via*, which means that we are in an uncertain condition, although we may be on the right path, because our efforts, indispensable as they may be, are yet insufficient.[6]

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[3] Cf. D.N. Dumville, "Echtrae and Immram: some problems of definition", *Eriu* 27 (1976): 73–94; Corin Braga, "Chapitre 2. Les voyages initiatiques irlandais", in *Le Paradis interdit au Moyen Âge*, vol. II, *La quête manquée de L'Avalon Occidentale* (Paris: L' Harmattan 2006), 79–191.

[4] In Miguel Asin Palacios*, Dante y el Islam* (Madrid), 1927 (Italian: *Dante e l'Islam* [Milano: Il Saggiatore, 2005]).

[5] See especially Dorothy Ann Bray, "Allegory in the Navigatio Sancti Brendani", *Viator* 26 (1995): 1–10, but also, for instance, Cynthia Bourgeault, "The Monastic Archetype in the Navigatio of Saint Brendan", *Monastic Studies* 14 (1982): 109–122; Francesco Sarchi, "Ancora sulla leggenda di San Brendano", *Miscellanea di storia delle esplorazioni* 18 (1993): 9–17 (he believes that the crystal column may be considered the symbol of *axis mundi* – but in this case, like *axis mundi*, it should cross the centre of the world; however, such detail is absent from the description of the crystal column in *Navigatio...*); J.S. Mackley, *The Legend of St Brendan. A Comparative Study of the Latin and Anglo-Norman Versions* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2008), etc.

[6] Augustine, *In Evangelium Ioannis*, II, 2: "*Sic est enim tamquam videat quisque de longe patriam, et mare interiaceat; videt quo eat, sed non habet qua eat. Sic ad illam stabilitatem nostram ubi quod est est, quia hoc solum semper sic est ut est, volumus pervenire; interiacet mare huius saeculi qua imus, etsi iam videmus quo imus: nam multi nec quo eant vident.*" See also *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, 76, 21.

The boat – the means we use to cross the sea – can be considered a symbol of the Church, of a monastic community or a symbol of a believer[7] in his effort of attaining the supreme purpose of life: eternal happiness. Even wood – the material of the boat – metaphorically represents the Saviour's cross; the suggestion is that we cannot become saints; we cannot overcome the challenges in our way without the help of Christ,[8] because, in fact, there is no redemption without his death and resurrection.

Light is the symbol of the true faith or of the Saviour, while darkness symbolises Hell and sin.

Wind is a symbol of the Holy Spirit[9], of the assistance provided by the Providence. Letting yourself go in the wind means, for the characters of *Navigatio...*, too, observing the divine will and ultimately ceding own will[10].

"The Promised Land of the Saints", *Terra Repromissionis Sanctorum*, as the anonymous author often underscores, is Paradise. Its description features multiple common elements with the Eden presented in the Genesis (2, 8–14) and in the Book of Ezekiel (23, 13): the stream, the fruit trees, the precious stones, etc. Those who

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[7] Tertulian, *De Baptismo*, XII, 33–37: "*Ceterum navicula illa figuram ecclesiae praeferebat quod in mari, id est in saeculo, fluctibus id est persecutionibus et temptationibus inquietetur, domino per patientiam velut dormiente donec orationibus sanctorum in ultimis suscitatus compescat saeculum et tranquillitatem suis reddat.*" The reference is to Matthew 8: 23–27, and Mark 4: 35–41, which represent the origin of this metaphor which was also used by Augustine, *Sermones de Scripturis*, 63, 1: "*Etiam navis illa Ecclesiam figurabat. Et singuli quippe templa sunt Dei, et unusquisque in corde suo navigat: nec facit naufragium, si bona cogitat.* See also *Physiologus Latinus*, Versio B, IV. Serra: *Mare autem saeculi huius figuram gerit; naves vero iustorum habent exemplum, qui sine ullo periculo vel naufragio fidei transierunt per medias huius mundi procellas ac tempestates, et mortiferas vicerunt undas, id est huius saeculi contrarias potestates.*"

[8] Augustine, *In Evangelium Ioannis*, II, 2–3: "*Ut ergo esset et qua iremus, venit inde ad quem ire volebamus. Et quid fecit? Instituit lignum quo mare transeamus. Nemo enim potest transire mare huius saeculi, nisi cruce Christi portatus. Hanc crucem aliquando amplectitur et infirmus oculis: et qui non videt longe quo eat, non ab illa recedat, et ipsa illum perducet. [...]...quia hoc pro nobis factus est, ubi portentur infirmi, et mare saeculi transeant, et perveniant ad patriam.*"

[9] *Cf*. In., 3, 8: "*Spiritus, ubi vult, spirat, et vocem eius audis, sed non scis unde veniat et quo vadat; sic est omnis, qui natus est ex Spiritu.*"

[10] In the New Testament, adjusting one's will to God's will was either the only way for salvation (Mt. 7: 21: "*Non omnis ... intrabit in regnum caelorum, sed qui facit voluntatem Patris mei...*"), or a guarantee of obtaining divine assistance (I In., 5, 14: "*Et haec est fiducia, quam habemus ad eum, quia si quid petierimus secundum voluntatem eius, audit nos*"). At a pinch, this conformation to the Creator's will involves giving up one's personal will, like in *Oratio Dominica* (Mt. 6: 10: "*...fiat voluntas tua...*") or like in the example given by Christ while praying in the Garden of Gethsemane (Lc., 22, 42: "*Pater, si vis, transfer calicem istum a me; verumtamen non mea voluntas sed tua fiat.*")

live here are always young and beautiful; they do not need to eat or drink, they do not know illness or physical pain or death – this idea is also present in the works of Augustine.[11]

This objective series does not stop here, either, considering that the numbers (forty, twenty four, twelve, eight, seven, six, four, three) used by the author of the text are not simply values that approximate distances or periods, define quantities or delimit groups. They are not random values, but in this context, they have a symbolic function; they do not inform, but they rather form, thus contributing to the didactic value of the text. Of course, various fragments of the Holy Scriptures feature occurrences of these numerical values, for which we may propose various interpretations. I believe it is far more relevant to compare the text under analysis with *Liber numerorum qui in Sanctis Scripturis occurunt* written by Isidore of Seville,[12] where the Hispanic bishop synthesises the allegoric interpretations to be conferred upon numerical values. Among the numerous interpretations, I must mention the following: three, as a number associated with Trinity; four, the number of the Gospels preached in the four corners of the world; six, a number associated with Creation and with the ages of the world; seven, a number mostly associated with the Holy Spirit, through His seven gifts;[13] eight, a number associated with hope for the eternal things; twelve references the tribes of Israel, the Disciples or the twelve thrones of the Apocalypse; forty, as a symbol of the end of time and as a number related to the duration of the fast.

Even the hours have a symbolic connotation: they refer either to the Gospels,[14] or to the canonical hours; the divisions of the liturgical day are also suggested by the fact that, in *Navigatio...*, the day does not begin with the first hour of the morning, but (because it is the interval between two consecutive evenings) with the evening of the previous day.[15] By interpreting them, the numbers ascribe greater value to the text by connecting the literary genre of the work to the scriptural, dogmatic tradition, to the monastic environment in which it had been created.

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[11] *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, 148, 5: "*Coelestia tranquilla sunt, pacata sunt; ibi semper gaudium, nulla mors, nulla aegritudo, nulla molestia...*"

[12] PL, vol. 83, coll. 179 *sqq*.

[13] *Cf.* Isaiah 11: 2–3: "*et requiescet super eum spiritus Domini:/spiritus sapientiae et intellectus/spiritus consilii et fortitudinis/spiritus scientiae et pietatis/et replebit eum spiritus timoris Domini.*"

[14] *Cf.* for instance Matthew 27: 45–46: "*A sexta autem hora tenebrae factae sunt... usque ad horam nonam. Et circa horam nonam clamavit Iesus voce magna...*" (See also Mark 15: 33–34; Luke 23: 44). The third, the sixth and the ninth hour correspond approximately to 9, 12 and 15.

[15] This is based on the interpretation of the verses from Genesis 1: 5 (8, 13, 19 etc.): "*Et factum est vespere et mane...*"

Thus, in the text, the narrative level is based on surprising meanings and hidden connotations, behind a subtle weaving of parallel allegories. If this is the state of things, one may ask whether the characters (or at least some of them) had been invested with symbolical and allegoric values.

III. The allegory of characters

Concerning the characters of *Navigatio...*, the first noticeable aspect is the absence of female characters. Not only are they absent from the framework (which may be explained by the exclusively male profession of navigator) but they are not even alluded as a paradigm of temptation and of fall into sin, implicitly;[16] as if the adventure of finding Paradise concerned human nature in its complexity before the creation of Eve. Hence, the characters within this book are all male; they may be classified, not only for practical reasons, into two categories: individual characters and collective characters.

Brendan – the main character – is the initiator and coordinator of the expedition. Paradoxically, the work does not feature any of his physical traits. The moral side is the only one that matters: of noble condition, "a man of a great abstinence and famous for his virtues, father (*pater*) of nearly three thousand monks" (chap. I[17]) – enough to note his persuasive force in matters of faith, his organizational capabilities and his piety. Such "virtues" would not have had much value for his journey in the absence of courage, based not on physical strength (though he seems to benefit from it, too), but on the trust in divine help. However, because only those who observe God's will receive His help, Brendan struggles – mostly in the crucial moments – to know the divine will in order to subsequently model his own will and that of his companions. This is what he does, for instance, upon their first stop on an island: he forbids his 17 thirsty companions to fill their flasks before finding a harbour; "After three days The Lord Jesus Christ will show us a landing-place and a place to stay," (chap. V), Brendan narrates. His prophetic spirit is the visible sign of holiness, a consequence of the long prayers and of the strenuous fasts – in other words, of piety seen mostly as mortification. Unlike *Vita prima...*, *Navigatio...* features a saint who does not perform miracles, if by miracles we

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[16] In chap. V of *Vita prima sancti Brendani abbatis de Cluain Ferta* (Ch. Plummer, ed., *Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae partim hactenus ineditae*, vol. I, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910]), for instance, Brendan, as a child, refuses to play with a noble child (and even hits her) for fear of "*colloquia prava mulieris animam eius corrumperent*"; concerning the same hagiography, one can invoke as an antonym Saint Ita, as an image of the monastic virgin who cannot repress the feeling of maternity (*Vita prima...*, chap. III: *Hec enim virgo multos sanctorum Hibernie ab infantia nutrivit.*): she will take care of Brendan during his early childhood and she will advise Brendan on the way to *Terra Repromissionis Sanctorum* (*Vita prima...*, cap. LXXI).

[17] The division of chapters follows the edition by G. Vincent: Anonimus, *Vita Sanctissimi Confessoris Christi Brendani*, G. Vincent, http://www.utqueant.org/net/index.htm (accessed on 15.05.2017).

understand a desirable change of the natural, normal and predictable course of the events: Brendan does not resurrect the dead; he does not make water stream for the rock and he is not visited by angels, as it occurs in *Vita prima...* (chap. XI, VIII and X, respectively); alternatively, he can command daemons, he can obsessively invoke the divine will (like the encounter with Judas: *Navigatio...*, chap. XXII) and he can correctly foretell the destiny, like in the case of the three monks who joined the expedition later. It is interesting that, from the perspective of the anonymous author, the gift of prophecy – granted only to those who deserve it – does not correspond with the idea uttered by Augustine in *Confessions*, XI, 18, 24. For the bishop of Hippo, prophecy – foretelling the future – cannot occur in the absence of God's goodwill; essentially, it represents the future projection of the correct interpretation of a chain of present causalities. For the author of *Navigatio...*, prophetic time (a category of future-oriented, sacred time) is not a mere projection of the way we understand our present, but a renewal of the eternal present, where God governs the world, because the theft committed by a peer (chap. VII) is not deduced from his behaviour, but it is simply revealed beforehand. Whereas Brendan can foretell the fate of his peers or, concerning Jasconius, he can see the nature of certain realities (chap. XI), nothing can help him foretell his own life, the stages of his journey or at least its ending: to this end, Brendan asks for and nervously follows the advice given by a bird on the Island of Birds, by the administrator (a character who seems to embody the image of the Guardian Angel: he assists him in certain stages of the journey, by providing him with things necessary for survival and by accompanying him to Paradise in the last part of his journey), by Albe or by Paul the Hermit. Precisely this tension generated by the uncertainty concerning the unfolding of his own endeavour ultimately provides meaning to his efforts, which become as feverish as his desire.

However, Brendan is not only a seeker of Paradise lost, but also a skilful sailor; he pays attention to everything in his path, convinced that the entire creation shows the almightiness of the Creator and that details that may seem irrelevant in his way can prove to be a sign of the divine will, worth analysing. All his other companions are mere executants: patient, obedient, endowed with impressive physical strength, but also frightful, they follow Brendan because they freely made a commitment to do so. Just like their leader, they will only have to face the difficulties of the journey: the access to *Terra Repromissionis Sanctorum* is not conditioned by the passing of other tests – insofar as we are tempted to see "tests" in any critical moment of their path. Indeed, the entire framework of *Navigatio...* can be interpreted allegorically as man's efforts to get to Paradise by living a holy life (in other words, by always fighting against sin).

However, the most surprising individual character is Paul the Hermit; there are enough elements relating the character of *Navigatio...* to Paulus Thebaeus, who had lived in Egypt between the years 227 and 341: longevity (140/114 years old), the 90/91 years spent as hermit, the frugal living standards, the physical features, the

lack of disciples etc, are all characteristics that connect him to Paul described by Saint Jerome in *Vita S. Pauli primi eremitae*, which is considered a source for the author of *Navigatio...*. His rather minute depiction (from the vision that made him leave his native community to the description of the lifestyle on the island) in relation with the economy of the entire work makes me believe that the author of *Navigatio...* intends to propose it as a model. Nonetheless, the fact that he is considered to be the descendent of Saint Patrick (*cf*. chap. XXXIII-XXXIV) seriously questions this, not only from a chronological perspective. Hence, insofar as he is not the image of a historical character whose memory was not conveyed,[18] maybe it is more natural to consider this character as a double suggestion: on the one hand, the hermitism of the island inhabitants originates in the activity of Saint Patrick (cca 385-461); on the other hand, the author of *Navigatio...* – by sharing Jerome's belief regarding the origins of continental hermitism[19] – wanted to establish a direct connection between Paulus Thebaeus and the first Irish hermit by using the name and the depiction of the character. Furthermore, this view would fully correspond to the general intention of the work in presenting monastic life as a higher *status vivendi*, also assumed because of the example provided by certain saints – Patrick, Albe, Ende –, although some of them are erroneously presented[20] as having belonged to the same generation.

Even collective characters – merely outlined or depicted in detail: the three monks who join the group last – create a lack of balance that may endanger[21] the expedition itself. Taking into account the profoundly Christian tone of the text and the way everyone ended up, I could at least assume it was the figurative projection of the three possibilities that any Christian has beforehand: 1) upon sinning, to use the sacrament of confession and of the Eucharist and thus to earn, through divine grace, a place in the Heavenly Home – after stealing a golden necklace, the monk who dies on the island where they made the first stop acknowledges his sin and, after receiving the sacraments, angels carry him to Heaven (chap. VII); 2) by leading

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[18] The identification with Paulus (Paulinus) Aurelianus (who died around 573 and who therefore was a contemporary of Brendan) has been rejected, among others, by R.E. Guglielmetti (*cf. Navigatio Sancti Brendani. Alla scoperta dei segreti meravigliosi del mondo*, edited by Giovanni Orlandi e Rossana E. Guglielmetti [Firenze: Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014], LXXVI, n. 189).

[19] Jerome, *Vita S. Pauli primi eremitae*, I: "*Inter multos saepe dubitatum est, a quo potissimum Monachorum eremus habitari coepta sit. [...] Amathas vero et Macarius, discipuli Antonii [...] etiam nunc affirmant, Paulum quemdam Thebaeum principem istius rei fuisse.*"

[20] I refer here to Saint Albe, who died in 528 (or 541), presented as being contemporary with Saint Patrick (cca 385–461; vezi *Navigatio...*, chap. XVIII); the author probably took over this mistake from *Vita Sancti Albei* (see Ch. Plummer, ed., *Vitae sanctorum Hiberniae partim hactenus ineditae*, vol. I, 46–64), written in the late 8th century (or early 9th century).

[21] See Anonymous, *La navigazione di San Brendano*, edited by Elena Percivaldi, preface by Franco Cardini, Latin text in the front (Rimini: Il Cerchio, 2008), 192–193, n. 31.

a life in full accordance with Christian morals, to be worthy of joining the groups that populate the Island of Strong Men; 3) a life lived in disagreement with the precepts of Christian ethics and unsupported by the power of the sacraments can only be worthy of damnation – this is actually suggested by the end of the last of the three monks, dragged by a multitude of daemons towards the depths of Hell (chap. XXXI). Moreover, this interpretation can be supported by the replies uttered by Brendan when parting with each of them: "Woe is yours, my brother, that you have received so evil an end to your life" (chap. XXXI), for instance, addressed to the last monk before going away from the island like a mountain "shooting up flames into the sky".[22] If such was truly the author's intention, then a *topos* of Celtic legends – of a preset number of navigators – substantially changes the role: the death of the three monks no longer restores that decisive balance, for the sake of the crew, of divinity and compromise through human will, but it reveals certain aspects of the Christian dogma, thus acquiring a didactic function. The presence of the three "intruders" no longer endangers the success of the expedition (as in the Celtic legends), just like their death is no longer a guarantee of victory.

The second of the "intruders" remained on the Island of Strong Men. However, who are they? Divided into three distinct groups – children, young people (adults) and elderly people –, the inhabitants of this island have no activity other than continuously venerate God. Nothing in their description refers to physical traits; hence, when one of the inhabitants offers Brendan some fruit of their land by saying "Take of the fruit of the island of strong men" (chap. XXIV), the reader has no physical feature to which to connect the *Insula Virorum Fortium*. Unless *fortis* does not refer to physical vigour, but to *fortitudo* – a cardinal virtue defined by the capacity of resisting to adversities and by constantly seeking the Good, which would suggest that we need this virtue (or all virtues, by extrapolation) to live our lives in accordance with the divine will in all three stages of life: childhood, maturity and old age. If we understand things this way, we also understand the reply that Brendan addresses to the one who remained on the island: "It was a good hour that your mother conceived you, seeing that you have deserved to live with such a community [...] Son, remember the great favours God conferred on you".

Chapters XXXI-XXXII are dedicated to the description of unwelcoming places: the island of the ironsmiths who attacked the navigators; a high mountain,

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[22] *Vita prima...* notices this allegory and presents it more explicitly: in chap. XV, for instance, Brendan's reply all three monks who were late ("*Iste frater bonum opus operatus est veniendo; quare Deus preparavit sibi altissimum locum. Alter vero veniam, licet Deum graviter offenderit, consequetur. Set tertius pro sua obstinatione dampnabitur*"), not only one of them, like in *Navigatio...*, chap. IV. *Vita secunda...* (Ch. Plummer, ed., *Vitae sanctorum Hiberniae partim hactenus ineditae*, vol. II, 270–292) but innovates it: in chap. VI, Brendan foretells a favourable end for one of them, and a death followed by going to Hell alongside Dathan and Abiron.

covered by thick smoke, where the last of the three monks who joined the voyage later was taken by the daemons; the rock where Judas, with help from the divine grace, sends certain moments within the year by atoning for lighter sins than the one of having betrayed the Saviour. Were we to consider the statement made by Brendan while they struggled to escape the island of blacksmiths – we are on the border of Hell, chap. XXXI –, these three places may be seen as an expression of a tripartite view of Hell. The first level corresponds to the condition of wilderness (expressed by physical deformity and by the lack of language[23]) of those who, by not knowing or not cultivating the Christian doctrine, oppose it or are hostile towards it. Their hideous appearance and the horrible conditions in which they work (the brief presentation shows that this is their whole life) are an allegory of the hideous character and of the spiritual stiffness of those who cannot have a spiritual life precisely because they do not share the teachings of the Saviour. Reversely, the attitude of rejecting it (thus rejecting a spiritual life as well) turns against themselves, because exclusively material interests are ultimately self-destructive: by throwing fire from the blacksmith ovens, they only manage to set fire to their own island.

Navigatio... shows that, before starting his voyage, Brendan sought the advice of fourteen fellow monks. In fact, the first occurrence states *bis septem* ("two times seven"), an algebraic operation that could be the indicator of an allegory. Hence, two groups of seven, which could mean that the author wanted to suggest that the life of a person worthy of Paradise is based on both the virtues (four cardinal and three theological), and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (seven). Were we to rephrase, we are suggested that the individual effort (the exercise of virtues) is not enough for salvation, but that it must be completed by a concrete proof of divine kindness and support (the gifts of the Holy Spirit). Whereas when the text was written (whenever that was),[24] this thesis was not presented as a whole, it was expressed clearly in the writings of Saint Augustine and of Gregory the Great. For Lactantius, virtue meant "doing good and not doing evil";[25] Augustine, on the one hand, defines virtues[26] as *habitus* and he relates them indissolubly to the act of

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[23] Although also featured in *Vita prima...* the idea that this island of ironsmiths is the border of Hell (*Vita prima...*, chap. LVIII: "*sumus modo iuxta os infernalis putei*"), the lack of language is a sign of their low spirituality of their savage character.

[24] Taking into account the importance given to the Epiphany Octave, first mentioned in *De ecclesiasticis officiis* (IV, 34: *De octavis Theophaniae*) written by Amalarius of Metz (*alias* Amalarius Symphosius, cca 780–850), or the possible allusion to the liturgical use of the organ (arrived in Western Europe in the second half of the 8th century), I believe that the term *post quem* for this work should be around 830.

[25] Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones*, VI, 5: "*Virtus tota nostra est quia posita in voluntate faciendi boni […] ita virtus est bonum facere, malum non facere…*"

[26] The four virtues mentioned by Plato in *Republica* and that Ambrosius (*De paradiso*, III) had called "cardinal"; *cf*. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, XXXI.

faith[27], while on the other hand, by defining virtue as the "arts […] which teach us how we may spend our life well", he considers it indispensable for acquiring eternal/happy life.[28] In his turn, Gregory the Great considers that the theological virtues represent the foundation of spiritual life and he explicitly states that they are necessary for salvation.[29] Hence, in the third book of *De vitiis et virtutibus*, Halitgarius Cameracensis (who died in 830/831) approached faith, hope and love, as well as the cardinal virtues from the perspective of their indispensable character for salvation.

As for the doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, founded on the verses of Isaiah, 11, 2-3, it suffices[30] to mention the opinion of the same Gregory the Great. After associating the theological virtues with the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit in *Moralia in Iob*, I, 27, 38, (thus interpreting the three daughters and seven sons of Job), in *Moralia...*, II, 49, 77, he relates these gifts to the four cardinal virtues. He believes that through his seven gifts, the Holy Spirit – by conferring upon us the exercise of moral virtues – instructs (*erudit*) the soul against any temptation.[31] Hence, both gifts and virtues are necessary for our efforts of becoming holy, whose direct consequence is salvation or, in other words, our access to Paradise.

If my supposition is correct – that the fourteen, divided in the first occurrence into two equal groups, are an image of the seven virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit –, the moment when Brendan asks for the advice of his fellow monks should be seen as an expression of his self-assessment, of a way to analyse his capacities in order to conclude this voyage successfully. Maybe this is the reason why the others follow their abbot in this voyage, because their will is actually God's will (*Navigatio...*, chap. VI: *Abba, voluntas tua ipsa est et nostra. […] Unam tantum queramus Dei voluntatem*).

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[27] Augustine, *Contra Julianum haeresis Pelagianae defensorem*, IV, 19: *Ex hac enim fide prudenter, fortiter, temperanter, et iuste, ac per hoc his omnibus veris virtutibus recte sapienterque vivit, quia fideliter vivit.*

[28] Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XXII, 24, 3: *...artes bene vivendi et ad immortalem perveniendi felicitatem, quae virtutes vocantur...*; See also *De Civitate Dei*, IV, 21.

[29] Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, II, hom. IV, 4: *...tres sunt virtutes sine quibus is qui aliquid operari iam potest, salvari non potest, videlicet fides, spes, charitas...*

[30] For a diachronic presentation of the doctrine of gifts and of the concept of virtue, see A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, E. Amann, eds., *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, fourth volume, second part (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané), VI, 1924, *sv* "Dons du Saint-Esprit"; and fifth volume, second part, VI, 1950, *sv* "Vertu. Enseignement des Pères".

[31] Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, II, 49, 77: *Donum quippe Spiritus, quod in subiecta mente ante alia prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam format, eamdem mentem ut contra singula quaeque tentamenta erudiat, in septem mox virtutibus temperat, ut contra stultitiam, sapientiam; contra hebetudinem, intellectum; contra praecipitationem, consilium; contra timorem, fortitudinem; contra ignorantiam, scientiam; contra duritiam, pietatem; contra superbiam det timorem.*

IV. Conclusions

Navigatio Sancti Brendani Abbatis should be regarded as a Christian version of the old Celtic legends, whose fundamental *topoi* are preserved in the substrate. Hence, it should be seen as a synthesis of specific elements, for both Christian and "pagan" elements. Thus, the hermeneutics of such a text assumes the use of corresponding and mutually complementary interpretive keys, all the more as medieval literature always mingles genres. For instance, an autobiographic text such as the *Confessions* of Augustine can very well be considered a theological text, just as a historiographic text or the story of a real or imaginary voyage can be read as literary works that include moral, dogmatic, liturgical, etc. elements. Moreover, at least starting with the theorising efforts of Isidore of Seville, we note the integration of the doctrinaire heritage of pagan Antiquity into the epistemological system of the Western Church.[32] Hence, elements of the narrative (the sea, the wind, the wood, etc.) of Celtic legends acquire new meanings, just as some commonplaces (the preset number of navigators as a guarantee of the successful expedition) are given different meanings, which ultimately suggest diverse dogmatic aspects. Obviously, in numerous contexts of the framework (whether it is a symbol or an allegory[33]), the principle *aliud dicitur aliud demonstratur* is also verifiable in the case of the characters (at least in case of certain characters).

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[32] Ernst Robert Curtius, *Literatura și Evul Mediu latin. Excursuri* (Literature and the Latin Middle Ages) (Bucharest: Paideia, 2000), 88.

[33] For the lack of a distinction between symbol and allegory in the Middle Ages, see Umberto Eco, *Scrieri despre gândirea medievală* (Scritti sul pensiero medievale), trans. Cezar Radu, Corina-Gabriela Bădeliță, Ștefania Mincu, Cornel Mihai Ionescu, Dragoș Cojocaru (Iași: Polirom, 2016), chap. "Simbol și alegorie" (Symbol and allegory), 63–86; Johan Huizinga, *Amurgul Evului Mediu* (The Waning of the Middle Ages), trans. H.R. Radian (Bucharest: Meridiane, 1993), chap. "Declinul simbolismului" (The fall of symbolism), 328–347.

AD ERUDITIONEM MULTORUM. THE LATIN VERSION OF THE BOOK OF THE APPLE AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROTREPTIC

IOANA CURUŢ[*]

Abstract The pseudo-Aristotelian *Liber de pomo* (*Book of the Apple*) is part of the pseudepigrapha genre which has enriched the Aristotelian *corpus* at the price of distorting Aristotle's real teachings. The present article seeks to re-evaluate the protreptic dimension of the opuscule and its connection to the tradition of philosophical exhortations, such as Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*. From this perspective, we aim to reconsider Manfred's intention to translate the *Book of the Apple* by taking into account the very nature of a philosophical protreptic as manifested within both the text itself and the Prologue that Manfred attached to the Latin translation. Such an approach is motivated by our identification of a new source in Manfred's prologue and our reattribution of the first proposition (allegedly from *Liber de pomo*) present in the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*.

Keywords Pseudo-Aristotle, medieval philosophical protreptics, *Liber de pomo et morte*, Boethius, Manfred, the value of philosophy, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*

Although not entirely neglected, the medieval genre of the philosophical protreptic is much more often overlooked than any other literary genre employed in the Middle Ages as an expression of philosophical thought. One compelling sign of this

tendency of disregarding the medieval protreptic as such can be traced back to an entry on "literary forms of medieval philosophy" from one of the most prestigious philosophical encyclopaedias that bears no reference whatsoever to any medieval philosophical protreptic.[1] In stark contrast stands its direct ancestor – the Ancient philosophical protreptic – which receives considerable scrutiny from scholars, whether we refer to Greek productions or their Latin counterparts. But regardless of how scant the production of philosophical protreptics was in the Middle Ages, they did not cease to be an important aspect of medieval philosophical literature, nor did they have a lesser impact on their readership.

In the present paper, we shall examine one of the most famous medieval philosophical protreptics, *Liber de pomo* (*Book of the Apple*), showing that the philosophical aspect of the *Book of the Apple* was much more enhanced once the Latin version was produced. In order to prove our thesis, we shall employ two sets of arguments, while also highlighting the main characteristics of the opuscule, such as its original elaboration, its several stages of redaction and translation, its core message and its subsequent influence.

The first set of arguments refers to the fact that Manfred, the author of the Prologue to the Latin text, was highly responsible for orienting the text's message towards a philosophical end. In this regard, after contrasting the Latin Prologue with the Hebrew one, we shall develop an interpretation of Manfred's intention of translating the *Book of the Apple* by appealing to one of Manfred's statements from his Prologue. Moreover, we shall determine a previously unidentified source of Manfred's Prologue which derives from Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*, thus offering another argument in support of the inclusion of *Liber de pomo* within the long-standing tradition of philosophical protreptics.

The second set of arguments relates to *Liber de pomo*'s medieval reception which, we argue, was much more connected to the philosophical nature of the text. In support of this claim, we shall draw attention to several examples of its medieval reception, such as the commentary on Boethius's *De consolatione Philosophiae*, or the recently edited commentary on *Liber de causis*, anonymously composed in the first half of the fifteenth century. In addition, we shall also consider the medieval *florilegium Auctoritates Aristotelis,* which compiles eight propositions allegedly extracted from *Liber de pomo*. After revealing that scholars have hitherto overlooked that the first proposition is in fact not from *Liber de pomo*, we shall draw the implications of this misattribution for the thesis stated above.

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[1] Eileen Sweeney, "Literary Forms of Medieval Philosophy", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2013 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu /entries/medieval-literary/ (accessed 11 November, 2016). In fact, the term "protreptic" is used by Sweeney only in relation with Thomas Aquinas's theological work *Summa contra gentiles*, further referring to Mark D. Jordan, "The Protreptic Structure of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*", *The Thomist* 50/2 (1986): 173–209.

Liber de pomo and protreptic literature

In Antiquity, protreptic literature (gr. *protreptikos logos*, 'exhortatory discourse') was devised as a means of persuading the reader into embracing a specific activity and adopting a new way of living by renouncing his old habits. Such discourses that aimed to convert the reader were developed within various areas of thought. One can recall for instance the famous example of the medical protreptic written by Galenus; yet another particular type of protreptic flourishing in Antiquity[2] more than others was the philosophical protreptic. It has been argued that the genre of the philosophical protreptic did not appear simultaneously with Aristotle's homonymous work, but had in fact started with plural and often incompatible endeavours on the part of Isocrates and Plato, both of whom established a tradition of protreptic discourse that culminated with Aristotle's text. The genre witnessed a comeback in Late Antiquity, in the forms of Iamblichus's *Protrepticus* and Elias's *Introduction to the Isagoge*, rendering different Neoplatonising versions of the traditional genre. Furthermore, it also intertwined with other literary forms of philosophical expressions, like in the case of Boethius's *De consolatione Philosophiae*, circulating classical consolatory themes, rhetorical techniques of conversion, along with a heavy philosophical argumentation.

Regarding the popularity of this literary form in the High Middle Ages, the impact that Boethius's *De consolatione* had on various readerships is impressive, if we consider the wide commentary tradition it has spawned.[3] In other contexts, the protreptic discourse pervaded the intellectual milieu of medieval universities, a situation which is more visible with respect to the emerging universities from Central Europe in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.[4]

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[2] On the Ancient tradition of philosophical protreptics, see the more recent James Henderson Collins II, *Exhortations to Philosophy. The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[3] On the medieval tradition of Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*, cf. the classical work of Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen and Lodi Nauta, eds., *Boethius in the Middle Ages. Latin and Vernacular Traditions of the 'Consolatio Philosophiae'* (Leiden: Brill, 1997). The medieval commentary tradition of the *De consolatione* was described in harsh termes by Pierre Courcelle in his *La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire. Antécédents et postérité de Boèce* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1967), 333. One can find a pertinent response to Courcelle's unfair criticism in Lodi Nauta, "Some aspects of Boethius' 'Consolatio philosophiae' in the Renaissance", in *Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs. Actes du colloque international de la fondation Singer-Polignac*, ed. Alain Gallonier (Louvain-Paris: Peeters, 2003), 767–778; for Nauta's response, 768–770.

[4] Sophie Wlodek, "Pourquoi étudiait-on la philosophie à l'Université de Cracovie au Moyen Age? Témoignage d'un maître de la première moitié du xve siècle", in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für Mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale 25. bis. 30 August 1997 in*

   Liber de pomo is a privileged piece of work for at least three reasons. First of all, it circulated in at least four distinct medieval cultures: Arabic, Persian, Hebrew and Latin. Secondly, its presumed Aristotelian authorship elevated the status of the opuscule to that of a text worth being read and commented upon in the medieval centres of knowledge. The third reason, historically restricted to the area of Latin thought, consists of the fact that *Liber de pomo* played a considerable role from the thirteenth century onwards in forging an image of Aristotle and of his teachings more suitable with the overall Christian dogma. Having been accessible to distinct cultures in the Middle Ages, the opuscule was greatly responsible for the emergence of a unique portrait of the Philosopher, providing Latins, in particular, with a strong argument for supporting the compatibility of Aristotle's thought with Christian doctrine.

   Regarding its origin, the *Book of the Apple* is a Pseudo-Aristotelian text anonymously composed in Arabic in the tenth century (bearing the initial title *Kitāb at-Tuffāḥa*)[5] that has managed to enrich the Aristotelian corpus by providing a unique representation of Aristotle in medieval culture. The opuscule sets a conversation between a dying Aristotle and his faithful disciples, giving the Philosopher a last opportunity to exhort them to practice philosophy as a means to escape the fear of death. As it is suggested in the title, the scent of an apple helps Aristotle to prolong his life until he finishes his speech.

   The most surprising parts of the text are those where the character of Aristotle is determined by the anonymous author to utter affirmations running contrary to the Philosopher's historical teachings, being more akin with the doctrinal core of the main monotheistic theologies. The main purpose of adjusting Aristotelian philosophy to a monotheistic readership is a feature of the text which has been preserved in all of its four different versions. The Arabic original was subsequently translated into Persian (*Tarjuma-imaḥâla-i- Arasṭâṭâlîs*)[6] in the thirteenth century, at

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Erfurt, eds. Jan A. Aertsen, Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26 (Berlin-New York: 1998), 330–338.

[5] The original Arabic version of *Liber de pomo* was unknown until the late nineteenth century. Preserved in the Istanbul codex Köprülü 1608, ff. 170b–181b, the manuscript is dated to around the sixteenth century and contains a complete version of the text which is explicitly attributed to Aristotle. Based on this manuscript and other two abridged versions of the Arabic *De pomo*, Jörg Kraemer was the first to establish in 1956 that the Arabic version was the model for the Persian one. Cf. Jörg Kraemer, "Das arabische Original des Pseudo-Aristotelischen *Liber de Pomo*", in *Studi Orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi della Vida* (Rome: Istituto per l'Oriente, 1956), vol. 1, 488–490.

[6] A translation from Persian into English was accomplished by David S. Margoliouth, "The Book of the Apple, ascribed to Aristotle", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 24 (1892): 187–252. Margoliouth's translation was reprinted as an appendix in Mary F. Rousseau, *The Apple or Aristotle's Death* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), 60–

approximately the same time as the Arabic version was adapted into Hebrew by the Barcelonan translator Abraham Ibn Hasdây, with the title *Sefer hat-tappuaḥ*.[7]

Both the Arabic-Persian and the Hebrew-Latin versions have as a recognizable model the platonic dialogue *Phaedo*, thus making Plato's text the main source of the Pseudo-Aristotelian dialogue. Although the anonymous author does not explicitly mention the Platonic dialogue, the *Book of the Apple* contains a series of considerable borrowings from this source, and yet it cannot be described in terms of a simple imitation. The possibility that the anonymous author had at his elbow an Arabic translation of *Phaedo* may be deduced from some formal cues, such as the structural similarity between the two texts or the recycling of some characters (Simmias, Crito), but also from the numerous doctrinal similarities, often joined by textual echoes from the platonic model.[8]

From the perspective of other sources, the Latin version of the *Book of the Apple*, inasmuch as it faithfully mirrors the Hebrew version, can be described, following Ruedi Imbach, as a "complex intertextual mosaic".[9] This phrase refers to the fact that the sources of the Latin version of the *Book* do not originate in the Latin culture of the thirteenth century, but in fact relate to Arabic sources later preserved by the Hebrew translator when composing his own version of the text. Moreover, the initial "mosaic" structure of the *Book* is further developed by the Jewish translator, Ibn Hasdây, who decides to add new textual elements to the original Arabic version that he is supposedly translating.

Thus, a significant turn took place in the transmission of the text with the elaboration in the year 1235 of what Abraham Ibn Hasdây described in his own words as a "translation" from Arabic into Hebrew of the *Book of the Apple* (*Sefer hat-*

76, and also in *Buch vom Apfel (Liber de pomo)*, ed., trans., commentary by Elsbeth Acampora-Michael (Frankfurt am Main: Vittoria Klostermann, 2001), 153–179.

[7] A list of manuscripts containing the Hebrew version can be found in Moritz Steinschneider, *Die Hebraeischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher* (Berlin, 1893), 267–270. After its first translation into Latin in the mid-thirteenth century, it was once again edited and translated into Latin by Joannes Justus Losius at the beginning of the eighteenth century: *Biga dissertationum* (Gisse Hassorum: Typis Henningi Mülleri, 1706). Another version of the Hebrew text doubled by a German translation is available in Jeremiah Musen, *Hatapuach. Übersetzt aus dem Arabischen ins Hebräische von Abraham ben Chasdai* (Lemberg, 1873). Ibn Hasdây's version received two translations into English: Isidor Kalisch, *Ha-Tapuach: The Apple. A treatise on the Immortality of the Soul by Aristotle the Stagyrite. Translated from the Hebrew with Notes and Aphorisms* (New York: The American Hebrew, 1885); Hermann Gollancz, *The Targum to «The Song of Songs». The Book of the Apple. The Ten Jewish Martyrs. A Dialogue on Games of Chance. Translated from the Hebrew and Aramaic* (London: Luzac and Co., 1908).

[8] For a detailed comparison of the two dialogues, see Rousseau, *The Apple or Aristotle's Death*, 11 sqq.

[9] Ruedi Imbach, "Vorrede", in *Buch vom Apfel (Liber de pomo)*, vii.

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tappuah).[10] The Hebrew version made by Hasdây in Barcelona survived in a fair number of manuscripts, but unfortunately has not yet received a complete critical edition based on all the known witnesses.[11]

Hasdây is the first to attach a prologue to the *Book of the Apple* and he is later followed in his gesture by Manfred. In his prologue, the Hebrew translator states his identity in a clear manner, expressing his opinion on the paternity of the book in believing that it was composed "by the Sages of Greece". With regard to the utility of the translation, Hasdây points to its benefits for the "weaklings", namely for "those who meditate upon the words of the heretics, who aver that, after the dissolution of the body, man has no real existence, and that man lives solely by reason of bodily existence, whereas, at his death, nothing remains".[12] In this explanation, Mauro Zonta had seen an anti-Averroist stance on the part of Hasdây by means of which the Hebrew translator wanted to condemn their view regarding the dissolution of the individual soul after the corporeal death.[13] From our perspective, Hasdây's declared intention for translating the text is rather clearly marked in his Prologue by a strong religious motivation, and not a philosophical one, given his expressed opposition towards what he calls "the heretics".

Regarding Hasdây's translation, his version of *Liber de pomo* presents numerous differences, both doctrinally and textually, in relation to the Arabic original. Since an Arabic manuscript of the *Book of the Apple* that is similar in almost all aspects to the Hebrew version has not been found, it is more reasonable to presume that Hasdây made his own version, adapting the Arabic original to his culture.[14] For instance, the Hebrew version develops the originally more concise introduction of the Arabic version by adding a preliminary scene, in which the sages, before going to visit the ill Aristotle, gather at a house in order to define the path of righteousness. This first interpolation, by which the Hebrew translator inserted

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[10] Gollancz, *The Targum to «The Song of Songs». The Book of the Apple. The Ten Jewish Martyrs*, 92.

[11] Ibid., 6: "The accompanying translation has been prepared after collating and combining various printed versions and several manuscripts." Gollancz's volume does not contain the Hebrew text.

[12] Ibid., 91.

[13] Cf. Mauro Zonta, *La filosofia antica nel Medioevo ebraico. Le traduzioni ebraiche medievali dei testi filosofici antichi* (Brescia: Paideia, 1996), 189: "Non é escluso che questa dichiarazionedi Ibn Hasdai nascondesse un qualche spunto polemico neiconfronti dell'averroismo che proprio allora cominciava aprendere piede tra i suoi correligionari provenzali."

[14] It was a common practice for Hebrew translators to adapt and transform the original texts beyond recognition. Cf. Mauro Zonta, "Medieval Hebrew Translations: Methods And Textual Problems", in ed. Jacqueline Hamesse, *Les traducteurs au travail. Leurs manuscrits et leurs methodes* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), 129–142.

biblical topoi in the text, such as the love of the neighbour and fear of God, was preserved as such in the Latin version:

> When the way of truth was closed against those Sages, and the path of equity hidden from those wise men of intellect and understanding, called in their won language Philosophers, the etymology of which expression is «lovers of wisdom», they all assembled together at on and the same time, and agreed to explain and to cause men to understand which was the right way in which man should walk, so that he might live by it. And they found but one way, and it was this: that man should seek for his neighbor that which he would seek for himself: that he should shun the thing which was blameworthy and ugly and conquer it: that he should confess to the truth, exact punishment from himself, and fear his Creator.[15]

Leaving aside all of the textual differences between the four versions of the *Book of the Apple*, the text undoubtedly maintained its distinct value as a philosophical protreptic over the centuries. This is clear for all its avatars, since both the Arabic author and the Hebrew translator intended to describe philosophy as an *ars vivendi* and as an *ars moriendi* as well, the speculative life being held in high esteem in both cases. Nonetheless, as we shall argue below, in the case of the Latin version of *Liber de pomo*, this specific feature of the text was so strong that its protreptic message ended up reduplicated in its Prologue.

Manfred's Prologue to *Liber de pomo et morte*

Just as the Hebrew version of the *Book of the Apple* had a prologue by its translator, the Latin translation also received a proem. But unlike the prologue authored by Ibn Hasdây, lacking any philosophical challenges, the one that accompanies the Latin *Liber de pomo* raises a range of problems, from the identity of the translator of the Latin text itself, to discovering the philological sources and making sense of the *intentio auctoris* of the Prologue. The author of the Latin Prologue is undoubtedly Manfred, given that he puts forth the same official formula that Manfred employed when presenting himself: *nos Manfredus, divi augusti imperatoris Friderici filius, Dei gracia princeps Tharentinus, honoris montis sancti Angeli dominus et illustris regis Conradi secundi in regno Sicilie baiulus generalis.*[16]

Moreover, the absence of the term 'king' in the same formula suggests the year 1258 as a very possible *terminus ante quem* for the translation of *Liber de*

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[15] Gollancz, *The Targum to «The Song of Songs». The Book of the Apple. The Ten Jewish Martyrs*, 92.

[16] Marianus Plezia, *Aristotelis qui ferebatur Liber de pomo, versio latina Manfredi* (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1960), 40.3–7. For more details about Manfred's authorship of the Prologue, see Rousseau, *The Apple or Aristotle's Death*, 39.

pomo, since that is the year when Manfred became king of Sicily. The death of his father, Frederic II, in 1350, led Manfred to inherit the aforementioned attributions, so the *terminus post quem* of the completion of the text may be pushed back to 1350. Manfred's prologue enjoyed a relatively wide reception in the Middle Ages, since most of the manuscript evidence that contains *Liber de pomo* preserved the king's preface as well.[17] In order for us to tackle the problems the prologue raises, I shall first provide a brief summary of Manfred's prologue from a doctrinal perspective.

The prologue can be divided into four distinct but nonetheless intertwined parts. The first part represents an *exordium* in which Manfred lays down the basic metaphysical frame of his thought. Drawing on the biblical theme of man as an image of God (*Genesis* 9:6), the opening section of the prologue sets forth knowledge of self and knowledge of God as the two most noble traits of man, while ignorance with regard to both counts as the most damnable feature. Knowledge of the divine and the self is assured by God, which, in the words from *John* 1:9, is "The true light that enlightens every man coming into the world".[18] For man's ignorance is accountable for his endeavour into the corporeal realm, that makes him forget his noble origin. The sole remedy for his predicament is the cultivation of human sciences that help man get rid of his vices, lead to a better version of himself and provide access to his creator.

After stressing the paramount importance of the sciences for salvation, the second part of the prologue introduces a necessary link between the ignorant man and the attainment of the sciences, since merely under the guidance of sages do men stray from the wrong path. The difference between men, as Manfred puts it, relies in that some of them are convinced by the teachings of the sages to renounce their wrongdoing and pursue happiness, while others manage to improve themselves only by the very self-example that sages offer. Interestingly, next we see Manfred himself ambiguously adopting the persona of a sage or a member of the first class of people.

The third part shifts the previous perspective to reflecting upon an autobiographical event in Manfred's life. Lying on his sick bed without the prospect of living, Manfred tries to convince his entourage that he is less frightened by death

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[17] Paolo Mazzantini, "Cenni introductivi", in Bruno Nardi, *Lecturae e altri studi danteschi*, a cura di R. Abardo (Firenze: Casa Editrice Le Lettere, 1990), 109. Studying what he considered to be a second revision of the Latin translation of *Liber de pomo*, Mazzantini established that none of the manuscripts containing this latter version have Manfred's prologue.

[18] The English translation of the biblical passage is drawn from the *Revised Standard Version* of the Bible.

than they are.[19] The rationale behind his optimism is, according to Manfred himself, the instruction that he had received at the court of his father, where sages taught him various philosophical subjects, such as the nature of the world, the perishable character of bodies, and the immortality of the soul. Manfred also explicitly states that his father's library contained theological and philosophical texts dealing with such topics.

The fourth part is devoted to a short description of one particular book that Manfred had found in the library, namely *Liber de pomo*, said to be authored by Aristotle on his deathbed. Manfred urged the people surrounding him to read that book, if they wished to understand that his death does not cause him pain and suffering, as they would assume, but rather that, as a sage, he gladly embraces it.

Manfred also provides information regarding the translation of this text, which he claims to have translated from Hebrew to Latin after his convalescence. In a rather confusing terminology, Manfred notes that the Hebrew translator had previously inserted some passages into the original Arabic text. Moreover, Manfred admits that Aristotle is the author of the book, but that the philosopher did not write it himself: *Nam dictum librum Aristotiles non notavit, sed notatus ab aliis extitit, qui causam hilaritatis suae mortis discere voluerunt, sicut in libri seriae continetur.*[20]

With respect to the series of issues that Manfred's Prologue raises, one of them is his claim of the authorship of *Liber de pomo*'s translation from Hebrew into Latin. While few scholars consider today Manfred to be the real author of the Latin version, the majority of them assert that the king had merely commissioned the translation, while some even deny Manfred any knowledge of Hebrew. On the one hand, Marianus Plezia, the Polish editor of the Latin *Liber de pomo*, inclines to think that Manfred was indeed the author of the translation, since the text showcases an imperfect knowledge of Hebrew, and it is known that at his court Manfred had Hebrew scribes that could have helped him in the process of translating. Moritz Steinschneider, on the other hand, was sceptical about Manfred's proficiency in Hebrew or the proficiency of any other Christian at that time.[21] However, Bartholomeus of Messina, a very active translator at the court of Palermo, remains a likely candidate for the authorship of the Latin *De pomo*.[22]

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[19] For a detailed presentation of this biographical episode, see especially Bruno Nardi, "Il Canto di Manfredi (*Purgatorio*, III)", in Bruno Nardi, «*Lecturae*» *e altri studi danteschi*, ed. R. Abardo (Firenze: Casa Editrice Le Lettere, 1990), 99–100.

[20] Plezia, *Aristotelis qui ferebatur Liber de pomo, versio latina Manfredi*, 42.2–5.

[21] Steinschneider, *Die Hebraeischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher*, 268, quoted inquoted in Plezia, *Aristotelis qui ferebatur Liber de pomo, versio latina Manfredi*, 21, n. 38.

[22] This proposal was recently revived by Pieter de Leemans, "Bartholomew of Messina, Translator at the Court of Manfred, King of Sicily", in *Translating at the Court: Bartholomew of Messina and Cultural Life at the Court of Manfred of Sicily*, ed. Pieter de Leemans (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2014), XI–XXIX.

More recently, Paraskevi Kotzia pointed out the ambiguity of the term 'transtulimus' by which Manfred indicated his involvement in the translation, that can be interpreted either as an act of commissioning on behalf of the king, or indeed as a plural of majesty underlining that Manfred is the author of the Latin version.[23] Without choosing either side, Kotzia interpreted 'transtulimus' as a sign of Manfred's attempt at a triple justification – of his father, of Aristotle, and of himself:

> Whether it was Manfred himself who actually translated the *Liber de pomo*, something which, as we have seen, cannot be decisively ruled out, whether he did so with the help of a Jewish translator, or ultimately assigned the work to someone else, the fact is that the content of the *Prologue* seems to serve the strategy of a triple justification to which I have already referred.[24]

As we have seen in the case of Kotzia's reading of the text, the question of purpose emerges from the question of authorship. What intentions could Manfred have had in mind when bringing forth a Latin version of *Liber de pomo*, regardless of whether he really translated it or simply encouraged its translation?

Many scholars interested in the Latin version of *De pomo* sought to find hidden reasons for Manfred's implication in the translation. One popular group of interpreters proposes that, by putting forth a Latin translation, Manfred's action was in reality an act of justification. For instance, Ruedi Imbach suggested that Manfred's strategy in writing the prologue was that of rehabilitating his father's reputation, the emperor Frederick II, often accused by his detractors of apostasy or even atheism[25]. By showing that his father's library contained a book that proclaimed the immortality of the soul, Manfred presumably wanted others to believe that Frederick II was a pious Christian. Imbach's theory is also adopted by Acampora-Michel and Alessandra Beccarisi.[26] In addition to admitting that Manfred was interested in "clearing" his father's image, Kotzia also conjectured that Manfred intended to both express his strong Christian faith and to present the Aristotelian philosophy as compatible with the Christian dogma, since the reception of the Aristotelian philosophy was confronted with censorship.[27]

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[23] Paraskevi Kotzia, "*De Hebrea lingua transtulimus in Latinam*: Manfred of Sicily and the pseudo-aristotelian *Liber de pomo*", in *Translating at the Court,* 73.

[24] Kotzia, "*De Hebraea lingua transtulimus in Latinam*: Manfred of Sicily and the pseudo-aristotelian *Liber de pomo*", 85.

[25] Ruedi Imbach, *Dante, la philosophie et les laïcs* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1996), 114.

[26] *Buch vom Apfel (Liber de pomo)*, 48; Alessandra Beccarisi, "Le *Liber de pomo seu de morte Aristotelis*. Quand l'exemple deviant récit", in *Exempla docent. Les exemples de philosophes de l'Antiquité à la Renaissance,* ed. Thomas Ricklin (Paris: Vrin, 2007), 278.

[27] Kotzia, "*De Hebrea lingua transtulimus in Latinam*: Manfred of Sicily and the pseudo-aristotelian *Liber de pomo*", 81.

As far as our reading of the text is concerned, there could be a more obvious reason for explaining Manfred's alleged translation. It is true that Manfred links his finding of the *Book of the Apple* with his father's persona, since, as he confirms, he was educated at his father's court by numerous wise men, and the manuscript containing the Hebrew version of *De pomo* was to be found in his father's library. However, it seems unlikely for Manfred to express the intention of rehabilitating Frederick II by correlating his father's image with a text that explicitly condemns two views which were in fact associated with the emperor by his contemporaries, *i.e.* the mortality of the soul and the eternity of the world.[28] At best, Manfred is only praising the high level of culture that the court of Sicily had achieved by the time of his father's rule, and the excellent education he was able to receive there. While not subtly implying his and his father's orthodoxy, Manfred rather champions the royal court as a source of knowledge and a place where *philosophy* flourished.

From our perspective, the key for understanding Manfred's intention lies in the narrative he construes around his episode of illness, his recovery and the crucial role played by the small "Aristotelian" treatise in his attitude towards death. The one (and maybe only) reason why he translated the text from Hebrew into Latin – or was at least highly responsible for its appearance – was, in Manfred's own words: "for the sake of teaching the many" (*ad eruditionem multorum*).[29]

Manfred's prologue cannot be read as an act of faith, since he never mentions the dogmas of the Christian religion he should have abided as a true believer: the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Judgement, etc. Part of the themes developed by Manfred are common both to Christianity and philosophy: the existence of a Creator (or prime mover) that bestows knowledge upon men, the fall of man (or the negative nature of corporeality), and the immortality of the soul, they are all questions that can preoccupy a philosopher and not necessarily a Christian one. Manfred's heavy use of biblical passages in this text might probably decide in favour of an interpretation that stresses the author's intention of manifesting orthodoxy, if one did not take into consideration other textual instances where Manfred employed biblical metaphors, but for some other purpose than that of expressing piety.

In a seminal study from 1982 on the disputed date of the first entry of Averroes in the medieval Latin culture, R. A. Gauthier addressed the case of the letter emperor Frederick II allegedly sent to the masters of the Faculty of Arts from the University of Bologna. The letter had previously been used by R. de Vaux as

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[28] Salimbene of Parma, the Franciscan friar who reported Frederick II's human experimentation with disapproval, characterized the ruler as "*homo pestifer et maledictus, scismaticus, hereticus et epycurus.*" (*Cronica fratris Salimbene de Adam ordinis Minorum*, ed. O. Holder-Egger [Hanover-Leipzig, 1905-1913], 31, 109–122.)

[29] Plezia, *Aristotelis qui ferebatur Liber de pomo, versio latina Manfredi*, 41.

proof that in 1231 the emperor sent Michael Scot's translations from Averroes to the University of Bologna, thus marking the debut of Averroism in the Latin world.[30] The letter survived in more than one hundred sources, all indicating Frederick II as its author, except one Parisian source that attributed the authorship of the letter to the emperor's son Manfred.

Gauthier dismantled de Vaux's theory by showing that the version of the letter that entitled Frederick was in reality forged after Manfred's epistle from 1263 addressed to the masters of the Faculty of Arts from Paris. Invoking an edition superior to the eighteenth century *editio princeps*, Gauthier emphasised the fact that the philosophical texts that Manfred promises to deliver to the Parisian Master cannot refer to the corpus of Averroes's works. Gauthier also made interesting remarks on the style Manfred employs in the letter: the king speaks in a language familiar to its addressee, namely the language of philosophy, quoting the definitions of science that were popular among the masters of Arts in that particular period[31].

Consequently, Alain de Libera pointed out the manner in which Manfred employs biblical metaphors to express not his praise to divinity, but actually the excellence of philosophy, similar to the strategy employed by Aubry de Reims in his treatise *De philosophia*.[32] Thus, the similarity between the language and rhetorical strategy in Manfred's letter and the writings of some masters, such as Aubry of Reims, challenges the idea that Manfred's prologue is a declaration of orthodoxy that was also meant to rehabilitate Frederick II's reputation. It would seem that Manfred here is not at all concerned with religious issues, but his efforts are rather inclined to fashioning himself as a philosopher.

What went unnoticed to scholars was that, in the *laudatio* dedicated by Manfred to human sciences in the Prologue, his affirmation that by means of cultivating sciences one brings "his eyes, so accustomed to darkness, to the light of manifest truth" (*atque ad lucem perspicuae veritatis oculos tenebris assuetos attollat*)[33] is virtually identical to a passage from Boethius, *De consolatione*

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[30] Roland de Vaux, "La premiere entrée d'Averroes chez les Latins", *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques* 22 (1933): 193–245.

[31] Rene A. Gauthier, "Notes sur les débuts (1225–1240) du premier «Averroïsme»", in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982), 321–374; here 329: "Des son adresse, Manfred parle aux maitres es arts de Paris le language qui est le leur [...] Sans doute Manfred appelle-t-il trois fois la philosophie du nom du science (lignes 4, 16, 30), mais pour lui c'est tout un: pour la louer, il fait appel a la Metaphysique d' Aristote (ligne 8) ou a la definition de la philosophie alors classique chez les maitres es arts (lignes 30–34)."

[32] Alain de Libera, *Pensar en la Edad Media*, trans. José Maria Ortega and Gonçal Mayos (Barcelona: Anthropos, 2000), 108.

[33] Plezia, *Aristotelis qui ferebatur Liber de pomo, versio latina Manfredi*, 38. The translation belongs to Rousseau, *The Apple or Aristotle's Death*, 48.

Philosophiae, IV, 26.[34] This borrowing from *De consolatione* suggests that Boethius's work might have served as a literary model for Manfred, since both *De consolatione* and Manfred's Prologue comprise an autobiographical narrative linked with death and moulded into a meditation and an apologia for philosophy. Therefore, this Boethian influence could be the starting point of a future study that inquires the reception of the *De consolatione* at the court of Sicily in the thirteenth century.

Furthermore, it is manifest that Manfred forges his image after the model of the dying Aristotle from *De pomo*: surrounded by his disciples (in the case of the philosopher) or by his courtiers (in the case of Manfred), both of them hold a speech that praises death.[35] In light of these analogies, we can affirm that one of Manfred's probable reasons for writing a prologue in which he combines autobiographical notes with metaphysical themes is to create a self-image of an educated man, steeped in a liberal formation, that is much more than a *laic interesse a la philosophie*, as Ruedi Imbach described him[36], but actually a philosopher, a peer of the masters of the University of Paris, as the language employed in the letter from 1263 clearly reveals.

An argument meant to strengthen this mere suggestion is the fact that, according to Manfred himself, the translation of *Liber de pomo* into Latin had the specific purpose of "teaching the many". We believe that the phrase *ad eruditionem multorum* underlines an attitude that Manfred had kept in the aforementioned 1263 epistle to the "philosophers" of Paris. As R. Gauthier pointed out, Manfred was familiar with the current definitions of science from the intellectual medium of the Faculty of Arts. One of these definitions, quoted by Manfred, belonging to Arnoul of Provence, sounds extremely similar to the intellectual motivation behind Manfred's desire to provide philosophical texts *ad eruditionem multorum*. According to Arnoul of Provence, science can be defined as *nobilis anime possesio que distributa per partes suscipit incrementum et avarum dedignata possesorem, nisi publicetur, cito*

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[34] Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica*, ed. Claudio Moreschini (Munich/Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2000), 116, ll. 89–92: "*Ita est, inquit, illa. Nequeunt enim oculos tenebris assuetos ad lucem perspicuae veritatis attollere similesque avibus sunt, quarum intuitum nox illuminat, dies caecat.*"

[35] The similarity between Manfred's story and Aristotle's case was also noted by Kotzia, "*De Hebrea lingua transtulimus in Latinam*: Manfred of Sicily and the pseudo-aristotelian *Liber de pomo*", 79: "It is obvious that he aims to draw a clear parallel between himself and the Aristotle of the spurious work. Like 'Aristotle', Manfred lies gravely ill, surrounded by friends who are afraid for his life and who believe that, he too, shares their fears. Like Aristotle, Manfred has no fear of his approaching death. Both are aware that illness is simply something bodily, the result of an imbalance of the elements of which the body is composed. Aristotle owes his lack of fear to his philosophy, Manfred to the philosophical education he received at his father's imperial court".

[36] Imbach, *Dante, la philosophie et les laïcs*, 112.

elabitur.[37] This definition, stating that science grows *only when it is disseminated*, probably best explains Manfred's aspiration of contributing to the Latin world's knowledge of Greek and Arabic philosophy.

The medieval reception of the protreptic dimension of *Liber de pomo*

Liber de pomo's protreptic dimension, much emphasised by Manfred's Prologue, exerted an influence on later medieval texts. On the one hand, despite the fact that the Latin version of *Liber de pomo* was widespread in medieval universities and libraries as part of the Aristotelian corpus for nearly three centuries, it seems that it was never included into the *curricula* of any medieval university. On the other hand, occurrences of quotations from *Liber de pomo* attest the dissemination of the opuscule in the medieval schools. It might often be the case that such a spread can be explained by the usage of medieval florilegia like the famous *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, which selects eight propositions attributed to the Pseudo-Aristotelian dialogue.[38] Out of the eight propositions extracted under the title *Auctoritates libri Aristotelis De pomo et morte*, the first one, stating that philosophy's divine origin ("*Saepius mihi philosophia visa est res divina.*") is in fact borrowed from another medieval Pseudo-Aristotelian text, *De mundo*, that opens with the following strikingly similar statement:

> *Multociens michi divina quedam ac mirabilis quippe res, Alexander, visa est esse philosophia, maxime autem in hoc quod sola elevata ad omnium contemplationem studuit noscere veritatem que in eis.*[39]

In our view, this association of a proposition bearing explicit philosophical implications (the phrase is actually formulated as a definition of philosophy) with *Liber de pomo* may have in turn represented another attempt to exploit the philosophical nature of the Pseudo-Aristotelian protreptic.

However, this circulation of a partial *Liber de pomo* does not exclude the possibility that *Liber de pomo* was also known amongst the scholastics in an unabbreviated form. This is indeed attested by an anonymous commentary to Boethius's *De consolatione Philosophiae*, attributed at times to Thomas Aquinas or

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[37] Arnulfus Provincialis, *Divisio Scientiarum*, in, *Quatre introductions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Textes critiques et étude historique,* ed. Claude Lafleur (Montréal-Paris: Publications de l'Institut d'étudesmédiévales, 1988), 313–314, ll. 181–184.

[38] Jacqueline Hamesse, ed., *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un Florilège Médiéval*, (Louvain-Paris: 1974), 273, n. 1. There has definitely been some confusion, because Hamesse's reference for the first proposition of *Liber de pomo* is to page 208, ll. 145–146 from Plezia's edition of *Liber de pomo*, but Plezia's Latin edition of the text stops at page 64.

[39] Aristotle, *De mundo. Translatio Nicholai*, 391a1-5, in *Aristoteles Latinus XI 1–2*, ed. Willelmus L. Lorimer (Leiden: Brill, 1965), 29.2–5.

to William Wheatley, which showcases a strong familiarity with the Pseudo-Aristotelian text, confirming that Latin authors naturally associated *Liber de pomo* with Boethius's exhortation to philosophy. As we have shown above, this compatibility was already discretely suggested by Manfred in his Prologue, where he implicitly quoted from the *Consolation of Philosophy*.

The commentary on *Liber de pomo* preserved in manuscript Erfurt CA 4319 (ff. 135r-138v) and attributed to Albert of Saxony by Wilhelm Schum[40] is also probably from the fourteenth century. It is a literal commentary from the second half of the fourteenth century that also expands on the value of *Liber de pomo* as a protreptic. A quick reading of the *divisio textus* reveals that the author places *Liber de pomo* among those authoritative texts that discuss and plea for intellectual happiness. The theme of intellectual happiness originates in Aristotle's apologia for contemplative life expressed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, which was later developed by Arabic and Latin commentators of the text. Besides the main task of providing a clear literal explanation of *Liber de pomo*, the author of the literal commentary also creates an association between the meaning of the text and several classical references within the genre of Latin philosophical protreptics, such as fragments from Cicero, Seneca, Boethius's *De consolatione Philosophiae*, Boetius of Dacia's *Summa de bono* or Averroes' commentaries.

Another example of a reception of the pseudepigraphic *Book of the Apple*, similar to the cases of the commentary on *De consolatione* and to the one on the dialogue itself can be found in the prologue of a commentary on another Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, namely *Liber de causis*. Recently discovered and edited, this latter commentary of Central European provenance, written in the first half of the fifteenth century, quotes *in extenso* passages from *Liber de pomo* in perfect consensus with the other authorities of the late medieval protreptic. The commentary has recently benefited from a critical edition based on all four known sources.[41] By briefly examining the explicit quotations from *Liber de pomo* in this

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[40] Wilhelm Schum, *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der Amplönianischen Handschriftensammlung*, Berlin, 1887, 552 sqq. (quoted in Plezia, "Praefatio" in *Aristotelis qui ferebatur Liber de pomo, versio latina Manfredi*, 11). A complete transcription of the *divisio textus* is present in Pietro B. Rossi, "*Odor suus me confortat et aliquantulum prolongat vitam meam*": Il fragrante frutto e la morte di Aristotele", in , *Vita longa: vecchiaia e durata della vita nella tradizione medica e aristotelica antica e medievale: atti del convegno internazionale, Torino, 13–14 giugno 2008*, eds. Chiara Crisciani, Luciana Repici, Pietro B. Rossi (Florence: Sismel-Edizioni Del Galluzzo, 2009), 114–119. For the misatribution of this commentary to Albert of Saxony, see Charles H. Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries. I. 1. Medieval Authors. A-L* (Florence: Sismel Edizioni del Galluzo, 2013), 46.

[41] Alexander Baumgarten, "*Theologia philosophorum parcialis*. Un commentaire sur le *Liber de causis*", in *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages: New commentaries on 'Liber de causis' and 'Elementatio Theologica'*, ed. Dragoş Calma, Studia Artisarum 42 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), 267–325; here 271–336.

commentary, we conclusively grasp the common philosophical element of these quotations. For instance, one quotation refers to philosophy as a means for salvation (*Qui inveniat philosophiam inveniet vitam in utroque seculo*)[42], while another quotation from the Prologue of *Liber de pomo* is linked precisely with Boethius's *De consolatione*:

> Ave *magistra omnium virtutum* moralium *de summo cardine celi elapsa,* id est de altitudine celi, ut vult venerabilisBoecius, I *De consolacione philosophie*. Ipsa enim *clarificat animam* et *trahit eam ab obscuritate ignorancie ad lucem sapiencie et ad claritatem intellectus*, ut habetur in libro *De pomo et morte*.[43]

Similarly to the commentary on *Liber de pomo*, the prologue of the anonymous commentary on *Liber de causis* has the specific features of a protreptic, which at the same time urges towards assuming a practical dimension of the intellectual life, a feature that points to its inclusion into a unitary type of discourse often found in the prologues of the commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus produced in the Central European medieval universities from the fifteenth century.[44] In any of these cases, the quotations from *Liber de pomo* reveal the wide dissemination of this treatise and its importance in the intellectual formation of the scholars pertaining to this specific region, a fact indicated, for instance, by the quotation from *Liber de pomo* in the speech held by Stanislaus of Scarbimiria on the occasion of the election of Petrus Wysz as bishop of Cracow in 1392.[45]

Therefore, *Liber de pomo*'s successful career as a philosophical protreptic relied not only on its inherent philosophical discourse articulated under the authority of Aristotle or the Philosopher, but also on Manfred's efforts of composing a Prologue that would highly influence any reading of the Latin translation of the *Book of the Apple*, fully integrating *Liber de pomo* within the tradition of medieval philosophical protreptics. From this perspective, Manfred's main intention might not have been either to rehabilitate his father's image, or to prove Aristotle's compatibility with Christianity, or to build an image of a pious Christian for himself,

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[42] Baumgarten, "Theologia philosophorum parcialis", 310.21–311.1; cf. *Buch vom Apfel* (*Liber de pomo*), 96.

[43] Baumgarten, "*Theologia philosophorum parcialis*", 316.1–5; cf. *Boethius*, *De consolatione Philosophiae*, I, pr. 3, 3, ed. L. Bieler (Turnhout: Brepols, 1957), 5, and also *Buch vom Apfel* (*Liber de pomo*), 92.

[44] For an overview of protreptic literature in Central Europe, see Juliusz Domański, *La philosophie, théorie ou manière de vivre? Les controverses de l'Antiquité à la Renaissance*, preface Pierre Hadot, Vestigia 18 (Fribourg Suisse: Éditions Universitaires; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1996), 79–84.

[45] Cf. Plezia, "Praefatio", in *Aristotelis qui ferebatur Liber de pomo, versio latina Manfredi*, 14.

but rather to expose his philosophical side by putting forth an appraisal of philosophy and of a philosophical way of living. Ultimately, Manfred wanted or considered himself to be a philosopher whose aim was to disseminate knowledge for the sake of the intellectual and philosophical improvement of the many – *ad eruditionem multorum*.

IDEAS • BOOKS • SOCIETY • READINGS

ON THE MEANING OF *DELIBERATIO* IN SAINT GERARD OF CENAD

CLAUDIU MESAROŞ[*]

Abstract The word *deliberatio* in the title of the work *Deliberatio supra Hymnum Trium Puerorum ad Isingrimum Liberalem* by Gerard of Cenad bears several meanings and its principal use is still to be discussed. We shall investigate the contexts and the possible sources in order to attempt a final conclusion regarding the multiple uses of the term and of the *deliberatio* as a practice.

Keywords Gerard of Cenad, deliberatio, virtues, medieval philosophy, medieval theology, Isidore of Seville, medieval hermeneutics, Central European philosophy

Besides having been, chronologically speaking, the first Christian bishop resident in what we today know as the Banat region of Romania, Gerard of Cenad authored an impressive book called *Deliberatio supra Hymnum Trium Puerorum ad Isingrimum Liberalem,* written some time between 1030 and 1046, the exact time of writing is still subject to conjectures. The Caroline minuscule manuscript dated to the second half of the eleventh century survived in one single copy in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich (Clm. 6211)[1]. It was edited for the first time in 1790 by Bishop Ignatius Batthyány of Alba Iulia[2]; then, in the twentieth century, a contemporary edition was released under the authorship of Gabriel Silagi,[3] followed

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[1] Előd Nemerkényi, *Latin Classics in Medieval Hungary 11th Century* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 81. Also, "The Deliberatio of Bishop Saint Gerard of Csanád", in *Filosofia Sfântului Gerard de Cenad în context cultural şi biographic* (The philosophy of Saint Gerard of Cenad in cultural and biographic context), ed. Claudiu Mesaroş (Szeged: Jate Press, 2013), 48.

[2] Ignatius Batthyány, *Sancti Gerardi episcopi Chanadiensis scripta et acta hactenus inedita cum serie episcoporum Chanadiensium*. (Albae-Carolinae [Alba Iulia], 1790).

[3] Gabriel Silagi, ed. *Gerardi Moresenae Aecclesiae seu Csanadiensis Episcopi Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1978), XVII, 217 p.

by the third, printed in 1999 by Karácsonyi & Szegfű.[4] A Romanian partial translation was published in 1984 but it did more damage than it helped the reception of the text due to the ideologised selection.[5] The text lacks an optimal reception even in Hungary due to its poor circulation and due to the fact that a modern translation has been made only in 1999. It is still to be discovered by the future generations. The knowledge on the biography of Gerard relies on two anonymous medieval sources, both originated in the same narration called *Legenda Sancti Gerardi*. The earlier version, *Legenda Minor*, is a shorter biography that may have been part of an *Hours Liturgy* and has known multiple editions and translations.[6] The second source, *Legenda Maior,* is larger and more hagiographical in style, considered by historians to be unreliable.[7]

The *Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum ad Isingrimum liberalem,* is considered to be the oldest theological text of the Hungarian Middle Ages and was meant to be a lengthy commentary on the biblical *Song of the Three Young Boys* in the Book of Daniel.[8] Information concerning Gerard's textual sources is scarce; he must have possessed a minimal stock of documents in Cenad, since his text, if written there, contains abundant Biblical, Patristic, Areopagytical and Isidorian fragments and phrases, besides mentioning a large amount of Ancient philosophers' names.[9] Judging by the quantity of the borrowed phrases, Gerard was certainly educated at least in part with the help of Isidore's *Etymologies.* Still, since no solid evidence of schools in Veneto existed in Gerard's time,[10] except some stylistic practice found in various compositions, it is only the supposed realism of some

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[4] Béla Karácsonyi, Szegfű László, eds., *Deliberatio Gerardi Moresanae aecclesiae episcope supra hymnum trium puerorum* (Szeged: Scriptum, 1999).

[5] Gerard of Cenad, *Armonia lumii sau tălmăcire a cântării celor trei coconi către Isingrim Dascălul* (World Harmony or Interpretation of the Hymn of the Three Dolphins dedicated to Isingrim the Teacher), trans. Radu Constantinescu, ed. Răzvan Theodorescu (Bucharest: Meridiane, 1984).

[6] Ross, Martin, "Izvoare istorice cu privire la Vita Gerardi", in *Filosofia Sfântului Gerard de Cenad …,* 23–28.

[7] Gaşpar, Cristian. 2012. "An intellectual on the Margin and His Hagiobiographers: For a New Edition of the Vitae of St. Gerard" (paper presented at the *International workshop on the Historiography of Philosophy: Representations and Cultural Constructions*, West University of Timisoara, Romania, September 22–23).

[8] Nemerkényi, *Latin Classics in Medieval Hungary 11th Century*, 80.

[9] Ibid, 178–179. After a massive discussion, Nemerkényi concludes that the direct access is rather improbable.

[10] His early studies in Venice have been polemically disputed especially after Gabriel Silagi's edition of the *Deliberatio* (Silagi, 1978). On these grounds, Ronald G. Witt, in *The Two Latin Cultures and the Foundation of Renaissance Humanism in Medieval Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 134–135, argues that no solid evidence of schools in Veneto existed in Gerard's time, although some suppositions might be made since serious stylistic practice can be found in different compositions of the time.

passages in *Deliberatio* (like 41 "*In Platone quippe disputationes quondam apud Galliam constitutus quasdam de Deo Hebraeorum confidenter fateor me legisse et de caelestibus animis*"[11]) that can shed some light on the issue of literary sources. According to Silagi and Witt,[12] Gerard may have read Greek philosophy or lectures like Chalcidius's translation of Plato's *Timaeus,* and probably other texts as well while visiting *Francia,* and also accessed the Latin translation of the *Corpus Areopagiticum,*[13] since the cult of Saint Denis was popular before the eleventh century.[14]

Gerard uses the term *Deliberatio* as a title for his biblical interpretation, meaning that the word bears some special significance for him. Although it is difficult to guesswhat the main meaning of the term was for Gerard, it is a sound hypothesis that there was such a principal use. There are several different contexts where the term bears a semantic weight and we shall discuss each of them in order to reach a final conclusion.

1. *Deliberatio* as rational discourse on the divine matters.

First, the term is used in Book I as a noun ("*Invenies autem non solum istos in dictis concordes, quin potius omnes divina sapientissime deliberantes*") to express that not only the theologians but all those who wisely *deliberate* on the divine things agree with each other. The meaning in this context seems to be similar to the one in the title of Gerard's book, rather general or at least having no special meaning: *deliberatio* is a rational discourse, since it is not only the theologians in particular but any other person ("*omnes ... deliberantes"*) who counts as an agent of a deliberative act.

Even in the absence of inspiration, any man is able to meditate and *deliberate* on the existence of a Creator just by thinking of the things above; therefore, nobody can be excused for not knowing about the existence of a Creator because the creation is a construction of signs ("*ad signum fabrica*"). And if someone is unable to measure these signs with his mind ("*et si eadem metiri non potest ulius ingenii suffragatione*"), then the *deliberatio* can be possible as an act of meditation

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[11] We shall be referring to Gerard's text by the number of the Liber from now on (Book I to Book VIII), in the text. The text is that of Gabriel Silagi, corroborated with the edition: Ignatius Batthyány, *Sancti Gerardi episcopi Chanadiensis scripta et acta hactenus inedita cum serie episcoporum Chanadiensium.*

[12] Ronald G. Witt, *The Two Latin Cultures and the Foundation of Renaissance Humanism in Medieval Italy,* 135.

[13] More on this in Előd Nemerkényi, *Latin Classics in Medieval Hungary 11th Century*, 73–156.

[14] The cult of Denis had spread as far as England before the eleventh century: Luscombe, "The reception of the writings of Denis the pseudo-Areopagite", in, *Tradition and Change: Essays in Honour of Marjorie Chibnall*, eds. Greenway, D., Holdsworth, Ch., Sayers, J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 115–144, especially 125–126.

on the immensity of creation ("*tum deliberet horum inaestimabilis factoris immensitatem*").

Human autonomous deliberation does not necessarily appear to be evil but it is clearly inferior and only useful as a weaker contemplation in the absence of a higher understanding. An instance of such a meaning can be found in Book VIII, where Gerard, after mentioning that another brother was waiting for him to write a book, stands up for the task but still asserts his minimal *ingenium* and does not dare to deliberate against such a clever and subtle debater as Isingrimus: "nimis *vereri prudentissimo deliberare tractatori et subtilissimo arbitri, praecipue cum dictorum pulchra me minime possideant ingenia*". Again, close to the end of Book VIII, Gerard names his own interpretation a *Deliberatio:* "*Supra autem in ceteris deliberationibus*".

The same meaning is employed when we are told that the most learned men have deliberated on the four uncontaminated virtues ("*incontaminatae ... virtutes*"), namely the cardinal virtues ("*doctissimorum deliberatio perfectissima virorum quattuor, nimirum prudentiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et iustitiam*"); Gerard uses Isidore's *Etymologies* and says that Socrates was the first to institute the cardinal virtues in his search for the good life (*bene vivendi*).[15] In his turn, Gerard will consider the cardinal and theological virtues as one single edifice: "*in unum efficiuntur septem virtutum spiritualium arcem continentes*" (Book VIII).[16]

2. *Deliberatio* as inspired discourse.

The prologue of Book II offers two more similar uses in an intricate text that goes like this: "*Iterum in manativis theoricis circa dictum ducenda est contemplatio, et iuxta fortitudinem caelestis **deliberanda** denuntiatio*". The writer makes a reiterated effort to shift his attention towards some objects of contemplation that are in some way active against the subject, inspiring, on the one hand, in order to *deliberate* on the celestial revelation. This celestial *denuntiatio* is the very object of the deliberation, the revealed Divine names; on the other hand, the deliberation itself is possible to the very extent that the object of discourse is in its turn inspiring (*denuntiatio*) the author of the deliberation. This hermeneutical exercise is "*iuxta voluntatem ad voluntatem et circa aliam formationem et regulam":* according to the will, for the will and according to different forms and rules, aiming at explaining the high Divine mysteries that can be evaluated by the mystics (*potentes*) without using a model

[15] See a more developed study on this subject: Claudiu Mesaroș, "Socrates and theory of virtues in the *Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum* by Gerard of Cenad", in *Saint Gerard of Cenad: Tradition and Innovation* (Budapest: Trivent Publishing, Philosophy, Communication, Media Sciences Series, 2015), Available online at http://trivent-publishing.eu/e-book/1saintgerardofcenad.html (accessed 15.05.2017).
[16] See also István P. Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

(*sine typo*), as the *potentes* have arrived at a direct understanding of the Divine, so any method or model is empty to them.

The second paragraph of Book II explicitly states that the sacred text or the Scripture had not been written to offer direct access to its meaning ("*Nil itaque aestimes nuditati commendatum in sanctissimis vociferationibus*"), therefore a true philosopher will assume St. Peter's model in exploring the Divine knowledge, unlike humans who deliberate like beasts ("*non cum hominibus, qui iumentis iunguntur*"), if we are to access the unthinkable and to discover the greatest mysteries ("*si meditari desideramus immeditabile et maxima denuntiare*").

It is obvious that the human rational deliberative discourse will have to adapt to God's inspiration: "*ex aliis cetera divinae aptanda animi virtute, non humani ingenii deliberatione*" (Book VI), and again, in Book VIII, where we see that nobody can *deliberate* without the teachings of Christ: "*Si advertere, ut deliberas, (...) nil vadationis sine periculo quis invenire potest, nisi ad omnia respiciat, et toto corde sequatur, quod Christi doctrina hortatur*"; similarly, on the next few pages below, we read that Judas has bruised all human *deliberatio* ("*Legat librum divini Iudae, in quo omnis humana deliberatio sugillata redditur*").

3. *Deliberatio* as hermeneutics.

The inspired discourse of the *potentes* is at the same time a hermeneutic act. The inner experience of the mystic precedes and offers the source for what may seem to the uneducated as mere autonomous intellectual efforts of explaining a text, whereas the *potentes* are the legitimate authorities able to interpret and their act is an educated (not trivial) one. In the same fragment at the beginning of Book II Gerard announces that we should expect to read an "educated deliberation" (*eruditam deliberationem*), a judgment that should not be trivially criticised either by unexamined arguments (*et discurse non potest, quemadmodum nec oportet, examinari inexaminatis taxationibus praecipue ad **eruditam deliberationem**...*) or by the flaming opposition (*ignitum iudicium contra iudicium*).

The inspired forerunners like Apostles and the *potentes* are the models to be followed in interpreting the text; at the end of Book VIII, Gerard says that he had followed them precisely as a *deliberatio*: "*ut potentes volunt, et nos deliberamus*".

4. *Deliberatio* as mystical experience.

Therefore, the act of *deliberatio* turns out to signify something more than a simple rational or even inspired discourse made up by a philosopher or a theologian: it is an act of someone who has a mystical relation with the very object of discourse. Gerard's status as a bishop is consistent with the claim of a hermeneutical endeavour made from the position of authority addressing his believers. Thus, the status of a bishop turns the *deliberatio* as a hermeneutical act into a learned translation of the revealed truth made from a position of authority and endorsed by an ascetical life. The interpretation is therefore not a mere semantic conversion of

terms but rather an internal experience that the interpreter lives in relation with the text to be explained: the act of interpreting is first of all a complex experience of entering the reality of the text and this experience precedes the interpretation as literary act, so the interpreter is rather making a testimony of a personal experience and the resulting interpretation of the sacred text becomes a mystical or soteriologic act of the interpreter himself.

The ascetical life implies that the interpreter of the text assumes a personal experience similar to that of the three young boys. The *Liber primus* begins with an obscure exordium that announces high *contemplationibus* and the need to be patient and not give up the effort however difficult it may be (*nec vero declinandum, quamlibet circulorum*). In Book IV expressions such as "excessive heat" (*cauma improbita*) suggest the conditions of the furnace in the Biblical text: the *cauma improbita* does not allow any relaxation. The term *cauma* is rare and highly stylistical,[17] so it is plausible that, in this case, it does not have a material meaning, but it stands for the furnace's extreme heat that the mystical interpreter assumes. Gerard uses the word in several instances, like in Book VII where the term characterises the Divine Verb: ("*Ros suum non deficit caumate, non artatur frigore, non congelatur algore, licet surgat aquilo*").

Again, in Book IV Gerard addresses Isingrimus through a terrible confession: "*Hoc autem dictum, ut scires divini et terribilis dicti nos esse concordes*", just to announce that when we try to *deliberate* that the visible sun is actually an angel as it is said in the Bible, we stumble ("*in eodem angelum stare deliberamus, suffocabitur*"). Further on, in Book VIII, Gerard mentions an aforementioned distinction between Spirits of God and Spirits opposed to God, as a *deliberatio* ("*ut deliberandum sit, quod sint spiritus non Dei*").

5. Bestial *deliberation.*

The term *deliberatio* is yet ironically associated with the term *luxuriosissima* (dissolute, profligate, debauched, prodigal, seductive, likerish) to build an antithesis between Christian and anti-Christian philosophy. There are philosophers called *humams* that search for God and have strength in discovering truth ("*Homines autem hic potentes in theophaniis dictorum*"), and there are weak philosophers, called "„beasts", who can only dig into the thrash of pagan inventions, due to their dissolute way of thinking ("*Iumenta in sterquilinio gentilium promulgationum figentes gressum luxoriosissima deliberatione*"). The antithesis is very strong: the negative *deliberatio* refuses Christian revelation and assumes an inverted path, still not necessarily irreversible, since bestial philosophers may be saved by God's mercy,

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[17] Nemerkényi, *Latin Classics in Medieval Hungary,* 139: "The Greek noun cauma occurs in medieval Latin but its use, instead of the more common aestus, ardor or calor, implies a stylistic input in the works of other authors as well as in the Deliberatio".

yet never by their own merits (*secundum multiplicationem totius deitatis misericordiae*).

In Book VIII, these "*maligni spiritus*" are described as "*spiritus procellarum*" that raise wars against the virtues and "*non faciunt verbum quia non sunt per verbum, peccata enim sunt, quae a Deo non sunt*"; they are "*inquieti et ad malum anxii*", and, according to the Psalm, "*Talium autem pars ignis, sulphur et spiritus procellarum calicis est*", where *ignis* signifies their evil spirit according to their *evil deliberatio* ("*Ignis cupiditatem significat omnium malorum iuxta deliberationem malorum*").

6. Divine *Deliberatio*.

The existence of a divine *deliberatio* may be confirmed by Gerard's use of the term in a difficult context of Book III when commenting on the meaning of the waters in the Song, namely the heavenly waters ("*Aquae supra caelos fundatos*"). As this is difficult to understand, Gerard appeals to an analogue demonstrandum borrowed from Isidore of Seville:[18] the Apostles have been named "waters" in the Bible because the water is equal to itself at the surface ("*Aqua siquidem dicta, quod in superficie aequalis sit*"), and so we should be perceiving these heavenly waters not in a human manner ("*non mortalium more*") but according to the sacred *deliberatio* ("*sed sacra deliberatione*"). This fragment is very important for at least two reasons. First, it suggests that the *deliberatio* shall also be a process of reaching a decision: the fact that there is a sacred deliberatio is *per se* an argument that there is a final and correct *deliberatio* concerning a given textual problem, and that correct deliberatio is Divine. Second, this adds another meaning to the multiplicity of uses discovered so far, probably the primary meaning of a possible hierarchy.

The divine *deliberatio* is firstly accessible to the Apostles and then to all other sacerdots (called by Gerard *Hyeromistas* or *Divini Perfectores*) through mystical life. In Book IV there is an occurrence of *deliberatio* where the apostles are named by Gerard *piscatores quam litteratos* that have been filled with sacred vision ("*postquam Spiritus Sanctus eructavit in illis*") so that they depassed all the *deliberationem* of the mortal philosophers ("*omnem deliberationem mortalium philosophorum transcenderunt*").

Again, in Book V, we find that Origene was above all others in what concerns the *ingenium* and divine *deliberatio,* as the sunt would have shown into his virtue ("*omnes divinos superavit tractatores ingenio pollens omnique divina deliberatione ac si sol in virtute sua resplendens*"). Just to confirm this, in Book VI he will say that according to the philosophy of the Evangels, plebeians and peasants are

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[18] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies*, 20, 3, 1, in Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, Oliver Berghof, *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). From now on we shall be referring to the Etymologies in the text, giving only the annotations from this edition and abbreviated as *Etym*.

turned into rhetoricians ("*Talis siquidem evangelii philosophia est, ut plebeios et rusticos concite faciat oratores*"). The same passage says that Stephen the Deacon crushed all human persuasions with the Saint Spirit's *pistillo*, although he had not been educated in the mundane deliberation ("*mortalibus deliberativis*").

The works of God are impenetrable and protected by the Divine *voluntatum* and *permissionum,* therefore no man can autonomously comprehend them through a *deliberatione* (Book VIII: "*Thesauri Dei inaestimabilitas sive operum, sive voluntatum, sive permissionum, de quibus nemo humana deliberatione quid digne valet comprehendere*"). Ioannes Scotus Eriugena seems to be addressed in the following line: "*Ergo illi, qui mendacissimo stilo de divisione rerum superiorum scripserunt, falsi sunt divinas operationes vanissimis aestimationibus circumstantiantes*".

7. *Deliberatio* as correct decision.

Book II offers an interesting viewpoint. When commenting on the issue of the multiplicity of the Heavens, Gerard quotes from Isaia and says: "In Isaia vero legitur, quod *septem mulieres virum unum apprehende*rint *dicentes: Panem nostrum manducabimus, vestimentis nostris operiemur, tantummodo invocetur nomen tuum super nos. Septem, quas audistis, mulieres septem praedictas ecclesias indubitanter sume. Virum, quem audisti, unum illum delibera, de quo Spiritus Sanctus: Ecce vir – ait –, oriens nomen eius"*. It is possible that *delibera,* "decide, think, be sure", stands, in this context, for the most proper meaning, that of a *decision* regarding the significance of a text or symbol. In this case, the *deliberatio* is rather more than a commentary or an interpretation; it also implies making the correct decision regarding the meaning of a term or text, and that decision is only possible on the basis of *legitimate criteria*. This is in accordance with the previous contexts where Gerard stated the need for a mystical experience in order for one to be able to access the mysteries of the Scripture, but it is still consistent with the logical use of the term in the *Etymologies* of Isidore of Seville, whereby Gerard could have learned of the *deliberatio* as a logical consistent discourse named *epichereme.*

8. *Deliberatio* as *epichereme.*

Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies* is the main source for Gerard's information concerning Ancient wisdom, and it is essential to see that his discourse on rhetoric, dialectic, theory of virtues, physics and many others are borrowed from them. Gerard's quotations are so close to Isidore's text that it is reasonable to assume that the *Etymologies* had been under his eyes when composing the *Deliberatio.* Just a few examples will suffice.

In Book IV, when Gerard states that we must praise *(laudare)* pagan philosophers for their spirit *(ingenium)* and merit *(iure),* as every human person was gifted by God, the entire list of Greek philosophers is taken from Isidore's *Etymologies,* 2. Another example is the integral quotes Gerard borrows from the

Etymologies when he discusses logic. He quotes two different passages from Isidore: first, the *Etymologies* 2.23.1-2, when he asserts that Varro defined rhetoric and dialectic: "*et Varro, qui nobiles geminas disciplinas definiendo sic distinguere dignatus est dicens, quod altera ab altera in manu hominis pugnus adstrictus et palma distensa. Una verba contrahens, alia distendens. Una ad disserendum acutior, altera ad ea, quae nititur instruenda, facundior. Una ad coessentes, alia ad forenses procedit. Quarum una studiosos requirit rarissimos, altera facundissimos populous*", and then, a few lines below, he takes text from *Etymologies* 2.24.7 to illustrate that dialectic and rhetoric were added to Socrates' ethics: "*subiungens logicam, quae rationalis vocatur, per quam discursis rerum morumque causis uim earum rationabiliter perscrutatus dividens eam in supra praedictas geminas disciplinas, dialecticam utique et rhetoricam*". Thus, merits for logic are shared between Plato and Varro, whereas Thales and Socrates have priority in the natural sciences and ethics, as Gerard learned from the *Etymologies,* in passages that he neither comments or nor criticises but simply takes them for granted. There are numerous other passages like these two.

It is quite clear that Gerard used the *Etymologies* and we may assume that other important knowledge from it was also well known to him. For instance, it is peculiar to note that Isidore's definition of *deliberatio* was, in *Etymologies* (2.9.6;16-1)[19], a sort of *epichereme.* Here is what Isidore says:

"Inference (*ratiocinatio*) is a discourse by which what is in question is put to the test. 7. There are two types of inference. First is the *enthymeme* (*enthymema*), which is an incomplete syllogism, and used in rhetoric. The second is the *epichireme* (*epichirema*), a non-rhetorical, broader syllogism. (...) 16. ... *epichireme*, deriving from inference as broader and more developed than rhetorical syllogisms, distinct in breadth and in length of utterance from logical syllogisms, for which reason it is given to the rhetoricians. This consists of three types: the first, of three parts; the second, of four parts; the third, of five parts. 17. The three-part epichirematic syllogism consists of three members: the major premise (*propositio*), minor premise (*assumptio*), and conclusion (*conclusio*). The four-part type consists of four members: first the major premise, second the minor premise joined to the major premise or a minor premise, third the proof (*probatio*), and the conclusion. 18. The five-part type accordingly has five members: first the major premise, second its proof, third the minor premise, fourth its proof, fifth the conclusion. Cicero puts it thus in his art of rhetoric (*On Invention* 1.9): «If deliberation (*deliberatio*) and demonstration (*demonstratio*) are kinds of arguments (*causa*), they cannot rightly be considered parts of any one kind of argument – for the same thing can be a kind of one thing and part of another, but not a kind and a part of the same thing,» and so forth, up to the point where the constituents of this syllogism are concluded".

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[19] Stephen Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, Oliver Berghof, *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville*, 72.

If Gerardus had this in mind, than his book called *Deliberatio...* should have been planned as a non-rhetorical inferential discourse (*epichireme*), broader than the logical syllogism due to the fact that each proposition has a proof, therefore a syllogism with five parts. In this case, *Deliberatio* could mean, as in Cicero's definition borrowed by Isidore, an inference, consisting of five parts: major premise, proof, minor premise, proof, conclusion. Therefore, Gerard would most probably have tried to follow a Ciceronian structure in his *Deliberatio*, more precisely an intentional rhetorical structure ("*it is give to the rhetoricians*") of syllogistic composition with each premise tested or given a proof; the conclusion in its turn must have a proof apart from the syllogistic inference, which consist either in the abundant Biblical quotations or in philosophical illustrations such as the information taken from the *Etymlogies.*

GERARD OF CENAD ON THE SOTERIOLOGICAL VALUE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PRACTICE AND THE PLURALITY OF BIBLICAL INTERPRETATIONS
(THREE POSSIBLE REVISIONS OF THE CRITICAL EDITIONS)

ALEXANDER BAUMGARTEN[*]

Abstract The present paper aims at analysing the modern editions of Gerard of Cenad's work, *Deliberatio super hymnum trium puerorum,* from the perspective of some revisable passages whose palaeographic and doctrinal analysis could lead to their likely original meaning. These passages convey the author's opinion on the value of intellectual practice and on the rules for biblical hermeneutics and for the plurality of interpretations.
Keywords Gerard of Cenad, critical revision of the text, Dionysian influence, medieval writing topics

Gerard of Cenad, bishop of Morisena and founder of the Benedictine tradition in Banat and south Hungary, was an Italian monk whose work, *Deliberation on the hymn of the three youths* (between 1030, the year when he became bishop, and 1046, the year of his death[1]) conveys similar issues and a common vocabulary to other European Benedictine authors who were his contemporaries, like Petrus Damianus, Lanfrancus of Padova, or Anselm of Aosta. By commenting on Prophet Daniel's deuterocanonical allegorical episode of the three youths who burned in Nebuchadnezzar's furnace, Gerard discusses problems of biblical hermeneutics and allegorical cosmology, and evokes the dispute between dialecticians and anti-dialecticians.

He is concerned with the place occupied by lay disciplines in the spiritual development, but also with the tense relations between the Hungarian political

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[1] According to Gabriel Silagi in Gerardi Moresenae Aecclesiae seu Csanadiensis Episcopi *Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum*, ed. Gabriel Silagi (Turnhout: Brepols, 1978), (refered to as "ed. Silagi" in this article), VII.

power and the clergy. The subject itself seems to support the transmission of the Benedictine tradition, if we attribute it to a short commentary on the same biblical passage in Gregory the Great's *Dialogues.*[2]

It was a single manuscript that conveyed this valuable spiritual testimony to the 11th century Latin tradition; it is preserved as Clm6211 at Bayerische Staatsbibliothek and dates back to the second half of the 11th century.[3] Unfortunately, this is not the autograph. Two modern editions are based on this manuscript: Bishop Ignatius Batthyányi's from 1793[4] and Gabriel Silagi's 1978[5] edition printed in the prestigious '*Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis*', followed by a Hungarian translation.[6] I shall discuss some of the options of the two editors and I shall invoke palaeographic and hermeneutic arguments to suggest either a different punctuation for some fragments or changes in two readings which do not make sense in their edited version. To these I shall add a series of commentaries on the meaning of Gerard' text.

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The first example that only, but importantly, refers to a reconsideration of the punctuation can be found in the Prologue. Here we see an incredibly subtle construction, whose structure is in close analogy to the prologues of all eight books and forms each time a complex syllogism about the anagogical hortation. Here is the text in the common version of the two editors:

> *Erigendum in optimis ex consuetudine contemplationibus et admodum duris incitationibus circa virium robor, licet nodosum, ad quod conandum, per quod incedendum, amplectendum minime vero, quantum pectoratim reor, quemadmodum potentes in theoricis aiunt: nec vero declinandum, quamlibet circulosum. Sudor enim in hoc omni sopore suavior aestimandus, praesertim cum divinus processus cuncta confidat ad optimum respicentia perficere. Fateor vero me quemquam in hoc, quod examinandum postulasti, minime admissise. Ideo difficillimum sumas, quod ex continuo usu leviter*

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[2] Gregory the Great, *Dialogues*, III, 18 (cf. Sancti Gregorii Papae Dialogorum libri IV, de vita et miraculis patrum italicorum et de aeternitate animarum, in *Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina*, vol. 77, ed. J. Migne, (Paris, 1849), coll. 150–430).

[3] From here on referred to as ms. M.

[4] Ignatius Batthyani, *Sancti Gerardi Episcopi Chanadiensis Scripta et acta hactenus inedita, cum serie episcoporum Chanasiendium, opera et studio Ignatii comitis de Batthyan, episcopi Transilvaniae* (Albo-Carolinae [Alba Iulia], Typis Episcopalis, 1790), referred to as "ed. Batthyáni".

[5] Cf. *supra*, footnote 1.

[6] *Elmélkedés. Gellért, A Marosi Egyház püspöke a háromfiú himnuszáról*, ed. and trans. Béla Karácsonyi and László Szegfű (Szeged: Scriptum, 1999).

sonat, et paene ab omnibus intactum dimissum, quia assiduum, unde totum laboriosissimum. Deus autem meus, in cuius praeconio elementa omnia provocantur, quique angelum suum descendere fecit cum Anania et sociis eius in fornace ad ostendendam potentiam suae deitatis et magnitudinem, adiuvet sic me tuae postulationi satisfacere, quo inimicorum laqueos possim evadere et tibi plenissime ad libitum obviare[7].

These first lines of the prologue draw, in my opinion, a courageous juxtaposition between the common literary archetypes of the frequently practiced authorial evasion in medieval literature[8] and the vocabulary of the spiritual anagogy. The result of this overlap, as we shall see, is the choice of exploiting the spiritual ascent of the intellectual work to interpret Prophet Daniel's passage. The grammar of the text is more difficult than the rest of book 1 and renders the elegance of an *exordium* that contains two levels whose juxtaposition takes the form of a syllogism. The first level that talks about the spiritual ascent (*erigendum…perficere*) is not introduced by any particle indicative of a logical relation. This is the reason why we consider this to be the author's assumption. In relation to the next ones, this first level could be understood as the major premise. The second one that corresponds to the *fateor…admissise* sequence contains an authorial evasion, and the adversative particle *vero* indicates its value as a minor premise of the reasoning. The entire next sequence (*ideo…obviare*) has the function of a conclusion introduced by the conclusive particle *ideo* and which explains why the necessity of the ascent and the problem of the authorial evasion complete each other and explain the *ratio operis*.

The spiritual ascent Gerard is talking about contains four important elements.

The first element refers to the imperative need of the ascent that is given by the passive periphrastic conjugation of the verbs *erigendum* ('we have to ascend'), *conandum* ('we have to try'), *incedendum* ('we have to advance'). The ascent is conditioned by the descending incitations (*incitationibus*), following the rules of mystical ascent that are common in the history of the religious experience in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages.[9]

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[7] Gerard, *Deliberatio*, Prol., ed. Batthyáni, 1–2, ed. Szilagi, p.1, l. 1–21, mss.M, f. 1r.

[8] For example, Gregory the Great, *Dialogues*, III, 38, ed. cit. coll. 316.

[9] A well-known example of the situation in which the access to the divine is conditioned by the divine itself, despite the illusion of the contrary, is found in Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite, *On the divine names,* III, 1, about the boat that is getting closer or further away from the shore, even though the illusion of the shore that is getting closer or further away from the boat is possible. Cf. Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite, *De divinis nominibus,* ed. P. Chevallier, *Dyonisiaca*, *Recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage*, I (Paris–Bruges, 1937), 122. For a similar use of *erigenda,* see Fredegisus of Tours, *De nihilo et tenebris,* I, 3.

The second element describes the starting point that hints to an original state of negligence, routine, habit, and unapprised tolerance for the possibility of spiritual ascent equivalent to a state of original inauthenticity. This second element results from the conjunction of two meanings of terms that appear throughout the given fragment and which explain each other. Thus, the ablative *ex consuetudine* is opposed to the verb *erigendum* which shows the abandoned starting point in the ascent: habit. This 'habit' receives the form of 'inducing sleep' (*sopore*) that is opposed to the 'sweat' during the ascent; if both 'sleep' and 'sweat' contain, in Gerard' opinion, sweetness (*suavitas*), then the original sweat-habit bears the appearance of a stable and desirable state, whence the need of pulling away from the ascent is not necessarily an evidence. In the conclusion, Gerard talks about the passage from the Prophet Daniel as being "familiar due to repeated use" and whose meaning evades us *quia assiduum.* It is clear that the meaning of *assiduum* must be established in relation with the previous expression (*ex continuo usu, leviter sonat*); our explanation for these words is that the hymn, whose interpretation will begin after the prologue, is ritually intonated by the monks whom Gerard addresses. Thus, *continuo usu* can represent the intonation in the Gregorian chants with poor differentiated tonalities, which explains the literal meaning of the verb *sonat* and establishes the meaning of the adjective *assiduum*: monotonous. We can understand from these partial synonymies that the starting point of the ascent is an inauthentic original position given by the habit which omits the essential and which applies to the intonation of a text interpreted by a musical theory that explains this position. We can draw a possible parallel between the act of ascending and the act of interpreting, because both support the repudiation of the same *consuetudo/assiduitas.*

The third element of the first sequence is illustrated by the accent on the difficulty of the path that surpasses the human powers, which cannot be completed, and which makes the refusal easy to understand. Therefore, the divine hortations are harsh (*duris*) compared to the power of our faculties, the periphrastic conjugation *erigendum* opposes the concession *licet nodosum* ('even though it's toilsome'). One cannot complete this path since it doesn't end in the definitive achievement of the object (*amplectendum minime vero*), which reminds us of the spiritual ascent of Anselm in *Proslogion* where, during the ascent, the one who embraces experiments his transformation into the "embraced"[10]. From the perspective of our interpretation, the sequence *quemadmodum potentes in theoricis aiunt* is interesting for its punctuation. Both modern editors of Gerard added a colon at the end, as if the following sentence can be attributed to the ones that have power in the objects to be contemplated: *nec vero declinandum, quamlibet*

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[10] Anselmus Cantuariensis, *Proslogion*, in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi* Opera omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1946), cap. 19, p. 115: "*nihil te continet, sed tu contines omnia*".

circulosum. But none of the editors mentions the source of this passage[11]. It is very probable that this source did not even exist, and the punctuation was defective. A simple full stop after *aiunt* shapes a simpler and more coherent sense and makes the entire sequence refer to the previous words, *i.e.* those who are competent in the spiritual problems would thus be cited by Gerard for the necessity of the ascent which is sinuous, but must not be refused, using the adversative particle *vero.* The scribe actually copied the full stop.

The fourth element of this first sequence is the natural refuse to follow this ascent. In the first sentence of his treatise, Gerard recommends an ascent for which he can already foresee the refusal, which he rejects before being formulated: *nec vero declinandum.* But we find another refusal (*minime admissise*) in the next sequence (the minor) that is reduced at the traps of the enemies (*inimiquorum laqueos*). In his commentaries, Silagi takes this passage as a *modestiae topos, haud facile intelligibilis.*[12] A more profound meaning of this passage could be possible. If we suggested a link between the ascent and the act of interpretation, we can continue the analogy and suggest a link between the two refusals. At the end of our analysis, it could reveal the way in which the spiritual ascent transmitted by the tradition becomes, in Gerard's reasoning, an effort of the literary composition.

If the first sequence was a major premise from the authoritative tradition (*potentes…aiunt*), the second one remarks upon the circumstances of the literary composition and is abruptly put: Gerard confesses he had initially refused the intellectual effort necessary to redact this treatise, which was requested by the one to whom he eventually dedicated it (the magister in the liberal arts, Isingrim). This second sequence is the minor premise and restates the naturality of the refusal from the sequence of the ascent in the plan of the literary composition. Regardless of the truth in recounting the fact, the literary historian can identify here a common model of medieval literature that probably comes from Quintilian, *De institutione oratoria,* and which had been reused in different ways in different centuries.[13] The elements of this scenario belong to a subtle transfer of auctorial responsibility towards those who requested the work and to a competence associated with the preliminary refusal to write the treatise.

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[11] Szilagi adds a comma after *aiunt,* but the Hungarian translator repeats Batthyani's colon, as if an authoritative citation follows.

[12] Szilagi, p. 1, note to 1. 11–13.

[13] Cf. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, with an English translation by H. E. Butler, coll. Loeb (London: Harvard UP, 1920, I, 1), 4: "*Post impetratam studiis meis quietem, quae per viginti annos erudiendis iuvenibus inpenderam, cum a me quidam familiariter postulaverunt, ut aliquid de ratione dicendi componerem, diu sum equidem reluctatus.*"

Because Quintilian's text was a handbook of rhetoric very well-known throughout the Middle Ages, the scenario of the auctorial evasion could have been preserved and used as a model for a large number of texts that repeated it. We can identify it in Augustine, *De trinitate,* III, 1, where many ask him to write; also, we find it in Gregory the Great's *Dialogues*, where the central idea is not about an act of writing, but Benedict's approval to become an abbot[14]. However, this repetition is not a stereotype, but it is rather exploited for a meditation and spiritual strategy ground to convert the mind to God and a ground for Anselm's ontological argument in the 11th century: *Monologion* repeats the scenario where the abbot Anselm talks to the monks of Bec Abbey who ask for an exposition of the divine essence.[15] However, in *Proslogion*, the same elements become the components of an interior scenario where Anselm requests the text, Anselm refuses it, and Anselm concludes that the work will be done explicitly based on the refusal and the auctorial evasion that allows the divine nature to intervene in assuming the responsibility for the argument of his own existence. The examples can be found even after the 11th century. This situation will show up in some medieval philosophical works that begin with a confession about the relation between the text and the author; for example, Peter Lombard's *Sentences* start exactly with the implicit citation from Augustine,[16] which indicates a new level in the history of this figure of speech that now no longer recounts something real, but rather underlines its nature as a *topos* that corresponds to a medieval way of understanding authorship.

Gerard' place in this *topos* is very specific: we saw that many authors use it implicitly (Quintilian, Augustine, Gregory), one uses it as a literary *topos* (Peter Lombard, who takes it from Augustine), while Anselm and Gerard add to its meaning the capacity to communicate a theoretical content of their texts. After writing *Monologion,* Anselm reuses this literary *topos* by re-dimensioning it at the beginning of his *Proslogion*, where the refusal does not address external requests anymore, but his own auctorial intention; his refusal proves to be the momentum of the composition and of the discovery of the ontological argument[17]. Gerard also decides to use the literary taxis for the content, but in another way that seems to mark the

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[14] Gregory the Great, *Dialogues*, II, 3: *"Non autem longe monasterium fuit, cuius congregationis pater defunctus est, omnisque ex illo congregatio ad eundem venerabilem Benedictum venit, et magnis precibus, ut eis praeesse deberet, petiit. Qui diu negando distulit, suis illorumque fratrum moribus se convenire non posse praedixit, sed victus quandoque precibus ad sensum dedit."*

[15] Cf. Anselmus Cantuariensis, *Monologion*, in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi* Opera omnia I, 7.

[16] Augustine, *De trinitate*, III, 1: "*non valentes studiosorum fratrum votis iure resistere, eorum in Christo laudabilibus studiis lingua ac stylo nos servire flagitantium: quas bigas in nobis agitat Christi caritas*" (Augustinus Hipponensis, *De trinitate libri XV*, ed. J. W. Mountain and F. Glorie (CC SL), [Turnhout, 1968], 127).

[17] Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, 89–90.

originality of his position: he adds the elements through which he describes the ascent (where the element of refusal plays a central role), thus interpreting the spiritual ascent told in Dionysian terms in order to exploit the status of his literary composition.

Therefore, we have arrived at what we indicated to be the last sequence and which is the conclusion introduced by *ideo*: the hymn of the three youths deserves an analysis because the intellectual effort put into the redaction of a commentary can have the soteriological values of a spiritual ascent. The elements of the ascent are once again found in the conclusion: the divine hortations are here the descent into the furnace together with Anania (*descendere cum Anania*), and the divine help throughout the ascent is here the support in writing the text (*adiuvet sic me tuae postulation satisfacere*). The conclusion is simple: if the terms of anagogy and those of the effort put into the literary composition are analogous, then their functions are assimilable and the redaction of Gerard' *Deliberation…* is taken by the author to be a spiritual ascent. The existence of a soteriological value of the literary culture, complementary to the spiritual contemplation, is evident in this way of thinking. Considering my commentary on the passage, here is a possible translation for it:

> We must rise from routine to the best of things through contemplations and through the <aforementioned> incitations, which are very harsh compared to the power of <our> faculties, even though<the end> to which we must struggle <and the path> we must advance on are toilsome, but which we will not grasp enough, as far as I can reckon from my heart, as those who have power regarding the things that can be contemplated say. But <this ascent> must not be refused either, even though it's sinuous, because the sweat <throughout this road> must be deemed sweeter than any slumber, especially when the divine procession strengthens our faith that we will accomplish all our aspirations towards <He who is> the greatest good. But I confess I barely agreed to the fact that you asked to examine <this text>. For this reason, accept that what sounds familiar is very difficult due to the often use and was left untouched by almost all because of the monotony, requiring thus much toil. But my God, in whose praise all elements are summoned, who made his angel descend with Anania and his companions in the furnace, to show the power and the greatness of his divinity, will help me fulfil your request so I can evade the enemies' traps and fully carry out your wish.

<p align="center">*</p>

The second example is found in the fifth book of Gerard's work where the author, after having discussed a number of possible interpretations of the nature of Christ

related to the issue of light, stops at the analogy between Christ and the sun. Despite all these, Gerard's hermeneutics admits that one signifier can have several significations among the Scriptural realities. Actually, his entire work is a long exercise to identify many signified things in the Scripture that hint at the same signifier or many possible signifiers that hint at the same signified thing. Gerard suggests here a link between the sun and the apostolic predication:

> *Ergo sol apostolica praedicatio, ut in alio opere demonstratum reliqui, tropologice admittenda per totum mundum specialius eminens et singulariter cuncta transcendens, a quo totus mundus illuminatus est. Sine sole quippe mundus caecus permanet. Sic nimirum nisi praedicatio apostolorum mundum irradiaret, in caecitate ignorantiae perseveraret[18].*

As it can be easily seen, the first sentence that establishes the signification link (*sol - praedicatio*), is interrupted by an incidental comparative structure that points to another work (considered today to be lost, unfortunately: *ut - reliqui*), and then continues with the predicate *admittenda <est>*, with the adverbial specification *tropologice.* Therefore, the correspondence of signification between the sun and the predication is acceptable in a moral reading of the Bible. The main sentence ends with two *participia coniuncta* that can be bi-functionally interpreted: in a relative sense and in a causal sense. The latter is preferable because it explains why the correspondence of signification is acceptable, *i.e.* because the signifier is *eminens* and *transcendens.* But what is this signifier? If we follow these participles, we cannot determine that because their gender is impossible to decide. If we follow the feminine periphrastic conjugation *admittenda*, we can identify the only possible feminine subject of the phrase: *praedicatio.* Despite these aspects, the phrase ends with a relative clause introduced by the masculine *a quo* that can only refer to *sol.* We are thus faced with a dilemma on which the understanding of Gerard's hermeneutic rule depends, so the text must without a doubt be emended: either the feminine *admittenda*, either the masculine *a quo*, since the two participles must refer both to the sun and to the predication, because otherwise the comparison would be useless. The two following phrases refer to *sol* (the first one), and to *praedicatio* (the second one), and repeat their common functions of irradiation (of light*vs.* of knowledge) over the world. The only word that can eliminate the ambiguity is *quippe.* It ascertains a fact ('indeed'), which means that Gerard's process has a starting point in an assertion (the sun illuminates the world) and decides to attribute the characteristics of this illumination to the apostolic predication. Therefore, the features of the predications are based on those belonging to the sun and not vice versa, which means the words *a quo* are correct, but *admittenda* must be emended into *admittendus.*

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[18] Gerard, *Deliberatio*, V, ed. Batthyáni, 113–114, ed. Szilagi, 61, l. 198, mss.M, f. 56r.

It is possible that the error belongs to the scribe due to the gender of *praedicatio*. The scribe wrote *admittenda* indeed, but the meaning was clear to who wrote the words *sol comparator praedicatoribus* in a 14th century hand.

As a consequence, *praedicatio* remains a supplementary predicative element for *admittendus*, and a correct translation could be:

> Therefore, the sun must be admitted tropologically to be the apostolic predication, as we showed elsewhere, because it shines in a more special way over the entire world, it is eminent, and transcends everything by itself, because the entire world was illuminated through it. Indeed, without the sun the entire world would remain blind. So, if the apostles' predication hadn't spread its ray over the world, it would have persevered in ignorance's blindness.

Such a textual emendation is not marginal, but refers to Gerard's main theory of hermeneutics, which is founded on induction: observing evident characteristics of some objects that are available to experience provides the analogy with different concepts of Scripture, so the plurality of interpretations comes from the possibility to recognise an identical and noticeable feature in experience, in many passages that are seemingly unconnected inside the sacred text.

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The third example we chose from book 6 discusses the passage from the book of Judges, 6, 37-38 about Gideon's divination: he asks God about his political destiny as a ruler of the Jews by laying a sheep's wool on the ground during the night and interpreting the divine answer according to the dew that may or may not form between the wool and the ground. After a long interpretation of this passage through his usual inductive method of enumerating the natural and evident traits of the objects, Gerard detects a piling-up of meanings that could be contradictory, because identical signifiers lead to contrary signified things, or vice versa, contrary signifiers lead to identical signified things. There hermeneutic remarks are very frequent throughout Gerard' *Deliberation…* and could be interpreted to assume the author's meditation on the limits of hermeneutics applicable to Scripture. Such a

meditation could be illustrated by the next phrase, but only if our minimal emendation is admitted:

Nimirum devenimus ad aram Gedeonis antea inspicientes sacramentum velleris et roris atque ex confluentibus infinita nimisque typorum nubibus involuta ultra virium magnitudine in omnia transcendentes, licet mediocres ingenio, licet imperiti sermone et scientia non magni[19].

The sentence contains a main clause (*nimirum…transcendentes*) and two final concessions (both introduced by *licet*) whose value – rhetorical or in itself – might depend on the meaning of the main sentence. These concessions are announced by the words *ultra virium magnitudine.* The verb expresses a transition (we call it T1) with a concise arriving point (*devenimus ad…*). This transition can be understood as a hermeneutic exercise to identify signifiers for the elements in the aforementioned passage. But the starting point for T1 is indicated by two plural nominative participles accorded with the assumed subject that refers to the author: *inspicientes* and *transcendentes*, linked by *atque.* Therefore, T1 must be understood in two ways: as a transition from searching the sacrament of the wool and dew (*sacramentum velleris et roris*), but also a transition from the event signified by the participle *transcendentes.* It is here that the first complication arises, because this last participle also expresses a new transition (T2). T2's arriving point is clear: *ad omnia* (even though the absence of its regent makes it unclear as to the 'all' the author refers to), while the starting point should be given in the expression *ex confluentibus*. But this last participle should have a regent and a subordinate (an accusative of direction for the verb *confluere*) to clarify it. This regent does not exist, and everything we can use is the words: *infinita nimisque typorum nubibus involuta.* It is clear that the enclitic conjunction *–que* unites the words *nimis – involuta* (rightfully shrouded by the clouds of the symbols). There is one word left, *infinita,* which must now subordinate to and clarify *ex confluentibus*, but, at the same time, it must be linked with *involuta*, due to the enclitic *–que*. The scribe and both editors write this word accordingly:

Our suggestion, discrete as to the emendation, is to split the word into *in finita.* Thus, the expression *ex confluentibus* will receive a subordinate (those that are gathered in a finite <number of meanings>), and the plural neutral noun *finita* explains *omnia* by offering a sufficient reason why *omnia* doesn't have a regent. If our suggestion is acceptable, then we might understand what T2 refers to: a

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[19] Gerard, *Deliberatio*, VII, ed. Batthyáni, 226, ed. Szilagi, 132, l. 954, mss.M, f. 123r.

transition from a finite number of meanings given to the same text to an infinite number of possible meanings, and thus to the total hermeneutics of the biblical text. Therefore, based on this emendation, we can understand the relation between T1 and T2. The first one determined an inductive procedure: the *inspectio* of the sacred meanings of two natural objects (the wool and the dew) led to the analysis of the meanings of Gideon's altar. The second one determined a formal aspect of the same procedure: from a finite number of meanings given to the wool and dew, these meanings became a whole (*ad omnia*), confusing the author and implicitly provoking a question on the limits of this plural hermeneutics of the sacred text.

The source for the scribe's error can be easily indicated: the symmetry between the ablatives *confluentibus* and *nubibus* (which must not be correlated) and the formal symmetry between *infinita* and *involuta*, which must not be read in a similar way.

In light of this emendation, Gerard's phrase determines an arrival point for his hermeneutics destined to the stupefaction due to the multiple (maybe even infinite, if we read *omnia* as an antonym for *finita*) meanings that are now attributed to the same passage. If so, the two concessions at the end of the phrase cease to be a simple proof of humility from the author and they receive an evident rhetorical connotation, since Gerard takes the responsibility for such an extensive hermeneutics. A possible translation of the passage would be:

> We have arrived without doubt at Gideon's altar after searching the sacrament of the wool and dew, and after we passed from those that are gathered in a finite number <of meanings> and <are> rightfully shrouded by the clouds of the symbols, to all <meanings>, beyond the measure of <our> powers, even though out talent is mediocre, even though we are not skilled in discourse and don't possess a great science.

These three fragments could suggest the fact that we are dealing with one of the 14th century authors that profoundly interrogate the soteriological value of the exercise that has an object in the hermeneutics of the sacred text (in the first example), and is concerned with the method (in the second example), and especially with the limits (in the last example) attributed to this exercise.

Language as a Unifying Element in John of Salisbury's Philosophical Treatises

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Abstract John of Salisbury's main political treatises, the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus* were not only published together, but also contain structural and thematic links, which suggest the author's intention of having the two works treated as a whole. The present article is targeted at highlighting the connections between the two texts, especially Salisbury's vision on language, seen as metatopic of both treatises. For this purpose, Christophe Grellard and Frederique Lachaud's *Companion to John of Salisbury* serves as the main critical source of bibliography.
Keywords John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, *Policraticus*, language, 12th century

Structural Connections Between the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus*

When confronting a text, be it a scientific or philosophical one, the post-modern reader may manifest a number of tendencies: to consider only the content of the text (a reminiscence of Russian Structuralism), to investigate the historical context in which it was written and the personal history of the author (perhaps even in a Freudian or Jungian manner), to resort to the internet or to other pieces of writing indicated by references, in order to gain a more in-depth knowledge of the subject matter. Regardless of the reader's tactic, he/she will always bear in mind a potential randomness of the para-textual elements (i.e. the cover, the font, the division into chapters, the insertion of other pieces of text within the same volume), as these are in most cases chosen by the publisher(s) or by the publishing house. However, that is not the case when studying a 12th-century treatise, whose author is also the editor. In this situation, the text is set up with the view that everything has a purpose, including its layout, just like in the medieval concept, God does not leave anything without a purpose.

John of Salisbury's work makes no exception. His main political oeuvre, the *Policraticus* was published in 1159, together with the *Metalogicon*[1], a defence of the

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liberal arts, as part of the same volume. Each of the two treatises is in its turn split in two parts. The first three books of the *Policraticus* focus on the frivolities of the courtiers, and the other five develop John's structure of the ideal state.

> Indeed, some structure is evident in that the first three books concentrate on *nugae curialium*, the central ones on the art of right government, and the last two treat of *uestigiis philosophorum*.[2]

The *Metalogicon* concentrates on medieval grammar in its first book, and on logic in the remaining three. In spite of the apparent dissimilarity in the structure of the two treatises, when analysed more in depth, they are incredibly mirrored. The first part of both treatises contains a critique, in the *Metalogicon* it is the critique of those who disregard the liberal arts, and in the *Policraticus* it is a critique of the courtiers. Counting the number of the books, the first part of the *Metalogicon* comprises 25% of the whole treatise, while the second part makes up to 75%. Applying the same method to the *Policraticus*, the first part contains 37.5%, while the second part contains 62.5%. At first glance, the numbers are quite different, but if one splits the percentages correspondent to each book in half for the *Metalogicon* and compares them to the percentages per each book for the *Policraticus*, the following proportion emerges:

Metalogicon

$2 \times 12.5\% = 1^{st}$ part $\qquad\qquad 6 \times 12.5\% = 2^{nd}$ part

Policraticus

$3 \times 12.5\% = 1^{st}$ part $\qquad\qquad 5 \times 12.5\% = 2^{nd}$ part

Looking at the numbers in this format, the proportions show that the *Policraticus* is one section longer than the *Metalogicon* in the first part and one section shorter in the second part, respecting the same ratio. In addition, the *Policraticus* is one book longer than the *Metalogicon* per each section. Such an exact growth from one treatise to the other can hardly be considered random.

The connection between the two parts of the *Metalogicon*, the first book focused on grammar and the other three focused on logic, is more obviously identified as being the language. While grammar gives access to logic by teaching how to read and write, but also by providing access to ancient treatises of logic, logic is in itself a study of the values of words within the sentence and within the text.

By contrast, the relation between the two parts of the *Policraticus* is not so evident. However, if analysed more closely, one can see that the two parts actually represent contrasting models of society. The first three books comprise the frivolities

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[1] See Cary J. Nederman, Introduction to *Policraticus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007/1990), xvii–xviii.

[2] Roland E. Pepin, "John of Salisbury as a Writer", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury*, eds. Christophe Grellard and Frederique Lachaud (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 161.

of the courtiers, representing the negative model of society, while the other five books contain John's model of an ideal society.

The structural duality does not stop at the level of the topics treated. The dedicatees of the *Policraticus* and the *Metalogicon* can also be categorised as twofold.

> Although John's major works were composed for Chancellor Thomas Becket, they were surely intended to circulate more widely. John himself identified some recipients: Peter of Celle received a copy of the *Policraticus*, as did Brito, a monk of Christ Church, Canterbury, who was an object of John's good natured jibing in the *Entheticus maior*: "You will find Brito happy, if there is cheese around!" Brito and a fellow-monk, Odo, who would one day become Abbot of Battle, are specifically mentioned as readers of the *Entheticus* when John advises in his book: "Let these men be your companions; disclose all to them." In fact, Odo and Brito are the only two names of actual contemporaries that occur in the poem, and significantly, both are hailed for their love of books. For John, such men were kindred spirits; they and the learned clerks in the household of Archbishop Theobald became his audience, an elite group of friends who would recognise his many allusions and unidentified quotations.[3]

At the time of the completion of the *Policraticus*, Thomas Becket was the second major political figure in the state, after the king, whose friend and adviser he was. Dedicating and providing the manuscript to Becket was John's way of trying to facilitate his work's access to King Henry II himself. John had high hopes that the young king would read his work and, as a result, the ideal reign that he had envisaged in the *Policraticus* would be brought closer to reality. The other recipients of the treatises were clerics, not to mention that Becket himself had emerged from the clergy. This way, John of Salisbury manages to bring together two factions of the public life, the clergy and the court, which were involved in a fight over influence at that time.

However, these apparently conflicting elements are not put together just for the sake of creating an antithesis, they are in fact unified through John's view upon the world.

Content Connections Between the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus*
Despite the relatively fugitive mentions of some common elements, the *Policraticus* and the *Metalogicon* have until now been treated separately. A clear flow from one to the other has not been demonstrated so far. It is this particular unexplored characteristic that will be approached in the present paper.

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[3] Ibid, 148.

Firstly, the *Policraticus* and the *Metalogicon* share not only the dedicatee and the target readers, but also the constant use of ancient sources. Both works abound with ancient textual references, a typical trait for John of Salisbury's writings, an issue that has led critics to consider him a "Christian humanist":

> The earliest studies that so defined John founded their judgement on his admiration for classical antiquity and his vast knowledge of Roman authors: what is variously called Latin, literary or scholastic humanism. But since John embraced the fusion of classical Latin literature and Christianity, and demonstrated his devotion to the traditions and texts of both, he is usually cited as a "Christian humanist." To be sure, "humanism" is a term that lends itself to complex definition and interpretation, as insightful studies have illustrated, but none would seem to exclude John from the ranks of its proponents. On the contrary, he "embodied the new humanism that came to permeate 12th-century thought," and he "has come to be known as the most eminent of the humanists."
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> As a writer, John consistently reveals his theoretical and practical devotion to humanism. He rarely misses an opportunity to impart moral principles and good counsel for righteous behavior, and these are usually bolstered by citation of authoritative sources.[4]

Intertextuality is not limited to classical and Christian references in Salisbury's works, but it also works between his texts. While in *Metalogicon* John describes a series of stylistic devices, he actively employs them in the *Entheticus Minor*, which appears as an introductory poem to the *Policraticus*.

> In matters of style and technicality, John was well acquainted with classical prosody, and he imitated the ancient satirists in his use of hexameters and pentameters, executing these flawlessly in his own poetry. His mastery of technical skills and his reliance on numerous poetic devices further attest to his wide reading and assimilation of the classical Latin poets. Like them, John adorned his verses with alliteration, assonance and repetition.[5]

John did not use these stylistic devices to merely imitate the ancients; he genuinely understood their role and the manner in which they deferred from the other contexts of speech, as can be observed from Chapter 17 of the first book of the *Metalogicon*.

Moreover, the *Policraticus* and the *Metalogicon* also share the same typology of antagonist, whom John generically names Cornificius. There has not yet

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[4] Ibid*,* 174.
[5] Ibid, 153.

been sufficient evidence to identify Cornificius with any particular contemporary of John's. He is the image of the epicurean, who disregards the liberal arts and seeks personal advantage once he has become a courtier.

> The contribution by Constant Mews and Cédric Giraud ("John of Salisbury and the Schools of the 12th Century") shows that against the figure of "Cornificius" John develops the ideal of an education that hones the critical judgement of each individual through the practice of liberal arts. […] It remains difficult, however, to explain why John needed to criticize "Cornificius" at a stage in his life where he did not belong to scholastic circles anymore. The repeated allusions to his adversaries' attacks may pertain to literary fiction; but there is no doubt that what John criticizes here is the distortion of Epicurus's thought, in particular among curial clerics, and the incitement to seek an immediate return on investment in studies. This criticism – which is the precise opposite of his praise of the liberal arts – is the intellectual equivalent of the dichotomy between the vanities of the court and the exemplarity of philosophers. At a time when John saw arriving at court an increasing number of clerics fresh from their studies in law and logic, his purpose was to denounce the intellectual foundations of the spontaneous epicureanism of the curiales, and to remind those keen to take part in public life of the necessity of practising the liberal arts.[6]

An almost chronological evolution can be traced from the *Metalogicon* to the *Policraticus*. While the focus of the treatise in the former is schooling, , in the latter it is the result of schooling . This result has direct qualitative consequences that can be visibly traced in Cornificius. In *Metalogicon* he is depicted in his school years as desirous of listening to hollow masters, who disregard the importance of the liberal arts, especially of grammar, a proto-science of the time, which was necessary to be thoroughly learnt in order to access the other possible branches of study. Even from this point, somewhere in his youth, Cornificius is described by John as an epicurean, and therefore as an ignorant and, at the same time, as an enemy of truth and of true value. In John's view, this does not stop Cornificius from gaining a place at the royal court, where his formerly described traits are not only maintained, but they are brought to a new level, which can cause harm to the state.

> This denunciation of study for the sake of money making and its adherents recalls, as proved by John's career itself, that frequenting the schools and acquiring educational skills facilitate social mobility. During the course of

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[6] Christophe Grellard and Frederique Lachaud, "Introduction", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury*, 17–18.

the 12th century, possibilities multiplied for pursuing a career in courts and bureaucracies, both lay and ecclesiastical. Contemporaries often observed this, generally to deplore the practice. Criticism of money-making skills, like law and medicine, became a common topos of moralizing preachers, as it was for John of Salisbury.[7]

Cornificius represents the courtier par excellence, as John of Salisbury portrays him in the first three books of the *Policraticus*.

This type of character evolution is not only a temporal succession, but a portrayal of the cause-effect relation. For this reason, the *Entheticus maior*, which is an anticipation of the *Policraticus*, starts with a defence of the liberal arts.

It begins with a broad defense of the traditional curriculum, and specifically the place of logic in it, against educational innovators who denigrate the liberal arts and disparage wide reading of the classical *auctores* in favor of a facile, utilitarian course based on "natural eloquence." John has their brash spokesman declare that "natural ability is the source of all [eloquence]" (*sit ab ingenio totum*), so there is no need for books and study, which are hindrances (*libri impediunt*), a form of torture (*tormenti genus est saepe uidere librum*). His advice: just be garrulous; away with writings! (*esto uerbosus, scripta repelle procul!*). In the *Metalogicon*, John would devote several Chapters (1. 6–8) to a refutation of the claim that "[p]recepts of eloquence are superfluous, since eloquence is present or absent in one by nature." (*Superflua sunt praecepta eloquentiae, quoniam ea naturaliter adest, aut abest*).[8]

In John of Salisbury's view, the epicurean who disregards the liberal arts in his youth is bound to become a frivolous courtier.

This way, the author underlines the essential role of the study of medieval grammar as part of the liberal arts. In the Middle Ages *grammatica* was the first of the liberal arts to be studied, as it formed the basic knowledge and skills necessary to approach the other subjects of the medieval curriculum, as John states in the *Metalogicon*: "grammar does not busy itself around only one subject, but with all of those which can be taught through words, so as to make the mind ready for

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[7] Cedric Giraud and Constant Mews, "John of Salisbury and the Schools of the 12th Century", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury,* 48–49.
[8] Roland E. Pepin, "John of Salisbury as a Writer", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury,* 151–152.

understanding".[9] Grammar encompassed a wide range of skills, from learning to read and write to the study of rhetoric, and even a kind of proto-linguistics.

Language as a Gate to Metaphysics and Politics

The role of *grammatica* as the basis of the other subjects also included a spiritual dimension, as grammar was the study of language, of the word, and Christianity was a religion of the book and of the word. This heavily relied upon the gospel of John:

> In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.
> He was in the beginning with God.
> All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being. What has come into being
> In him was life, and the life was the light of all people. […]
> And the Word became flesh and lived among us, and we have seen his glory, the glory as of a father's only son, full of grace and truth.[10]

Knowledge of grammar made access to metaphysics possible, enabling the believer to read the Scripture, to participate in the mass and rites through meditation and prayer.

It is this exact trait of language that John considered significant, and which unifies the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus* within the same train of thought. Language made the connection between man and God, by giving man access to the word of God, and therefore by making him better. To this John adds the access that grammar gives the medieval courtier to the teachings of the ancients, particularly to philosophical works, which instructed one even more in the course of virtue.

> By connecting the study of grammar to the description of the four tasks that lead to both philosophy and virtue, John presents this discipline as the foundation of a true art of living, which develops into ethics. Inasmuch as the first three tasks (reading, teaching, meditation) create the knowledge that allows for right conduct, grammar, the basis of reading and of communication, acts in cooperation with prevenient grace. In this way, John restores grammar to the Christian economy of learning and re-establishes for the society of his own day the Ciceronian ideal of the *homo bonus*.[11]

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[9] John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, ed. J. A. Giles (London: Oxonii, 1848), 52, "*non circa unum grammaticam occupari; sed ad omnia, quae verbo doceri possunt, ut eorum capax sit, animum praeformare*".

[10] John 1:1–4, 1:14.

[11] Cedric Giraud and Constant Mews, "John of Salisbury and the Schools of the 12th Century", 52.

The benefit of language does not stop at the vertical relationship between man and God, but it necessarily applies to the relation between men, that is to society, to the *civitas*, as this relation is the one by which God assesses man at the end of the world:

> Then the king will say to those at his right hand, 'Come, you that are blessed by my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world;
>
> for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me,
>
> I was naked and you gave me clothing, I was sick and you took care of me, I was in prison and you visited me.'
>
> Then the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry and gave you food, or thirsty and gave you something to drink?
>
> And when was it that we saw you a stranger and welcomed you, or naked and gave you clothing?
>
> And when was it that we saw you sick or in prison and visited you?'
>
> And the king will answer them, 'Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me.'[12]

Thus, language becomes essential for metaphysics, ethics, and even politics: "From its first definition, grammar plays a civilizing role, since it teaches man to express himself."[13]

A man like Cornificius, who did not want to gain access to language through the study of grammar, was implicitly not a Christian. In the conception of a medieval humanist, such as John of Salisbury, this attitude made vileness unavoidable.

In John's view, the difference between an ideal society and a corrupt one is made by the quality of the communication which takes place within society. Post-lapsarian communication and language can be both constructive and destructive, providing the same quality in human interactions.

> Speech, on the one hand, makes communication possible and guarantees the civilization that John holds so dear. On the other hand, the world of governance is exemplified by miscommunication, competing dialects and acts of mendacity. These negative qualities of human discourse, as depicted in the *Historia pontificalis*, guarantee the strife and confusion in the world that is a mark of the perennial contingency of human language after the fall. This is the antinomy that informs all of John's writing, that which exists

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[12] Matthew, 25:34–40.

[13] Cedric Giraud and Constant Mews, "John of Salisbury and the Schools of the 12th Century", 51.

between language as God-given, and yet also the most evident mark of man's post-lapsarian location in time.[14]

John considers that truthfulness marks the difference between constructive and destructive language . Originally, before the fall of man, language was strictly truthful, because Christ, the divine *Logos* is truth itself: "Jesus said to him: 'I am the way, the truth, and the life'."[15] Because the purpose of man is to get as close to God's likeness as he can, the same goes for society:

> John recalls for the occasion the etymology proposed by the Stoics, according to which faith derives from the fact of doing what one says. This idea of confidence, or contract, nevertheless equally provides the point of departure for the religious notion of fides. Faith is a kind of contract by which one gives one's confidence to invisible truths revealed by grace[16]

John classifies political interactions in two categories: flattery (marked by deceiving language, which harms society) and friendship (characterised by truthful language, which enables society to develop). Flattery is characteristic of the courtiers whom John criticises in the first three books of the *Policraticus*: "John treats flattery as the quintessential courtly vice, according to which the flatterer seeks his own good without reference to the good of others",[17] while friendship is a trait of the ideal society, presented in the second part of the *Policraticus*:

> Perhaps as importantly, at least in the context of John's immediate concern with courtly flattery, virtue stands in close and irrevocable connection to truth. Since virtue requires knowledge of the good, which is grounded in truth, as John says above, the bond of friendship must rest on the commitment of the friends to seek and respect the truth. As a general precept of his thought, John emphasized that open and free debate and criticism formed a crucial quality of the public spheres of the court and of the school. Individuals should be protected in their liberty to engage in conscientious, constructive reproval of the morals of others and to challenge ideas that do not meet up to rational evaluation. (John's concept of liberty in this regard will be elucidated more fully below.) Likewise,

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[14] Clare Monagle, "John of Salisbury and the Writing of History", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury,* 232.

[15] John, 14:6.

[16] Christophe Grellard, "John of Salisbury and Theology", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury,* 368.

[17] Cary J. Nederman, "John of Salisbury's Political Theory", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury,* 261.

people should be prepared to listen to and consider seriously such honest criticism when it is rendered. This quality seems particularly necessary in the case of friendship, which is guided by truthfulness.[18]

Language as a means of human interaction is the basis of politics, not just at a more subtle level, but also overtly, through rhetoric.

John was, in the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus*, a determined exponent of the role of effective rhetoric in human affairs. That is, in both works, he stressed the importance of morally grounded persuasive speech as the foundation of society. And persuasive speech, the art of rhetoric, aimed not at finding the Truth, but in generating probable logic, in playing around with a hypothesis, rather than in proving an ultimate thesis.

John's insistence on the necessity of rhetoric as the foundation of society was pronounced for its time. While all schoolmen were trained in rhetoric, as part of their grounding in the liberal arts, John was singular in his articulation of the relationship between rhetoric and effective governance and administration.[19]

Language represents the basis on which society is constructed at a cultural level as well, through the creation of history. Even though in the 12th century history was regarded as a part of literature, historical works still moulded the identity of various people and highlighted the spirit of various events.

As a scholar, John was, first and foremost, interested in the use of language to build political communities and maintain peace. His statement that he will only deal with events that he has witnessed himself, or experienced through the words of trusted people, itself testifies to that conviction of civilizations built in words. That is, in claiming the epistemological reliability of witness, he was more broadly asserting that the communities of men could adequately represent the past in human speech. As a rhetorician aiming at the presentation of plausibility, John's *Prologue* thus suggests that the use of the idea of the archive, the criticism of other historians, and, the idea of the witness, all had purchase in that regard.[20]

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[18] Ibid, 262–263.

[19] Clare Monagle, "John of Salisbury and the Writing of History", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury,* 219.

[20] Ibid, 220.

In fact, in the *Metalogicon,* John states that in the absence of language human beings would be reduced to the level of beasts.[21] This brings to mind Aristotle's statement from *Politics* that man outside society is either a beast or a god. What is interesting to analyse is the way in which John modifies Aristotle's statement. Firstly, society is identified with language. As I have previously stated, John sees language as the basis of society and therefore he treats the two as synonymous. Secondly, he eliminates the possibility of man being a god outside society, because the Christian context in which he writes is no longer polytheist. There is only one God, who is the original, creative Word. As a result, only one option is left for man outside society and language, and that option is the status of beast. Through this simple statement John also underlines the impossibility of man to evolve in the absence of language, either spiritually (as he cannot access either the rites, or the Scriptures), or in terms of knowledge (as he cannot access the writings of the ancients).

The ideal society that John of Salisbury envisages is also split in two: the body politic and its soul:

> For a republic is, just as Plutarch declares, a sort of body which is animated by the grant of divine reward and which is driven by the command of the highest equity and ruled by a sort of rational management. By all means, that which institutes and moulds the practice of religion in us and which transmits the worship of God (not the 'gods' of which Plutarch speaks) acquires the position of the soul in the body of the republic. Indeed, those who direct the practice of religion ought to be esteemed and venerated like the soul in the body. […] The position of the head in the republic is occupied, however, by a prince subject only to God and to those who act in His place on earth, inasmuch as in the human body the head is stimulated and ruled by the soul. The place of the heart is occupied by the senate, from which proceeds the beginning of good and bad works. The duties of the ears, eyes and mouth are claimed by the judges and governors of the provinces. The hands coincide with officials and soldiers. Those who always assist the prince are comparable to the flanks. Treasurers and record keepers (I speak not of those who supervise prisoners, but of the counts of the Exchequer) resemble the shape of the stomach and intestines; these, if they accumulate with great avidity and tenaciously preserve their accumulation, engender innumerable and incurable diseases so that their infection threatens to ruin the whole body. Furthermore, the feet coincide with peasants perpetually bound to the soil, for whom it is all the more necessary that the head take precautions, in that they more often meet with accidents while they walk on the earth in bodily subservience; and

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[21] See John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, 13.

those who erect, sustain and move forward the mass of the whole body are justly owed shelter and support. Remove from the fittest body the aid of the feet; it does not proceed under its own power, but either crawls shamefully, uselessly and offensively on its hands or else is moved with the assistance of brute animals.[22]

Even though John attributes the authorship of this structure of the state to Plutarch, research has proven that the *Instructio Trajani* is in fact a fictional treatise, invented by John in order to give authority to his ideas.

Books Five and Six are most famous for their development of an extended analogy between a commonwealth and the human body, which John claims to adopt from Plutarch, but which Hans Liebeschütz convincingly traced to Robert Pullen, one of John's teachers. Commenting on *Deuteronomy* (17:14–20) in his *Sentences* (7.7), Pullen had likened the roles of kings and priests, *regnum et sacerdotium*, in governing a commonwealth to those of body and soul in a human being. He developed the theme by outlining the duties of judges, knights, peasants and other classes in society. John of Salisbury introduces the same topics in the same order as his former teacher, who later became a cardinal and served in the papal curia, where John was likely reacquainted with him.

This organic metaphor, in which our author likens the prince to the head, the king's council (*senatus*) to the heart, judges to the eyes and ears, soldiers to the hands, and so on through all the classes of the commonwealth, expresses John's fundamental view of the state. He was fond of examples of this type, and in Book Six (24) he related a fable told to him by Pope Adrian IV about the rebellion of the members of the body against the voracious belly. From their subsequent deprivation they learned a salutary lesson about mutual cooperation, an ideal embraced by John of Salisbury, who was later credited with authorship of popular verses on this theme called "*De membris conspirantibus*."[23]

The body politic comprises all the lay institutions in an organic relation, in which each one contributes to the well-being and functionality of the whole. The soul is represented by the church with its structure.

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[22] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, trans. Cary J. Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 38–39.

[23] Roland E. Pepin, "John of Salisbury as a Writer", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury,* 163–164.

Just like the human body and soul, the state and the church can be involved in both good and bad matters, which is why John mentions the existence of both lay and clerical tyrants:

> He identifies in the *Policraticus* several species of tyrant: the private tyrant, the ecclesiastical tyrant, and the public or royal tyrant. According to John, anyone who employs the power he possesses to impose his own will arbitrarily upon another person may be classified as a tyrant.[24]

The difference between the king and the tyrant lies in their approach towards the law:

> When undertaking to distinguish the prince from the tyrant, which he does on two occasions in his *Policraticus*, John chooses the criterion of legality, very common in Antiquity but scarcely used since.[25]

The law is a relevant criterion, as it is the defining language of the state, inspired by God to the wise men of the state (the philosophers) and in accordance with the divine law revealed by the Scriptures:

> In John's eyes, law as a gift of God can only be *dogma sapientium*, and *compositio ciuitatis*: it depends on the truth revealed to those who possess sapientia, who formulate it, and, in a way, relay it to other humans; it "assembles" the city, and "puts [it] in order" (the main meanings of *componere*, from which *compositio* derives).[26]

As the law is inspired by God, it is above the king, who has to obey it, not out of necessity, but out of his natural care for his people and for the commonwealth.

> In short, John takes the *Digest*'s definitions as his starting point, but changes their wording in order to liberate the law in its fundamental aspect from any voluntarist intervention, to free it from the autonomous will of a human legislator; the voluntarist vision gives way to a theological vision of law's origin, in which the human mediator – the one who necessarily translates divine *aequitas* (the definition in Book 8 makes law the *forma aequitatis*) into words – is reduced to the role of telling to the people, in the manner of Moses the initial "legislator," or Gideon the arbiter of the law's application,

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[24] Cary J. Nederman, "John of Salisbury's Political Theory", in *A Companion to John of Salisbury,* 266.
[25] Yves Sassier, "John of Salisbury and Law", in 240.
[26] Ibid, 246.

the rule whose *auctor* is none other than God. The two definitions, of an equity that subsumes justice and of the law as interpreter of divine will, serve the same end here: to assert that the will of the human legislator is a captive will, totally subjugated to this objective principle of equity, coming directly from God.

This definition of law is followed by an analysis of the particular situation of the prince in his relationship to the law. Here again borrowing the vocabulary of the glossators, John begins by saying that all the prince's subjects are constrained by obligation (*necessitate*) to observe the law. Then he comes to the prince, and to Ulpian's famous maxim *princeps legibus solutus est*, John's intention here being to give his own interpretation, endeavouring, it seems, to exclude the glossators' *ex uoluntate*, or at least to limit its scope. In substance, he writes that the prince is said to be exempt from the laws because what must guide him in his function, and does indeed guide him if he is truly a prince, is not fear of punishment, but his sole duty of cultivating equity through love of justice, and administering *utilitas rei publicae*, which implies the effacement of his personal will – his private will – in the general interest. Here John introduces what seems to be an allusion to submission *ex uoluntate*, derived from the glossators: "But who, when it comes to public affairs, can speak of the will of the prince (*de principis uoluntate*), when, in this domain, he is permitted to desire nothing except that of which he is persuaded by law or equity, or which is implied by considerations of general utility?" Thus in public affairs the will of the prince has to be subordinated to *lex, aequitas*, and *utilitas communis*, and it is on this basis that it possesses what John calls "the force of judgement" (*uim judicii*), and that, he goes on, "what pleases him in such matters has the force of law, inasmuch as his ruling does not depart from the spirit of equity (*ab aequitatis mente*)." Such a ruling is bound to be, "as a consequence of painstaking contemplation, the image of equity," which is to say the image of the command of God.[27]

Clerics are not exempt from obeying the law, only that it is the clerical law, traced in the Bible and in the writings of the Fathers of the Church, which they obey. Due to the fact that the lay law is created in accordance with the clerical law, these two should not come into opposition, unless the king's or the courtiers' egotistical interests tried to bend the lay law. However, such a change of the lay law would indicate the rule of a tyrant, not of a king.

Conclusions

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[27] Ibid, 246–247.

To summarise, there seems to be a fine thread connecting all the apparently heterogeneous pieces of the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus*, and this thread is the language, as John of Salisbury sees it. Language is unifying. It is both stated directly and suggested as a central element governing the individual and the society of which he is part. Moreover, for John, language does not randomly and statically connect these elements, it marks the presence of the divine rationale imbedded in the world in a precise structure, created with the purpose of helping humanity raise itself towards God. Language becomes a metatopic, which brings extra meaning both overtly, creating continuity between the two works, and implicitly, through the structure of the treatises. In addition, the abundance of classical references is a means for John to mark himself as a continuator of the New Academy, in an improved, Christian version. Salisbury does not aim to merely propose theoretical philosophy, but a philosophy as Cicero sees it, used actively to benefit the commonwealth.

SOME REMARKS ON PETER OF SPAIN`S THEORY OF *SUPPOSITIO*

VLAD-LUCIAN ILE[*]

Abstract The present paper aims to reconsider our approaches to the *suppositio* theory (in the particular case of Peter of Spain`s *Summaries of logic*) in light of a new hypothesis of the double nature[1] of medieval logic. Starting from the existing points of view, i.e. the theory of *suppositio* as a theory of reference and *suppositio* as a theory of an untranslatable, this paper will examine their underlying commitments to the nature of medieval logic. Such an analysis will entail for the former approach a commitment to a formal nature, while for the latter to a non-formal one. The possibility of a new approach emerges when both natures can be traced in Peter`s theory.

Keywords *suppositio*, logic, reference, Peter of Spain, *Summaries of logic*, properties of terms

1. Introduction

When we put ourselves in front of the task of rendering a philosophical concept from medieval Latin into a modern language, we may almost always be confronted with a dilemma regarding how to do it: ought we to render it in a manner more familiar and accessible to us contemporaries? or should we rather stay faithful to the text in particular and to the medieval authors in general, rendering it in a manner that is closer to their form and use of the concept?

The general difficulty that this dilemma poses, i.e. of deciding what option is better, can also be felt in the contemporary studies of *suppositio*, the theory about the main property of categorematic terms from *logica modernorum*. Regarding the *suppositio* conceptual apparatus, Dutilh Novaes identifies in the contemporary literature two lines of thought or two approaches: "the historical line" and "the systematic line".[2] In spite of a difference in method[3] she finds a common trait in

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[1] By the expression "nature of logic" I understand the defining character or aspect of logic.
[2] See Catarina Dutilh Novaes, *Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories*, Vol. 7, Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 8. On the one hand, we have "the historical line [which] is primarily concerned with the establishment of reliable

both approaches, that of rendering the *suppositio* theory as a theory of reference.[4] But what she calls the historical line of thinking really seems to present an opposite characteristic, that of rendering the term and concept of *suppositio* through a calque, as an untranslatable. The arguments for this approach are made explicit in Alain de Libera`s article in the *Dictionary of untranslatables*[5] and the presence of it can be seen in numerous works before De Libera`s intervention.

But, in the case of the *suppositio* theory, the way in which we render a concept is not the result of a mere philological decision, but a philological decision doubled by a philosophical one. This means that at the basis of our own philosophical approach stands a particular conviction about medieval logic. If a clear-cut distinction between the two approaches on the theory of supposition is possible, then we can identify the corresponding commitments on medieval logic. If for the historical line of thinking we have a particular methodology described by dealing with the text in a descriptive, comparative, non-critical manner, plus a choice of rendering the concept of *suppositio* as close as possible to the medieval way of thinking, then this endeavour presupposes a particular commitment to medieval logic, one that considers it to be different in nature from modern logic. Accordingly, if the systematic line of reasoning has a critical point of view that comes from modern logic and philosophy of language, plus a choice of rendering the concept of *suppositio* as reference, then they must commit to the fact that both the medieval logic and the modern logic share a common nature, so that the first one can be studied with the tools of the second one (let us call them the difference and the non-difference thesis.) That being said, further clarifications about the theory of *suppositio* could be made in connection with our approach on medieval logic.

In this paper, I shall try to show that in the particular case of Peter of Spain`s theory of *suppositio*, we can identify, on the one hand, a formal aspect of medieval logic, the common trait shared with the modern logic or philosophy of language, and, on the other hand, a non-formal aspect of it, the specific, intuitive

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editions of the original Latin texts, with the identification of historical threads of influence among the different authors, and so forth". On the other hand, we have "the systematic line", in which "philosophers of logic […] estimate that some of the theories and ideas developed by medieval logicians can be fruitfully applied to current problems of philosophy of logic and language. In order to do so, they take up the task of 'reconstructing' medieval logical systems so that the latter acquire the form to which philosophers and logicians of the 20th and 21st centuries are accustomed."

[3] See Ibid, 8–9. The first line of dealing with the theory of *suppositio* has a perspective about medieval logic from within, a non-critical attitude towards it. The second one comes with a perspective from the modern logic and philosophy of language, a critical one, making an assessment from outside of medieval thinking.

[4] Ibid, 9.

[5] Alain de Libera, "Supposition" in *Dictionary of Untranslatables*, ed. Barbara Cassin (Princeton University Press, 2014), 1097–1102.

and particular trait. The identification of this double nature of medieval logic in the theory of *suppositio* is important, because it makes us re-evaluate the two approaches that the contemporaneous exegesis offers. If the historical approach has at its core the difference thesis and the systematic or critical approach has the non-difference thesis, then a third approach may exist, one that must partially include both. If the theory of *suppositio* presents the formal and the intuitive or specific aspects of medieval logic, then maybe we must not rush to consider *suppositio* either a fully untranslatable term, or a term or concept that can be equated with the concept of reference.

The first part of my paper includes a discussion about the possible commitments to medieval logic and their implications concerning the *suppositio* theory. Here I shall consider medieval logic as having three possible natures: formal, non-formal and both formal and non-formal. Of these, I shall test the third nature in the case of Peter of Spain`s theory.

The second part will try to show how and to what extent Peter of Spain`s theory can be called formal. I shall try to achieve this objective in two ways. On the one hand, by pointing out the fact that Peter`s conceptual apparatus can fit in the larger picture, that describes an evolution of the medieval terminology in the 12th and 13th centuries towards formalization. On the other hand, by describing the way in which Peter of Spain defines *suppositio* in *Summule logicales*.

The third part will be concerned with the non-formal aspect of medieval logic. By an etymological analysis on *suppositio* words, by identifying some uses of those before having a logical, grammatical or theological qualification, and by showing some paraphrases regarding the *suppositio* concepts that are found in Peter`s work, I shall try to suggest that the medieval logic is expressed in an intuitive and natural manner which compensates its lack of a rigorous formal character.

2. The nature of medieval logic

The problem that the theory of *suppositio* in general, and Peter of Spain`s theory of *suppositio* in particular have in common starts to emerge when we ask ourselves "*What is a theory of suppositio?*". The answer is not as simple as one might expect. From the beginning, we must mention that if we speak about the theory of *suppositio* in general, there is already a difference between the Oxford and the Parisian[6] tradition. In addition, we find the difference from one author to the other within each tradition, therefore a general answer to the question is hard to give. What we can acknowledge is that the way the concept of *suppositio* is rendered can influence the answer to our question. From what we have seen so far, we have two possible solutions and they seem mutually exclusive:

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[6] See Alain de Libera, "The Oxford and Paris traditions in logic," in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, E. Stump, eds., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,* 174–187.

S1. The theory of *suppositio* is a theory of reference, *'suppositio'* is 'reference'.

S2. The theory of *suppositio* is a theory about an untranslatable,[7] *'suppositio'* is 'supposition'.

Both cases have their own shortcomings and ramifications. Some of them are discussed in the current literature,[8] others will be mentioned below. But what is important from my perspective, is that the first one implies choosing to render the concept in question in a form that is more familiar to us than to the medieval scholars, in a form that resembles something that we already know and already have at our disposal today.[9] The second possibility is to render it in a form that is closer to medieval scholars, in a form rather unfamiliar and strange to us, by a linguistic calque. But this negative quality of being strange bears a positive effect. The strange form of the word, through the character of being strange, offers us a hint that invites us or the readers to make an extra effort for the process of understanding to take place. This implies that, in this second way, we assume the existence of a distance between us and the concept that we want to understand, and the possibility to surpass that by making it more familiar to us, by following the hint, the strange aspect of the word. This is acquired by trying to understand the history and the context of that concept, by looking where the wordform is pointing.

The commitment to S1 or S2 entails, in my opinion, a commitment to the non-difference or difference thesis regarding medieval logic. In other words, if we equate the theory of *suppositio* with the theory of reference, we implicitly acknowledge that the nature of medieval logic and the nature of modern logic or philosophy of language is common; if we accept the terminological and conceptual untranslatability, we implicitly acknowledge that the medieval logic is somehow different from our aforementioned disciplines. If we disagree with this kind of reasoning, thinking that we can adopt S1 without the non-difference thesis, or S2 without the difference thesis, then we can be accused of anachronism or ignorance. Anachronism, because to study a medieval concept with a modern conceptual tool

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[7] See Barbara Cassin, ed., *Dictionary of Untranslatables*, vii. As E. Apter via B. Cassin puts it, an untranslatable is a concept that is left in the way it is in its original language, by reason of "instability of meaning and sense-making, the performative dimension of sophistic effects, and the condition of temporality in translation". Probably more appropriate for our case, we can understand the expression of *suppositio* as an untranslatable, a concept that is a specific product of medieval thinking to such an extent, that we can only understand it in Latin with the conceptual apparatus of medieval logicians, hence in their own terms and context.

[8] See Alain de Libera, "Supposition", 1097–1102, and Catarina Dutilh Novaes, *Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories*, 17–30.

[9] When I say 'x refers to y', 'y is the referent of x', 'the relation between x and y is a relation of reference', the auditor understands quite well what I say, and is not necessary to offer him a theory of reference to understand my message.

could be a faulty method, when there is no common nature between the disciplines where those concepts appear. Ignorance, because we must not neglect the new possibilities, offered by our modern disciplines, of answering some old questions when it is legitimate to do so. Thus, if we agree that for the acceptance of one approach we must commit to the corresponding thesis regarding medieval logic, then we must sketch what the nature of medieval logic could be.

Regarding the nature of medieval logic, we can find two positions, supplemented by a third, which synthetically includes the first two.

The first position sustains a non-difference thesis, namely that the nature of medieval and modern logic is formal.[10] In the contemporary studies, we can find a tendency of searching for the formal aspect of medieval logic and so of considering it formal in nature (at least to some extent). From the work of Alfonso Maierù *Terminologia logica della tarda scolastica* (1972) to the collective studies reunited in the volume *Formal Approaches and Natural Language in Medieval Logic* (forthcoming), the topic of the formal aspect of medieval logic is a much debated one. Although we cannot say that medieval logic has a formal nature either in the sense of a formal system[11], or in the sense of a formal logic[12], I think we can agree that it presents a formal nature, as conceptual rigour. In this broad sense, the character of formal is understood as a tendency of using a specialised language which is partially distinct from the natural one and which avoids conceptual ambiguities. Although we do not have a pure formal language, we have some concepts like categorematic and syncategorematic terms, and the ones that are pertaining to the ontology of grammar, that allow us to talk about a form of a proposition or the structure of a sentence. From this perspective, we can find similarities in principles between terminist logic and the propositional analysis used by analytic philosophy, so that it will seem legitimate to adopt S1.

The second position sustains a difference thesis, a difference in nature between medieval and modern logic. In *A history of formal logic* (1961) Bocheński states that in spite of the similarities between the medieval and contemporary logic

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[10] For the different senses of formal and formalization in logic see Catarina Dutilh Novaes, *Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories*, 215–292, and Catarina Dutilh Novaes, "The different Ways in which Logic is (said to be) Formal", *History and Philosophy of Logic* 32 (2011): 303–332.

[11] Roy T. Cook, *A dictionary of Philosophical logic* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 124. "FORMAL SYSTEM – A formal system (or calculus, or deductive system, or formal calculus, or logistic system, or syntactic system) is a formal language supplemented with a set of axioms and/or rules of inference specifying which sequences of formulas from the language are to count as derivations".

[12] Formal logic: W. Marciszewski, *Dictionary of logic as applied in the study of language* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1981), 183. "a theory which investigates the structure of sentences and of deductive inference by a method which abstracts from the content of sentences and deals only with their logical form".

(after all, he speaks about a formal medieval logic), there is a fundamental difference between the medieval and contemporary formalism. This difference consists of the fact that scholastic logic deals with an ordinary or common language, that of Latin language, while contemporary logicians have developed an artificial language.[13] Thus, the difference in the language leads to differences in the tools used by those two types of logic, and finally to differences between the degrees of formalization. But this remark must be taken with a pinch of salt. Although medieval theories of logic were expressed in Latin, this Latin was not as common and ordinary as we may think. It was the language of universities, of the clergy, of the official institutions, so it was a highly regimented one. Nevertheless, the non-formal aspect of medieval logic offers our theory of *suppositio* a specific character, different from our modern ones, as Bocheński and ultimately De Libera seem to suggest.

The third position, that which synthetically includes the other two, can be found in a negative form in the works of authors like Laurent Cesalli. In his short introduction, *What is medieval logic after all? Towards a scientific use of natural language*, the author talks about two constraints of the medieval logician. On the one hand, we have the formal constraint, the desire of medieval logicians "to have at their disposal a language which would be sufficiently free from ambiguities and other semantic distortions to be suitable for the purpose of demonstrative science"[14]; on the other hand, we are faced with the material constraint, defined by the fact that "the language with which medieval logicians primarily worked was not an ideal, purely formal language but a natural or (semi-natural) one, namely Latin".[15] The positive version of this position will transform the formal and material constraints of the logicians into formal and material aspects that pertain to the nature of medieval logic. This way, the formal nature of medieval logic will deal with the character of being highly conceptually regimented, sketching clear delimitations between concepts. The material or non-formal nature of medieval logic will have to deal with the intuitive character of the natural or semi-natural language that was being used. By adopting this third position we can avoid the implications of S1 and S2 without fully rejecting them or the corresponding thesis.

If we agree with the last viewpoint on medieval logic in general, then this double nature of logic, formal and non-formal, can be identified in the particular cases. In the following two sections, we shall try to show the extent to which Peter of Spain`s theory of *supposition* from *Summule logicales* presents such characteristics.

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[13] See I. M. Bocheński, *A history of formal logic* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), 173.

[14] L. Cesalli, "What is Medieval Logic After All? Towards a Scientific Use of Natural Language" *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 52.

[15] Ibid.

3. The formal aspect of the *suppositio* theory

In this section, we shall try to show how we can identify the first character of medieval logic, that of being formal, in the theory of *suppositio*. For this purpose, we must take into account the origin and the evolution of the *suppositio* theory until the 13th century, when it reaches a maturity stage in the work of Peter of Spain. That being said, the formal character of the theory in question understood as conceptual rigour can be found, on the one hand, in the conceptual evolution of this theory before the *Summule logicales*, and on the other hand, in the way Peter of Spain deals with the theory itself in his work.

3.1 The evolution of the concept of suppositio in the 12th and 13th century

Today, the common belief about *logica modernorum,*[16] i.e. 12th and 13th century "branches of logic invented by medieval thinkers, such as the theory of properties of terms"[17] which cannot be found in the Aristotelian logic, is that it is the specific product of the medieval Latin thinkers. Contrary to Prantl`s thesis, it is not a Latin adaptation of Arabic or Byzantine doctrines.[18]

Within *logica modernorum,* the mature theory of *suppositio*, the theory that describes a particular property of a term within the terminist logic, seems to have been rooted in three medieval disciplines: grammar, logic and theology. As the scholarly literature suggests, we can particularly identify uses of the *suppositio* conceptual apparatus in the early stage of its development. Broadly, most of the work concerning grammar and logic is present in Rijk`s two volume book *Logica modernorum* (1962, 1967), which was updated by the collection of studies edited by Bos, *Medieval Supposition Theory Revised* (2013).

Regarding the grammatical tradition of using the *suppositio* conceptual apparatus, Rijk points out that at Priscian we can find '*suppositum*' with the sense of a grammatical subject of a verb, while '*substantia supposita'* stands for "the acting individual thing".[19] Peter Helyas (about 1140–1150) preserves the same sense of grammatical subject in the use of *supponere* and *suppositio*[20] so that for medieval scholars, *'subiectum'* and *'suppositum'* will have had the same meaning, i.e. the grammatical subject and the subject-matter of a proposition.[21] But the subject-

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[16] For the division of medieval logic see L. M. De Rijk, ed., *Logica modernorum I. A contribution to the history of early terminist logic* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967), 14–15.

[17] John Marenbon, *The Many Roots of Medieval Logic: The Aristotelian and the Non-Aristotelian Traditions* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1.

[18] See L. M. De Rijk, ed., *Logica modernorum I. A contribution to the history of early terminist logic,* 18.

[19] L. M. De Rijk, ed., *Logica modernorum II, Part one. A contribution to the history of early terminist logic* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967), 527.

[20] Ibid. to put "as grammatical subject", "the act of putting as grammatical subject".

[21] Ibid.

matter of propositions will have soon come to be designated by *substantia*, which in the 12th century in grammarian's tradition had some ontological implications, since *substantia* or *existentia* designated the individual thing. This way, the commentaries on Priscian will use the expression *supponere* as an equivalent for the expression *to signify substance* (individual) or to *signify substance with quality* (individual and universal).[22] But the minor ontological implications are evaluated at another level in Sten Ebbesen's works.[23] While for Rijk in grammar tradition *suppositio* is an intra-propositional property, for Ebbesen it is something different, "the bearer of the form". So, from Apollonius, Priscian, Peter Helyas to other 12th century grammarians, this sense is well preserved and transmitted.[24] Regardless of the intra-propositional or extra-propositional meanings of the *suppositio* terminology in grammar its existence and its possible influence on medieval terminist logic cannot be denied.

Besides the influence of grammar on the 13th century theory of *suppositio*, modern literature talks about an early development of its conceptual apparatus in logic. Rijk states that "the doctrine of fallacy seems to have been, together with twelfth century grammatical theories, at the very basis of terminist logic".[25] Starting with the rediscovery of Aristotle's works on logic in the 12th century, in the logic commentaries on his works we can observe, as Ebbesen points out, a particular development of *suppositio* terminology in three stages.[26] At first, until the end of the 12th century, the *appellatio* terminology is a fully developed one in comparison with *suppositio*[27] But starting with 1190, *suppositio* and *appellatio* are used indiscriminately until the beginning of the 13th century, when the concept of *suppositio* slowly started to replace that of *appellatio*. In this century *suppositio* conceptual apparatus begins to evolve into a full-blown theory and like in Peter of Spain`s case, *appellatio* will become a special type of *suppositio*.

Another trail of influence, this time from theology, is discussed by Ebbesen, Kneepkens, De Libera and Valente. They subscribe to the idea that the 13th century theory of *suppositio* is influenced by the Porretan theology. As Ebbesen points out, Kneepkens suggests that the conceptual apparatus found in the grammatical works of Peter Helyas is borrowed from Gilbert the Porretan.[28] In the same collective volume dedicated to the theory of *suppositio*, Valente argues that *suppositio* terms

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Sten Ebbesen, "Early Supposition Theory (12th–13th century)", in *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* 3/1 (1981). *Sémantiques médiévales: Cinq études sur la logique et la grammaire au Moyen Âge*, 35–48, and Sten Ebbesen, "Early Supposition Theory II" in E. P. Bos, ed., *Medieval supposition theory revisited* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 60–78.

[24] See Sten Ebbesen, "Early Supposition Theory (12th–13th century)", 37–38.

[25] L. M. De Rijk, ed., *Logica modernorum II, Part one,* 492. In spite of the fact that the grammar tradition was more influential.

[26] See Sten Ebbesen, "Early Supposition Theory II".

[27] The *suppositio* in the logical tradition is believed to be *what may be subsumed under a term.*

[28] Sten Ebbesen, "Early Supposition Theory II", 61.

are used by Gilbert in the sense of "an action performed by the speaker, not a property of terms",[29] namely the act of referring to a subsisting thing[30] through a subject term. Is spite of this, some of his pupils have a different approach. The author claims that in the works of his students, *Summa Zwettlensis* and *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*, the language tends to be objectified into a formal system of terms. In the former work, we have *suppositio* in the sense of a property of a subject term in a proposition that refers to something[31] and a classification of the types of *suppositiones*. In the latter, *suppositium* is, as in the former, the referent of a name, if it is considered to be independent of a proposition, and the signification or subject-matter of a proposition, if it is considered to be in a proposition[32]. In this sense *supponere* will be a function of a name, *officium*, of referring to something.[33] In conclusion, in the Porretan theology, the *suppositio* terminology evolved from being an action pertaining to the speaker, to a property pertaining to the term of a proposition.

Seeing this brief historiography sketch, we can draw two conclusions. The first one is that the changes in the way *suppositio* was used cannot be spotted only from 12th to 13th century logic, when we can speak of a full-blown theory, but in each discipline as well. In grammar, logic and theology, in early stages, we do not have a unitary way of using a *suppositio* conceptual apparatus. There are variations from one text to another, so that it is difficult to say that we have one specific sense of *suppositio* or *supponere* for grammarians, one for logicians and one for theologians. The second one is that through equating *suppositum* and the grammatical subject, subject-matter or the act of speaking, the 13th century offers a different use of this concept. *Suppositio* will slowly become the property of a term in a given proposition of sending outside of language, at an extra-linguistic entity. But the final product of the 13th century, a fully developed theory with a classification of types of *suppositio*, is obtained after a long interplay between the concept of *suppositio* and *appellatio*. The evolution captured in the history of the concept in question does nothing but mark the gradual increase of formality understood as conceptual rigour. From a

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[29] Luisa Valente, "Supposition theory and Porretan theology: *Summa Zwettlensis* and *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*" in *Medieval supposition theory revisited*, 122.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid, 127: "It seems that by suppositio here the Summa means the name itself as used as subject term in a proposition, by appellatio the name considered independently from its being used within the proposition, and by supponere the action performed by names when used as subject terms in propositions—and not by speakers or authors—and consisting in referring to some objects (subiecta)".

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid, 135: "From the double signification of names derives their double function: that of referring to (*supponendi*) the *subsistens*, *suppositum* or *persona* when the name is placed as subject term in a proposition, and that of predicating (*apponendi*) the form or quality when it is used as predicate term".

concept without a defined meaning, often confused with *appellatio*, without a theory, proper rules or classification types in the early stages, *suppositio* had become, by the time Peter of Spain wrote his book,[34] a well-developed theory.

3.2 Peter of Spain`s theory of suppositio *in the treatise* Summaries of logic[35]
In the previous section we have tried to show the way in which the *suppositio* theory in general had evolved before the 13th century, becoming more and more conceptually coherent. In this section, we shall try to show its formal nature in a particular case, that of *Summule logicales* of Petrus Hispanus. By briefly presenting his[36] theory about *suppositio*, we shall discuss some of his conceptual distinctions and show how this concept represents the main property of his terminist logic, depending on which of all other properties of terms are defined.

His *Tractatus* subsequently called *Summule logicales* is composed of 12 tracts,[37] of which the first 5 and the 7th are dedicated to *logica antiqua*, and the 6th tract alongside with the last 5 deal with *logica modernorum*, more precisely with *proprietates terminorum*.

In the second paragraph of the 6th treatise, *De suppositionibus*, , we encounter the first important concept for the definition of *suppositio*, namely the signification (*significatio*) of a term: *"Significatio termini, prout hic sumitur, est rei per vocem secundum placitum representatio."*.[38]. "The signification of a term, as used here, is the conventional representation of a thing by an utterance".[39] Further in the same paragraph, Peter states that the condition for an expression to signify a thing (*res*), is to signify a universal or a particular one, since each thing is either a particular or a universal.[40] The things are distinguished from signs (*signa*), so that the universal and particular signs (quantifiers) are not terms in the strict sense as the

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[34] According to the assumption of the latest bilingual edition, the text was written in the second quarter of the 13th century, see Peter of Spain, *Summaries of logic*, text, translation, introduction and notes Brian P. Copenhaver with Calvin Normore and Terence Parsons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[35] For references I shall use Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis), *Tractatus, Called Afterwards Summulae logicales, First Critical Edition from the Manuscript*, ed. L. M De Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), (abbr. SL.); Peter of Spain, *Summaries of logic*, (abbr. Sl.)

[36] Today it is acknowledged that Peter of Spain`s terminist logic is not as original as one might think. A great part of his *proprietates terminorum* is taken from *Summule antiquorum*, see SL, preface.

[37] *I De introductionibus, II De predicabilis, III De predicamentis, IV De Sillogismis, V De locis, VI De suppositionibus, VII De Fallacis, VIII De Relativis, IX De Ampliationibus, X De appellationibus, XI De Restrictionibus, XII De distributionibus*.

[38] SL. VI, 2, l.11–12

[39] Sl. 6, 2,

[40] Although in SL XII,5 that which is signified by quantifiers seems to be considered a *res*, because *res* is of two kinds.

terms that signify a universal or particular, although they signify in some way too[41]. [42]
He seems to suggest that there are 2 types of significations, one of the substantival
name (*nomen substantivum*) and one of the adjectival name or verb (*nomen
adjectivum vel verbum*). The first one signifies a substantival thing (*rei substantive*)
and the second an adjectival thing (*rei adiective*)[43]. But the fact of being substantive
(*substantivatio*) and the fact of being adjective (*adiectivatio*) are not modes of
signifying but modes of the things that are signified.[44] The ontological import of the
theory of signification seems evident. As Klima concludes, Peter`s difference in the
theory of signification is not founded on the modes of significations but on the
modes of things,[45] in such a way that even what we can call quantifiers signify some
sort of thing. On this foundation of the theory of signification, Peter will start the
construction of the *suppositio* theory. Thus, of the two types of names, only the
substantive one has the property of *suppositio*, therefore the substantive name can
be the subject of the action exercised by *supponere*. The other type of name only has
the property of *coppulatio*.

Starting from paragraph 3 to the end of the 6th treatise, the main subject of
the discussion will be the definition and classification of the *supposito* concept. That
being sad, we have something that we can call the general definition of *suppositio*:
"Suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo"[46]. But the taking of a
substantive term in place of something, i.e. *suppositio*, is different from the
conventional representation of a thing by an utterance, i.e. *significatio*, because the
former is applied on a term that already has the latter. For a *suppositio* to take place,
the term that performs the action of *supponere* must already have a signification
made by the imposition of an utterance upon a thing.[47] Another difference between
significatio and *suppositio* can be seen in the numerous examples that Peter offers.
Almost always[48] when he talks about the *suppositio* of a particular term, this term is

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[41] Sl. 12, 5 "every/all signifies neither the universal, nor the particular. The other type of thing
however, is a condition of the thing that can be a subject or predicate, and it is that thing
which this sign every/all signifies."

[42] See Sl. 6,2.

[43] *Sl.* translates "*rei substantive"* with "things as substance" and "*rei adjective"* as "a thing as
modifier". It seems to me that the translation is forcing the grammatical sense of the
expressions into an ontological one.

[44] Idem.

[45] Gyula Klima, "Two *Summulae*, Two Ways of Doing Logic: Peter of Spain`s "realism" and John
Buridan`s "nominalism". The two Summulae and the "nominalism/realism" distinction" in:
http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/FILES/Two%20Summulae%20(2).pdf, 6–7 (accessed on
19.05.2017).

[46] SL. VI,3, l.8–9

[47] See Sl.6,3

[48] SL. VI,4, l. 5–6. "*Accidentalis autem suppositio est acceptio termini comunis pro eis pro
quibus exigit adiunctum. Ut 'homo est'; iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro presentibus; cum*

given in a propositional context which determines the thing the term can stand for, e.g. "ut cum dicitur *homo currit*, iste terminus *homo* supponit pro Sorte vel Platone, et sic de aliis"[49]. In the case of signification, we do not have such a context-dependent approach.

Besides the differences between *significatio* and *suppositio*, the classification of the latter is of great importance for showing the formal aspect of this theory. A schema of this categorization can already be found in the introductive study of Rijk's edition.[50] Starting with SL VI, 4 Peter distinguishes between nine types of *suppositio* in 5 divisions. The first one is between *suppositio communis* and *suppositio discreta*. The difference is given by the type of subject term. The former has a common term, like '*man*',; the latter has a discrete term, which seems to be a proper name like *'Socrates'* or a name with a demonstrative pronoun as *'that man'.* From here until the end of the classification, only the *suppositio communis* branch will be further divided. Thus, the next pair, *suppositio naturalis* and *suppositio accidentalis*, will be types of *suppositio communis*. *Suppositio naturalis* is "taking a common term in place of all those that is naturally suited to be shared by, as *'human'* used by itself supposits of its own nature for all the humans who were, who are, and who will be".[51] Meanwhile *suppositio accidentalis* is defined as the taking of a common term in place of those things that are demanded by the other term, with whom the common term is bounded in the proposition.[52] The next distinction of *suppositio accidentalis* is between *suppositio simplex* and *suppositio personalis*. *Suppositio simplex* is "taking a common term in place of the universal thing signified by it".[53] In the examples "*Human is a species"* and "*Animal is a genus*", the terms do not stand for any particular thing but for the thing in common, the universal. *Suppositio personalis* "is taking a common term in place of those below it, as when someone says *'a human runs'* that term *'human'* supposits for those below it"[54]. The last pair is *suppositio determinate* and *suppositio confuse*, both pertaining to the *suppositio personalis*. The first one is that in which the common term is taken either indefinitely, e.g. *'A man runs'*, either with a particular sign, e.g. *'Some man runs'.*[55] The important remark that Peter makes is that in his examples the term *'man'* stands for every man, not only for those who are actually running. So, this is the point where he underlines the independence of the property of a term to stand for

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autem dicitur 'homo fuit' supponit pro preteritis; cum vero diciutur 'homo erit', supponit pro futuris".
[49] SL. VI, 3, l. 10–13
[50] See SL., p. LXXVII
[51] Sl. 6,4
[52] See SL. VI, 4, l. 5–6.
[53] Sl. 6,5
[54] Sl. 6,7
[55] See SL VI,8, l.13–16.

something from the truth-value of the proposition in which that term appears. The term *'man'* does not stand only for those men that make the proposition true, because "Aliud enim est supponere et aliud est reddere locutionem veram pro aliquo".[56] The last type, *Suppositio confuse* "is taking a common term in place of many by means of a universal sign, so that when someone says *'every human is an animal',* that term *'human'* is used for many by means of the universal sign because it is used for anything whatever that it supposits for".[57] This type of *suppositio* can take place either by necessity of the sign, or by the necessity of thing, the last being refuted later. By necessity of sign, the term *'human'* stands for each and every man and it is doing so in the mobile way, when a descent to each can be made like in the example 'Every human, therefore Socrates"'. When the descent is not permitted for a term, it is said to have immobile confused *suppositio*, e.g. '*Every human is an animal; therefore, every human is this animal.',*[58] from the premise we cannot obtain the conclusion.

The discussion about *suppositio* is supplemented in the other 5 tracts of terminist logic by: the thematization of relative terms, comparative pronouns and adjective (SL VIII), the restriction and enlargement of the domain of things, for which a term can stand (SL IX, XI), the property of term named *appellation* (SL X), the taking of a common or singular term in place of an existing thing, and distribution (SL XII), the multiplication of a common term by the universal sign.

From this brief sketch we can observe that Peter of Spain`s theory of *suppositio* presents a high degree of conceptual rigor. First, he distinguishes between *signification* and *suppositio*. The first is a property of a substantive and adjectival term to represent, by convention, a thing by means of an expression. *Suppositio* is a property of a substantival term within a propositional context to stand in the place of a thing that is already a significant of an utterance. The way in which this process happens depends, on the one hand, on the nature of the word, and on the other hand, on the other linguistic elements with which the term makes the proposition. In the theory of *suppositio* from *Summaries* we do not stumble upon an indiscriminate use of the concepts *suppositio* and *appellatio*, as in other 12th century texts. Moreover, *appellatio* is defined like a particular case of *suppositio*, namely the taking of a common term in place of an existing thing. In addition, Peter arrives at a successive division of the *suppositio* types, identifying about 7 modes in which a term is said to stand in place of a thing. Since in *suppositio* a certain substantive term takes the place of all the things for which it can stand in the propositional context, and not only for those things which make the proposition true, this theory differentiates itself from a semantic theory of truth.

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[56] SL. VI, 8, l. 19–20.
[57] Sl. 6,9.
[58] Ibid.

All these conceptual differences, on the one hand, of *suppositio* regarding the other properties of terms, and on the other hand, those made within the theory of *suppositio*, show that Peter of Spain had tried to define his concepts as clearly and univocally as possible.[59] In the light of the things presented above, I consider that in the theory of *suppositio* from *Summaries* we can find the formal nature of logic understood in a wide sense, as conceptual rigour, i.e. we find the presence of technical specialised concepts.

4. The intuitive or non-formal nature of medieval logic

Although in the theory of *suppositio* we deal with a well defined conceptual apparatus, which frames specialised uses of various concepts, the language in which they are expressed is Latin. In spite of the fact that in the 13th century Latin was not so much of a natural language like in the classical period, for the medieval universities it was still a language in which one thinks, talks and writes, a *lingua franca*. This fact challenges us to testify for the second nature of logic, namely, the naturality and the intuitiveness of the language in which it is expressed. In this sense, we shall try to offer an etymological analysis of *'suppositio',* to present some uses of this term that pertain neither to logic, nor theology, nor grammar, and in the end to search for explanations or replacements of our concept in the *Summule* through some paraphrases.

4.1 The etymological analysis
In classical Latin, the substantive *suppositio*, *suppositionis* of the third imparisyllabic declension seems to come from de verb *suppono, supponere, supposui, suppositus.* At its origins, it was formed of the prefix *sub* and the verb *pono, ponere, posui, positus*, whose main meaning is to put, to place, to set. *Ponere* with the *sub* prefix, and in the end *supponere,* means to put or place under, to put in place of something, to substitute. We can find both the substantival form of *suppositio* and the verbal form in *Summule*. Usually the substantival form is used more when Peter defines what the theory of *suppositio* is and which its types are. In the expressions of the form *'x habet suppositionem z'*, the term *x* has a *suppositio* of type *z*. In the expressions of the form *'x supponit y'*, thus where we deal with the verbal indicative use of the word, *x,* a certain substantive propositional term, *stands for*, or according with the classical language, *is put in place of*, or *substitutes* y, in a given proposition. In accordance with participle forms, from which the substantive forms have appeared, *x* from the last expression will be the *supponens* (active present participle), that which *supposit*, thus that which *is put in place of another* or *substitutes*, and *y* will be *suppositum*, the extra-linguistic entity which has been substituted. But we must mention that expressions with the form '*x est […]'*, where *x*

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[59] The place of logic in the medieval curriculum and the age of the students is also a factor for this kind of enterprise.

is a term from the *suppositio* family, which marks the beginning of a definition, can be found only in the case of the substantive form, *suppositio*. Peter does not define separately what a *suppositum* is, like in the case of *suppositio*, but he lets the definition of the former to be intuitively understood through the grammar of the latter.

The rendering of this concept by means of the paraphrase, thus in accordance with the natural language, offers a certain degree of intuition for the understating of the *suppositio* theory; however, this kind of approach is deficient both with regard to the economy of the words used and with regard to the formal aspect of the theory. In the absence of some adequate participles and in the presence of some qualifications that both already exist in modern languages (e.g. supposition as assumption), *suppositio* as untranslatable seems to be appealing. But beyond this, we can agree on the fact that the *suppositio* terminology from *Summule* has an intuitive and natural sense, seeing that resembles the sense of *suppositio* and *supponere* from ordinary Latin, which seems to have at their origins the joining of *sub* and *ponere*.

4.2 The unqualified use of 'suppositio'

Another argument for an intuitive sense of the *suppositio* theory is that in Latin we can find uses of this terminology which do not seem to be logically, theologically or grammatically qualified. Although this subject remains in great parts unexplored, the contemporary exegesis on the *suppositio* theory talks about a juridical use of this term. In this sense, *suppositio* means the fraudulent substitution of something.

We can spot an instance of this use in Plautus's (c. 254–184) play *Captivi* 1030. In what we can call the epilogue of the play, the company tells the audience that the play was made in accordance with the virtuous habits (*ad pudicos mores facta haec fabula est*) and so one cannot find vicious intrigues (*subigitationes*), love affairs, money schemes and fraudulent substitution of children (*pueri suppositio*) in it. This sense, which is often attributed in the medieval imaginary to the cuckoo, who lays its eggs in another bird's nest,[60] makes us conclude that *suppositio* has a particular meaning in ordinary language before being a regimented term in the university disciplines. Its common sense of substitution, de action of putting something in another's place, is quite close to Peter`s sense, to stand for something, to stand in place of something. The difference seems to be that in the natural language, the term suggests the action of putting something in another`s place, or of substituting a thing with another, while the term from terminist logic suggest the existence of a relation between a linguistic entity and an extra-linguistic one.

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[60] The expression "*Cuculus ova sua supponere amat alaudae, palumbi aut currucae*" seems to originate in Aristotle, *Historia animalium* IX, 29 and it is possible to be found in the medieval paradoxography literature.

4.3 Paraphrases equivalent with the definition of suppositio *in Summaries*
Besides the *suppositio* terminology, Peter uses a natural language in his work, in his definitions and explanations, namely terms that are not logically regimented. The expression *'acceptio pro aliquo'* from *suppositio* definition: "*acceptio termini substantive pro aliquo*", taking the substantival terms in place of something, can be an example. Saying *'Acceptio termini x pro y'*, ultimately means to paraphrase the expression *'x supponit y'* or *'x supponit pro y'*, namely *'x has suppositio'*, or *'he stands in relation of suppositio with y'*.

From the definition of *appellatio, "Appelatio est acceptio termini communis pro re existente",*[61] the taking of a term in place of a thing that exists, in contrast with *suppositio* and *significatio* "*suppositio et significatio sunt tam de re existente quam de re non existente*",[62] we can observe that the perfect passive participle forms of *supponere (suppositus, supposita* and *suppositum)* have a textual counterpart, *res, rei*, the thing. What Latin grammar tells us by means of an almost negative language, by these participle forms, e.g. *suppositum:* that which has been substituted, that for which a certain term stands, in some places we find the same thing expressed in a positive way, by means of the term *res, rei*, the thing.

This being said, we can see in the examples above that the *suppositio* terminology from *Summaries* presents counterparts in paraphrases expressed in natural language. Those provide some intuitive information about what the formal concepts used in theory are and how they really work.

5. Conclusions and final remarks
In this paper, I tried to show how the double nature of medieval logic, understood on the one hand as a tendency towards formalization, i.e. conceptual rigour, and on the other hand, as a non-formal attitude, i.e. the naturalness and intuitiveness of the language in which it is expressed, is present in the particular case of the *suppositio* theory from *Summule logicales*. If, after the arguments given, we can say that the theory of *suppositio* presents this characteristic, then I think that a new approach which acknowledges the double nature of medieval logic could overpass some difficulties raised both by the *suppositio* as reference approach and by *suppositio* as untranslatable. In conclusion, the methodological options offered to us by the contemporary exegesis and presented above, become nothing more than mere commitments to one particular aspect of the nature of medieval logic. If we terminologically and conceptually equate *suppositio* with *reference*, then we consider the former more formal than it is. If we consider *suppositio* an untranslatable in the contemporary language, and thus we equate *suppositio* with its corresponding calque *suppositio*, then this theory becomes a product of medieval philosophy that is too specific and more dependent on the context in which

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[61] SL. X, 1, l. 4.
[62] Ibid. l. 9–10

appeared. That being said, I think that by only considering these two aspects of the theory, the formal and non-formal nature, we can try to elaborate a new project of conceptualization and translation of the *suppositio* theory in a modern language. All these efforts aim to try to answer the question: "What is the theory of *suppositio* and for what purpose was it made?".

DISSENSIONES INTER VIAM ANTIQUAM ET VIAM MODERNAM: AN EDITION OF THE WROCŁAW, BU, 6130, MILICH., II, 78, F. 1-5 MANUSCRIPT

ANDREI-TUDOR MAN[*]

Abstract The article discusses an anonymous, late medieval philosophical text, followed by its first critical edition that sets the main differences between *via antiqua* and *via moderna*, the two major philosophical parties of the second half of the 14th,and the 15th century. The phenomenon of the two ways originated in the quarrels between the Parisian realist and nominalist philosophers, and moved away to Central Europe through the departure of the German nation masters and students from Paris towards the newly founded Central European universities. Thus, due to its reference apparatus, discussed problems, and academic and historic context, the text appears to be included in the *via moderna* tradition, as an apologetical endeavour to sustain the modern cause.

Keywords *via antiqua, via moderna,* 15th century philosophy, Central European universities

The text *Dissensiones inter viam antiquam et viam modernam* opens the Wrocław, BU, 6130, Milich., II, 78 manuscript, consists of five *folio* with two columns writing, and preserves the scholastic exhibition of the differences distinguishing the main philosophical factions of the 15th century, the *via antiqua* and the *via moderna.* The textual structure is simple and it is characterised by orality right from the prologue, testifying to its intention to present the main differences between the two ways through six small questions, *quaestiuncula.* Also, the debate is presented by way of

small arguments suggesting a good philosophical knowledge, aimed to argue in favour of one of the positions, rather than to impartially present the two opposing doctrines. The prologue, where the author states his intentions, does not suggest the author's affiliation to any of the two traditions, but solely presents the chief members of the two schools: Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas for the *via antiqua*, and Johannes Buridanus, Marsilius of Inghen and William Ockham for the *via moderna*. Nevertheless, as I shall argue, the distribution of the arguments throughout the six *quaestiones*, favouring the *via moderna*, suggests the author's affiliation to the modern cause.

The *Wegestreit* phenomenon is one of the main characteristics of Central European universities, preserving in an institutionalised form the Parisian quarrel between the realists and nominalists, as the universities were inscribing in their curricula the doctrinaire orientation as following *via antiqua* or *via moderna.* The prevalence of modern arguments, the orality, and the reference in the third *quaestio* to *Erfordia* as an example of proximity suggest that the text is a scholastic apology for the *via moderna* and that Erfurt, one of the main late medieval *via moderna* universities, was its place of composition. In the following pages, I shall argue for the scholastic character of the text, for its links with the *via moderna* and with the university of Erfurt.

I.   Distinctive features of the text

The manuscript preserved at the National Library of Wrocław opens with the debate over the main differences between the philosophical traditions of the 15th century, followed by a number of Thomas Aquinas's treatises, such as *De principio individuationis* and *De natura accidentis,* some anonymous commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics, De generatione et corruptione* and *De caelo,* commentaries on Thomas Aquinas's *De ente et essentia,* a commentary on the pseudo Aristotelian *Liber de causis,* Thomas Sutton's *De productione formae substantialis,* and also the sentences condemned in 1241, 1277 and 1387. Henrik Wels[1] emphasises that the thematic unity of the manuscript resides in its interest in the problem of universals, in the difference between being and essence, and in the Parisian censored propositions respectively. As he argues, the thematic unity is based on the fact that the manuscript is the work of a sole copyist, whose name can be read in some of the colophons as– Mauricius of Dresden. The colophon of the commentary on *De causis* marks the year of the production, 1455, but none of the colophons preserve the copying place. As the prologue announces, the text is structured as six short questions that aim to exhibit the main differences between the *via antiqua*, as

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[1] Henrik Wels, *Aristotelisches Wissen und Glauben im 15. Jahrhundert. Ein anonymer Kommentar zum Pariser Verurteilungsdekret von 1277 aus dem Umfeld des Johannes de Maisonneuve. Studie und Text*, Bohumer Studien zur Philosophie 41 (Bohum: B.R. Grüner Publishing Co., 2004), 28–34.

inherited from Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, and the *via moderna,* as inherited from the nominalists William Ockham, Johannes Buridanus or Marsilius of Inghen.[2]

The six questions are:

1.   *Utrum sit ponendum ex natura universale praeter intellectus operationem, sicut ponenda universalia realia ab individuis separata.*

2.   *Utrum essentia differt ab esse.*

3.   *Utrum distincte praedicamenta inter se differunt formaliter <et> realiter.*

4.   *Utrum potentiae animae distinguantur ab anima realiter et inter se realiter et formaliter.*

5.   *Utrum suppositio sit distincta realiter <et> formaliter a termino supponente.*

6.   *Utrum propria passio distinguitur a suo subiecto.*

The main areas of debate are the problem of universals, the difference between being and essence, Aristotle's theory of the soul and the problem of predicaments. Although the goals presented in the prologue do not imply an apology for one of the traditions, the author offers a quantitative prevalence to the arguments sustaining the *via moderna*. Thus, measuring the number of lines granted to each position (see the following table), we shall find a prevalence of the modern arguments. This occurs even in the first two questions, where, though the ancients are granted with a wider arguing space, their positions are described in a detrimental way by the means of their own arguments. In the case of questions three through six, the author merely resorts to a succinct presentation of the ancient positions, emphasising the ability of the modern way to produce a plurality of arguments, and even confines the *via antiqua* position to *quod sic*, as a sanction to the problem set forth in the *quaestio*.

Quaestio	Antiqui	Moderni
1	30	13
2	51	44
3	8	109

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[2] *[1ra] Notandum quod doctores antiqui Albertus et beatus Thomas ex una parte, Johannes Biridani, Marsilius et praesertim magister Wilhelmus Occami, quem moderni Occam vocant "viae modernae reformator singularis", parte ex altera, in multis punctis materialibus naturalibus <et> logicalibus discordant, diversimode sentientes seu scolastice dogmatizantes, de quibus punctis sex modo quaestiuncularis recitabuntur, quarum prima est:*

4	6	22
5	7	87
6	*Quod sic*	35

The name of Mauricius of Dresden, as Wels indicates, is also present in a manuscript preserved in Munich,[3] dated between 1452 and 1453, which once again makes no mention of the place where it was copied. The sole lieu where the copyist marked the place of production is within the colophon of Thomas Sutton's *De productione formae substantialis*, under the form *sczerbist*,[4] identified by Wells as the German city of Zerbst. The toponym is also present in the Munich manuscript. In the third question regarding the issue of the distance between two individuals, the author mentions *Erfordia* as an example of proximity, and Babylonia[5] as an example of distance. This note may suggest that the writing place of the text was the University of Erfurt, founded in 1392, which, according to *Manuale scholarium*,[6] had the reputation of being a nominalist university. Indeed, as Astrik L. Gabriel writes,[7] no realist student came to Erfurt through the student exchanges between Erfurt and Paris. Moreover, the short distance of only 150 kilometres separating Erfurt and Zerbst may suggest the University of Erfurt as the place where the text was written. Even though the name of Mauricius is not present in the student lists of the university of Erfurt, he may have become acquainted with the text in Zerbst, where the monastery of Saint John functioned since 1235. The monastery was abolished by the Reformation, Martin Luther himself preaching in its church, but it survived as a library and a gymnasium. It is easy to presume that a school text written at the University of Erfurt could have easily been brought to Zerbst, where it could have been copied by Mauricius of Dresden, maybe a monk of the Francisceum, or, as Astrik L. Gabriel presents the 15th century intellectuals, a humanist wandering from university to university, ignoring the theological titles, who halted at Zerbst and became interested in the referred texts. Thus, we can observe how, through its structure and its possible location, the text is placed within the *via moderna* milieu,

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[3] München, UB, 2°, Cod. ms. 49.

[4] *Et sic est finis tractatus de forme substantialis productione in vigilia penthecostes anno Mo cccco lvo in sczerbist Mauricius de Dresden .*

[5] *...quod Socrates sit albus in Erfordia et Plato sit niger residens in Babilonia...*

[6] *The Manuale scholarium, An original account of life in the medieval university*, transl. Robert Francis Seybolt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921), 41.

[7] Astrik L. Gabriel, ""Via antiqua" and "Via moderna"and the Migration of Paris Students and Masters to the German Universities in the Fifteenth Century*", in *Antiqui und Moderni, Traditionsbewusstein im späten Mittelalter*, ed. Alfred Zimmerman (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), 450.

as the modern argumentation is more extensively discussed and it was probably written at the University of Erfurt.[8]

Beyond the information provided by the Erfurt and Munich manuscripts, we lack any other information and sources concerning the studies and activity of Mauricius of Dresden; there is no indication of whether he was close to any of the two ways, of which his alma mater was or which university where he may have taught was. Not even the Wroclaw manuscript's table of contents offers any relevant information concerning his activity or philosophical affiliation. Thus, if the majority of texts comprised in the manuscript[9] are *via antiqua* treatises, such as the large variety

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[8] I am thankful to Ioana Curuț for showing me the commentary of Nicholas of Amsterdam on *logica vetus,* as a possible source for our text, or even as a possibility that our text rests under the authorship of Nicholas of Amsterdam. He was a prominent *via moderna* master of the university of Rostock, who studied at the universities of Cologne and Erfurt, at the latter developing his interest for the *via moderna* problematics and methodology. Therefore, the academic context in which the *magister Erfordiensis* professed corresponds both to the possible time interval in which the composition of our text might be situated and to the place where our text might have been written. Moreover, the commentary on *logica vetus,* the only entirely edited and published work of Nicholas (Nicholas of Amsterdam, *Commentary on the Old Logic,* ed. Egbert P. Bos, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophien 58 [Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2016]) meets with our text in the discussion on the problem of predicaments, where similar expressions are used, but for different purposes. Therefore, the presence of common formulas might suggest the link between the two texts and, also, the text of Nicholas as a source for the text that we introduced. However, the problem might be explained by the fact that they share the same academic milieu and the modern way. Thus, the expressions shared by the two authors might be the usual expressions in the discussion on the problem of predicaments and, therefore, they do not suggest a real filiation between the two texts. We shall offer a careful observation of the studies on the work of Nicholas of Amsterdam and to the future editions of his works, in order argue for, or against the possible link between our text and his work.

[9] 1. *Dissensiones inter viam antiquam et modernam.*
2. S. Thomas, *De principio individuationis.*
3. S. Thomas, *De natura accidentis.*
4. Thomas Sutton, *De productione formae substantialis.*
5. S. Thomas, *De mixtione elementorum.*
6. S. Thomas*, De iudiciis astrorum.*
7. Mauricius de Dresden, *Auctoritates ex diversis libris Aristotelis, Senecae, Boetii.*
8. Anon., *In I-XII Metaphysicae.*
9. *Index quaestionum operis praecedentis.*
10. *Tractatus formalitatum.*
11. *Exercitium super De generatione.*
12. *Commentum super De caelo et mundo.*
13. Franciscus Mayronis, *De esse et essentia.*
14. Anon., *In De causis.*
15. Armandus de Bellovisu, *De esse et essentia.*

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of Thomist treatises, Thomas Sutton's *De productione formae substantialis* or Jean Versor's commentary on Aquinas's *De ente et essentia*, the text that opens the manuscript presents itself from the very beginning as an apology for the *via moderna.* We have to remark the copyist's interest in the commentaries on *De ente et essentia* linking in the same manuscript the commentary of Jean Versor with the ones of Franciscus Mayronis and Armandus de Bellovisu. Through its content, the manuscript can be characterised as scholastic, containing well known treatises within the late medieval academic life, written by *via antiqua* authors and studied within the universities of those days. Nevertheless, the choice to open the manuscript with a text pertaining to the *via moderna* tradition is peculiar. In the following pages, we shall continue to argue that the text connects to the *via moderna* tradition and philosophy. In this regard, we shall firstly present a short history of the schism between ancients and moderns and, secondly, we shall outline the philosophical structure of the text and its web of references.

II. *Antiqui et moderni*

The distinction between *via antiqua* and *via moderna* was specific to the 15th century and lost its importance in the 16th century. The schism must be linked with two major phenomena of the 15th century: the founding of the central European universities, in whose structure it is reflected, and the migration of the masters and students from Paris towards the newly founded universities. In the beginning, the universities made a choice between the two ways, but in time they came to accept both of them, so the distinction disappeared by the end of the century. Moreover, the academic curricula of the central European universities, following the *via antiqua* or the *via moderna* respectively, reflected the doctrinal and institutional quarrels between the Parisian realists and nominalists.

The doctrinal dissensions started in Paris, in the 1330s, with the introduction of the English terminist logics comprised in treatises, such as William Ockham's *Summa Logicae*, which were trying to restructure the Aristotelian logics following a principle that offers a more efficient academic initiation. The conflict concerned problems of teaching and interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus:

16. *Regestrum alphabeticum operis praecedentis.*
17. S. Thomas, *De ente et essentia.*
18. Johannes Versor, *In de ente et essentia.*
19. Fragmentum anon, *comenti in Metaphysicam.*
20. *Fragment tekstu filozoficznego.*
21. *Quaestiones disputatae variae.*
22. *Sophismata.*
23. *Aliae quaestiones disputatae.*
24. *Errores a Stephano Tempier damnati cum notis explicatoriis.*
25. Aegidius Romanus*, De erroribus philosophorum* (fragmentum).
26. *Formalitates* (sine fine).

whether logics should be studied following the traditional way, namely commenting each of Aristotle's known works, or following a rational structure, as the one used by the academic manuals, such as Ockham's *Summa Logicae* or Buridan's *Summulae de Dialectica.* At the University of Paris, the 14th century was marked by the scission between the followers of these two methods, the works of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas being the leading ones for the traditionalist party. Thus, the main schools of the century were the Thomist, the Albertist and the terminist. The end of the 14th century saw a predominance of the nominalists in Paris and an increased activity of what the author of the manuscript called *scola Biridani,* comprising philosophers like Marsilius of Inghen, Albert of Saxony, Nicolas Oresme etc.

Classic researches concerning the distinction between *via antiqua* and *via moderna* and its Parisian origins are the articles of Gilles Meersseman,[10] presenting the Parisian origins of the Albertism of Cologne, and of Astrik L. Gabriel,[11] that broadens Meersseman's interpretation to the whole German cultural space of the 15th century. In the following pages, I shall refer to the two studies.[12] In the second

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[10] Gilles Meersseman*,* "Les Origines Parisiennes de l'Albertisme Colonais", in *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age*, Vol. 7 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1933).

[11] Astrik L. Gabriel, ""Via antiqua" and "Via moderna"".

[12] I shall focus only on the articles of the two scholars, both for their reputation, the articles being cited in the great part of scholarly literature that approaches this issue, and their historical, and not polemical endeavour to identify the source of the *Wegestreit*. Beyond them, we are dealing with a vast literature treating the causes of the schism between the two ways. Some works place the birth of the schism within the 14th century Parisian conflicts, caused by the introduction of the ockhamist logic in Paris, like those of Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, IV, (Leipzig, 1870), Heinrich Denifle, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II, (Paris, 1891), Gerhard Ritter, *Via Antiqua und Via Moderna auf den deutschen Universititen des XV Jahrhunderts*, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, (Heidelberg, 1922) or the well-known work of Franz Ehrle on Peter of Candia's commentary on Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences: Franz Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexander V*, Franziskaniche Studien 9 (Münster im Westf., 1925), N.W. Gilbert, "Ockham, Wyclif, And the "Via moderna"", in *Antiqui und Moderni, Traditionsbewusstein im späten Mittelalter* , 85–125, refutes the above interpretation and places the origins of the *Wegestreit* within the 15th century events of John Wycliff's attacks against the terminist logics and the separation between the realism of Wycliff and Jan Huss and the terminism of Pierre d'Ailly and Jean Gerson. Moreover, Zénon Kaluza, "La crise des années 1474–1482: L'interdiction du Nominalisme par Louis XI*"*, in, *Philosophy and Learning, Universities in the Middle Ages,* eds. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, J.H. Josef Schneider and Georg Wieland (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 293–327, critically approaches both exegetical versions. The scholar presents the Prague quarrel as a nationalist matter, and not a philosophical one, revolving around the departure of the german nation masters and students from Prague, and, at the same time, he presents the origins of the *Wegestreit* belonging to the quarrel between the Parisian realists and nominalists, but he emphasizes the political

half of the 15th century, the University of Paris weakened its independence in the face of the royal authority. In that context, King Louis XI censored the study of nominalist doctrines,[13] because, as it is argued by Gabriel, a realist protégé of the Roman Curia lost a *disputatio* at Leuven in the face of a nominalist Parisian doctor. Thus, by condemning the nominalists, the king was offering a favour to the pope. The nominalists produced a memoir[14] exposing their complaints and a history of the four western persecutions against the nominalism. The first was against Ockham, the second was against the Bohemian nominalists, adversaries of the Hussite realism, the third occurred in Paris at the beginning of the 15th century and the last one is presented as the cause of the memoir. Both Meersseman and Gabriel identified the source of the distinction between *antiqui et moderni* in the third persecution, but, as they argued, it had not been a persecution per se, but a chain of historical contexts that compelled the German masters and students to depart from Paris towards the newly founded Central European universities and caused the establishment of a group of Albertists in Paris in 1407. Thus, in 1407, in the l context of the conflict between the house of Burgundy and the house of Armagnac, Louis, Duke of Orleans,

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character of the quarrel, the significance of the argument of heresy, used by the 1474 condemnation, and the low significance of the philosophical implications of the quarrel. A reconciliatory exegesis is offered by William J. Courtenay, "Antiqui and Moderni in Late Medieval Thought*"*, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 48/1 (1987): 3–10. He demonstrates the Hussite schism as only the peak of a process started by the introduction of terminist logics in Paris, and presents the large use of the term *modernus* throughout the Parisian 14th century, from its signification as contemporary, like Ockham was using it, to labelling the terminist group, as it functioned throughout the entire 15th century. A remarkable exegetical endeavour is comprised in the ninth volume of *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* (1974), entirely dedicated to the distinction between ancients and moderns, not only as a late medieval academic phenomenon, but also as a conceptual couple functioning throughout the Middle Ages.

[13] Franz Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar…*, 310–321.

[14] Ibid, 322–326; Zénon Kaluza, *La crise…*, 321–324 recognizes the 1474 condemnation text as the source for the fallacious exegetical identification of the origins of the *Wegestreit* as being the condemnation of the ockhamism or the Hussite refutation of nominalism. Suggesting the political character of the quarrel in both Prague and Paris, Kaluza comments the stages of the nominalist persecution, as they are presented by the nominalist memoir, and exposes them as a nominalist endeavour to create a history that exposes the persecution from a doctrinal perspective. Thus, the nominalist memoir historically justifies the existence of nominalism and its right of presence within the university as a survivor of multiple persecutions: the condemnation of Ockham and ockhamism, the Kutná-Hora decree, presented by the memoir as an anti-nominalist action by ignoring its nationalist implications, the 1407 condemnation, one of the causes being presented by the decree as the alliance between the albertists and the English in the Hundred Years' War, and the 1474 condemnation, presented by the memoir by ignoring its political implications. Hence, by applying a negative hermeneutic, Kaluza recognized the necessity to historically study the epochs of the quarrel between ancients and moderns, by transcending the narrativities fabricated in order to sustain the parties.

was assassinated by Jean sans Peur, Duke of Burgundy. Because of this destabilising event for the Parisian university, but also because of the Hundred Years' War crisis and the precarious financial situation in Paris, compared with the freshly founded European universities, the members of the German nation, masters and students, left the city, the university's leadership being transferred to a group of Albertists who censored nominalism. The leader of the Albertist group was Johannes de Nova Domo, the master of Heymericus de Campo, who became chief of the Albertist party and the founder of *Bursa Laurentiana,* the Albertist headquarters at the University of Cologne. The Albertist domination at the University of Paris lasted until 1437, when the nominalists regained their hegemony. Therefore, the main Parisian schools of philosophy were the Albertists and the nominalists, along the Thomists and the Scotists, who were also of realist orientation, but with a lower influence. By leaving Paris for the Central European universities, the scholars preserved the Parisian pattern. However, their labels changed from the representative philosopher to *antiqui* and *moderni.* Most of the universities elected a single way, but some universities allowed the students to choose the way in which they should be educated. The University of Cologne, where Heymericus de Campo had taught, was one of the leading universities in the Albertist *via antiqua.* One of the main *via moderna* universities was the University of Erfurt, where Bartholomaus Usingen taught and Martin Luther had been one of his students. In Krakow, the two ways alternated: in the first half of the 15th century the *via moderna* was followed, and in the second half the *via antiqua* was followed. In Basel and Tübingen, both of the ways were simultaneously accepted. Adopting one *via* or another implied the curricular orientation, but did not exclude the presence of philosophical opponents at the university, as it is confirmed by Servatius Fanckel, student at the University of Cologne. In his recordings of the usual academic disputes, he recorded the presence of a nominalist at a *disputatio* concerning the real distinction between the persons of the trinity. The academic disputes played a major role in the medieval university, and there was a whole range of them, like the *disputationes nocturnae,* held every night at various colleges, or the *bursae, disputationes vacantiales*, held every week during the summer break, and other disputes held upon the bestowal of different academic distinctions. As Maarten Hoenen[15] argues, commenting Servatius Fanckel's record of the disputes in Cologne, the *disputatio* played a major didactical role, providing the students and the auditorium the possibility to hear both the arguments favouring their own academic orientation and those favouring the opponents. Thus, there are numerous documents that record the *disputationes* with an emphasis on the arguments used, because students recorded those arguments that could be used in their future disputes. The text in question is not the recording of a dispute, but a

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[15] Maarten Hoenen, "Nominalism in Cologne: The Student Notebook of the Dominican Servatius Fanckel with an Edition of a Disputatio Vacantialis Held on July 14, 1480", in *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities*, ed. Spencer Young (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 86.

university speech or, probably, a lesson, which took the form of a dispute between ancients and moderns. The parts of the dispute are announced in the prologue in a chronological order and through particular speech formulas: *Ad quod respondent platonici...Sed hoc reclamant moderni istomodo; Ad hoc respondit beatus Thomas...Dicit tamen Albertus...Sed Biridanus et scola moderna respondent...;* or *Ad hoc antiqui respondent, ut thomistae, albertistae...Ad hoc antiqui respondent;* or *Ad hoc respondet Albertus quod...Sed ista positio non placet modernis...et cetera.*

In the prologue, the author presents the representatives of the two *viae,* the ancients Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas and the moderns Johannes Buridanus, Marsilius of Inghen and William Ockham, the main reformer of the modern way. Despite the fact that Ockham is emphasised as the main figure within the modern way, throughout the text, the most invoked modern philosopher is Buridanus, often as a spokesman of the moderns: *Sed Biridanus et scola moderna respondent....* The emphasis on Ockham's special role within the modern way is specific to the literature of the 15th century. For instance, Bartholomaus Usingen's text also contains a dispute between ancients and moderns, held at Erfurt, in 1497, where Ockham is introduced with the title *venerabilis inceptor viae modernae.* The most cited philosopher is Buridanus, because his works were well known, having been used as academic textbooks together with the ones of Marsilius of Inghen. As Zénon Kaluza[16] argues, a characteristic of the impact of buridanism originates in the fact that in 1339 and 1340 nominalism was not generally censored in Paris, but only the doctrine of Ockham and the okhamism, this allowing the buridanism to expand at the central European universities. Also, as Heiko A. Oberman[17] argues, another feature of the influence of buridanism in Central Europe consists in its reverence towards Ockham. Because *via moderna* did not associate itself with the thought of a sole philosopher, as was the habit within the *via antiqua,* but with a sum of school leaders, Ockham is remembered as a historical representative for the birth of *via moderna,* rather than a school authority.

III. Philosophical aspects

As I have already stated, the difference between *esse* and *essentia* plays a major role in the manuscript's table of contents. The fragment we discuss also deals with the aforementioned issue. That is why we shall confine our commentaries to the second question and how the problem of *esse et essentia* appears throughout it, and to the third and fifth questions, both dealing with the problem of the predicaments. During this entire exercise, we shall continue our endeavour to prove the text's inclusion within the modern way and we shall support this statement by way of the text's philosophical aspects and references.

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[16] Zénon Kaluza, *La crise...,* 294, note 2.
[17] Heiko A. Oberman, "Via antiqua and Via moderna: Late Medieval Prolegomena to Early Reformation Thought*", Journal of the History of Ideas* 48/1 (1987): 35.

1. Esse et essentia

The second question investigates the difference between *esse* and *essentia,* implying three philosophical arguments – two ancient ones, of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, and one nominalist argument, of Johannes Buridanus and the *modern school*. The realist arguments are contextualised within the Neoplatonist problem of emanation from One to multiplicity, but set forth in its Christian creationist form. The implied arguments are linked with the ones used by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas in their commentaries on the pseudo-Aristotelian *Liber de causis.*

Approaching Saint Thomas's view on being and essence, despite the fact that it is discussed at length in *De ente et essentia,* the author presented only the arguments of the fourth book of the named treatise, in which Saint Thomas discussed the separate substances, and limited the Thomist arguments only to those treating the first levels of the world's hierarchy: God and the angels. Thus, the Thomist argument is twofold. Firstly, the author presented the identity of being and essence in the case of the first Intelligence or God, arguing through the authority of Aristotle's theory of the first and incorruptible substance.[18] Secondly, the author presented the Thomist argument concerning the angels, or the second intelligences, emphasising a real and necessary difference between being and essence. If neither God, nor the angels are composed of matter and species or other integrating parts, another form of contrast has to save the first Intelligence's supreme simplicity and that is what must be the real difference between being and essence within the second intelligences. We have to remark how the two arguments are closely presented with to the Thomist conception of the synonymy between the first Intelligence and God, and the multiple intelligences and the angels, avoiding the confusion with the Albertist philosophical vocabulary, where, following the theory of *Liber de causis,* the concept of intelligence represents an intermediary between being and multiplicity. At the end of the paragraph dedicated to Saint Thomas, admitting the validity of the first argument, the author succinctly refutes the second argument regarding the second substances. He argues that, despite its intentions of creating a contrast between God's simplicity and the composed nature of the angels are valid, the contrast could be more properly argued through the argument of the angel's composition of potency and intelligible species or of potency and the acts of comprehension.

The author's critical endeavour must be understood on the grounds of the necessity to refute the realist philosophers and to favour the nominalist philosophers. However, its validity is open to question, because it tends to ignore major details of the theory of Saint Thomas. Thus, in the fourth book of *De ente et essentia,* Saint Thomas certainly refutes the endeavours to theorise the composition of matter and form in the intelligences and in the soul, endeavour inherent to

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[18] Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* XII, 6, 1072a.

Avicebron's *Fons vitae.* Saint Thomas theorises a hierarchy of the intelligences using the authority of *Liber de causis,* IX, distinguishing between being and essence in the case of angels and emphasising God as pure essence. However, he does not ignore the inherent potentiality of the inferior intelligences and their specificity of comprehensible beings, as the anonymous author objects. Saint Thomas used the argument presenting the second intelligences as intelligible from the beginning of the fourth book, with the purpose of refuting the theory of Avicebron, because the composition with any type of matter would compromise their intelligibility. Moreover, Saint Thomas does not end his research with God and the second intelligences, but he vastly describes the Neoplatonist hierarchy, down to the lowest position of the human soul. Potentiality is the principle used to pass from One to multiple. Because God is a pure, simple essence, and creation receives its essence and being from him, and because anything received from something rests in a potential state relative to the offeror, the creation rests in a potential state relative to God. The quiddity of the intelligences rests in a potential state relative to the being received from God and the received being always acts as actuality. Because God is the sole pure essence, the distinction from him takes place through an admixture of potentiality.[19] As much as the scale bends on the potentiality's part, the substances occupy a lower level on the hierarchy and their multiplicity increases. Hence, the objection made by the author is partially valid, because potentiality is not excluded from the Thomist hierarchical scheme, and neither is the admixture with comprehension acts, specific to the separate intelligences.[20]

In the second step, the author described the position of Albertus Magnus, emphasising his distinctness compared to his predecessor in the order of the text and succinctly argued the invalidity of his major arguments. As we also remarked while discussing the argument of Saint Thomas, Saint Albert's argument is folded in a multiplicity of theoretical covers and, right from its beginning, it is linked to Albert's commentary on *Liber de causis.* Thus, the first step in order to distinguish Albert from Thomas, presents the second intelligences not composed of *esse* and *essentia*, as Thomas argued, but of act and potency, as a receptacle of the divine revelations, their union being named *materia spiritualis.* Saint Albert's works contain two concepts that, although they may seem to be synonyms, they are enunciated in a real distinction. Thus, the concept of spiritual matter, used by the manuscript's author, can only be found in three different works of Albert.[21] The concept of *hyliatin*

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[19] Saint Thomas also refutes Avicebron's theory in *Summa Theologica*, Ia, q.50, art.2.

[20] Ibid. Ia, q.50, art.2, ad 3m.

[21] Albertus Magnus, *Super I Sententiarum*, II, 18,8, in *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, XXV, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1893–1894), 324b; idem, "*De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*", I, 1, 5, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, XVII, Pars II, ed. Winfridus Fauser (Aschendorf: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1993), 10–13; idem, "De intellectu et intelligibili", I, 1, 7, in *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, IX, ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), 532.

is theorised throughout an entire chapter in Albert's commentary on *Liber de causis*[22]. In the aforementioned fragments, and mainly in the one of *De causis…,* the spiritual matter is postulated as an intermediary between the first cause, lacking matter, and the multiplicity of particular objects, bearers of corporeal matter. The necessity of an intermediary form of matter emerges from the Albertist hierarchical succession of the causes, as exposed in the commentary on *De causis*: the influence of the first cause does not reach the particular objects directly, but gradually, through the mediation of several other causes. The spiritual matter is one of the mediating causes. The chapter in Albert's commentary on *Liber de causis,* treating the problem of *hyliatin,* is of great importance, because it is one of the major sources in the research of the theory of being and essence in Saint Albert's view. As the scholarship remarked,[23] the use of *hyliatin* has a double source in this commentary. Firstly, it originates in a philological error: offering the sense of an admixture of matter and being, due to a euphony with the Greek word for matter, ὕλη, to the lieu where the pseudo Aristotelian treatise discusses the admixture of species and being within the derivate entities.[24] Secondly, the use of *hyliatin* corresponds to the distinction of Boethius between *id quod est* and *quo est.* Thus, *hyliatin* acts as a principle of individuation, because only something concrete is passible of acting and suffering and, because matter is the Aristotelian principle of individuation, *hyliatin* is the material principle of individuation for the intelligences able to receive the divine revelations. However, Albert recognised the absence of a third form of matter within the non-corporal entities and, in so doing, he postulated a third degree of pure receptivity, correctly interpreting the receptive structure of the intelligences, as described in *Liber de causis. Hyliatin* is not a type of matter adequate to non-corporeal entities, but a principle of their individuation, a supposition (*suppositum*), that occupies the place of *id quod est* in Boethius's theory, a receptacle of the being, *quo est,* received from the first cause.

By comparing the use of the two concepts, we can remark how the theory read as *materia spiritualis* by our anonymous author is linked to Saint Albert's understanding of *hyliatin*. Even though both theories describe the material character of the intermediary intelligences, compared to the first Intelligence and the multiplicity of corporal objects, the theory of the spiritual matter does not imply its

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[22] Albertus Magnus, *De causis,* II, 2, 18, 110–111.

[23] Alexander Baumgarten, *Intermediaritate şi Ev Mediu* (Intermediarity and the Middle Ages) (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Viaţa Creştină, 2002), 25–54; Idem, "*Liber de causis*: teoria inteligenţei intermediare între aristotelism şi neoplatonism" (*Liber de causis*: the theory of intermediary intelligence between Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism), in *Pseudo-Aristotel, Liber de causis*, bilingual edition, trans. Alexander Baumgarten (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 2002), 107–174; Therese Bonin, *Creation as Emanation* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 15–34.

[24] Pseudo-Aristotle, *Liber de causis,* 90.

receptivity and its correspondence with the essence understood as *id quod est* or *suppositum.* Moreover, the synonymy of *materia spiritualis* and *hyliatin* is only apparent, because within the non-corporeals Saint Albert only recognised the apparent material character of the second concept, while he presented the spiritual matter as a simple intermediary between the first, active cause and the passive, corporeal objects.[25]

In the second step, the author discusses the validity of the argument concerning the eternity of the essences of objects, refuting it through Anaxagoras's theory of *homoiomeries*. The albertist position is succinctly invoked, completed by the authority fragment of Aristotle's Physics, I, 189a, 5-8. The text implicitly refers to Saint Albert's commentary on *Liber de causis.* In the second book, Albert introduces the following argument: *Propter quod formae in intelligentia acceptae, aeternae sunt et universales: acceptae autem in materia, temporales sunt et particulare: hoc est quod dicunt et Aristoteles et Boetius, quod "universale est dum intelligitur, particulare dum sentitur."[26] EDDIG*

Thus, if the Thomist argument and the first step of the Albertist argument discussed the difference between being and essence concerning the first Intelligence and the second intelligences, the second step of the Albertist argument discusses the essence of corporeal, multiple objects. The presentation is only partial, because, as we can read in the fragment above, Albert introduces a double significance of the essences of particulars. Thus, Albert theorises the eternity of objects only from the intelligible perspective, grounding his theory on Aristotle's theory of the principle of material objects,[27] and on Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy,* a view also grounded on Aristotle. The eternity and universality of the material objects is not acceptable from the sensible perspective. Henceforth, we can infirm the refutation based on the ontology of Anaxagoras, because the eternity of the essences of objects can be sustained only on an intellectual ground.

The third step of the Albertist argument, following the being and not the essence, discusses the problem of generation and corruption. We have to emphasise that the confusing use of the terms *being* and *essence* within the arguments originates in the works of Albert.[28] A proper understanding would be provided by changing them with Boethius's concepts of *quo est* and *id quod est.* Thus, as we observed when we discussed the spiritual matter, the second intelligences are composed of being (*quo est*) and essence (*suppositum, id quod est*). The essence acts as a principle of individuation, similar to matter. The author's conclusion, that being and essence are distinct, like the eternal and the corruptible, is valid, because the

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[25] Albertus Magnus, *De causis…,* II, 2, 18, 110–111.

[26] Ibid, II, 1, 19, 83–84 .

[27] Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 189a, 5–8.

[28] Therese Bonin, *Creation as Emanation,* 24–25.

individuation principle of the corporal substances is the corporal matter. However, their being emanates from the first cause.

The third argument, of Buridan, is based on his commentary on the *Metaphysics*.[29] In the eighth question, the medieval master investigates the identity of being and essence within the object and, in the ninth question, he investigates the distinction between being and essence regarding the act of rationalising. For both questions, Buridan's answer is affirmative. Thus, in its first step, the text follows Buridan's position assuming the identity of being and essence within the object and their distinction implied in the act of rationalising. For explanatory purposes, the author uses the example of the identity of light and the act of lighting, an example that does not belong to Buridan, but to Saint Albert. However, the example was not used by Albert in order to assert the identity of being and essence, but in order to support his theory of the diffusion of Being as *actus essentiae.*[30] Therefore, the conceptual definition is transferred from ontological grounds to logical grounds. The author argues how the two concepts in question refer to the same object, but from different perspectives. Essence is an absolute concept, expressed through absolute and un-composed terms, like human or animal. Being is a verbal concept, expressed through a discourse composed of accidents and the expression of the essence, like *the human is.* The core authority for Buridan's eighth question is the fragment of *Metaphysics*,[31] where Aristotle sets the identity of essence, even though it refers to a real human or the notion of human. Due to a better fitting of the Aristotelian theory through the emphasis of the predicative function of essence, Buridan uses, in the eighth question, the example of *the rose* and *being a rose,* and not Albert's example of light and the act of lighting. The master admits their real identity, but he postulates their logical distinction. Thus, the being is what is predicated relative to the particular being to whom the act of existence is inherent. The predication of the rose as essence does not concern the existence or the inexistence of an actual rose. The essence is identical to the noumenon, relative to whom the being is contingent. This is the object of knowledge and it ignores the being or the un-being of the object. Thus, being is not inherent to the object in an essential way, the object having the possibility of being or un-being. However, as Buridan emphasises in the same question, being is not something added to the essence. If not, the task to identify the origin of being would be an infinite one. In order to offer a possible solution for the problem, the author of the manuscript invokes Boethius's argument of being, interpreted as *quo est* and not as *id quod est*, but in the same paragraph he refutes the argument's validity through the argument of the limited terms and the

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[29] Johannes Buridanus, Lectura Erfordiensis in Aristotelis I –VI Metaphysicam*, together with the 15th-century* Abbreviatio Caminensis, VIII-IX, ed. L.M. de Rijk (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 75–82.

[30] Albertus Magnus, *Super Sententiarum,* I, 8, 5, 227–228.

[31] Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* IV, 2, 1003b.

transcendental terms. As William Ockham[32] puts it, a transcendental term is common to every object, like *genre, one, good* etc. A limited term is common only to a part of the objects. Therefore, the author argues that Boethius's argument is valid only for the limited terms and not for the transcendental ones and that the error of the ancients originates in ignoring this distinction.

2. The problem of predicaments

The third question of the manuscript forms a philosophical couple with the fifth, both discussing the problem of the real or nominal distinction between the predicaments and, in the latter, the difference between the predicaments of passion and substance. The distinction between predicaments is of great importance within the late medieval philosophy, being discussed throughout all its aspects: ontological, epistemological or theological. On 7 March 1277, Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, , released a list of 219 articles, containing phrases from the philosophical literature of that time, and condemned their use in the academic practices. The aim of the decree was to stop the advance of the Aristotelian philosophy and of its Averroist interpretations, which could interfere with the Christian theology. The main endangered issue was the divine omnipotence, which, even though it was formulated by Petrus Damianus and by Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences*, it had to be strengthened by confronting menacing theses, like the Aristotelian thesis of the inexistence of the void. Despite the fact that the jurisdiction of Tempier was restricted to the Parisian diocese, the decree of censorship was undertaken by the Franciscans and, later, by the universities, like the ones of Bologna, Vienna, Cologne or Erfurt. The main effect of the condemnation was to cause the establishment of a new intellectual class that questioned the Aristotelian principles, like the ones threatening the validity of the divine omnipotence.[33] Therefore, the problem of the divine omnipotence was transferred to the core of late medieval philosophy, because, if the philosophical thinking previous to the Parisian condemnation limited the divine omnipotence to the logical contradiction, God being thus unable to act in contradiction with the laws of creation, the philosophical thinking that followed the condemnation, like Buridan's, transcended the Aristotelian dogmatism and restored the plenitude of the divine omnipotence, by operating the distinction between *potentia Dei absoluta* and *potentia Dei ordinata. Potentia Dei absoluta* concerns the infinity of possibilities available to God in the anteriority of creation, which remain mere potentialities in the posteriority of creation. *Potentia Dei ordinata* concerns the actual plan of creation, i.e. the sum of potencies actualised by the choice of God

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[32] Pseudo-Ockham, *Elementarium logicae*, 7, 13, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, revised by Gedeon Gal and Joachim Giermek, in William of Ockham*, Opera philosophica VII (opera dubia et spuria)* (St. Bonaventure N.Y: St. Bonaventure University, 1988).

[33] Edward Grant, *The Nature of Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 53.

within the act of creation. Despite the fact that God has the ability to actualise the potencies excluded from the creation's plan, he does not actualise them, in order not to disturb the natural order.[34] By postulating this distinction, philosophy enables itself to research the problems by transcending the Aristotelian physics, issues like the existence of void, God's ability to create other worlds, distinct of our own, whether God is able to move our world rectilinearly or whether God has the ability to separate the accidents from substance.

The argument of the ancients is attributed to the Albertists and the Thomists, which argue the real distinction between predicaments. We must remark that, despite their admission of a real distinction between predicaments, that does not imply their severability from substance, which will be discussed in the fifth question. The ancient position is presented through the argument of logical transitivity: the predicament of quality is distinct from substance and the predicament of relation is also distinct from substance; therefore, the two predicaments have to be distinct from one another. The ancient position is presented as being based on the authority of Themistius. However, because the author vaguely names the ancients as Albertists and Thomists and because the fragment and its answer, found in the following paragraph, correspond to the place of *Lectura erfordiensis,*[35] where Buridan treats the same problem and where the name of Themistius is not mentioned, the source of the argument must be the Buridanist commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

The modern argument opens with a response to the ancient authority: because the principle *essentiae predicamentorum sunt impermixtae* must be understood not ontologically, as a real existence of the predicaments and their reciprocal real essential distinction, but as an act of predication, their essential difference consists in their specific role within the process of predication, one predicament not being able to essentially predicate in relation to another predicament, but only accidentally. However, if the argument of the ancients concerned the reciprocal distinction between predicaments, the modern argument transfers the discussion to the distinction between accidents and substance, as it can be noticed in the following arguments that discuss the difference between relationship and substance. Hence, through the fragment attributed to Themistius, the author argues for the accidental predication of the predicaments in relation with substance, exemplified through the propositions *Socrates is white* and *Socrates is a father.*[36]

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[34] Ibid, 54.

[35] Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura erfordiensis,* XI, 393, 33, 92.

[36] The modern arguing originates in Buridan's commentary on the *Metaphysics*:
For the ancient argument:
"Confirmatur per istam auctoritatem famosam quod essentie sive quiditates <diversorum> predicamentorum sunt impermixte sive diverse. Hoc enim accipitur ab Aristotile primo

The modern position is sustained through the example of relationship, and the author uses six arguments in this regard. However not all of them are faithful to the doctrine of Buridan, even though they follow the modern tradition. Despite the fact that Buridan is one of the scholars who argue that the divine power separates the accidents from substance, in this case the identity between substance and accidents must be understood in the perspective of *potentia Dei ordinata,* i.e. the natural logic which can be defied by God through miracles. As Femke J. Kok argues,[37] Buridan asserts the miraculous severability of accidents from substance. However, that does not offer the statute of substances to the accidents, because their separate existence does not happen naturally. Hence, the discussion has to be kept within the limits of the natural, but the severability of the accidents from substances must be accepted in the exceptionality of the divine intervention, like the case of the Eucharist. In this context, the master argues for the identity between substance and the predicament of relation. In his first argument, he emphasises the non-object character of relationship: if the relationship were really distinct, we would have to admit a plurality of real potencies, because it is able to enter in an infinity of relations. The second argument refutes the ontological transitivity of relationship. The third argument transcends the Buridanist position, arguing that, if the relationship were really distinct from substance, it would also be a substance implying the property of divisibility and, therefore, the property of quantity, from here resulting a factual contradiction: *quod in maiore homine esset maior paternitas et in minore homine minor paternitas, quod est falsum.* Even though he refutes the real distinction between accidents and substance, Buridan offers a special statute to the predicament of quantity, by using the example of condensation and dilution. He accepts a real distinction between substance and quantity, because, in the named phenomenon, what changes is not the substance, but its quantity.[38] Thus, if the

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Posteriorum et a Commentatore duodecimo Methaphisice. Modo figura et cera que est figurata sunt diversorum predicamentorum." Johannes Buridanus*, Lectura Erfordiensis,* XI, 393, 33, 92.

For the modern argument:

"Similiter ad ultimam auctoritatem potest dici quod essentie predicamentorum sunt impermixte ad istum sensum quod termini de uno predicamento non ponantur modo essentiali de termino alterius predicamenti et quiditative, sed modo denominative." Buridanus*, Lectura erfordiensis,* XI, solutio, 409, 14, 95.

[37] Femke J. Kok, *John Buridan's Commentary on the Metaphysics*, in *A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, eds. Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 495–550.

[38] *"Ad istam quaestionem respondeo secundum viam antiquam quod nulla substantia est magnitudo sive quod materia non est magnitudo. Et ad hoc adduco primo unam rationem naturalem: ponentes enim quod omnis res extensa sit magnitudo concedunt rarefactionem et condesationem fieri per motum localem secundum quem partes substantiae elongantur ab invicem vel approximantur ab invicem ad obtinendum minorem locum absque hoc quod*

author followed the Buridanist view, it would not imply the identity of quantity and substance and the fact that a larger man would imply a larger amount of paternity, because the phenomenon of quantity change demonstrates that what is transformed is not the substance, but its quantity. That is why Buridan defined the predicament of quantity by following the *via antiqua* and accepting its real distinction from substance.

The fourth modern argument sustains, through the example of causality, the invalidity of the real existence of relationship, because, if the relationship were a predicament truly anchored in substance, the implication would be that a certain agent would be able to produce infinite potencies existing in a real way and acting through an infinite distance. The relationship is based on causality, through the fact that one member of the relationship gains a note of likeness with another member of the relationship, ignoring the distance separating them. The author tries to emphasise the absurdity of the realist thesis and, to this purpose, he formulates an example: the white man named Socrates living in Erfordia and the black man named Plato living in Babilonia are separated by an infinite distance; through the fact that Plato whitens himself, the likeness is produced, and, therefore, the relation is created through an infinite distance and has to be acknowledged as existent. However, the example does more than prove that the realist thesis is absurd; it is truly important in the endeavour to geographically localise the place where the manuscript was produced. The text uses Erfordia as an example of the closest proximity and Babilonia as an example of the most remote farness, therefore offering reasons to consider the *via moderna* University of Erfurt as the place where the text was written.

The fifth argument once again discusses the problem of the second argument, emphasising that a relationship does not imply a real transformation, and it defines the relationship following the modern way: the relation and its fundament are not really distinct, except in a modal way, i.e. a relative term that predicates an accidental mode, relative to the subject or the fundament. The last argument presents the function of the relationship in the Buridanist view, it augments the position of Buridan, it operates the distinction through different types of relationships and it concludes the rationalization. Therefore, in Buridan's view,[39] the relationship is caused relative to the act through which the soul compares objects. In other words, the relationship has a comparative functionality. However, the author operates a distinction. Thus, when the relationship is based on substance, it is caused concerning a concretely existing object, like paternity, based unmediated on father's substance, because the paternity is founded between a concrete

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quantitas corrumpatur." Johannes Buridanus, *Physica,* XXI, 1, in Benoit Patar*, La physique de Bruges de Buridan et le traite du ciel d'Albert de Saxe*, vol. II (Longueuil: Les Presses Philosophiques, 2001), 75–82.

[39] Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura erfordiensis,* XXVII, solutio, 682, 160.

individuality, gaining the fatherhood quality, and something predicated in an absolute way, like human or animal. The relationship is mediated when it is founded on quantity and the mediation is operated, through quantity, in substance, as it is exemplified by the author through the relation of likeness between two white men. The author thus draws the conclusion. Firstly, he affirms the simultaneity of the predicament of relation, which, even though it is split between logical and ontological, when the soul compares the objects, the two parts are engaged simultaneously, as the likeness and the objects being alike. Secondly, the mediation allows to postulate a difference between the relationship and substance. Because the relationship concerns a concrete object, it is predicated about substance, like the fact of being alike. The relationship that concerns an abstraction is predicated about quantity that mediates its foundation in substance. Thus, the author exhibits the identity of substance and relationship as valid only on the level of the unmediated relationship, like the paternity; but, due to the quantitative mediation, he admits a logical difference between substance and relationship, when the relationship is predicated about absolute terms.

The fifth question treats the difference between substance and accidents by applying the general debate of the third question to the difference between the predicament of passion and its subject. Therefore, without naming the philosopher who authored the argument, the author exhibits the ancient position in accepting the real distinction between passion and its subject, through the fact that, according to the *Metaphysics*,[40] where passion is placed through its definition under the genre of quality, the passion is an accident and the subject is a substance. As it was argued in the third question, the ancients assert a real distinction between accidents and substance. Henceforth, they admit a real difference between passion and the subject of passion.

The modern position is again presented through Buridan, whose theory implies the modal distinction between passion and its subjects. In his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Buridan discusses the subject of the science of metaphysics and says that it is different from the subject that is distinct from passion. Through this, Buridan postulates the purely nominal distinction between passion and subject: both refer to the same *suppositum*, but passion adds an additional connotation to substance. The author uses the method of *reductio ad absurdum* in order to argue for the modern position. Therefore, the main premise of the second argument consists of a fragment of Buridan,[41] based on the Aristotelian theory of the

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[40] Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* 1022b, 15.
[41] Johannes Buridanus, "*Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima (de tertia lectura)",* I, 5; II, 2*,* in Jack Zupko*, John Buridan's Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation of Book III of His "Questions on Aristotle's "de Anima", with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays*, Dissertation, Cornell University, 1989, 201, 234.

anteriority of substance relative to accidents, by time, definition and nature.[42] As it can be observed, in Buridan's commentary on *De anima,* the philosopher accepts the Aristotelian principle, but only in form, because the matter of the object is acknowledged only through accidents. The master argues that, if we admit the real difference between substance and passion, we have to admit the possibility that they exist separately from one another, i.e. laughter exists separately from the human subject and the human subject independently from his passions. The conclusion exposes the absurdity of the ancient position.

The third argument, through a *reductio ad absurdum*, presents once more the position of the ancients from a nominalist perspective. By demonstrating that the ancient theories are inconsistent, the author theorises the passion as an essential aptitude, distinct from the subject only within the act of reason. The author offers the example of laughter and of the ability to laugh, an example which had also been offered by Buridan. Thus, the passion is an aptitude for an act, and, in order to distinguish the aptitude from the act, the author uses two notions of medieval logic, *materia naturali* and *materia contingenti.* The two notions represent types of modal propositions, which, by adding the notion of *materia remota*, circumscribe the areas of essential and accidental predication. *Materia naturali* represents the necessity: what is attributed to an object must be attributed to all of the objects. *Materia remota* represents the impossibility: what is retracted from an object must be retracted from all objects. The two notions constitute the essential predication. *Materia contingenti* concerns an accidental link between subject and predicate, postulating a third genre of modal propositions, that is neither necessary, nor impossible, but contingent, and it forms the accidental predication.[43] According to this logic, the proposition *The human is laughable* is a necessary proposition, while the proposition *A human laughs* is an accidental one. The difference between subject and passion is accepted only under these conditions. The essential aptitude, i.e. the soul operating through its various faculties, distinguishing each other only through the variety of functions, is not different from the subject, but it is the very subject able of an act. However, as it is argued in the fourth argument, the essential aptitude is not a distinct part of the subject, but it is the very subject in the state of the possibility for a certain act. The last part of the modern argument reiterates the modal argument, demonstrating that the difference between passion and subject should not be accepted as both having different essences, but through the fact that passion constitutes an accidental predication, because it implies the *actus vivendi*. In other words, the proposition predicating the passion pertains to the contingency

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[42] Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* VII, 1028a.
[43] Gino Roncaglia, "Modal Logic in Germany at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century: Christoph Scheibler's Opus Logicum", in *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory*, eds. Russel L. Friedman, Lauge O. Nielsen (Dordrecht: Springer-Science&Business Media, 2003), 259.

described above, because its reference implies the accidental note of the activation of an aptitude.

A frequently used argument throughout the text, labelled at the end of the fifth question as a Parisian article, is: *quaecumque sunt distincta realiter possunt separari et separatim conservari.* The expression *possunt separari et separatim conservari* is frequently present within the medieval philosophical literature, as in the works of Duns Scotus or in the in the glosses of *De consolatione philosophiae in usum Delphini,* the last presences being attested to Descartes and Leibniz. The author uses the argument to sustain the modern position when the problem of the predicaments is discussed. The argument was frequently used by Buridan regarding the same problem. We claim the author took the argument directly from Buridan's work, who, as Edward Grant indicates in his commentary on the 1277 condemnation, used the formula in a direct link to three of the articles of that condemnation.[44] Because the 139, 140 and the 141 articles were condemned, as they implied the problem of the Eucharist,[45] despite Buridan not being a theologian, but a mere magister of the Parisian arts faculty, he discussed the problem of divine omnipotence and the problem of the Eucharistic transubstantiation. Thus, in the commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, Buridan uses the divine omnipotence to argue the real difference between substance and accidents and does so in order to argue the possible existence of the void: God can create an accident without subject and he can separate the accidents from their subject and, being separated, to conserve them in that state (*potest accidentia separare a subjectis suis et separatim conservare*). In the same manner, God can create a third dimension, different from any type of substance or accident. Moreover, God can facilitate the interpenetration of these dimensions by creating a three-dimensional void space, capable of containing natural objects. We must emphasise the fact that the position of the author, who introduces the Parisian article to support the modern position, and the position of Buridan are not in contradiction; the two positions complete each other, if seen through the distinction between *potentia Dei absoluta* and *potentia Dei ordinata.* Buridan accepts the real distinction between accidents and substance only as a possibility inherent to the divine, absolute omnipotence. Nevertheless, he excludes it from the sum of possibilities introduced in the world by God in the act of creation. Otherwise, the position of Buridan would imply the real presence of

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[44] "139*. Quod accidens existens sine subiecto non est accidens, nisi equivoce; et quod impossibile est quantitatem sive dimensionem esse per se: hoc enim esset ipsam substantiam.*
140. *Quod facere accidens esse sine subiecto habet rationem impossibilis implicantis contradictionem.*
141. *Quod deus non potest facere accidens esse sine subiecto, nec plures dimensiones simul esse*." David Piché, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277* (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 120–122.
[45] Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain: Publications universitaires; Paris: Vander-Oyez, 1977), 287–291.

accidents separated from their substance and actually existing on their own as substances, which is an absurdity refutable at the exam of nature, where the quantity, quality or relation exist only in the predication of a substance. The formula appears again in Buridan's commentary on *Metaphysics*, IV. By invoking the same theological argument and the example of the Eucharist, while discussing the difference between *esse* and *essentia,* the philosopher accepts the real separation of accidents from substance.[46]

IV. Conclusions

The aim of the present study was to argue that the text *Dissensiones inter viam antiquam et viam modernam* is included in the *via moderna* tradition. We examined each of the hypotheses by exposing the peculiar character of the text within the table of contents of the manuscript, the possible composition place, the possible transcription place as the 15th-century University of Erfurt, the particular character of the *antiqui et moderni* phenomenon in Central European universities and the philosophical changes that came with it, and, mostly, by presenting its philosophical characteristics and Jean Buridan as its main authority. The purpose and function of the text are not explicit, but its participation to an eminently academic dispute, the naming of Erfurt, home of one of the main *via moderna* universities, and the naming of Buridan, whose works functioned as academic textbooks within the *via moderna* universities, suggest the academic character of the text. Nevertheless, the function of the text within the university is uncertain. It could be a regular lesson, held by a master, hypothesis sustained by the rhetoric of the prologue, where the theme, the parts of the dispute and the structure of the presentation are announced. However, the 15th century academic practices implied different didactical institutions, the *disputatio* being one of the most important. The text has the structure of a dispute, which could have been written by a student or master, as a scholastic exercise aimed to gather a sum of arguments useful in a dispute on diverse problems. The widespread use of paper, starting with the 15th century, allowed the students to take notes of the arguments used within the disputes. Therefore, the text could be a made-up dispute, for exercise, in which the arguments of both traditions are briefly exposed.

Another possible academic functionality of the text may be that of an occasional academic discourse, held by a master or student when obtaining an academic degree. Nevertheless, the lack of addressing formulas toward the

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[46] *"Dico ergo quod nos tenemus ex fide quod per potentiam Dei accidentia possunt separari a substantiis et separatim conservari sine substantia sic subjecta, unde dicitur quod sic, sine subjecto, subsistent in sacramento altaris."* Johannes Buridanus, *Subtilissimae Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis* (Paris, 1509), fol. 74r, bk. 4, 9.8. Reprinted as *Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Physik* (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1964).

academic authorities, which had to be present at such an occasion, and the lack of solemnity indicate the questionable possibility of this functionality.

The inclusion of the text in the *via moderna* tradition is indicated right from the prologue, where the author names William Ockham as *viae modernae reformator singularis.* Not only is the author full of reverence towards the authority of Ockham, participating in a Central European medieval practice, presented above, but he also endeavours to justify the modern cause. Thus, Ockham's reformatory character must be understood as a limit within the logical and epistemological interpretation of Aristotle, the author placing Ockham as a demarcation point between the ancient realist interpretation and the nominalist modern interpretation. If Porfir's *Isagoge* constitutes the debut for the quarrel of the universals, the author establishes Ockham as a turning point in solving the problem, awarding him great respect, appropriate to the one who inaugurated the new way of interpreting the Aristotelian corpus. Ockham's presence is historically justified; however, the real textual authority is Jean Buridan. Hence, the tradition of the text is historically circumscribed by naming its initiator, Ockham, and its Parisian moment of development. Even though the modern exegesis questions the actual existence of a Buridanist school in Paris,[47] the manuscript circumscribes the history of the modern tradition not from an institutional view, but a doctrinaire one, presenting the main members of the disputes concerning the nature of the universals, the difference between *esse* and *essentia* or the distinction between predicaments.

The most cited work is Buridan's *Lectura Erfordiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysicam I-VI*,[48] preserved in only one copy at the Allgemeinbibliothek zu Erfurt.[49] This is a didactical purposed version of Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, presenting significant differences from *Lectura ultima,* the text considered the final version of the Buridanist commentary, but, in fact, a distinct version. The commentary's editor, L. M. De Rijk, emphasises its importance for the research of the academic philosophical practices in the late Central European Middle Ages. The manuscript of the Buridanist commentary is attested in the first half of the 15th century, thus close to the temporal interval of the discussed manuscript. Commenting the third question, we indicated how the Buridanist argument on the difference between predicaments provided the source for the arguments of the manuscript, the author appropriating the entire modern argument from the fourth

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[47] William J. Courtenay, "The university of Paris at the time of Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme", *Vivarium: Journal for Mediaeval Philosophy and the Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages* 42 (2004): 3–17; J. M. M. H Thijssen, "The Buridan school reassessed. John Buridan and Albert of Saxony," *Vivarium: Journal for Mediaeval Philosophy and the Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages* 42 (2004), 18–42.
[48] Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura erfordiensis*.
[49] Mss Erfurt, Amplon, *f.* 322.

question of *Lectura erfordiensis.*[50] Moreover, Buridan provides argumentative fragments for the first *quaestio*, where, citing *De anima,* 430b, the author cites Aristotle through the paraphrase of Buridan from his commentary on the Aristotelian work.[51]

The particularity of the late medieval intellectual life consists in a mixture between great authoritarian texts and small individual intellectual progresses, all within the university, where, through academic practices, new ways of discussing nature, God or logics were developed. The text under scrutiny attests this type of intellectual context, since it is an anonymous work composed within a Central European university and a text with references to the works of Jean Buridan, one of the major medieval philosophical authorities. Thus, we may find here a pattern that anticipates the birth of modernity, the university having been the place where a critical reading of Aristotle was developed, attested through the works of masters, like Buridan. Moreover, the university was the medium where a critical attitude towards the authoritarian scholastic philosophy was developed through disputes and lessons questioning the ancient methodologies, through new answers offered to the philosophical questions, through the development of new questions concerning the nature and the practice of a philosophy that anticipates the modern experimentalism. The text that we introduced is integrated in the second part of our exposed pattern, through its dialectical particularity presenting the *via moderna* revolution parallel to the answers given to the same questions by the *via antiqua* philosophers. Thus, the text, like a large number of other such texts, *disputationes, reportationes,* academic discourses, still available only in manuscripts, is a major instrument for the study of the late medieval academic establishment. If the early modern philosophy is generally characterised by the refutation of Aristotelianism and scholasticism and by the experimental methodology, even though the contemporary scholarship exhibited the scholastic particularities present in the modern works, e.g. Etienne Gilson's reading of Descartes, the roots of this revolution must be searched for in the late medieval academic transformations. Our text attests this kind of change in the practice of philosophy, citing texts that respond critically to the Aristotelian problem of the severability of the accidents from substance through the example of an experiment: blowing up a pig's bladder to assert the real difference between quantity and substance. Also, the text is included in the great discussion on God's omnipotence, by tackling the problem of the difference between accidents and substance and by its references to Buridan's interrogation on the same problem. Therefore, the text outlines an image of the late medieval philosophical practices. Even though it is short, its importance is great and its greatness grows if the text is placed within the large amount of similar, yet unstudied texts. If we are correct, and the late medieval philosophical practices and

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[50] Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura erfordiensis,* IV, 64–81.

[51] Ibid, *De anima, q.12*, 130–140.

the roots of modernity are twofolded, as an academic schism between philosophical authorities and a plurality of individual endeavours, the importance of this text consists in its contribution to the study of the late medieval academic revolution.

Appendix

Dissensiones inter viam antiquam et viam modernam

[1ra] Notandum quod doctores antiqui Albertus et beatus Thomas ex una parte, Johannes Biridani, Marsilius et praesertim magister Wilhelmus Occami, quem moderni Occam vocant "viae modernae reformator singularis", parte ex altera, in multis punctis materialibus naturalibus <et> logicalibus discordant, diversimode sentientes seu scolastice dogmatizantes, de quibus punctis sex modo quaestiuncularis recitabuntur, quarum prima est:

Q. 1. Utrum sit ponendum ex natura universale praeter intellectus operationem, sicut ponenda universalia realia ab individuis separata

Ad quod respondent platonici, quod universalia praeter intellectus operationem ponenda, sicut[1] praeter intellectus operationem sunt ponenda realia ab individuis separata, moti ex hac ratione quia "oportet omnem intellectionem simplicem esse veram", ex III[o] *De anima*[2]. Sed multae sunt intellectiones simplices universales. Ergo etiam multa sunt universalia realia. Consequentia tenet ex hoc quia "singulare non potest esse obiectum intellectionis universalis"[3], ex quo sint diversarum rationum. Haec positio est falsa et reprobata per Aristotelem VII[o] *Metaphysicae*[4], I[o] *Posteriorum*[5], I[o] *De Anima*[6] et I[o] *Ethicorum*[7]. Sed ad rationem respondetur quod duplex est circumstantia, una est materialis, alia formalis[8]. Magis ad hoc quod omnis intellectio simplex sit vera, non requiritur circumstantia formalis, sed sufficit circumstantia materialis. Sed sic est de re singulari sive individuali, quod ipsa <est> obiectum materiale universalis cognitionis, licet res singularis secundum suam individualitatem non sit obiectum formale universalis intellectionis concepta

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[1] ponenda sicut] *inv. W.*

[2] oportet ... veram] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *De an.*, III, 6, 430b 26, *sed verba sunt Buridani, cf.* IOH. BURID., *De an.,*III, 1, 3, p.144

[3] singulare ... universalis] cf. ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.,* VII, 15, 1039b 27 -1040a 5

[4] Aristotelem...Metaphysicae] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.,* VII, 15-16, 1040a 6-1041a 5

[5] I[o] Posteriorum] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Anal. Post.*, I, 24, 85a

[6] I[o] De anima] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., De an., I, 1, 402b 5-10

[7] I[o] Ethicorum] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Ethica,* I, 4, 1095a 14-1095b 13

[8] duplex...formalis] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.,* VII, 3, 1029a 1-1029a 30

terminandi speciem intelligibilem universalem. Sed quidam alii antiqui, ut albertistae, thomistae, ponunt universalia praeter intellectus operationem realia, non separata a singularibus, sed coniuncta, probantes hoc sic: una est communitas[9] essentialis omnium individuorum speciei humanae, sed illa essentia non est essentia singularis Socratis, Platonis etc., nec etiam est ficta.

Sed hoc re-**[1rb]**clamant moderni isto modo. Nam si essent ponenda universalia realia coniuncta, ut ipsi asserunt, talia essent priora suis singularibus ut per se concedunt, sed omne prius potest absolvi a suo posteriori. Hoc stante fierent platonica argumenta, quia, quecumque sunt distincta, possunt separari et separatim conservari. Et confirmatio modernorum patet ex intentione Commentatoris super III^{um} *De anima*[10] dicente: si aliqua[11] universalis poni deberet illa a specie inteligibili ortum haberet; si ergo modus universalis aliquis in rebus reperiatur, verior in intentionibus reservatur.

Q. 2. Utrum essentia differt ab esse

Ad hoc respondit beatus Thomas ponens duo per ordinem. Primum quod in prima intelligentia sive in Deo idem sint esse et essentia[12]. Probatur, quia in prima essentia nulla est compositio, sed mera simplicitas, ut patet XII^{o} *Metaphysicae*[13]. Secundum quod ponit est quod in omnibus aliis inteligentiis sive angelis esse et essentia differunt realiter[14]. Quod sic probat, quia nisi in angelis esset praedicta compositio, non videtur modus per quem potest salvari maior simplicitas in prima inteligentia sive in Deo quam in secundis vel angelis ex eo quod, sicut in intelligentia prima non est compositio ex materia et forma, nec ex partibus integralibus, sic etiam in secundis intelligentiis, necessarium est ponere differentiam inter esse et essentiam in angelis sive in secundis intelligentiis[15]. Sed motivum huius opinionis non valet. Nam sufficienter salvatur maior simplicitas in prima intelligentia quam in secundis per hoc quod in intelligentiis est compositio ex potentia et speciebus intelligibilibus, secundum unam opinionem, vel ex potentia et actibus inteligendi, secundum aliam opinionem. Nullam autem compositio reperitur in Deo seu in intelligentia prima, igitur motivum opinionis dictae non valet.

Dicit tamen Albertus quod intelligentiae secundae sunt compositae ex actu et potentia[16], quae actus et potentia est potestas recipiendi revelationes divinas et

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[9] communitas] communa *W.*

[10] Commentatoris…De anima] *cf.* Averr., *In De an.,* III, 39, 20, p.505

[11] si aliqua] *iter. W.*

[12] Primum…essentia] *cf.* Thomas de Aq., *De ente*, V, p.378

[13] *Probatur...Metaphysicae*] *cf.* Arist. Lat., *Metaph.,* XII, 7, 1072a 32-34

[14] inteligentiis…realiter] *cf.* Thomas de Aq., *De ente*, V, 378.

[15] necessarium ... intelligentiis] *iter. W.*

[16] intelligentiae...potentia] *cf.* Alb. Mag., *De praed.* , I, 3, p.156

hanc potentiam vocat 'materiam spiritualem'[17]. Sed Albertus dicit et ponit duo per ordinem. Primum sciendum **[1va]** quod essentiae rerum sunt aeterne[18], quod satis manifeste deducit super I[um] *Physicorum*[19]. Sed simpliciter haec minus opinioni praetactae valent. Nam secundum istam opinionem rediret opinio Anaxagorae, qui dixit quod licet esse in quolibet pro tanto, quia secundum positionem suam tunc ex certa portione materiae primae possunt infinite esse formae generales preexistentes generaliter secundum essentiam, et per consequens opinio Anaxagorae rediret. Sed secundum dictum suum est quod res accipit generationem et corruptionem secundum esse et non secundum essentiam. Sed ista positio iterum non valet, quia essentiale non potest poni substantia, ut ipse per se concedit. Si ergo poneretur accidens, tunc periret omnis generatio et corruptio simpliciter dicta. Ex istis duabus propositionibus secundum Albertum infertur id certum quod esse et essentia differunt realiter sicut aeternum et coruptibile.

Sed Biridanus et scola moderna respondent ad dubium, quod esse et essentia idem sunt realiter, sed differunt solum secundum actum rationis, sicut lux et lucere idem sunt in re, differentia tamen secundum rationis actum. Unde dicit quod essentiae correspondet conceptus absolutus, esse correspondet conceptus verbalis, connotativus terminus principale temporalis, id est connotat quod illa res principaliter coexistit tempori. Item essentia est res designata per terminum absolutum incomplexum, scilicet 'homo' vel 'animal', sed esse designatur per orationem compositam ex accidente et infinito, ut hominem esse. Et probat Biridanus positionem suam auctoritate Aristotelis IV[o] *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit quod "idem est homo et ens homo et unus homo[20]". Et idem confirmat Aristoteles processu textuali in II[o] *Posteriorum* ubi dicit: "Quaestio quaerens videlicet centaurus[21][22]. Sed non est questio ponens in numerum, id est non est differentia realis numeralis inter centaurum[23]. Et eadem sententiam vult Averroes super V[o] *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit quod quaestio quaerens utrum homo est animal, vel animal est homo non est quaestio ponens in numerum. Et probat Biridanus amplius intentionem suam, tali ratione essentia secundum se est aliquid. Ergo, secundum se habebit esse, eo quod esse est proprium entis, nihil ergo habet esse per se et essentialiter, et sic habetur propositum, quod esse non est quid supradditum essentiae, cum nihil **[1vb]** habet esse per esse superadditum, cum illud iterum quaeratur de illo cui sit per se vel per aliquid, et sic in infinitum procedendo. Sed id

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[17] materiam spiritualem] *cf.* Alb. Mag., *De int. et intel.,* I,1, 7, p.488a; *In Sent.,* II, 18, 8, p.324b; *De causis,* I, 1, 5, p. 12a

[18] essentiae...aeterne] *cf.* Alb. Mag, *De praed.,* 7, 12, p.295b; *De causis,* II, 1, 19, p.84b

[19] I[um] Physicorum] *cf.* Arist. Lat., *Phys.,* I, 7, 189b 5-8.

[20] idem … homo] *cf.* Arist. Lat., *Metaph.,* IV, 2, 1003b 16.

[21] centenarius] centaurus *W.*

[22] quaestio … centaurus] *cf.* Arist. Lat., *Anal. Post.,* II, 1, 89b 10

[23] centenarium] centaurum *W.*

argumentum convenienter solvunt antiqui, quod id esse est esse quo et non quod. Sed haec solutio non valet, quia licet habeat medium in terminis limitatis, tamen non habet locum in terminis transcendentibus, unde mutatio quod est in quo est, licet causare potest fallaciam figurae dictionis in terminis limitatis, non tamen habet id locum in transcendentibus, cum albedo non suscipit denominationem concretam, quia ut ille idem ponit unum simpliciter dictum convertitur cum ente, cum igitur non superadditum esset, ens necessario esset unum, et sic ipsa solutio peccat ex illorum terminorum ignorantia.

Q. 3. Utrum distincte praedicamenta inter se differunt formaliter <et> realiter

Ad hoc antiqui respondent, ut thomistae, albertistae, quod sic, probantes ex eo quia qualitas differt a substantia essentialiter et relatio a substantia essentialiter, ergo etiam differunt realiter. Antecedens patet ex *Praedicamentis*[24] et probant hoc auctoritate Themistii dicentis essentiae praedicamentorum sunt impermixtae[25].

Ad hoc respondent moderni, quod dictum Themistii et aliorum idem profitentium non debet sic intelligi quod pro quaelibet praedicamento oporteret poni unam essentiam obiectualiter realiter distinctam a qualibet alia. Sed sic differunt essentialiter, quod terminus unius praedicamenti non potest vere et essentialiter praedicari de alio termino aliquae praedicamenti, licet bene accidentaliter[26], ut haec non est essentialis 'Socrates est albus' vel 'Socrates est pater'. Et probatur, ut specialiter, de relatione quae principaliter fundatur in substantiam immediate, et relatio est praedicamentum speciale, et ii non differunt realiter a substantia. Probatur: relatio paternitatis non differt realiter a Socrate patre suo <et> a suo fundamento. Probatur, quia sic tunc in causa rei essent ponenda infinita accidentia eadem actu, quia eadem res ad infinita potest referi. Sunt enim in eadem relationes[27] ostendi ut in Socrate est essentia (?) et identitas, habitudo et diversitas, **[2ra]** relatio et aequalitas essentiis.

Secundo probatur eadem opinio: id quod inexistit rei sive est in ipsa re na<tura> facta transmutatione, haec non debet poni ens reale, sed sic est de relatione. Nam si Socrates sit album ut quatuor et Plato efficiatur albus ut quatuor, Socrates refertur ad Platonem nulla stante transmutatione in Socrate.

Tertio probatur sic: si relatio esset realiter et formaliter distincta a substantia vel a fundamento, sequeretur quod esset accidens reale, sed hoc est falsum, quia nihil esset accidens divisibile vel indivisibile, sed nullum illorum probatur

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[24] Antecedens…Praedicamentis] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Anal. Post.*, I, 5, 74b 5 sqq.

[25] Antecedens...impermixtae] *cf.* IOH. BURID*., Metaphysica I – VI*, q. 11, quaestio, par. 393, p.92

[26] non...accidentaliter] *cf*. IOH. BURID*., Metaphysica I – VI,* q 11, sol., par. 409, p.95

[27] relationes] *iter. W.*

quod non indivisibile, quia nullum accidens indivisibile est ponendum[28] in aliquo subiecto divisibili. Etiam implicat aliquod accidens esse reale indivisibile, quia omne tale fortiter naturam convertibili esset divisibile. Probatur, quia tunc esset extensum et magnum et tunc sequeretur ulterius quod in maiore homine esset maior paternitas et in minore homine minor paternitas, quod est falsum.

Quarto idem sic probatur: si relatio esset accidens realiter inhaerens substantiae vel suae fundamento, tunc sequeretur quod aliquod accidens reale posset generari per aliquod agens infinite potentiae per infinitam distantiam. Id patet posito quod Socrates sit albus in Erfordia et Plato sit niger residens in Babilonia vel alias per infinitam distantiam distans, et dealbetur Plato per certam causam agentem, tunc Socrates qui prius fuit dissimilis Platoni erit Platoni similis, et illam similitudinem non causat aliud agens nisi albedinem producens in Platone, qui[29] per infinitam distantiam distat a Socrate.

Quinto sic: si relatio esset distincta sive esset[30] accidens reale, sequeretur quod subiectum mutaretur realiter per eum[31] accessum et recessum. Sed hoc est falsum, quia paternitas adveniens Socrati nullam causat in eo alterationem realem, ut etiam duxit ratio secunda. Ex isto patet conclusive quod relatio et suum fundamentum non differunt realiter, sed solum modaliter, hoc est, terminus relativus exprimit quemdam modum accidentalem circa subiectum sive fundamentum.

Ulterius sciendum quod secundum intentionem Biridani **[2rb]** relatio uno modo causatur pro actu animae quo anima comparat res admodum[32], sed alio modo relatio causatur pro illo pro quo concretum, scilicet pater, supponit. Pater enim supposuit pro re quae significatur per terminum absolutum 'Socrates' homo vel animal, et tale est verum fundamentum dummodo relatio fundatur in substantiam. Sed quando fundatur in quantitate, ut similitudo quae habetur de duobus albis, immediate fundatur in qualitate mediante, aut scilicet mediante qualitate in substantiam, quoniam etiam immediate fundatur in quantitate mediante quantitate in substantiam, ut patet de qualitate cuius subiectum immediatum est quantitatis. Quibus stantibus aliqua ponuntur conclusive per ordinem. Primum: relatio et suum fundamentum non distinguuntur causando relationem pro illo pro quo suppositus abstractum, ut paternitas et fundamentum[33] pro illo pro quo supponit[34] concretum, ut pater semper enim supponit pro eadem re nisi ubi connotatio concreti superaddit aliquid reale ut simile et similitudo eaedem causando relationem active, scilicet pro

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[28] est ponendum] *iter. W.*

[29] qui] quod *W.*

[30] esset] essent *W.*

[31] eum] eam *W.*

[32] anima...admodum] *cf.* IOH. BURID*., Metaphysica I – VI*, q. 27, sol., par. 682, p.160

[33] fundamentum] *scr. ill. sed corr. sup. lin. W.*

[34] supponit] abstractum *add. sed del. W.*

actu quo mediante anima comparat sive refert rerum admodum. Relatio distinguitur a suo fundamento, quia sic relatio est accidens et fundamentum substantia. Item causando relationem pro illo pro quo supponit concretum, aliqua relatio distinguitur a fundamento saltem mediatione ut simul supponunt ut simile supponit pro substantia, scilicet Socrate, sed similitudo supponit pro quantitate. Similiter aequale supponit pro substantia et aequalitas pro quantitate, et sic patet quod aliqua relatio non est distincta a suo fundamento realiter, ut paternitas a Socrate patre, certa tamen relatio a suo fundamento distinguitur ut similitudo quae est qualis distinguitur a Socrate simili, quae est substantia universaliter, tamen haec est vera quod nulla relatio distinguitur a suo fundamento immediate. Nam fundamentum similitudinis immediatum est qualis aqua realiter non distinguitur.

Q. 4. Utrum potentiae animae distinguantur ab anima realiter et inter se realiter et formaliter

Ad hoc respondet Albertus quod potentiae animae differunt secundum proprias essentias, id est realiter <et> formaliter, tamen non differunt secundum substantias sive subiective[35]. Et hoc sic probat, nam sicut **[2va]** differunt quod est et quo est, ita differunt quod potest et quo potest.

Sed ista positio non[36] placet modernis. Ponunt enim moderni, quod potentiae animae principales non sunt realiter ab ipsa distinctae, sed sunt ipsa anima met potens exercere diversas operationes vitales per diversa organa ad hoc deputata[37], et nisi sic, sequeretur quod potentia intellectiva esset infinitae potentiae realiter ab intellectu distinctae, quod est valde absurdum dicere. Sequela probatur, quia secundum Philosophum III^o *De anima*[38] intellectus *"est quodammodo omnia"*, et hoc specificans dicit intellectus agens est "omnia facere", intellectus possibilis est "omnia fieri". Patet etiam ibidem auctoritate Philosophi III^o *De anima*[39], capitulo 1°, ubi dicit: non ab altero absolutum appetitivae et intellectivae, sed secundum rationem solum, id est differunt solum secundum speciem intelligibilem. Quo non obstante positio Alberti probabilitatem habet sive probabilis est in via sua. In materia autem probabili non est inconsequens sapientem sapienti contradicere.

Q. 5. Utrum propria passio realiter distinguitur a suo subiecto

Ad quod respondent antiqui, quod propria passio et suum subiectum habent se ut essentialiter et realiter differentia, eo quod passio essentialiter est

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[35] potentiae...subiective] *cf.* ALB. MAG., *De an.,* II, 1, 11, p.80a
[36] non] differunt *add. sed. del. W.*
[37] potentiae...deputata] *cf.* IOH. BURID., *De an.,* q. 17, pp.189-196
[38] III^o De Anima] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *De an.,* III, 4, 430a 15-17
[39] III^o De Anima] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *De an.,* III, 1, 429a 10-13

qualitas[40], eo quod essentialiter tenetur sub qualitate, sed subiectum est substantia, modo implicat unum et idem esse realiter subiectum et accidens. Sed Biridanus cum certis modernis dicit quod propria passio non distinguitur realiter a subiecto, sed tantum modaliter[41]. Cuius ratio, quia antiqui dicunt propriam passionem progredi et fluere a principiis essentialibus speciei, quod falsum ostenditur ex I° Metaphisicae, quia actus sunt suppositorum, sed principia essentialia speciei sub esse specifice considerata non habet rationem veri suppositi, quare nec ipsis attribui potest active et per consequens non sunt causa fluxus, ut ipsi dicunt. Ex falsitate igitur opinionum antiquorum trahitur positionis veritas modernorum.

Secundo, ideo non dicuntur differre realiter, quia "substantia praecedit accidens tempore, natura et deffinitione"[42]. Si ergo pro- **[2vb]**pria passio sit distincta realiter a subiecto tamquam accidens stabit in instanti prioritatis humanis sine ridere aut subiectum sine propria passione, quod est impossibile.

Tertio, ideo moderni non ponunt distinctionem realem, quia ponentes distinctionem realem inter subiectum et propriam passionem incidunt in multa contra proprias opiniones, quia sic ponentes non habent ponere potentias distinctas quas tamen distinctas asserunt. Et quod hoc sequeretur patet, quia sic opinantes habent ponere quod propria passio immediate progrediatur ab essentialibus principiis speciei. Sed etiam potentiae sunt de genere qualitatis; sequeretur quod erit causatio ante praedictas potentias, et per consequens non oportet poni potentias, nam superflue ponerentur, si causatio et operatio possunt sine eis salvari. Et ideo dicendum est quod propria passio, ut ridere, supponit pro homine connotativo aptitudinem essentialem in ordine ad actum ridendi. Sed actus ridendi est extrinsecus speciei et ideo haec propositio 'homo ridet' est in materia contingenti, sed illa 'homo est risibilis' est in materia naturali. Et dixit connotando aptitudinem essentialem[43], unde haec aptitudo essentialis est met res apta et aptitudo totum conceptum aptum, igitur subiectum et eius propria passio realiter non distiguuntur, sed solum secundum rationem, et licet idem sint in re, tamen proprium importat idem quod subiectum sub modo extrinseco induunt (?).

Quidam tamen ponunt aptitudinem essentialem dictam esse solam formam et tunc connotatum sive passio et subiectum distinguuntur sicut pars et totum, et haec via etiam apparet probabilis ex eo quod forma humana omnibus existentibus accidentibus seclusit maiorem[44] habet habitudinem essentialem ad risibilitatem. Sed via ponens realem distinctionem proprius a subiecto sicut accidentis realis et materialis a suo subiecto omnino est abicienda.

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[40] passio...qualitas] *cf.* ARIST. LAT, *Metaph.*, V, 21, 1022b 15

[41] sed ... modaliter] *cf.* IOH. BURID., *Metaphysica I – VI,* q. 4, sol., par. 234, p.58

[42] substantia...deffinitione] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.,* VII, 1028a 32-35, p. 125; IOH. BURID., *De an.*, I, q. 5, p. 201; II, q. 2, p.234

[43] aptitudinem essentialem] *cf.* PORPH., *Isag.,* p.20

[44] maiorem] *sup. lin. W.*

Et ad illorum dicta dicitur quod propria passio et subiectum differunt essentialiter. Non debet sic intelligi quod propria passio poneret essentiam distinctam ab essentia subiecti, sed sic quod propria passio numquam potest praedicari essentialiter de sua specie sive **[3ra]** de suo subiecto, sed semper constituit praedicationem accidentalem[45] ex quo in suo connotato includit actum videndi, qui est extrinsecus et accidentalis speciei.

Item positio modernorum alia ratione confirmatur sic, si propria passio distingueretur realiter a sua specie vel a suo subiecto, vel ergo illam realitatem haberet eius supposito vel in connotato, non in supposito, quia tunc proprium non potest vere praedicari de sua specie dicendo 'homo est risibilis', quia isti termini 'homo' et 'ridere' non supponerent pro eadem re nec in connotato, quia vel illud connotatum est ens rectum vel absolutum non rectum, quia tunc ly 'ridere' non esset de predicamento qualitatis, sed relationis, quod enim est falsum non absolutum, quia quodlibet tale potest separari a significato suae speciei, et sic staret quod aliquis esset homo qui non esset risibilis. Et assumptum primum probatur per articulum parisiensem "quaecumque sunt distincte realiter possunt separari et separatim conservari"[46].

Q. 6. Utrum suppositio sit distincta realiter <et>formaliter a termino supponente

Et sicut dicitur de suppositione, ita pariformiter determinandum est de ampliatione, appelatione et ultra de omnibus accidentibus praedicatorum, ut sunt accidentia partium orationis. Ad hoc respondent antiqui quod sic, sed Biridanus et ceteri moderni respondent negative, dicentes quod suppositio non est res a termino supponente distincta. Probatur sic, quia si esset res distincta a termino supponente, tunc possunt separari et separatim conservari, ut patet per articulum praeallegatum. Tunc illo stante sequeretur, quod si esset aliqua conclusio demonstrata eadem conclusione manente possit fieri[47] falsa, quod enim est contraPhilosophum I°*Posteriorum,* ubi dicit quod scientia est necessariorum et perpetuorum[48], idest conclusionum perpetuae veritatis. Sed sequela patet, et volo quod Deus auferat illud accidens supposito a termino supponente; tunc ablata suppositione conclusio est falsa. Ipsa manente demonstrata falsitas patet, quia est una affirmativa cuius subiectum et praedicatum non supponunt absque eius mutatione pro eodem, igitur propositum verum. Etiam sic ostenditur veritas propositi quidquid advenit **[3rb]**alicui absque eius mutatione reali vel penitus nulla facta mutatione in re. Hoc non est

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[45] praedicationem accidentalem] *cf.* OCKHAM, *In Sent.*, q. 10, l. 15, p.317

[46] quaecumque...conservari] *cf.* IOH. BURID., *In Phys.*, fol. 74r, bk. 4, 9.8; *In Metaph.*, IV, q. 6, fol. XVII ra-rb, p. 21, 1.75-82

[47] fieri] demonstrata *add. sed. del. W.*

[48] Scientia...perpetuorum] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Anal. Post.,*I, 32, 88b 31-32

accidens reale, sed huiusmodi est suppositio, igitur etc. Assumptum pro secunda parte probatur sic: scribatur illa propositio ad parietem sic 'homo est animal'. Notum est quod ly 'homo' habet suppositionem. Et si in in quadruplum dixerint antiqui de suppositione aut quolibet alio accidente consimili sic arguendo quaecumque sic se habet quod verum corumpitur relinquo manente, illa habet realem distinctionem. Dicendum est quod omnia illa argumenta peccant in ignorantia appelationis formae simplicis et varie, unde corumpitur suppositio etenim suppositio non manet suppositio dum utique suppositio manet.

Tituli integri librorum qui abbreviationibus allegantur

ARIST. LAT., *Anal. Post*.= Aristoteles Latinus, *Analytica Posteriora (Guillelmus de Morbeka revisor translationis Iacobi Venetici)*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello et B.G. Dod, 1968, pp. 285-343.

ARIST. LAT., *De an.* = Aristoteles Latinus, *De anima (translatio 'nova' - Iacobi Venetici translationis recensio)*, textus sec.: *S. Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, XLV, 1, Sentencia libri de anima* - ed. Commissio Leonina, Roma, 1984, pp. 3-258.

ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.*= Aristoteles Latinus, *Metaphysica (translatio 'media')*, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem, Aristoteles Latinus, Brill, Leiden, 1976.

ARIST. LAT., *Phys.=* Aristoteles Latinus, *Physica (translatio 'vetus')*, ed. Fernand Bossier et Jozef Brams, Brill, Leiden-New York, 1990.

ALB. MAG., *De an.* = Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, VII, Pars I ed. Clemens Stroick, 1968.

ALB. MAG., *De causis* = Albertus Magnus, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa* in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, XVII, Pars II, ed. Winfridus Fauser, 1993.

ALB. MAG., *De int. et intel.* =Albertus Magnus, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, IX, ed. Borgnet, 1890, pp. 527-584.

ALB. MAG., *De praed.* =Albertus Magnus, *De praedicamentis*, *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia,* I, ed. Borgnet, pp. 150-242

ALB. MAG., *Super Sent.* = Albertus Magnus, *Commentarium super libros Sententiarum*, în *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, XXV, ed. Borgnet, 1893-4

AVERR., *In De an.* = *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis 'De Anima' libros,* ed. F. Stuart Crawford, Medieval Academy Books, 1953.

JOH. BURID., *Lectura ...* = Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura Erfordiensis in Aristotelis I –VI Metaphysicam, together with the 15th-century Abbreviatio Caminensis*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Brepols, 2008.

JOH. BURID., *In Metaph.* = Johannes Buridanus, *In Metaphysicem Aristoteles questiones argutissime Magistri Ioannis Buridani*, Paris, 1518.

JOH. BURID., *In De an.* = Johannes Buridanus, *Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima (de tertia lectura)*, in Jack Zupko, *John Buridan's Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation of Book III of His "Questions on Aristotle's "de Anima" , with*

Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays, Dissertation, Cornell University, 1989.

JOH. BURID., In Phys. = Johannes Buridanus, Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Physik, Frankfurt am Main, 1964, apud Benoît Patar, La physique de Bruges de Buridan et le traite du ciel d'Albert de Saxe, II, Longueuil, Quebec, 2001.

OCKHAM, In Sent. = William Ockham, Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum (reportatio), Guillemi de Ockham Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Opera Theologica, VI, ed. F.E. Kelley et Gi.I. Etzkorn,1982.

PORPH., Isag.= Porphyrii Isagoge, Translatio Boethii in Aristoteles Latinus, Categoriarum suplementa, ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello et Bernardo G. Dod, Brill, Leiden, 1966, pp.1-32

THOMAS DE AQ., De ente = Thomas de Aquino, De ente et essentia, în S. Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia, XLIII, ed. Comissio Leonina, Roma, 1976, pp. 369-384.

PETRARCH'S DEMARCATION OF HUMANISM

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Abstract Based on Petrarch's epistle *De ignorantia*, the present paper offers a critique of the thesis of the modern demarcation of humanism proposed by Th. E. Mommsen, a thesis that still causes reverberations within the scholarly literature that focuses on Petrarch. The paper analyses Petrarch's stance on what he calls *medium nostrum tempus* in relation with Antiquity and the way in which his notion of darkness represents a means to delimit humanism within a Christian philosophy of history based on ethics. The conclusion of the paper shows that Th. E. Mommsen's interpretation, together with other contemporary readings of humanism must be recalibrated in accordance with the practical and eschatological finality that Petrarch gave to his notion of *studia humanitatis*.

Keywords Petrarch, humanism, moral philosophy, ignorance, self-care, Middle Ages, modernity

1. *On ignorance*: a manifesto for humanism

De ignorantia[1] is a polemic text in response to the calumny made by four of Petrarch's friends (who are thus proven to be pretended friends). A manuscript copy

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[1] The original text of the *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia* can be found in two autographed manuscripts (Francesco Petrarca, *Über seine und vieler anderer Unwissenheit*, Übersetzt von Klaus Kubusch, ed. August Buck (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993): *Cod. Hamilton* 493, Staatsbibliothek Berlin (the copy sent by Petrarch to Donato Albanzani, together with the dedicatory epistle) and *Cod. Vat. lat*. 3359, Bibliotheca Vaticana (Petrarch's personal copy, dated: Arqua, June 25, 1370). The latter contains corrections and the following *Postscriptum: "Hunc libellum ante biennium dictatum et alibi scriptum a me ipso, scripsi hic iterum manu mea; et perduxi ad exitum Arquade, inter colles Euganeos 1370 Jun. 25, vergente ad occasum die"* (L. M. Capelli, *La traité De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia* [Paris, 1906], 4.) The first edition was made by L. M. Capelli, *La traité De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia* (Paris, 1906). The second edition represents a *revisio* of L.M. Capelli's made by P. G. Ricci, *De*

of the work *De ignorantia* preserved in Venice (*Codex Marcianus Latinus*, IV, 86) contains a *marginalia* that lists the names of the four objectors of Petrarch: Leonardo Dandolo, a Venetian man (1330-1405), the son of Dodge Andrea Dandolo, followed by Zaccaria Contarini (probably a law graduate in Paris), a Venetian nobleman and diplomat, Tommaso Talenti, a successful Venetian merchant, and Guido da Bagnolo, the court physician of the King of Cyprus, but more importantly, a former student of the University of Bologna and, of all the aforementioned friends, an expert in Aristotle's writings, the commentaries to these and, of course, also in the works of Averroes.

The one who informs Petrarch about the rumours that had already been circulating since 1366, spread by the four objectors, is also the recipient of the dedicatory letter at the beginning of *De ignorantia*, Donato degli Albanzani de Pratovecchio (1328-1411).[2] A letter sent to Boccaccio reveals that Petrarch started writing *De ignorantia* at the end of 1367 while navigating on the river Po towards Padua, but this initial version was only finalised towards January 1371 (three and a half years before his death). Only then did Petrarch send his work to Donato Albanzani in the form of a letter accompanied by the introductory dedication. Therefore, we can conclude that this short text had been on Petrarch's mind for five years.

De ignorantia [On Ignorance] simultaneously represents thus a short manifest and a testament. The faults of which he is accused by his four Venetian friends are fame, reputation and glory, and Petrarch nostalgically reflects: "I travel happily, having laid down this illustrious but weighty bundle. With oars, sails, and ropes, I overcome the current of Po, returning to the Ticino river and its ancient city of scholars. There, if I choose to, I shall not only resume the mantle of my former fame, which has been lost among the seaman [in Venice[3]], but I shall not be able to renounce it, even if I should really want to (139)[4]."

These were the circumstances of a kind of retreat and of a sort of regret: the poet's fame was contested in Venice; his fame had become a reason for polemic and

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suis ipsius et multorum ignorantia – L'ignoranza mia e di tanti altri, in F. Petrarch, *Opere latine*, a cura di A. Bufano (Turin, 1975), vol. II, 1025–1151. The present paper is a restatement of the ideas expressed as a prefatory study to the Romanian translation of Petrarch's *On ignorance* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2016), 11–36.

[2] A friend with whom Petrarch exchanged letters, who taught in Ravenna and Venice. He translated Petrarch's *De viris illustribus* and Boccaccio's *De claris mulieribus* from Latin to Italian.

[3] Our explanation.

[4] The numbers in parentheses, if not marked otherwise, always refer to the paragraph number in the English translation of *De ignorantia* used throughout this paper: Francesco Petrarca, *Invectives*, trans. David Marsh, The I Tatti Renaissance Library 11 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 222–364.

he could not escape it even after he confessed to not being worthy of it no longer wished to bear it. His fame became a burden; it constantly attracted envy and it fed on that envy regardless of where it took refuge, where it hid or how much it was masked by apparent ignorance – this is thus the tone of the lamentation rocked by the thwarting flow of the Po that the reader encounters in the beginning and that accompanies him throughout the text which, in this metaphor of writing on water, seems to confront the passing of time itself.

As a literary genre, *De ignorantia* is not an invective[5] in its entirety, as it would seem, but, in an epistolary confession style accompanied by lamentation, it rather emulates the form of the Ciceronian pleads, so that Petrarch, the son of a notary and a student in law, writes in a Ciceronian juridical style: accusers, a fault, a defender and a court are all present. What unfolds before our eyes is therefore the defendant's plea. The starting model seems to be Cicero's *In Catillinam*: the epistle's intro is abrupt and bawls a blast of seven questions; that certain Ciceronian interrogative dive from *Quoadusque abutere…?* is also used by Petrarch in his questions at the beginning of his work. However, the literary form is composite and varied: the basis is structured as a juridical plea, but the stylistic inflections throughout the text bring epistolary and confessionary tones, invectives, dialogues, imprecations and lamentations.

But what is it all about? Who brings accusations, to whom and why? In essence, we are given to understand that four friends formed an ad hoc court in order to accuse the fifth (the defendant, i.e. Petrarch) of ignorance and to thus contest his fame. They contest his fame and teachings, basically stating that "the man is not that great" and, furthermore, that he is ignorant especially in philosophy. Petrarch defends himself in a Socratic manner, admitting his guilt and showing his willingness to accept the accusation of ignorance. In this case, what would be the purpose of a trial in which the defendant pleads guilty? Well, the purpose is represented by the fact that the way in which he admits his guilt would actually give way to a new trial: the accusers that formed the court are now on trial, the case is the legitimacy of the aforementioned court, the basis of the accusation of philosophical ignorance. At first glance, this basis is represented by knowledge, for only through superior knowledge can ignorance be identified. But is knowledge a good enough reason to define man's humanity and to therefore reduce the humanity of an ignorant? What type of guilt is human ignorance and who can judge it? What is left after a verdict that shows lack of knowledge? Is knowledge the final decisive criterion for what man is or what man should be? These are the thematic questions that outline the epistemic location of ignorance.

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[5] William J. Kennedy, "The Economy of Invective and a Man in the Middle," in *A Critical Guide To The Complete Works*, eds. Victoria Kirkham, Armando Maggi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 263. The article points out the elements of satire and invective, as well as the economic metaphors *mercator, merces* from *De ignorantia*.

In his defence, Petrarch formulates an opposition between two models of knowledge: the first model is that of the "natural philosophy" around which the paradigm of the "scientific" knowledge of the world is constructed. Petrarch's four "accusers" were Aristotelian representatives of this paradigm who, at the time, identified with Aristotelianism, the only available philosophy which offered a platform for the study of nature. According to Petrarch (62), regarding the way in which the meetings with these Aristotelians took place, there was a direction specific to the Italian universities where Artistotelianism, interpreted in the lines of Averroism, was used in the study of medicine and in applied natural sciences (biology and physics), but not in theological matters. Therefore, the accusation of ignorance is formulated based on this orientation and it implied the fact that Petrarch was a respectable man of letters but an ignorant in regard to the paradigm of the pure interpretation of nature.

Today, this division into "two cultures"[6] is quite familiar: on the one hand, the philological paradigm and, on the other hand, the paradigm of natural sciences; on the one hand, those who read entire libraries, on the other hand, those who calculate. But in this case, we are only collaterally facing the issue of the cultural secession described by C. P. Snow in 1959, because the second model, which was formulated by Petrarch as a retort, does not focus on philology or on "books" in general. What Petrarch brings forth is the idea of knowledge in the field of Christian morals. It is not the "man of letters" who opposes the researcher, but rather the one who makes his life the purpose of salvation, trying to become better and to make others better. For Petrarch, goodness, happiness and self conversion are "reality" to a greater extent than the realism of orientation in the knowledge of reality. In this case, Petrarch is critical of the scientific stances that consider religious engagement to be *ignorance* and, in other words, the lack of sapiential-superior detachment from the matters regarding faith. Therefore, for Petrarch, the accusations made by the four friends offer the opportunity to bring arguments against the imperative "detachment" endorsed by the theory of the double truth in Averroist Artistotelianism, according to which we have access to the truths of natural philosophy, truths which are different from the truths of faith.

Petrarch's ideal is, in contrast, a "unified" man for whom being good, doing good, preparing for salvation are issues that go beyond the idea of knowing nature; the engagement with the truths of faith imply his theological scepticism regarding humans' capability to investigate and to understand nature as the result of an act of creation. The argument for this scepticism is as follows: nature as creation is an *object of absolute complexity*, which reveals its Author through its complexity. The argument is borrowed from Cicero, who speaks "like an Apostle" (68) in this case: in Petrarch's summary, just like an instrument that shows the movements of the stars

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[6] C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961).

and their positions (a model of the heavens) cannot be suspected of having appeared by accident, but is supposed to be a result of its creator's reason (the astronomer) and of his art, the real heavens with those laws regarding the movements of the stars also could not have appeared by accident, and therefore it proves the existence of an author more complex than his creation[7] (67). But, as a *complex object*, nature only contains truth in its *entirety*, which also includes its author. Therefore, any investigation that is limited and that has limited means (the human mind) of an infinitely complex whole (nature – God's creation) is marked by partialism and is thus doomed to fail. This is the scepticism of the incommensurability of knowledge which, at least through its base elements, anticipates Nicholas of Cusa's stance and whose origins are to be found in Augustine's Book XII of the *De civitate Dei* (99). The theme of the "errors of the philosophers" is based on this scepticism, a theme that is widely present in *On ignorance*: the multiplicity of the gods, Aristotle's lack of knowledge of true happiness, the construction of the world from atoms, the belief in the eternity of the world etc.

2. A Christian Theology of History: Against Th. E. Mommsen's Dark Ages

In Petrarch's plea, faith is not connected to the simple hope of a promise or to what became a wager after Pascal's theories; it takes Augustine's radical expression (*De civitate Dei* XX, 9,1): *ergo et nunc ecclesia regnum Christi est regnumque caelorum*[8], where *faith* implies the acceptance of the certainty of immortality as a fact in the Christian history of the world which Augustine structures in three interventions (*De trinitate*, XIII, *On ignorance* 51-52) made by God himself: 1. The fall as an expression of *power*; 2. The redemption of Christ as an expression of *justice* (of divine justice); 3. Redemption as the power of justice. This theological reading of history is based on Petrarch's own view of history and of the essence of man, ideas that must guide the understanding of Petrarchan humanism. In our hurry to modernise Petrarch, his humanism was imprudently interpreted as part of an Enlightenment type of deliverance from different tutelary authorities, or as an endeavour to philologically reclaim Romanism. The expression "dark ages" belongs to him and is somewhat responsible for this interpretation.

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[7] The argument for theistic complexity is still used today in the philosophical debate regarding creationism vs. anti-creationism. Richard Dawkins in *The Blind Watchmaker* makes a fascinating argument against the irreducible complexity. He offers a model of small replicants, which, during a long period of time, through nano-deviations, manage to form complexity.

[8] "Therefore the Church even now is the kingdom of Christ, and the kingdom of heaven", St. Augustine, *The City of God*, in *New Advent*, trans. Marcus Dods. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 2. Ed. Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887). Revised and edited for *New Advent* by Kevin Knight, http://www.newadvent.org /fathers/120120.htm.

In a letter written to Agapito Colonna in 1359, Petrarch confesses that because his project *De viris illustribus* (a work of history whose project was modified numerous times) focuses on the real and old Roman history and because the illustrious figures of his time and the previous times (referring to the previous generations of the Colonna family, to the 13th and probably 12th centuries, due to the fact that Petrarch refers to Agapito's father and uncle) are so few, he states the following: *Nolui autem pro tam paucis nominibus claris, tam procul tantasque tenebras stilum ferre*[9]. Therefore, in this case, Petrarch considers his time (the 14th century) and the previous century (probably more than one previous century) tenebrous because of the lack of illustrious figures. It is not at all obvious what Th. E. Mommsen presumes in his famous article *Petrarch's Conception of the "Dark Ages"*, namely that once Petrarch established the limit of his history at Titus Flavius Vespasianus (the second half of the 1st century AD), the *darkness* contains the entire following period[10]; in this case, this is the first occurrence of an immense *dark age*. In Mommsen's interpretation, the decline of the Roman Empire marks an era of decadence and of historical significance, thus expanding to Petrarch's time. Therefore, Petrarch's approach on history would be a "modern" one, anticipating the representation of the 15th century on the succession of the historical ages: Antiquity, Middle Ages and the new age of Modernity. Of course, Th. E. Mommsen's probative endeavour regarding Petrarch's attitude towards the centuries under our scrutiny (starting with the 15th century) as part of the Middle Ages is understandable. According to this thesis, by dividing history into three periods, namely Rome's golden ages, the period of decadence and the new, flourishing period that was to come, Petrarch anticipated the *humanist demarcation*[11] of history. Th. E. Mommsen's argument includes the statistics of the names explicitly used by Petrarch (Petrarch cites very few "medieval" figures) and his constantly critical and lamenting approach to "the times of decadence", which indicates Petrarch's need to detach himself from his own times or a feeling of exile. The decisive verses from *Epistolae metricae* (III, 33 – cited by Th. E. Mommsen) clearly note this lament for the epoch (that lasts for centuries) and, by expressing the wish to have lived in a different time, formulate a concept of one's own time as *nostrum medium tempus*: "*Vivo, sed indignans, quae nos in tristia fatum/Secula dilatos peioribus intulit annis. /Aut prius, aut multo decuit post tempore nasci;/Nam fuit, et fortassis erit, felicius aevum. /In medium sordes, in*

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[9] "But, for so few famous names, I did not want to push my quill so far and through so much darkness."

[10] Th. E. Mommsen, "Petrarch's Conception of the 'Dark Ages'", *Speculum* 17/2 (1942): 237.: "This point of view Petrarch expressed when in 1341 he drew a line of demarcation between ancient and modern history, and when later on he called the period stretching from the fall of the Roman Empire down to his own age a time of darkness. In Petrarch's opinion that era was dark because it was worthless, not because it was little known."

[11] Ibid., 239.

nostrum turpia tempus / Confluxisse vides; gravium sentina malorum /Nos habet; ingenium, virtus et gloria mundo /Cesserunt; regnumque tenent fortuna, voluptas"[12].

It is interesting that all of the quotes given by Th. E. Mommsen to strengthen his construct are from the writings from before 1363, while the ones from the late writings (*De ignorantia* and *Apologia contra cuiusdam anonymi Galli calumnias*) meant to further defend his thesis are cropped and read almost in opposition. In 1373, Petrarch wrote *Apologia* where, like in *De ignorantia* (1371), the Dantean idea[13] appears regarding the misfortune of the old ones to not have lived the revelation of the Christian truth[14]: "Elucebant tamen inter errores ingenia, neque ideo minus vivaces erant oculi quamvis tenebris et densa caligine circumsepti, ut eis non erranti odium, sed indignae sortis miseratio deberetur."[15] For Th. E. Mommsen, this fragment illustrated an inversion of the original Christian metaphor that illustrated the dawn of Christianity as a bright moment delimitating the "darkness" of the pagan Antiquity: "Antiquity, so long considered as the 'Dark Age,' now became the time of 'light' which had to be 'restored'; the era following Antiquity, on the other hand, was submerged in obscurity".[16] Nonetheless, Petrarch's words seem less revolutionary and they merely reiterate a stance repeatedly found in his work and in the works of his predecessors. For instance, Dante (Canto 4), at the entrance of his famous Limbo, asks Virgil (as a guide to the

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[12] Where Petrarch laments that he should have been born earlier, or long after this time for it had been and probably will be a happier era. And he defines his epoch as *our times of in between* (medium nostrum tempus). As we can see, one word apart, the concept of *aevum medium* appears to be formulated almost linguistically; Petrarch uses *tempus* as a synonym for *aevum* (from the previous verse) and had he interchanged the terms, the expression *medium nostrum aevum* would have appeared (instead of *tempus*).

[13] The idea does not belong to Dante; the idea is older, but its expression in Dante's writings is closest to Petrarch's approaches. There is a letter to Boccaccio among Petrarch's writings, in which he explains his deferential relation to Dante, whose writings were familiar to Petrarch and with whom he had family ties.

[14] The *Wikipedia* article on the *Dark Ages* is suffocated by a wrong reading induced by Mommsen to an impetuous reader (for Mommsen does not state that Petrarch refers to his closest predecessors), and it therefore spreads the idea that Petrarch's characters are the medieval people surrounded by darkness. Nothing further from the truth! The ones to whom Petrarch refers here are the people of the antiquity who had not lived to see the sun of justice shine, namely Christ.

[15] *Apologia contra cuiusdam Galli anonymi calumnias,* in Th. E. Mommsen, "Petrarch's Conception of the 'Dark Ages'", 227. "Amidst the errors there shone forth men of genius, and no less keen were their eyes, although they were surrounded by darkness and dense gloom; therefore they ought not so much to be hated for their erring but pitied for their ill fate."

[16] Th. E. Mommsen, "Petrarch's Conception of the 'Dark Ages'", 228.

Inferno) to explain the religious motivation for the damnation of the innocent who had simply lived before Christ, as Virgil himself states:

> *ch'ei non peccaro; e s'elli hanno mercedi, non basta, perché non ebber battesmo, ch'e porta de la fede che tu credi; e s'e'furon dinanzi al cristianesmo, non adorer debitamente a Dio: e di questi cotai son io medesmo. Per tai difetti, non per altro rio, semo perduti, e sol di tanto offesi che sanza speme vivemo in disio.*"[17] And Dante laments: "*Gran duol mi prese al cor quando lo 'ntesi, pero che gente di molto valore conobbi che 'n quel limbo eran sospesi*.[18]

This paradigm, conventionally referred to as "Dantean", reverberates several times in *De ignorantia*. We can now see Petrarch suffering for Cicero in the same way:

> when I read him, I often pity his fate, and lament in silent grief (*dolens*) that he did not know the true God. He passed away only a few years before the birth of Christ. Alas, death closed his eyes just when the night of error and its darkness (nox *erratica*) was nearly over, and when the starting-point of truth, the dawn of true light, and the sun of justice were fast approaching" (58).

He then notes that Epicurus and other philosophers from the Antiquity could not know the creation of the world through the word of God, but the alleged philosophers, who do not understand this truth either, are even less excusable: "In the darkness even a lynx may not be able to see, but anyone who opens his eyes in the light a sees nothing must be blind" (97).

Therefore, for Petrarch, the darkness covers the pagan period, the Antiquity and also his own times, since there still were non-believers who lived in darkness. Thus the idea does not focus on the radically inverted light-darkness metaphor, just like in Th. E. Mommsen's view, but on differentiating the ancient "ingeniousness" which, even outside the "light", had the proleptical spirituality that reveals the truth. There is also a congruency between the three "historical" periods divided through

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[17] *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri*, Vol. 1, *Inferno*, ed. and trans. Robert M. Durling (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 72–73: "that they did not sin; and if they have merits, it is not enough, because they did not receive baptism, which is the gateway to the faith that you believe. And if they lived before Christianity, they did not adore God as was needful: and of this kind am I myself. Because of such defects, not for any other wickedness, we are lost, and only so far harmed that without hope we live in desire."

[18] Ibid., 72–73: "Great sorrow seized my heart when I understood him, because I knew that people of great worth were suspended in that limbo."

the aforementioned Augustinian theological division of history (downfall–power, redemption–justice, salvation–power of justice). For Petrarch, the first two periods fluctuate, since light and darkness still intertwine. The second period (Christianity in a historical march) is marked by the dynamics of conversion; this is why, on the one hand, Petrarch can endorse his time period's access to light and, on the other hand, he can affirm that this period is still an unclear time in the struggle for salvation; Antiquity is also a dark age, but it is one in which the forecasting spirits of the Christian world do not sparkle. This is the reason why Cicero, in some passages, is presented "*like an Apostle*" (*De ignorantia* 68, sqq.) especially where (83) he foresees monotheism and creation. Petrarch, in those passages, states that he surpasses himself by ascending (*colligit sese,* 75). The same is Plato's situation, who, even though he had not fully comprehended the truth, "he saw it and came closer to it than the rest" (114), alongside Cicero, Pliny, Plotinus, Macrobius, Porphyry, Censorinus and Josephus.

Humanism as an outlook on these foreknowing views is thus, in essence, a historical *interpretatio christiana* of the pagan philosophical system of thought. These authors deserve attention (*studium*) to the extent that they had approximated light and truth even in their historical situation which had been immersed in darkness and falsehood. But even in the works of these "visionary apostles", Petrarch identifies pages which, as testimonies of darkness,

> should never have been written. I wouldn't believe they should be read either, except that reading and understanding such trifles about the gods awaken our love of true divinity and the one God, and that, as we read, our contempt for foreign superstition awakes reverence four our religion in our minds. The clearest possible means of understanding a thing is to place it next to its opposite. Nothing makes light more lovely than our hatred of darkness" (83).

In *De ignorantia*, this is the starting point of the long denunciation of the "errors of the philosophers". The denunciation divides the world of thinkers into "our philosophers"[19], namely the ones who search with faith and the others who, like Aristotle and Averroes, are completely outside the radius of the foreknowing view of the revealed truth. Therefore, faith appears to be a structure that divides history and which, in accordance with its foreknowing nature, configures the ancient cultural legacy. But Petrarch does not reject *medium nostrum tempus* (The Middle Ages) as he rejected the pagan fundamental *darkness*. His critique approaches the stylistics of the scholastics' language (*insanum et clamosum vulgus scolasticorum* –

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[19] *His nostris philosophis credere* (114): to believe in our philosophers.

De ignorantia, 114) and, even in *De ignorantia*, refers to the hypertrophy of the senetences' genre.

Petrarch's philosophical orientation is determined by his immense knowledge and his contact with Latin Roman literature. It is thus true that the platform for humanism is based on the *Latin Romanism*, but it is not less true that the Petrarchan humanism is not limited to a revival of Romanism. The figure called upon to institute this re-humanisation of Romanism from a Christian perspective is Marcus Tullius Cicero, an archetype of the man of letters who, through writing, deals with the world of language and resides in it with the authenticity of its irreducible expression. We encounter the same adherence to the expression of the Latin language in Petrarch's case. The study of a re-appropriated classic language offered Petrarch the opportunity to notice the relation between the obligation towards authenticity and the simplification of the language. He constantly considers the obligation to be in a personal relation with language; therefore, the dark age in which he humbly places himself, is consequently marked by an ignorance towards language, an ignorance which does not conceive of the language as edificatory and creative for the self. This idea is present in his reproach to the commentator, a man who alienates his self by parasitising another's expression of self: "If it could speak, the Book of Sentences would bear witness to this in a loud an complaining voice, since it has suffered at the hands of a thousand such workmen" (115).

Studia humanitatis, the study programme[20] of humanist formation established by Petrarch and maintained further by the humanist movement, considers moral philosophy[21] to be their guiding point. The five fields of study included in this curriculum were: grammar, rhetoric, poetics and history, all of which were contained in the force field of moral philosophy. The completion of the studies was not seen as a performance of knowledge (which is why, basically, the "great

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[20] Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and its Sources*, ed. M. Mooney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 23: "the studia humanitatis includes one philosophical discipline, that is, morals, but it excludes by definition such fields as logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, as well as mathematics and astronomy, medicine, law, and theology." Eugenio Garin's view is that the humanist Renaissance brings forth a new philosophy and in relation to it, the other great researcher of the Renaissance, P.O. Kristeller is critical on this point; for him the humanists were mainly literate men and not philosophers, and willing to escape from Aristotle's authority, they replaced him not with Plato the philosopher, but with Cicero…the orator (*Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters,* III [Rome, 1993], 40). Cicero's works play a great part in (and starting with) Petrarch's writings. Therefore, P. O. Kristeller's interpretation focuses on two cultures: the scholastic one, which is a philosophical culture, and the Renaissance one, which is a philological culture (grammar, rhetoric, literature) and the curricular lack of logic is significant from this point of view.

[21] "*Ad moralem precipue philosophiam et ad poeticam prono*" (*Posteritati*, a cura di P.G. Ricci, in F. Petrarca, *Prose* [Milano, Napoli: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1955], 6.)

Renaissance scholars" did not consider themselves specialists, but rather *uomini universali*), but rather as a path towards personal formation in the spirit of a good and just life (*recte vivere*). These *umanista* were regarded as initiation and practical formation techniques for the self which was enclosed by the purpose of moral initiation in the world: *ars bene beateque vivendi* (the art of living well and happily). Therefore, even the formative nature of humanism, through its fields of study, imposed a practical attitude of assuming a set of moral principles that continuously increase and potentiate the eagerness to study.

3. Humanist Techniques: Self-care and Asceticism of the Inner Self

These demarcations are not due to any kind of strive for modernization. They are made in the spirit of a correction from an Augustinian perspective, which, as Petrarch's entire work redundantly shows, leads to the careful observation of the motility of the self and to the tireless monitoring of the reverberations suffered by interiority. The self-centred authorship rises from these actions, without appointing an author of subjective impressions (fiction). In the continuous narrative relation with the self, the author is not associated with egolatry, but with the care for the soul,[22] he is thus the one who stands over the self and who tends to the self.[23] This concept therefore implies an extension of the *spiritual exercise*, the idea that the author bares his self in the written word: the writer is an ascetic of the self, a practitioner of analysis of the self who, through writing, purifies himself in confession.[24] This is the spiritual direction which defines the humanist's life: self-examination through writing, a curative writing which casts out sin and exteriorises it. Besides the monastic tradition of the ascetic study, Petrarch formulates a humanism which wishes to broaden the study of scripture and the production of commentaries with writers for whom the purpose of revisiting illustrious (enlightened) men from the Antiquity and the personal expression of authorship is to morally perfect the self.

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[22] *Animi cura* – Fam. 1.9.

[23] S. Greenblatt even mentions the Renaissance self-fashioning, in the footsteps of M. Foucault (techniques of the self, the creation of the self); the feeling of exile and of creating the self is connected to the Christian conversion, namely to its Augustinian interpretation as a continuous (*in via*) conversion of the self.

[24] Gur Zak, *Petrarch's Humanism and the Care of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 11: *Petrarch's concept of philosophy thus closely echoes Pierre Hadot's definition of ancient philosophy as "spiritual exercises" – "an art of living…which engages the whole of existence…a progress which causes us to be more fully and makes us better". To fulfill the task of philosophy, to truly philosophize, therefore, we need to perform certain actions upon the self – "spiritual exercises" in Hadot's terms – and for Petrarch it is achieved mainly by writing. Petrarch'e ethics of care of the self, as a result, are in a fundamental way an ethics of writing.*

"Ascent of Mont Ventoux", Petrarch's story in an epistolary form, is relevant for what this curative writing of the self means. What is considered to be "an exercise of style"[25] in this case, is actually something different from Petrarch's commitment to writing. On 26 April 1336, Petrarch together with his brother and his two servants ascended to the peak of Mount Ventoux. For modern interpreters, "conquering the mountain" could mean the first mountaineering excursion as a recreational activity and as free tourism, the first purely aesthetic experience of the "beauty of nature", as Petrarch himself apparently declares: "led solely by a desire to view the greate hight of it"[26]. Throughout the narration, the leisure walk turns into a reflection on an ascetic initiation. Petrarch soon leaves the "the straight path to the heights" (*compendiaria via ad altiora*), trying to find an easier access on the other side (*sperare me alterius lateris faciliorem adytum*), rather than the "straighter path" (*iter rectius*). As a result, Petrarch finds himself on a path with many detours and obstacles (*per valles errabam* – "I was still wandering through the valleys"), which only wears him down and drives him further away from the mountain peak. This happened several times within a few hours (*ter aut amplius intra paucas horas contingit*) and each time a conjunction appears between leaving the straight path and "forgetting" what had previously happened, followed by the somewhat absurd hope of reaching "up" following a path that leads "down" (*iterum ad inferiora*). Finally, Petrarch understands that "it is impossible for something of corporeal nature to reach the above by descending" (*nec fieri potest ut corporeum aliquid ad alta descendendo perveniat*). Petrarch also has a moment of reflection on the fluctuations of the self in the ascension towards the peak and, narrating the journey as a parable, he "addressed himself":

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[25] Ronald G. Witt, *In the Footsteps of the Ancients: The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni* (Leiden: Brill, 2003). Humanism is defined here as a stylistic ideal, starting with the analysis of Petrarch's fragment on the subject of death (which, in my opinion, can also be read in an Augustinian interpretation): "*Ego quoque dum hec leges moriar, tu moreris dum hec scribo, ambo morimur, omnes morimur, semper morimur, nunquam vivimus dum hic sumus, nisi quandiu virtuosum aliquid agentes sternimus iter nobis ad veram vitam, ubi contra nemo moritur…nec mutatio sentitur, nec timetur finis*" (Fam. 24, 1, 27) – "I too shall be dying while you read this, you are dying while I write this, we both are dying, we all are dying, we are always dying; we never live here except when doing something virtuous to pave our path to the true life, where in contrast no one dies… where there are no change and no reason to fear its ending", quoted in Gur Zak, *Petrarch's Humanism and the Care of the Self*, 8.

[26] Petrarch, *Lettres familières*, Tome II, *Les Belles Lettres*, 2003, Liber IV, 1: "*sola videndi insignem loci altitudinem cupiditate ductus, ascendi.*" Francesco Petrerca, *Rerum familiarium libri*, trans. Aldo S. Bernardo (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1975), 172. Because the interpretation depends closely on the translation, in what follows I took the liberty of translating myself the few shorter passages from the *Ascent of Mont Ventoux*.

What you have experienced so often today in trying to climb this mountain you should know happens to you and to many others as they approach the blessed life. This is not easily realised by men, howeverm because although the movements of the body are visible, the movements of the mind are invisible and concealed. The life we call blessed is certainly located on high, and, as it is said, a very narrow road leads to it. Many hills also intervene and one must proceed from virtue to virtue with very deliberate steps. At the summit lies the end of all things and the limit of the path to which our travelling is directed.[27]

Therefore, these reflections help him regain his lost strength during his spiritual disorientation and they mobilise him towards the peak which, once reached, gives way to an aesthetic contemplation[28] of the scenery. The landscape, with the clouds below and the snow covered Alps in the distance, carries the free flow of consciousness towards memories. The self is once again captured, this time by the beauty of the exteriority. Awakening from the reverie and "following the example of my body raising my mind to loftier things"[29], Petrarch then opens Augustine's *Confessions* at random and reads a passage: "And they go to admire the summits of mountains and the vast billows of the sea and the broadest rivers and the expanses of the ocean and the revolutions of the stars and the overlook themselves."[30] Besides the temptation of wandering to try to find an easier path to the heights lurks the wandering of the self in what in today's words would be the sublime. Petrarch does not find the sublime as an elevation of the consciousness of the self over the immensity of nature, but, in accordance with Augustine, he sees the sublime as a loss of attention towards the self or, as Meister Eckhart already pointed out, as a loss of the self in the images of the world: "I closed the book enraged with myself because I was even then admiring earthly things after having been long taught by pagan philosophers that I ought to consider nothing wonderful except the human mind compared to whose greatness nothing is great".[31] Petrarch's attitude changes radically: what at first was the impetuosity of juvenile eagerness to soar towards the peak became an alert consciousness of the self (*in me ipsum interiores*

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[27] Translated by Aldo S. Bernardo, 174–175.

[28] Ibid. "moved by a certain unaccustomed quality of the air and by the unrestricted spectacle, I stood there as in trance."

[29] Petrarch, *Lettres familières*, 31: "…*exemplo corporis animum ad altiora subveherem*". In English by Aldo S. Bernardo, 177.

[30] "*Et eunt homines admirari alta montium et ingentes fluctus maris et latissimos lapsus fluminum et occeani ambitum et giros siderum, et relinquunt se ipsos*". Ibid., 178.

[31] Petrarch, *Lettres familières*, 31: "…*iratus michimet quod nunc etiam terrestria mirarer, qui iampridem ab ipsis gentium philosophis discere debuissem nichil preter animum esse mirabile, cui magno nichil est magnum*". In English by Aldo S. Bernardo, 178.

oculos reflexi) due to Augustine's converting words. The ascension on Mount Ventoux is the story of the inner self's ascension above nature so that, once the spiritual change had taken place, "I turned back to look at the summit of the mountain, it seemed to me scarcely a cubit high in comparison with loftiness of human meditation".[32]

Consequently, true ascension is the ascension of the self above the mundane wishes, ascension obtained through the conversion of the meaning of a physical ascension into a spiritual one, a return to the inner self triggered by Augustine's writing. Therefore, for Petrarch, it would appear that writing (and the letter in general) is neither a style, nor fiction, neither aestheticised confession, nor a record of impressions; if a certain eloquence is present, its purpose is strictly for writing, namely being a pragmatism of modifying the other, of effectively causing the amend of the stance and state of the self or, as Petrarch states again years later in *De ignorantia* (108), the purpose is not to inform, but to make the other better, just as "our philosophers"[33] do in their writings:

> whose first and last purpose is to make their students and readers good. They not only teach the definitions of virtue and vice, haranguing us about virtue's splendor and vice's drabness. They also instill in our breasts both love and zeal for what is good, and hatred and abhorrence of evil.[34]

Petrarch's *ars vitae* is not a secular stylistic of subjectivity[35], but a means to ascend to *humanitas*.

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[32] Petrarch, *Lettres familières*, 33: *"…cubiti altitudo visa est pre altitudine contemplationis humane"*. In English by Aldo S. Bernardo, 178.

[33] The Christian philosophers.

[34] See *De ignorantia*, 110.

[35] Gur Zak, *Petrarch's Humanism and the Care of the Self…*, 119 states that Petrarch "secularizes the medieval uses of reading and writing as spiritual exercises. By transforming medieval techniques of self-care in accordance with his Stoic understanding of the self, in addition to reviving classical practices such as the conducting of examination of conscience in letters to friends and the writing of "Senecan" letters of consolation, Petrarch establishes his humanism as a spiritual alternative to the monastic traditions of "care of the soul" of the later Middle Ages, fashioning it as what might be described as a form of secular spirituality." The author previously noticed the implication of Augustinianism: "strong affinities also to the Augustinian-monastic tradition of the Middle Ages, which in itself draws on these classical sources" (85). But it is clear that he ignores this observation in order to support his original thesis: "Petrarch's humanism – both with respect to its approach to the self and to philosophy in general – (…) is largely defined and dominated by a return to this Imperial, and mainly Stoic, mode of subjectivity" (84).

Neither is the praise for Antiquity so unconditional and so absolute because Mount Ventoux takes the form of the ancient "giants" who, after the revelation of the ascension, transform into "dwarfs" who barely glimpsed the truth.

4. Petrach's Christian Moral Humanism as Demarcation for Classical Antiquity

Far from enthusiastically exploiting the Antiquity[36] as a "rebirth" of the "ancient values", of "human centricity" or of "philology", the Petrarchan humanism is the expression of human essence, stating that man "ascends" and is redeemed through Christian faith. The Petrarchan humanism is the first to explicitly formulate the *homo christianus* model which ascends above the Antiquity through its heritage, namely in a manner in which it finds its essence (its *ethos* or morality) by exceeding and decisively ascending above the Antiquity: the Petrarchan humanism is not a rebirth of Romanity, but a Christian fulfilment of Romanity:[37]

> *Sic philosophica, sic poetica, sic historias legamus, ut semper ad aurem cordis Evangelium Cristi sonet: quo uno satis docti ac felices; sine quo quanto plura didicerimus, tanto indoctiores atque miseriores futuri sumus; ad quod velut ad summam veri arcem referenda sunt omnia; cui, tanquam uni literarum verarum immobili fundamento, tuto superedificat humanus labor.*[38] (Fam. VI, 2).

Although, in common conception, the Renaissance humanist is identified with the genius encyclopaedist who dedicated his life to knowledge (a conception filtered by the Romantic Faustianism), we must accept that, at least in his original writings that programmatically appear in Petrarch's works, he first and foremost offers a moral profile. For that matter, this is where Petrarch's clear and strong

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[36] Eugenio Garin, *L'umanesimo italiano: Filosofia e vita civile nel Rinascimento* (Bari: Laterza, 1994/1947, 22): "For this reason one should never seek to distinguish between the humanistic discovery of antiquity and the humanistic discovery of man – for they amount to exactly the same thing. For the discovery of antiquity implied that one had learnt to make a comparison between antiquity and oneself, to take a detached view of antiquity and to determine one's relation to it," quoted in Gur Zak, *Petrarch's Humanism and the Care for the Self*…, 6.

[37] This interpretation was established by P. O. Kristeller, Gioseppe Toffanin and A. Buck in the array of studies on humanism, and its Augustinian interpretation, extending the idea towards a humanist Augustinianism was formulated by A. D. Trapp and R. Arbesman.

[38] "Let us thus read philosophical, poetic, or historical writings so that the Gospel of Christ resounds always in the ear of our heart. With it alone are we sufficiently happy and learned; without it no matter how much we learn we become more ignorant and more wretched. To it all things must be referred as if to the loftiest stronghold of the truth; on it as if on a single immovable foundation of literary truths, human labor can safely build." Fam. VI, 2. In English by Aldo S. Bernardo.

message from *De ignorantia* appears: the stake of humanism is not knowledge, but the moral development of the self and the labour of study and reformation in the moral edification of the self. Moreover, Petrarch considers himself a moralist and was acknowledged as such by his contemporaries, as proven by a formal declaration by the Dodges of Venice who recognised him as the greatest philosopher of morals, after he promised to donate his personal library to the Venetian patrimony.[39]

It is known that *Moralis* is Cicero's translation of the Greek term *ethikos* in *De fato*. Even today, Heraclitus's much abused saying "Ethos anthropoi daimon" (character is fate) is still correct, since "whose son are you", "where are you from", "where have you travelled", "what can you do", "man's language and clothes" still define man's character. Man's *being* is nothing other than his purpose or the fate of his future character (*factura*). Heraclitus's words were clear: what determines man's actions is not a fate made by the gods, but the ancient and inherited origin of the place, the time, the language and all "characters". In Latin, *mos, moris* indicates the calling to develop in accordance with the heritage. This is why moral refers to the heritage of tradition (*mos maiorum*), namely to what passes through time, losing itself, diminishing and becoming, in what is kept and transmitted, something more essential and noble. It becomes something that is only meant to ascend something else above itself. The morality invoked by Petrarch does not refer to a moral philosophy of manners, but to this meaning given to *mos, moris* as a heritage that sacrifices itself when it is dispelled and that ascends; for Petrarch, the heritage of the Antiquity represents the level where the ascension that had already happened is realised.

This heritage does not imply a return to the ancients. It is already seen "from above", from what had already ascended above it: the Antiquity can become heritage only from this perspective. Inheriting a house, for example, implies that it is inherited as something already yours, as something that was handed down (lost and passed on) in order to receive the edifice of a new ownership and that must be taken by reason of provenance of that certain belonging "as yours". While the ancestors are only those who had noticed the possibility of ascending above themselves, above their status of "bequeathers", the inheritors are those who must realise the ascension in their own way, not by simply repeating it, and who must edifice it in a new way as "their own". They will always receive the inheritance as a personal dwelling and, from the old dwelling, they will only keep what is worthy of their own level of ascension. In Petrarch's way of receiving the ancients' "house", not all predecessors can be considered ancestors. Therefore, not all predecessors had risen to the level on which they could recognise the bequeathing ancestors in the form of

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[39] Quoted in Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, John Herman Randall Jr., *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pomponazzi, Vives*, Phoenix Books (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 24.

their own *ethos*; not all predecessors had seen the possibility that this inheritance could stand on their shoulders and rise above them.

From the perspective of the relation of 12th-century cathedral schools to the Antiquity, the idea of understanding heritage as ascend-above is also present in Bernard de Chartres's famous saying "dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants" (*nos esse quasi nanos, gigantium humeris insidentes*[40]). The idea is also used in Christianity's approach to its Judaic premises, which is visible in the illustration present in the stained glass in Chartres Cathedral, showing the "minor" evangelists Mathew, Mark, Luke and John standing on the shoulders of the giant prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel. Petrarch applies the same principle, but in a monstrous reversal of the roles: the giants are "our philosophers" who had seen "the sun of justice" and "the light of truth". The heritage of Antiquity is, in this case, the study of those authors who had noticed the possibility of ascending above their time and, through their way of speaking and being (*more antiquorum*), had noticed the possibility of another time and of a higher means of being. Therefore, heritage, actively inheriting what they bequeathed, is not represented by revisitation or by an emulation of the ancients, but by the *studium* of that certain segment of Antiquity which manifested *humanitas*, the segment that foresaw the inheriting ascension of humanity, in other words, the moral ascension of man to the redeemed humanity.

For Petrarch, *humanitas* is just that: recognising one's own essence through the study of the moral ascension of humanity based on its Roman heritage; a *studium*, a strife that continuously manages to morally raise man to *humanitas*. But, as a studium, the recognition of the ancient heritage is always filtered by the judgement that divides the moral ascension of humanity that made the observation of *humanitas* in the field of ancient heritage possible, from the rest of the Antiquity which is not worthy of prophetic discussion on ascension. This type of judgement implies a pre-understanding of history since, by recognising its heritage, it only considers that segment as part of its history. But what is the aforementioned moral ascension on which this critical judgment as *studium humanitatis* is based?

Following in Augustine's footsteps, it is possible that Petrarch's supposed inclination towards moral philosophy represents the assumption of a Christian philosophy of history.[41] He reads and selects Antiquity through the filter of inheriting moral: the Antiquity is praiseworthy because, during weak moments of enlightenment, it foresees the Christian essence of man, namely *humanitas*. Approximately one century later, Hermeticism would appear as a Petrarchan "moral philosophy", in which Hermes Trismegistus's old wisdom foresees Christ and the

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[40] Attributed to Bernard de Chartres by John of Salisbury in his *Metalogicon*.

[41] Amos Edelheit, *Ficino, Pico and Savonarola. The Evolution of Humanist Theology 1461/2–1498* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2008). The author notes that "a new humanist theology from the early 1460s to the end of the 1490s," a perfectly valid characterization of Petrarch's situation, namely for the original concept of humanism in the 14th century.

ascension of man as a divine *logos*. From a Hermetic point of view, the Romans were not the only ones to contribute to the creation of this *humanitas,* but the wisdom of the entire world, the certain *prisca theologia* – which, in its prophetic way, guides humanity as a whole towards is historical fate of moral ascension. Christianity is thus seen as the humanity which inherits the knowledge of humanity in its entirety. In *De ignorantia*, the motive of "Aristotle as great man but still an ignorant man" implies that he did not have any access to *humanitas* as ascension. In this respect, Aristotle is not part of the heritage included in *humanitas*. For that matter, Cicero is not part of *humanitas* either, but he participated in its heritage since he foresaw it. The ascension to *humanitas* is mediated by conversion and it exceeds the status of a simple human. Therefore, *humanitas* describes the existence of a solution of continuity between *humanum* and *divinum*.

If modern historical research defines the Renaissance as the rebirth of the Latin letters and of humanism, identifying Petrarch as "the father of humanism", it uses a humanist concept that no longer has anything to do with the original *humanitas*. The historians of the 19th century (G. Voigt and J. Burckhardt) define the Renaissance as a historical era based on a meaning of history that implies progress in man's autonomy given by knowledge, by imposing itself as a central reference point for the values of an *uomo universale*. In this case, humanism is an overemphasis of the Enlightenment, which actually established the meaning of morality as a liberation from recognising any heritage and as a pure morality of manners (of the *must* in itself). F. Nietzsche, in his Genealogy of Morality, notes that the rule of the morality of manners is not the abstract *categorical imperative*, but a more concrete negotiated penalty, which is seen as a revenge of plebeian vileness and helplessness. The moral rule of manners is represented by the character Shylock, who takes *the pound of flesh* in the name of human reciprocity, claiming revenge in the name of Judaic secondariness and precariousness. He claims his rights in the name of humanity as equality and reciprocity among humans (*The Merchant of Venice,* Act 3, Scene 1. 49-61). Thus, the character declaims humanism as the natural essence of humanity and not as *humanitas*.[42] The morality of manners refers to a humanism that shifts the focus from nature to value and that represents an "intellectual manifest" of a set of values. The Petrarchan humanism of *humanitas* is rather a manifestation of faith that assumes the lifestyle not through manners, but rather through the revealed truth. Nature opposes divine action as the history of man, but nature is not simply "what is given", but it is rather understood as a concept of knowledge, as a result of man's autonomous knowledge, thus as a concept of natural philosophy.

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[42] In Shakespeare's play, in the resolution, the meaning of *humanitas* as moral ascension is also present, since love and Christian clemency triumph over Shylock's rights. The rights of *humanitas* prevail over the rights of natural blood-bound equality which were invoked by Shylock.

5. Conclusion

The sense of moral ascension of *homo christianus* is, at the same time, the filtering sense of his heritage. Therefore, through *studia humanitatis*, his momentary superior status is educated, surpassing classicism by "exploiting the classics". The only value is given by *homo christianus* and all other values of manners must be exceeded. In this case, it is not surprising that, until the Reformation (whose effect was a radicalization of the humanist and philology studies – in the case of Erasmus, for example – in the direction of a Christian *humanitas*) and until the "Book of Nature" of the 16th century which strived to exceed Aristotelianism through natural Christian philosophy, the Catholic Church did not hesitate to support this humanist project.[43]

Petrarch's initiatives had followers. On the one hand, M. Ficino and G. Pico were Petrarch's children in regards to the field of philology and of religious devotion. They radicalised the heritage of the Antiquity by adding Platonism at the root of the Christianity's foreshadow and by interpreting Hermeticism and cabala as *prisca theologia*, which basically bore the same anticipating directions of Christianity.

Moreover, Petrarch compares the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle not through a philological or philosophical judgement, because he did not have access to the Platonic texts,[44] but through a purely humanistic one: Plato foresaw the moral ascension of humanity through Christianity and his writings are those which must be studied (rather than Aristotle's) as the heritage of truth progressively revealed throughout history. This incentive and this recognition of Platonism is followed in the mid-15th century by Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus, Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico and the Platonic Academy in Florence.

G. Bruno was also Petrarch's follower but only in matters of poetry, where his influence is visible. In most cases, Bruno opposed to Petrarchan humanism. He rejected philology, Christianity and the *prisca theologia*. Although he keeps the rhyme scheme of the Petrarchan sonnet, he forms an attachment to hermetic magic. Besides Cicero, Bruno also discovers Lucretius. He thus opposed this *humanitas christiana* – in the name of an Antiquity that does not bear religious meanings and

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[43] *"This religious tendency was strong among many of the Humanists and found its culmination in the Christian Humanism of Erasmus."* Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, John Herman Randall Jr., *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. *Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pomponazzi, Vives* ..., 5. Or Ch. Trinkaus, *Petrarch's Views on the Individual and His Society*, Osiris, Vol. 11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 196: "Petrarch anticipates the Puritan's lonely struggle with his conscience by three centruries."

[44] Petrarch owned many of Plato's *Dialogues* (see *De ignorantia*, where he mentions six of Plato's works), but they were in Greek, a language Petrarch did not know sufficiently in order to read them. Therefore, Petrarch's references to Plato are given through Cicero and Augustine's stories.

that is thus insignificant from the point of view of the Christian heritage. Through his magic, atomist and infinitist view, G. Bruno is the great anti-humanist, the philosopher who opposed both to the naturalist-Aristotelian academic philosophy and the Christian humanism. The fact that, at the end of the 16th century, Galileo's mechanical philosophy (and the Copernicus model) gives a mortal blow to scholarly Aristotelianism has nothing to do with the humanist (Petrarchan) critique of Aristotelianism; on the contrary, Galileo was formed by the scholarly Aristotelianism specific to the Italian universities[45] which, technically speaking, criticised Aristotelianism, but still continued and developed its naturalist *ethos* (the eternity of the world, the practice of science in the name of a united intellect, defining man's sociality in the terms of biology etc.).

Petrarch is an "unaffiliated" scholar. He does not belong to a university, he is not a high prelate and he is not part of the Venetian Patriciate. From this point of view, Petrarch's humanism, *humanitas christiana*, as a historical project, was quickly isolated as a merely philological writing and it confined (abandoning its historical concept of man's moral ascension) in being a discipline that studies aspects of human culture (humanities). The humanities that today lack a strong basis (which speaks volumes about the fate of the *humanitas christiana*) still nostalgically and naively argue their equal legitimacy to the sciences that produce technology, due to the fact that they form "moral characters" through the knowledge of classic models. What this thesis cannot state is the fact that the fundamental argument of the "humanist studies" is based on the historicity assumed by the humanist as an ascended man: only after he morally ascended through Christianity could he recognise the "moral characters" in the darkness of the Antiquity.

Translated from the Romanian by Anca Chiorean

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[45] The Italian universities differed from the ones in Paris, where Aristotelianism was interpreted, articulated and purged (by Averroism) theologically. In Italy, Aristotelianism was taught especially within the medical sciences, therefore the Averroist interpretations were under no theological pressure and its (secular) doctrine was not opposed within the university. The extent of the influence of Averroism in Italy can be seen in Dante Alighieri's *De monarchia*, where Dante does not refrain from arguing the political necessity of humanity in the basis of the Averroist doctrine on the unity of the intellect.

JOHANNES DE WASIA AND HIS *SENTENCES* COMMENTARY

LUCIANA CIOCA*

Abstract The article seeks to describe the manuscript Erfurt/Gotta, Universitäts und Forschungsbibliothek CA 2° 110 which contains Johannes de Wasia's (d.1395) abbreviation of Alphonsus Vargas' *Sentences* commentary and to give the complete list of the *quaestiones* treated in the prologue in order to compare Wasia's work with his source, Alphonsus Vargas.
Keywords Johannes de Wasia, Sentences commentary, Alphonsus Vargas, Latin manuscript, Prologue

Johannes de Wasia (alternative forms of the name: Johannes de Waes, Jan de Waes, Jean Waes, Jan von Waes) was born in Waasland (today East Flanders, Belgium), *ex loco in pago Wasiae qui Sallynghem dicitur.*[1] He reads his *Sentences* commentary in 1376 in Paris, as we can see in ms. Erfurt CA 2° 110, ff.16r and 59r: *Magister Johannes de Wasia anno 76.* The *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis,* in 23 June, 1379 refers to him as *baccalarius formatus[2] in theologia[3].*

[1] Adriaan Pattin, "Les Elements d'Euclide source du *De proportionibus* de Jean de Waes († 1395)," in *Tradition et Traduction,* ed. Rita Beyers (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), 305.

[2] By the time Wasia read the Sentences, the title of *baccalaureus formatus* meant someone who had already finished lecturing on the *Sentences*. Before 1350, however, one could have been called a *baccalaureus* while lecturing on the *Sentences*. See William Courtenay, "The academic environment of Peter of Candia," in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages*, eds. Kent Emery, Russell Friedman, Andreas Peer (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 928.

He is mentioned in the *Chartularium* together with three others, Lambertus de Marchia[4], Guilhelmus Amelline[5] and Philippus Pin[g][6], *intrantibus magistris venerabilibus et circunspectis viris,*[7] in the context of the election of the new rector, Johannes de Beke Brabantinus,[8] in June 23, 1379. He left Paris and became *curatus de Coukelar* and then *curatus sancte Walpurge Brugensis*, where he was found in 1389.[9] In 1393 he was the rector of the university of Cologne[10] and became the first dean of the faculty of theology the next year.[11] He died in 1395.

Johannes de Wasia's biography seems to point towards an interesting case of a scholar in the age of the transfer of knowledge from the universities that already had a tradition, like Paris, to the newly born establishments, like Cologne. In fact, part of the statutes for the Parisian theological faculty were reconstructed using references from other universities that copied the Parisian model, including Cologne.[12]

The Erfurt/Gotta, Universitäts und Forschungsbibliothek CA 2° 110 manuscript contains Johannes de Wasia's abbreviation of a *Sentences* commentary, generally (but incompletely) known as the summary of Alphonsus Vargas' commentary. The text comprises his *Principia*[13], a Prologue, and the

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[3] Henricus Denifle, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. III (Paris: ex typis fratrum Delalain, 1894), 237.

[4] "*Lamberto Colini de Marchia, presb., bac. in theologia, nuper rectori universitatis Parisien., quis [sic] pluribus annis rexit in atrium facultate legitque librum ethicorum, de canon. sub exp. preb. eccl. Lingonen. ad quos alias fuit signatus per dom. Gregorium predec. vestrum;*", *Rotuli Parisienses: Supplications to the Pope from the University of Paris*, vol III, eds. William Courtenay, Eric D. Goddard (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 47.

[5] "*Guillermo Aimeline, subdiac., mag. in artibus et bac. in decretis, de benef. ecclesiast. c.c. vel s.c. /168v/ ad collat. abb. et conv. monast. B. Marie de Lira, O.S.B., Ebroicen. dioc.*", *Rotuli Parisienses,* 238.

[6] Mentioned as "Johanne Pin," but found as Philippus de Ping in *Liber proclamationum nationis Anglicanae,* cf. *CUP* III, 1421, 237.

[7] *CUP* III, 1421, 237.

[8] For further reading on Johannes de Beke, see H. Bruch, *Chronographia Johannis de Beke* (Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1973).

[9] A. Pattin, "Les Elements d'Euclide source du *De proportionibus* de Jean de Waes († 1395)"..., 306.

[10] Wilhelm Schmitz, *Die matrikel der Universität Köln* (Bonn: H. Behrendt, 1892), 51.

[11] H. Denifle, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis....*

[12] Monika Asztalos, "The faculty of theology" in *A History of the University in Europe: Volume 1, Universities in the Middle Ages,* ed. Hilde de Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 417.

[13] *Principium* was a mandatory practice for the candidate to the title of doctor in theology, in which he had to defend his ideas in a public debate with *socii,* a debate held before reading the commentary itself. The *Principia* had 4 parts, one for each book. Most of them remain

Sentences commentary in four books. The contents of the manuscript have been subject to debate because of Vargas' *Commentary* which only has the first book. Since Wasia's abbreviation has four, there remains the question of books 2, 3 and 4.[14] D. Trapp identified them as abbreviations of John of Mirecourt's commentary, aspect that will not be examined at length in the present paper, but which could be part of a future research. As part of the Prologue transcription work,[15] I extracted the complete list of *quaestiones* in the Prologue from the manuscript, which I shall present here in comparison with those of Alphonsus Vargas (for the Prologue and book I),[16] in order to have a clear picture of the way Wasia abbreviated his commentary.

We can find the manuscript mentioned in the following catalogues:

F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, 1, Würzburg 1947, n° 504, pages 247-248.

W. Schum, *Beschreibendes Verzeichniss der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt*, Berlin, 1887, n° 110, pages 76-77.

Physical description

Material: Paper

Dimensions: 30 x 22

Foliation: Trapp mentions 2 ways of pagination.[17] Throughout the text there are actually 3 ways of numbering the pages. The second starts at f. 12r in brackets: (13). The third starts at 16r with 1.

Letter: Rounded cursive.[18]

Decoration: There are simple decorations around the capital initials at the beginning of the prologue (16ra) and at the beginning of each of the books

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unknown, mostly due to the fact that they circulated independently. Some were later added to the text of the commentary. For further details and a case study on *Principia*, see Petrus de Alliaco, *Quaestiones super primum, tertium et quartum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Monica Brînzei (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 11–18. Also, for a wrap-up of the subject of *Principia* and the researchers currently working on it, see L. Cioca, "Les Principia sur les Sentences: entre exercise institutionel et realite intellectuelle," *Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale* 57 (2015): 434–437.

[14] Trapp identifies these books as being abbreviated from John of Mirecourt. See D. Trapp, "Augustinian theology of the 14th century. Notes on editions, marginalia, opinions and book-lore," in *Augustiniana* 6 (1956): 214.

[15] The transcription is part of Monica Brînzei's ERC-THESIS project.

[16] The titles are from the incunabulum Venice, 1490, that contains Alphonsus Vargas' *Sentences* commentary.

[17] Trapp attributes this to the fact that the *Principia* part was added later on. Trapp, "Augustinian theology of the 14th century."

[18] Wilhelm Schum: *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1887), n° 110, 76.

(26ra, 59ra, 100ra, 138ra). On 16ra, the initial is decorated with a geometric frame enriched with curved lines, dots, and circles, continuing down the margin of the text. The capital initial starting the first book of the commentary has the same frame, but not the rest of the embellishment. The beginning of the second book has a much simpler decoration for the initial (C), a part of the interior being filled with colour and different shapes, but the decoration does not continue down the margin. The opening initial for the third book is a much larger letter than the last one, but with a simpler decoration inside the letter. The beginning of the fourth book copies the initial from the second. The secondary initials are very simply decorated with lines and dots, some are simply enlarged without anything added.

Ruling: The *Principia* section (ff. 1-15v) is written on one column, but starting with the Prologue (f. 16r) there are two columns. The number of lines in a column varies from 55 to 60. The lines drawn to border the columns are visible in each folio.

Copyist: There is only one hand in the entire manuscript, even in the annotations.

Date: 1376. The mention is found in ff.16r and 59r: *Magister Johannes de Wasia anno 76*.

Content

The title added on a label on the hardcover of the manuscript reads: *Lectura Magistri Alfonsi Hermitae Abbreviata per Magistrum Iohannem de Wasia. Super Quattuor Sententiarum.* The medieval shelf mark was added inside the cover: *51 theologie.* Also, here we find the modern label containing the name of the library and the number of the manuscript. The next four pages of the manuscript are in paper and contain a table of people who have read the manuscript since 1919. Among them, we find F. Stegmuller, Rega Wood, Katherine Tachau and P.A. Zumkeller. The fifth and sixth pages contain the description of Schum's catalogue on a modern paper. The first page on parchment, marked "vorblatt II", reads this title written by a 14th century hand: *Lectura magistri Alfoncii ordinis fratrum heremitarum Sancti Augustini Super Quattuor Libros Sentenciarum Abbreviata per magistrum Iohannem de Wasia Parisiensem/ 51 Theologie*. The next 5 pages, "vorblatt III, IV" are blank. We see that the note found in Amplonius' Catalogue, *Theologie 52*, is no longer in the manuscript. This is not a singular case, Erfurt/Gotta, Universitäts und Forschungsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA F. 118, containing James of Eltville's commentary, is in the same situation. The text was attributed to Henry of Langenstein and all the titles in the manuscript mention

him. Monica Brînzei analyses Altavilla's case[19] and offers two possible interpretations of this transmission. Firstly, the author of the catalogue could have had some information on Langenstein that he used to attribute the text. Secondly, the title could have been reproduced based on the initial title that is no longer in the codex. As we can see below, Erfurt CA° 110 has notes of attribution throughout the entire text. Wasia's text poses another challenge – as it has already been stated, the issue of the sources of the abbreviation. While it is clear that Vargas is the source for the prologue and the first book, the other three books need a close comparison for an accurate attribution while keeping in mind D. Trapp's mention that they are abbreviated from Mirecourt.

Johannes de Wasia, *Lectura Super Quattuor Sententiarum*, Erfurt, UB CA F. 110:

1r – 6r: *Primum principiorum circa librum Sententiarum a magistro Johanne de Wasia.*

6r – 9r: *Secundum principiorum magistro Iohanne de Wasia.*

9r – 12r: *Principium circa tertium librum Sententiarum.*

12r – 16r: *Principium magistri Iohannis de Wasia circa quartum Sententiarum.*

16r[20] – 26r: *In sole etc. Magister Iohannes de Wasia, anno 76.*

26r – 59r : *Circa distinctionem primam.*

59r – 100r : *Liber secundus a magistro Iohanne de Wasia. Anno 76.*

100r – 138r : *Circa tertium sententiarum a magistro Iohanne de Wasia compilatum.*

138r – 157v: *Circa quartum sententiarum a magistro Iohanne de Wasia compilatum.*

Marginalia: The manuscript has very rich additions in 17 folios, the rest are shorter. Most of the annotations are just a few words long. Some of the additions are indicated by a *manicula* (ff. 85v, 87v, 93r, 93v, 105v, 113v, 119v, 150r, 154r). The annotations are in the same hand as the text in the columns.

Attribution

The text belongs to Johannes de Wasia, as indicated in f. 1r (*Primum principiorum circa librum Sententiarum a magistro Johanne de Wasia*), f. 6r (*Secundum principium magistro Iohanne de Wasia*), f. 12r (*Principium magistri Iohannis de Wasia…*), 16r (*magister Iohannes de Wasia*), 60r (*Liber secundus a magistro Iohanne de Wasia*), 100r (*Circa tertium sententiarum a magistro*

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[19] Monica Brînzei, "Enquete sur la tradition manuscrite du commentaire des Sentences du cistercien Jacques d'Eltville," *Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale* 56 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 259.

[20] The beginning of the prologue.

Iohanne de Wasia compilatum), 138r (*Circa quartum sententiarum a magistro Iohanne de Wasia compilatum*). D. Trapp identifies this manuscript as an autograph due to the "empty spaces within the column, by twofold paginations resulting from a later insertion of the Principia".[21] Also, in ff. 100r and 138r, we read: *a mag. Io. De Wasia compilatum.*

Johannes de Wasia possessed a considerable number of manuscripts which were later on bought by Amplonius, including CA 2° 110. Some of the manuscripts in the collection "Bibliotheca Amploniana" bear the mark of this acquisition in the annotations.[22] Here are two examples:

Erfurt/Gotta, Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek CA 2° 108, 1r: *Nunc est magistri Iohannis de Wasia curati sancte Walpurge Brugensis, qui emit ab exequutoribus domini Iohannis Campionis. Nunc est Amplonii Ratyngh de Berka*.[23]

Erfurt/Gotta, Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek CA 2° 351: *Iste liber est magistri Amplonii de Berka, qui emit eum ab executoribus magistri Io. De Wasia prumpto auro anno siquidem 1402 in mense Marcio.*[24]

A large number of these manuscripts have annotations, titles and tables added in another hand than the one that wrote the text. I compared CA 2° 110 with CA 2° 108, which has the very clear mention of possession by Wasia; the same hand that wrote *Nunc est magistri Iohannis de Wasia…*, also wrote the entire manuscript CA 2° 110. I think this is a very reasonable argument in favour of labeling CA 2° 110 as an autograph. The same hand added the said annotations, titles and tables in other manuscripts, which indicates the fact that Wasia was carefully cataloguing his books and taking interest in them, since many are commented and improved upon in his own hand. This also indicates a rather wide and diversified interest, since his collection includes not only philosophy and theology, but also medicine, mathematics, magic, astronomy, and so on.

Quaestiones
Since we now have an online edition of Alphonsus Vargas' *Sentences* Commentary[25], I shall present the *Tabula* by comparing the titles for both Wasia's and Vargas' books.

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[21] Trapp, "Augustinian theology of the 14th century. Notes on editions, marginalia, opinions and book-lore"…, 214.

[22] The history of the collection can be found in Brigitte Pfeil's 'Mosaiksteine' zur Geschichte der 'Bibliotheca Amploniana', in http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=18984 (accessed on 24.05.2017).

[23] *Manuscripta Mediaevalia* in http://www.manuscripta-mediaevalia.de/#|5 (accessed on 24.05.2017).

[24] Adriaan Pattin, "A propos de Joannes de Wasia," *Bulletin de Philosophie medievale* 20 (1978): 74.

Principia[26]

1r- 5v: *Primum principiorum circa librum Sententiarum a magistro Johanne de Wasia. Haec est collatio eius.*

Incipit sermo: *Facies eius sicut sol lucet[27], scribitur Apocalypsis primo capitulo reverendi patres etc. Sicut scribit doctor egregius Hyspalensis Ysydor, libro Ethicorum V, capitulo 1: facies dicta est ab effigie. Ibi est enim tota figura hominis et uniuscuiusque personae cognitio.*

5v-6r: Incipit sermo:*Facies eius sicut sol lucet, Apocalypsis primo capitulo. Resummendo thema quid sumpsi in primo cursu meo et in primo sententiarum primus cum doctrina viri meritiorem faciens eius sit ostendens. A doctrina enim sua cognitio vir, prout 12 capitulo.*

6r-9r: *Secundum principium magistro Iohanne de Wasia.Quaere collationem in ultimo latere.*

Incipitquaestio collativa: *Iuxta thema collationis formo talem tytulum quaestionis: utrum facies solis infinite relucentiae ab aeterno splendorem adequatum immensitati suae potentiae potuit quovismodo producere.*

9r- 12r : *Principium circa tertium librum Sententiarum.*

Incipit sermo: *Facies eius sicut sol lucet, Apocalypsis, primo capitulo. Viri doctrina merito appelari potest meritior eius facies quoniam sicut in naturalibus ab exteriori faciei dispositione, ut patet per Philosophum, liber suo De physionomia.*

9v: Incipit quaestio collativa: *Iuxta thema collationis formo talem tytulum quaestionis: utrum facies solis infinite relucentiae umbram corporalis deficientiae sibi potuit ypostatice unire.*

12r-15v: *Principium magistri Iohannis de Wasia circa quartum Sententiarum. Quaere collationem finita quaestione.*

Incipit quaestio collativa: *Iuxta theologia collationis formo talem tytulum quaestionis: utrum facies solis infinite relucentiae virtutem spiritualis efficientiae sacramentis communicaverit effective.*

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[25] The commentary is available at http://thesis-project.ro/alphonsusvargas/ (accessed on 24.05.2017)..

[26] Vargas' commentary does not have a *Principium* per se, but it is recycled in his Prologue. More information about this will be given in Chris Shabel's forthcoming article on principia that is based on his conference during the aforementioned *Principia* workshop at IRHT, Paris.

[27] This is a pun, a practice used by the commentators in which they chose biblical passages that include words that resemble their names. Regarding this issue see Ueli Zahnd's database: http://puns.zahnd.be/puns.php (accessed on 24.05.2017). Johannes de Wasia is listed under the pun "facies" that in vernacular sounds like Wasia.

15v: Incipit sermo: *Facies eius sicut sol lucet, Apocalypsis, primo capitulo. Cum a doctrina sua cognoscitur vir Proverbiorum, 12 capitulo, et in facie prudentis reluceat sapientia.*

Johannes de Wasia, *Lectura Super Quattuor Sententiarum*, Prologus, Erfurt, UB CA F. 110

16ra-20rb: Quoniam multo laboris studio, cum vita brevis, ars vero longa scientiis acquirendis propter naturale ad hoc in situm desiderium, cum omnes homines natura scire desiderent, I Metaphysicae. Et generosos animos labor nutriat, Senecae Ad Lucilium, epistola 31, et apud potentiam intellectus nihil sit difficile, De regimine principium. Et precipue Scripturae quae maxime honoranda et maxime divina est totis viribus, insudare non in merito debeamus, ut modi scientias investigandi plenius pateat norma. Ordiar questionem sub hac forma: utrum a viatore naturali industria concurrente solum Dei generali influentia possit de aliquo certitudinaliter acquiri notitia scientifica.

20rb-22va: Secundo quaero : utrum theologia quae de communi lege habetur a theologis sit scientia proprie dicta.

22va-24ra: Tertio quaero: utrum habitus theologicus possibilis viatori de communi lege distinguatur realiter a fide.

24ra-26va: Quarto quaero: utrum articuli fidei sint principia theologiae.

Alphonsus Vargas, *Lecturain primum librum Sententiarum,* Prologus, Venice, 1490

1va-8b: Utrum aliqua notitia evidens de veritatibus theologiae sit possibilis viatori de potentia Dei absoluta quae sit scientia proprie dicta.

8rb-13rb: Utrum habitus theologicus possibilis viatori de lege communi sit scientia proprie dicta.

13rb-15va: Utrum habitus theologiae possibilis viatori de lege communi sit realiter distinctus a fide.

15va-17va: Utrum articuli fidei sint principia theologiae.

17va-20va: Utrum de ratione formali primi et per se subiecti habitus

scientifici sit habere passiones distinctas a se realiter.

20va-24ra: Utrum habitus theologicus intellectus creati sit de Deo ut Deus est tamquam de subiecto primo.

24ra-27rb: Utrum habitus theologicus intellectus creati sit de Deo sub ratione finita tamquam de subiecto primo.

27rb-29rb: Utrum ex infinitate subiecti primi formaliter sumpti necessario concludatur infinitas habitus scientifici.

29rb-32va: Utrum finis principaliter intentus in habitu theologico viatoris sit praxis vel speculatio.

32va-35vb: Utrum habitus theologicus possibilis viatori de lege communi sit practicus vel speculativus.

Johannes de Wasia, *Lectura Super Quattuor Sententiarum*, Liber I, Erfurt, UB CA F. 110

26ra-28rb: Quoniam Magister in distinctione prima agit principaliter de fruitione et usu. Et fruitio est essentialiter dilectio vel delectatio vel utrumque, ut materia fruitionis planius intelligatur, quaero istam quaestionem praeambulam: utrum delectatio sit perfectior dilectione.

28rb-29va: Secundo quaero circa istam distinctionem: utrum fruitio sit essentialiter dilectio vel delectatio.

29va-30vb: Quaeritur tertio circa istam primam distinctionem: utrum fruitio proprie dicta in creaturis sit solius voluntatis formaliter et subiective.

Alphonsus Vargas, *Lectura in primum librum Sententiarum*, Liber I, Venice, 1490

35vb-39va: Utrum delectatio sit perfectior dilectione.

39va-41ra: Utrum fruitio sit essentialiter dilectio vel delectatio.

41ra-42vb: Utrum fruitio proprie dicta in creaturis sit solius voluntatis formaliter et subiective.

30vb-33ra: Quaeritur quarto: utrum aliqua creatura possit esse debitae ac ordinatae fruitionis obiectum.

33ra-37va: Quaeritur: utrum creata voluntas per suam ingenitam libertatem et sua propria efficacia possit non frui obiecto beatifico clare viso in patria.

38ra-40ra: Quaero: utrumnon fruendo personis possit voluntas creata ordinate frui divina essentia.

40ra-41va: Circa distinctionem 2 in qua Magister auctoritatibus Veteris ac Novi Testamenti probat trinitatem personarum in unitate essentiaequaero: utrum 'Deum esse trinum et unum' sit naturaliter demonstrabile.

41va-42vb: Circa distinctionem 4 in qua Magister agit de aeterna generatione Filii a Patre inquirens an concedendum sit quod Deus genuit Deum quaero: utrum potentia generandi in Deo sit vera potentia productiva.

43ra-43vb: Secundo convertendo materias de potentia generandi quaero: utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio.

44ra-44va: Circa distinctionem 7 quaero cum Magistro: utrum essentia divina generet vel generetur.

44vb-46ra: Circa distinctiones 9 et 10 quaeritur: utrum generatio Filii sit realiter prior spiratione Spiritus Sancti.

46rb-47rb: Circa distinctionem 13 quaero: utrum generatio et spiratio in divinis realiter distinguantur.

48ra-50va: Circa distinctiones 33 et 34 in quibus Magister agit de divina essentia et proprietatibus relationis quaero: utrum divina essentia sit eadem

42vb-51rb: Utrum fruitio qua creatura rationalis nunc fruitur Deo beatifice ipsa manente in creatura possit non esse fruitio sibi.

51rb-54vb: Utrum debitum obiectum fruitionis ordinatae possit esse aliqua res creata.

54vb-61ra: Utrum voluntas creata per suam propriam efficaciam et ingenitam libertatem possit non frui obiecto beatifico clare viso.

61ra-64ra: Utrum voluntas creata de potentia Dei absoluta possit non frui obiecto beatifico clare viso.

64ra-67vb: Utrum voluntas creata possit ordinate frui essentia divina non fruendo personis.

67vb-72ra: Utrum 'Deum esse trinum et unum' possit naturaliter demonstrari.

72ra-79ra: Utrum partes imaginis creatae sint aequalis perfectionis entitative.

79ra-82vb: Utrum quaelibet pars imaginis creatae sit totalis causa effectiva sui actus.

82vb-85rb: Utrum potentia generandi in Deo sit vera potentia productiva.

85rb-87ra: Utrum essentia divina generet vel generetur.

realiter et formaliter proprietatibusrelationis.

50va-52va: Circa distinctionem 38 primo quaeritur: utrum futurum possit evidenter a Deo sciri esse futurum.

53ra-54vb: Quaero circa distinctionem[28]: utrum aeterne praedestinationis aliquorum et reprobationis aliorum ex parte praedestinati et reprobati sit aliqua causa totius effectus praedestionationis et reprobationis.

55ra-56ra : Quaeritur circa distinctionem 42: utrum omne fieri possibile Deus sua absoluta potentia possit facere.

56rb-56va : Circa distinctionem 37 quaero: utrum praesentialitas qua Deus est praesens omnibus creaturis dicat rationem positivam vel privativam.

56vb-57rb : Circa distinctiones 45, 46: utrum sic semper impleatur divina voluntas quod non sit impedimenti eius per creaturam possibilitas.

57va-58va: Circa distinctionem 48 et ultimam primo quaeritur: utrum quaelibet voluntas creata teneatur se conformare voluntati divine.

87ra-89ra: Utrum in divinis possunt esse plures filii.

89ra-91rb: Utrum potentia generandi in divinis sit essentia vel proprietas.

91va-97rb: Utrum principium in entibus sit tantum aliquid et non aliquid et aliquid per exclusionem omnis distinctionis et non identitatis ex natura rei perfectionum attributalium.

97rb-100rb: Utrum generatio Filii sit realiter prior processione Spiritus Sancti.

100va-103ra: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio tamquam ab uno libero principio.

103ra-105rb: Utrum generatio et spiratio in Deo realiter distinguantur.

105rb-106rb: Utrum cuilibet personae divinae vere conveniat missio.

106rb-110va: Utrum charitas augeatur secundum esse.

110va-114vb: Utrum charitas augeatur per depurationem

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[28] distinctionem] *lac. E*

a contrario.

114vb-120va: Utrum charitas augeatur per additionem partis ad partem utraque parte remanente.

120va-122ra: Utrum gradus adveniens in augmento charitatis ab intellectu creato possit intuitive videri non viso priori.

122ra-124va: Utrum aliquis possit esse Deo charus et acceptus ad vitam aeternam sine dono charitatis infuse eius animam formaliter informante.

124va-127rb: Utrum per se et proximum fundamentum receptivum aequalitatis in creaturis sit natura specifica vel mutabilis.

127rb-130rb: Utrum trium personarum in divinis sit aequalitas summa.

130rb-132ra: Utrum ista propositio sit concedenda 'solus Pater est Deus'.

132ra-133va: Utrum nomina dicta de Deo dicantur de ipso formaliter.

133va-134ra: Utrum trinitas personarum in divinis sit verus numerus.

134ra-136vb: Utrum personae divinae distinguantur personaliter proprietatibus absolutis vel relative.

136vb-143rb: Utrum omnis relatio realis in creaturis sit res distincta a rebus absolutis.

143rb-144va: Utrum Dei ad creaturam sit relatio realis.

144va-147vb: Utrum Deus referatur temporaliter ad creaturam relatione reali quae sit formaliter in

ipso vel in creatura.

147vb-150va: Utrum essentia divina sit eadem realiter proprietatibus relativis.

150va-151vb: Utrum essentia divina sit eadem formaliter proprietatibus.

151vb-153va: Utrum Deus cognoscat aliquid extra se.

153va-157rb: Utrum omnis propositio de futuro a Deo praescita in sua veritate sit infallibilis et necessaria.

157rb-158rb: Utrum omnis praedestinatus ab aeterno fuerit praedestinatus.

158rb-163rb: Utrum omnis propositio de futuro contingenti determinate vera per divinam potentiam possit nunquam fuisse vera.

163va-165rb: Utrum quilibet homo potens uti libero arbitrio teneatur sub poena peccati voluntatem suam voluntati divine universaliter in volito conformare.

Liber secundus a magistro Iohanne de Wasia anno 76:

59ra-60va : Circa secundum librum Sententiarum quaero primo: utrum rerum creatio sit possibilis naturaliter ab aeterno.

60va-61vb : Quaeritur secundo: utrum ab aeterno plures possent fuisse creatores per aliquam potentiam.

61vb-63rb : Quaeritur tertio: utrum cuiuslibet entitatis productae vel producibilis ad extra solus Deus sit causa principalis effectiva.

63rb-65vb : Quaeritur quarto circa eandem distinctionem: utrum anima rationalis convenienter sit unita corpori formato de limo terrae et corporali.

66ra-67rb : Circa distinctionem 2 in qua Magister inquirit in quo loco angeli fuerunt creati, quia in empyreo caelo, quaeritur: utrum angeli sint in loco.

67rb-69va: Quaeritur: utrum angelus possit se movere localiter et succesive et in instantia.

69vb-74ra : Circa distinctionem 3 quaeritur: utrum angelus in aliquo instanti primo peccare poterat vel mereri.

74ra-78va : Circa distinctionem 4 in qua Magister inquirit an creati sint angeli beati vel miseri quaero:utrum angeli tam boni quam mali fuerunt in gratia et caritate creati.

78va -81vb : Quaeritur: utrum cuiuslibet viatoris liberum arbitrium libere eliciat quemlibet actum suum meritorium vel demeritorium.

82ra-85ra : Quaeritur: utrum alicuius creaturae liberum arbitrium possit libere velle et similiter libere respuere quodlibet obiectum, ut verbi gratia velle malum et respuere bonum.

85ra-86vb : Quaeritur: utrum unus angelus naturaliter ex se aliorum angelorum cogitationes ac etiam materias possit distincte et intuitive noscere.

86vb-88rb : Circa distinctionem 18 in qua Magister agit de formatione mulierum ex costa viri quaero: utrum ex sola illa costa absque alicuius alterius additamento materie fuit formatum corpus Evae.

88rb-89va : Circa distinctionem 19 quaeritur: utrum corpus primi hominis in statu innocentiae aliquando fuisset corruptum et fuit corruptibile.

89va-94ra : Quaero: utrum circumscripta speciali gratia viator aliquis possit implere preceptis de diligendo Deum super omnia.

94ra-95ra: Circa eandem materiam quaero:utrum virgo gloriosa Dei mater benedicta fuerit in peccato originali concepta.

95rb-95vb: Quaeritur: utrum decedentes cum solo originali puniantur aliquo sensus penali.

95vb-99ra : Circa distinctiones 34 et 3 sequentes quaero: utrum Deus creator omnium aliorum supernaturalis sit causa efficiens immediata cuiuslibet peccati actualis.

99rb-99va: Quaero nunc ultimo circa istum secundum sententiarum: utrum quodlibet divinum beneficium aggravet voluntatis demeritum sive peccatum.

Circa tertium Sententiarum a magistro Iohanne de Wasia compilatum:
100ra-100va : Circa tertium librum sententiarum primo quaeritur: utrum, si primus parens non peccaset, Deus humanam naturam corporalem assumpsiset.

100vb-101vb : Circa distinctionem 2 quaero: utrum alia natura quam humana potuisset a verbo in unitatem supposoti fuisse assumpta.

101vb-104va : Circa materiam distinctiones 6 et 10 quaero: utrum Deus per assumptionem humanae naturae in unitate supposoti incepit esse creatura et an hic Deus factus est homo in primo instanti conceptionis sue fuisset parte vera si fuisset formata.

104va-106rb : Circa distinctiones 8 et 9 quaeritur, et etiam<circa distinctionem> 4 quaeritur: utrum beata virgo in sua conceptione generavit verum hominem active et proprie.

106rb-107va : Quaeritur: utrum si Deus assumptam naturam dimitteret et sibi hora primae quod eliceret 'b' actum ante instantiam 'a' immediate illius Dei praeciperet. Utrum stent simul quod talis natura peccavit ante 'a' et tamen in nullo instantia ante 'a' supposito quod ommitteret.

107va-108va : Quaeritur: utrum passio Christi satisfactoria fuit ita vitae meritoria ac si non fuisset satisfactoria.

108va-110vb : Quaeritur: utrum Filius Dei humanam naturam potuit assumere cum libertate indifferentiae ad meritorie et demeritorie agere.

110vb-112rb : Quaeritur: utrum sit aliqua lex quae sit omni catholico viatori certa lex seu regula iuste vivendi.

112rb- 113vb : Quaero: utrum bene industriosus rationibus in lumine naturali concludentibus esset vere convincendus sic quod sibi rationibus naturalibus probari posset quod in viatore catholico sit necessario aliquis habitus theologicus supernaturalis ponendus.

113vb-115ra : Consequenter quaeritur: utrum melius sit aliter viatori eodem gradu dilectionis meritorie diligere proximum propter Deum quam Deum propter se.

115ra-122rb : Adhuc quantum ad materiam dilectionis quaero: utrum aliquis diligendo alium possit sibi secundum leges statutas mereri gratiae et gloriae augmentum.

122rb-127va : Quaero circa distinctiones 37 et 38: utrum aliquis viator existens in gratia possit vere esse perplexus inter duo mala per preceptum prohibita.

127va-137vb : Quaero circa distinctiones 39 et 40: utrum duobus existentibus in extrema necessitate potens tantum uni eorum subvenire et non utriusque nulli eorum subveniens sit rebus homicidii utriusque.

Circa quartum Sententiarum a magistro Iohanne de Wasia compilatum:

138ra-139va: Circa librum quartum Sententiarum quaero primo: utrum tempore legis evangelice debeant esse tantum septem sacramenta ecclesiae.

139va-143vb: Circa distinctiones 3, 4 quaero: utrum baptismus sit sacramentum ad salutem necessarium.

143vb-144vb[29]: Quaeritur secundo circa baptismum quantum ad suscipientes ipsum: utrum indifferenter propter necessitatem baptismi quilibet et quorumlibet filii possint baptizari.

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[29] The folios are mixed up at this point. The text from f. 143v and 144r is repeated, but the numbering restarts with 144r, even though on f. 144v the text changes. This is what the folios look like:

143v: *licet in…*
144r: *nisi baptismus…*
144v: *licet in…*

144vb-145va : Quaeritur secundo circa baptismum quantum ad suscipientes ipsum: utrum indifferenter propter necessitatem baptismi quilibet et quorumlibet filii possint baptizari.

145va-146va : Quaeritur: utrum eadem sit ante baptismum decedentis conditio parentum fidelium parvuli cum sarracei vel cuiuscumque increduli parvulo.

146va-149va: Circa distinctionem 7 in qua tractatur de confirmationis sacramento quaero: utrum confirmationis sacramentum sit ad salutem necessarium et a solis episcopis ministrandum.

149va- 156rb : Circa materiam de sacramento entis quaero primo: utrum per transmutatione sub speciebus panis et vini sit realiter de virgine natumverum corpus et sanguis Christi.

156rb-157vb : Quaero secundo: utrum materia conveniens huius sacramenti possit esse indifferenter quodlibet genus panis et vini et an aqua vino semper debeat ammisceri.

144r: *nisi baptismus*...
144v: *ad ista*...

"IMAGINATIVE LOGIC": THE ROLE OF IMAGES IN BRUNO'S ARTS OF INVENTION

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Abstract In this paper, I examine a number of exercises of invention in which images play a role, in an attempt to find out whether the function of the images within these exercises has any connection with the cognitive value of the different types of invention, and whether it can offer any indication about their position within Bruno's art. I try to show that all these exercises correspond to different phases in Bruno's project of improving the model of invention derived from the Lullist art by giving images a more important role in the various forms of information processing.
Keywords Giordano Bruno, invention, commonplacing, memory, image, imagination

Introduction

As W. J. Ong explains, the 16th century diffusion of the topical method is largely due to the influence of Agricola's "De invention dialectica libri tres". The topical method takes over the territory occupied by the other logical disciplines and, as Ong argues, "with Agricola, the topical tradition tends to forget its limited objective and to think of itself as somehow the adequate instrument for dealing with all knowledge whatsoever."[1] According to L. Bolzoni, the topical method as devised by Agricola and developed by some of his disciples (Sturm, Ramus, Cornelius Auwater), together with the influence of Lullism and the impact of Camillo's theatre and his other works on dialectic, make up the complex tradition behind the development and use of rhetorical machines. Such devices were both instruments for the analysis and the assimilation of texts, by facilitating the ordering and visualization of their content

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[1] Walter J. Ong, *Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 93–94, 104–105.

and structure, but in the same time they were "generative models", facilitating the use of that material for the composition of new texts or of different versions of the same text.[2]

Among the multiple meanings taken on the term of "place" in the 16th century, Bolzoni underlines the association of topical places and places of memory, of which his 16th century commentators and writers on rhetoric and dialectic were very aware.[3] She also points out that images, particularly mythological image, apart from having a mnemonic role, can also become (as a result of allegorical interpretation) topical places, "capable of setting into motion and enriching the process of invention". "Allegory", she argues, "plays an important role in the creation of a circular relationship between memory and invention and in a mirroring relationship between words and images".[4]

In this paper, I want to discuss a number of exercises of invention from Bruno's mnemonic and Lullist writings in which images play a role in the finding and composition of arguments. I want to examine the part images play and their importance in different forms of invention and to consider the place and value of these exercises within Bruno's art and in the process of its development.

P. Rossi describes Bruno's art as an "imaginative logic", with a term that Bruno himself uses in reference to his art in *Cantus circaeus*[5]. Bruno's suggestion is that in a more permissive understanding of logic, his method of combining images representing things and words could be considered a form of logic. According to Rossi, Bruno's art "was conceived as a refutation of traditional logic and replaced *topica* and *analytica* with 'images' and 'words'."[6] R. Sturlese points out the importance of images in Bruno's art as "instruments for discovering new logical relations and new linguistic possibilities,"[7] and in another article she tackles the role of images in the cognitive processes involved in the assimilation and transmission of information and in the practice of linguistic creativity and figurative discourse[8]. M. Matteoli discusses Bruno's use of memory and invention devices that allow one to modify the meanings asscoiated to images by recombining and modifying the images. With the help of such devices, by acting upon the images and introducing

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[2] Lina Bolzoni, *The gallery of memory: literary and iconographic models in the age of the printing press*, trans. Jeremy Parzen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 48, 65–72.

[3] Ibid., 189.

[4] Ibid., 181.

[5] Giordano Bruno, "*Cantus Circaeus*," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* II, eds. Vittorio Imbriani and Carlo Maria Tallarigo (Florence: Le Monnier, 1886), 234.

[6] Paolo Rossi, *Logic and the art of memory: The quest for a universal language*, trans. Stephen Clucas (London: Continuum, 2006), 90.

[7] Rita Sturlese, "Il 'De imaginum, signorum et idearum compositione' ed il significato filosofico dell'arte della memoria," *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 69 (1990): 182–203, 201.

[8] Rita Sturlese, "Arte della natura e arte della memoria in Giordano Bruno," *Rinascimento* 40/2 (2000): 123–141, 128.

variations at this level, one is able to produce new contents and new meanings.[9] S. Clucas noted that Bruno's use of images in the construction of arguments and his association of images with the principles of the Lullist art play an important part in his project of developing "an integrated logical method".[10]

My intention is to examine and compare some of the applications for invention pointed out by the aforementioned scholars as being relevant for Bruno's idea of "imaginative logic". In some of these devices, as I shall try to show, the images have a rather auxiliary, mnemonic role: they assist the process of invention by facilitating the retention, organization and accessibility of the sequence of places and eventually of the combinatory system. In other cases, the images play a part in the process of invention and in the composition of arguments, with an interesting result for the topical method. I want to consider whether the structure of such commonplaces and the role of images in their composition and functioning are significant for their cognitive value and representative for specific types of invention.

Imagines atque similitudines

Before I begin discussing the mentioned applications, a few observations are in order regarding the meaning of the term "image" in this context. Bruno often uses the term *imago* as a synonym for "representation". In *De imaginum compositione*, he explains the difference between twelve types of representation[11], however, in the next chapter[12] he points out the legitimacy of allowing the term image (*imago*) to replace either one of the more specific ones, as every kind of sensible representation can be reduced to visual representation, which can convey the objects of all cognitive and sensible faculties.

Among the 12 types of representation, the term *imago* is discussed together with *simitudo* and *proportio,* and is defined in relation to *similitudo*: *similitudo* is the type of representation formed by a picture, a statue, or a comparison of two terms, and is directly associated with the mental representation

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[9] Marco Matteoli, "Geometrie della memoria: schemi, ordini e figure della mnemotecnica di Giordano Bruno," in *Aspetti della geometria nell'opera di Giordano Bruno*, ed. Ornella Pompeo Faracovi (Lugano: Agora & Co., 2012), 129–170, 155–160. Marco Matteoli, "Nel laboratorio della fantasia: Giordano Bruno tra filosofia e arte della memoria," *Viator* 41 (2010): 393–406, 401–402. Matteoli's conclusions are based on the discussion of a number of devices from the 30 seals, some of which I shall also interpret in this article.

[10] Stephen Clucas, "'Illa est mater, haec vero filia': reformed Lullism in Bruno's later works," in *Giordano Bruno in Wittenberg, 1586–1588. Aristoteles, Raimundus Lullus, Astronomie*, edited by Thomas Leinkauf, *Bruniana & Campanelliana* 6 (Pisa-Roma: Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 2004), 59–69, 66–77.

[11] Giordano Bruno, "De imaginum, signorum et idearum compositione," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* II, 3, eds. Felice Tocco, Girolamo Vitelli (Florence: Le Monnier, 1889), 97–99.

[12] Ibid., 100.

received by the senses and retained by the imagination. *Imago* functions in the same way, but it involves a closer resemblance between the signified and the signifier (they have to belong to the same genus or species)[13].

In both *De imaginum compositione* and *Cantus Circaeus* Bruno provides a list containing a variety of ways in which one thing can be used to represent another[14]: several of these can be easily assimilated to rhetorical tropes and figures: synecdoche (the things that follow from the things that come before, the parts standing for the whole, the species for the genus[15]) metonymy (the instrument standing for the user, the effect for the cause[16]), metaphor, antiphrasis[17], analogy, irony[18]. In *Cantus*, Bruno refers to these as images[19], and to the process of representation as *figuratio*. In *De imaginum compositione* he talks about "representing and signifying" (*figurandum et significandum*) in similar terms, as a process of dealing with images (*imagines et similitudines*). [20]

Figuratio is described by Bruno as an activity of the imagination, and in one of the 30 seals[21] from *Explicatio triginta sigillorum* it is specifically associated with the formation of images understood as figurative language. [22] „The principle of the

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[13] Ibid., 99.

[14] Ibid., 111: "*rationes, quibus res quaedam per res alias figurantur et significantur.*"

[15] Bruno, "Cantus Circaeus," 242 (vi-viii), 243 (xviii) 245 (xxvii). See also the discussion of synecdoche in Quintillian, *Institutio oratoria*, vol. III, trad. H. E. Butler (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), VI, 6, 19, 310–311.

[16] Ibid., 224 (xxv); Bruno, "De imaginum compositione," 110 (xxx); see also the discussion of metonymy in [Cicero], *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), IV, xxxii, 43, 335–336.

[17] Bruno, "Cantus Circaeus," 244 (xxiii), 245 (xxxix).

[18] Bruno, "De imaginum compositione," 108 (vi), 110 (xxxii).

[19] Bruno, "Cantus Circaeus," 241: "*modi aliquot imaginum ad rerum figurationem atque vocum.*"

[20] L. Bolzoni points out a tendency, discussing 16th century writings: "to perceive poetic images in visual terms, and vice versa, to translate visual images into words." The art of memory uses images from both literary and iconographic sources, and it can be said to be "mediating between words and images, in creating bridges and modes of translation from one to the other." See Bolzoni, *The Gallery*, 179–181, 184, 188.

[21] On Bruno's notion of "seal", see Matteoli, "Geometrie della memoria", 145; Mino Gabriele, *Giordano Bruno. Corpus iconographicum* (Milano: Adelphi Edizioni, 2001), 158–169; Frances A. Yates, *The art of memory* (London: Routledge, 1999), 243–265.

[22] Giordano Bruno, "*Explicatio triginta sigillorum*" in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* II, 2, eds. Felice Tocco, Girolamo Vitelli (Florence: Le Monnier 1890), 136–137: "*Hic locus est adducendi principii artis figurativae, in qua illud praeaccipiendum est, quod omnia per omnia possunt figurari; [...] tunc enim phantasia omnia in omnibus fingere et imaginatio omnia ex omnibus concipere valebit: concipere inquam aut per identitatis modum, si eadem genere, specie vel numero sint; adsimilabile et suum correlativum aut similitudine, si similia;*"

image-making art" („*principium artis figurativae"*), defined as the possibility „to make everything into everything and to form everything out of everything," i.e. to derive any content from any other content, regardless of the abstract or concrete quality of the term, is described in terms of creating figurative representations by means of associations similar to the ones mentioned above, in the lists of images and representation techniques from *Cantus* and *De imaginum compositione*. But here Bruno puts forward more than just the idea of association: he insists on the necessity to modify one term in order to adequately represent another, which is the function of figurative language[23].

The context of this discussion on the meaning of *figuratio* is the seal *Phidias* or "The sculptor", from *Explicatio triginta sigillorum*. "The sculptor" comes after another seal, named "The painter", and they are both presented as metaphors of the imagination and its functions. „The painter" is mainly linked to the role imagination plays in helping natural and artificial memory - the fashioning of visual representations of abstract things[24] - but Bruno also alludes to the importance of this function in composition and argumentation (the art of the poet and that of the philosopher). Imagination as „The sculptor" is more obviously associated with the artifices of figurative language, and it is also more clearly linked not only to memory, but to mental operations involved in the assimilation and processing of information in general (invention, reading, contemplation, the ability to distinguish and to order information) - in other words, to learning.[25]

For this reason, I believe, *figuratio* and the attributes of the imagination illustrated by „The sculptor" are relevant for the way Bruno understands the role of images and of imagination in the process of invention – the finding and formulation of arguments in the composition of a discourse. I also think it is this function of the imagination that allows Bruno to come up with an application for invention like the one in *Proteus*, based on a series of arbitrarily chosen words that function as places

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aut proportione, si proportionabilia; aut ironia, si absona, ut cum 'poenarum divitias' 'thesauros' que 'irae' dixere [...]."

[23] Ibid., 137–138: "*In omnibus tandem eo insistendum, quo affabre et melius, vel traductione, vel transmutatione, vel transpositione, vel conversione, vel antiphrasi, allusione, illusione, delusioneve quadam proposito adcommodentur.*"

[24] Ibid., 134.

[25] Ibid., 135: "*Haec est statuarius ille, qui famosam Nabuchodonosoris statuam erexit, haec ordinatam fortunae regni successionem descripsit, haec tropologiarum fabricat discursus, haec formae conditiones in aliquo sensibili, circa quod et in quo pleraque metaphorice delineat, certo quodam ordine eademque qua meminisse volumus serie describit. Huius suffragio in Centum statuarum volumine conditiones virtutum atque vitiorum universas ita quandoque descripsimus, ut earum lectio delectabilior, contemplatio iucundior, distributio ordinatior, series distinctior, similitudinum comparationumque consequenter concatenabilium inventio promptior et memoria tenacior haberetur.*"

of invention ("verbal places")[26]. As L. Vianello points out, in *De lampade combinatoria lulliana* Bruno himself links *Phidias* with the method of invention by means of "verbal places"[27].

Proteus

Proteus is one of the 30 seals presented in the third book of Bruno's *De imaginum compositione*. It is made up of two parts: a mnemonic exercise, entitled *Proteus in the house of Menemosyne*, and an application for invention, entitled *Proteus in the house of Pallas, where Gorgias is*[28]. Bruno uses the same system of randomly chosen "verbal places", first in the mnemonic application, then in an application for invention. The verbal places are a sequence of words from a well–known poem: the first three verses of the Aeneid provide us with the following sequence of places: „*Armatus, Vir, Cantans, Primus et Orans, Italicus, Fatum, Profugus, Lavinia, Ventus, Littoreum, Multum, E terra, Iactatus et Altus.*" According to Bruno, the words of the Aeneid behave like the matter, symbolised by the god Proteus, that can transform itself "into all images and similitudes, by means of which everything can be disposed, ordered, recovered and examined."[29]

In the mnemonic application, the use of images is closer to the operation of the imagination that is expressed metaphorically by the „The painter": imagination as a painter that depicts sensible representations of abstract content: every word is linked to an abstract content, and Bruno attempts to create a connection between the word and the abstract concept by using an image. The first term, *armatus*, is linked to the concept of "matter", trough the image of a battalion of men armed with swords (presumably the word *ferro*, that can mean both swords and *iron*, should help one relate to *matter*). The word "man" corresponds to "form", trough the image of a painter painting *the shape* of man on a white surface; "oris" (shores) has become, trough a phonetic associations, "orans" (praying), and is linked with the "end" (*finis*) through the image of a man who gets up and leaves *after having finished his prayer*.[30]

In the second part of the seal, Bruno will show how the same sequence of words can be used to compose an argumentation to prove that the world (as

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See also Sturlese, "Arte della natura," 137, where she links "the principle of the image-making art" with the application for invention in Proteus. [26] For an explanation of "verbal places," see, for example, Bruno, "*Explicatio triginta sigillorum*," 143.

[27] See Lucia Vianello, *Una lampada nella notte. L''ars inventiva per triginta statuas' di Giordano Bruno* (doctoral dissertation defended at the University of Padua, 2014), 106–107; See Giordano Bruno, "*De lampade combinatoria lulliana*," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* II, 2, 303–304.

[28] All English translations used in the text of the article are mine, unless otherwise specified.

[29] Bruno, "*De imaginum compositione*," 289. See also Giordano Bruno, *On the Composition of Images, Signs and* Ideas, trans. Charles Doria (New York: Willis, Locker & Owens, 1991), 238.

[30] Ibid., 287.

universe) is eternal, or that the world (as a planet) is not eternal. This time he uses the words of the poem not as mnemonic places, as in the previous application, but as places of invention, from which one can derive arguments for either one of the chosen theses. The way images are used in the application for invention can be related to the operations of the imagination as "The sculptor" – the imagination that deals not only with the association of an abstract with a concrete term, but with two terms, regardless of their quality, in which one is expressed or represented by the other, or in which one is derived from the other. The result of this composition exercise is an argumentation on the chosen topic in the form of a philosophical poem, as the arguments come to be expressed in a figurative form.

> Thus, the fact that the world is eternal is shown by I. the WEAPONS
> Wielded by a powerful hand, II. and by the POWERS of their keeper, and by that III. wonderful order of the HARMONY, IV. And the SONG of the poets
> V. And because there is no CIVIL rebellion of any size threatening
> To destroy the eternal peace.
> […]
> VIII. Furthermore, not everything is subject to FATE,
> And yet each thing <comes about> from foreign elements, not from that which belongs to itself
> IX. Moreover, anything that perishes is made of FLEEING
> Elements, that, for this reason, glide to other SHORES.
> But who would speak of other SHORES outside the whole?
> Where will the parts and the whole spread out, because that which is born here
> Flows out of it and what is alien flown into it?
> The opposites need to remain eternally in it,
> Because only the nothing or the void is opposed to the whole.[31]

The argumentation expressed in the verses above is consistent with Bruno's philosophical position regarding this subject, as expressed in other works[32], and it

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[31] Ibid., 287–288: "*Sic mundum aeternum demonstrant I. ARMA, potenti / Exagitata manu, II. et VIRES servantis, et illa / III. HARMONIA series mira, IV. CANTUSQUE poetae, / V. Et quia dissidium tanti CIVILE perennem / Disturbans pacem prorsus non imminet ullum. / […] / VIII. Praeterea totum FATO non subditur, atqui/ Quodcumque haud proprio, at peregrinis est elementis./ IX. Quin etiam quodcumque perit PROFUGIS elementis / Constiterat, quae alias ideo labuntur in ORAS. / Porro alias extra totum quis dixerit ORAS? / Quo se proripiet totum partesve quia extra hinc / Nativum effluitet, peregrinumque influat illinc? / Perpetuo remanere decet contraria in ipso, / Plenum namque aliunde nihil contra est vel inane.*" I chose to attempt my own translation as I don't always agree with the interpretation of the Latin text proposed by C. Doria. See Bruno, *On the composition of images*, 235–236.

can be summarised as follows: an eternal cause necessarily has an eternal effect; the things that are contrary to each other within the whole are not contrary to the whole; contraries destroy each other, but since the universe, as a totality, has no contrary, it cannot be destroyed; only the unstable things perish (i.e. things that move from one place to another) but the universe and its parts cannot move to another place because there is no other place outside the whole.[33]

At a first glance, this application appears to be no more than an exercise of composition, requiring the student to put together a discourse on a specific theme, while integrating an arbitrarily chosen list of words. The words of the Aeneid, far from being an aid in composition, seem to require more effort and more skill from the part of the student who has to integrate them in their discourse. On the other hand, an obvious result is that they help and in the same time compel the student to adopt an indirect and figurative mode of expression.

In the second part of this application, Bruno explains how the poem was composed with the aid of his method.

> Firstly I conclude the world is eternal from the weapons signifying the potency and the eternal instruments. […]
> IV. From the city, which signifies the republic of the world; for nothing opposes it, <as to lead> to degradation and destruction; nor, indeed, are contrary to the world the things that are contrary <to each other> in the world, because they are parts and members of the world. […]
> VIII. Eight, from the fate, because above the universe, which is the whole body of nature, there is no necessity, but nature itself is necessity itself.[34]

The words of the poem, Bruno tells us, are "transformed" into the middle terms necessary to connect the two terms of the examined thesis – the subject "world" and the predicate "eternity".[35] The middle term serves to establish the agreement or the disagreement between the two terms of the thesis in relation to a

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[32] Mostly *On the Infinite Universe and Worlds*; see the references in the Italian critical edition: Giordano Bruno, *Opere mnemotecniche II*, eds. Marco Matteoli, Rita Sturlese, Nicoletta Tirinnanzi (Milano: Adelphi, 2009), 820–831.

[33] On Bruno's discussions on the topic of the eternity of the world, see Maurizio Cambi, *La machina del discorso. Lullismo e retorica negli scritti latini di Giordano Bruno* (Napoli: Liguori 2002), 71–81.

[34] Bruno, "De imaginum compositione", 298–290: "*Primo ex armis significantibus potentiam et instrumenta infinite durantia concludo mundum aeternum / […] / IV. Ex civitate, quae notat mundi rempublicam (nam nihil adversatur) ad corruptionem et interitum; non / enim mundo sunt contraria quae in mundo sunt contraria, quia mundi sunt partes et membra. […] VIII. Octavus ex fato, quoniam super universum, quod est totum naturae corpus, non est necessitas, sed ipsa natura est ipsa necessitas.*" See Bruno, *On the composition of images,* 238–239.

[35] Ibid., 289.

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specific commonplace. Invention, as a stage in the process of composition, is the search for the middle terms. The commonplaces serve as "headings or key notions to which one turns to find out what is available in one's store of knowledge for discourse on any given subject".[36] Generally speaking, the determination of a middle term with the aid of a commonplace means particularising (applying) the respective commonplace to the chosen subject matter.

In this application, the function of the sequence of words from the Aenneid, which Bruno assimilates to Proteus and to "the matter which can be transformed into all images and similitudes" is similar to that of a system of commonplaces: to organise and generate the arguments or the content of a discourse. Moreover, this process is mediated by images: each of the words is integrated or developed into a metaphor or another figure of speech that conveys an idea or an argument relevant to the theme in question: the word "Troiae", or "civitas" brings up the idea of the "city of the world", which is, here, is a symbol of the world as a totality that contains everything and to which nothing can be contrary; the "shores" are immediately associated with the movement of the waves, that suggest the constant return and regeneration of individual structures within the infinite universe etc. L. Vianello, describes this method of inventions based on "verbal places" as a series of reflections (associations) linked to a specific topic and brought to mind by the words of the texts.[37]

Bruno combines the mnemonic notion of place and its functions – the ordering of information while associating it with images – with the function of places in invention – the finding, the development and the ordering of arguments. The discovery and the elaboration of the argumentative content is simultaneous with the association of the abstract content with images, and the list of places, which is the source of the figurative form of the discourse, is also, although indirectly, the source of the content.

Considering the observations Bruno makes in *The sculptor* regarding "the principle of the image-making art", it would be justified for imagination to play a very important role in a form of invention in which arbitrarily chosen words act as commonplaces and arguments are derived from them through the mediation of images or figurative language. But, within Bruno's art, what would be the cognitive value of a form of invention based mainly on a function of the imagination?

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[36] See Ong, *Ramus, Method*, 104-106, 116-123; J. R. McNally,"Rudolph Agricola's *De inventione dialectica libri tres*: a translation of selected chapters," *Speech Monographs* 34/ 4 (1967): 393–422, 396–397; J. R. McNally, "*Dux illa directrixque artium*: Rudolph Agricola's dialectical system," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 52/4 (1966): 337–347, 340–342. Eleonore Stump, "Dialectic in ancient and medieval logic," in *Boethius's "De topicis differentiis"* (London: Ithaca and Cornell University Press, 2004), 195.

[37] Vianello, *Una lampada*, 106–107.

In a very similar seal from *Explicatio triginta sigillorum*, published eight years before *De imaginum compositione*, Bruno gives an indication about the limited value of such a method by specifying that it is only useful for the invention of the kind of discourses that seeks to persuade, and distinguishing it from a method that he presents as useful for all types of invention, but in which images play a much less significant role. This seal, the 20th presented in *Explicatio*, is also mentioned by Bruno in the context mentioned above from *De lampade combinatoria lulliana*, in association with *Phidias* and as an example of invention by means of verbal places. Moreover, here too Bruno recommends this method for rhetoricians, poets and prophets, as a means of adding a metaphorical or figurative dimension to the discourse.[38]

Just like *Proteus*, this seal[39] has one application for memory and one for invention, both based on a sequence of words from a poem, this time from Horatio: "*Odi profanum vulgus et arceo*". They both function a lot like *Proteus*. For the purposes of the mnemonic application, each verbal place is first "made visible" by association with a character who performs the action expressed by the word from the poem. We have a character who hates for *odi*, for *profanum*, one who performs an act of blasphemy or something that has been desecrated, etc.

The application for invention is based on the same principle symbolised by Proteus: that from any word one can derive any meaning, and from any meaning, any other meaning.[40] The topic he chooses in order to exemplify how this works is that of generosity: from the first term, *odere,* we can derive the idea that generous people hate ignoble acts; from *profanum* – that they keep away from impious acts that could disgrace them, etc. However, used in this manner, this seal is "not useful for all types of invention [...] but for those that persuade".[41]

In order to use this seal for "invention in general" ("*ad inventionem universaliter dictam")*, Bruno advises us not to use the words of the poem as images (*pro formis*), like in the example above and like they are used in the second application of Proteus, but as places for images (*pro formarum subiectis*). This means that the words of the poem and images derived from them in the mnemonic application would have to be used only as mnemonic devices, meant to help

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[38] Bruno, "*De lampade combinatoria lulliana*," 303: "*Si rhetoricus es vel poeta vel propheta, adde ex omnibus terminis qualiacunque occurrunt, assumptas metaphoras seu translationes, quas per similitudines, proportiones vel per negationes vel aliis modis qui in sigillis Apellis atque Phidiae a nobis aperiuntur, accomodes.*"

[39] Bruno, "*Explicatio triginta sigillorum*," 143–145: *Compositi et Elementi, quod vicesimus est sigillus, explicatio.*

[40] Ibid., 143: "*Ad inveniendum etiam confert, quoniam ex vocibus omnibus omnes revocare possumus intentiones, exque intentionibus omnibus et quibuscumque omnes et quaecumque aliae intentiones exuscitantur et exurgunt.*"

[41] Ibid., 144: "*Ad omnes inventionis species non utilis est iste modus, sed ad eas tantum, quae persuasionem faciunt.*"

organise and retain the actual set of commonplaces that will serve as the basis for invention: the hater will stand for "essence", the defiler for "potency", the next character for "operation", and so on. However, in this kind of invention the individual words and images would play no part is the process of composition as such.

Persuasion vs. demonstration

How does Bruno situate this application within his art when he classifies it as only being suitable for the invention of discourses that seek to persuade? And more importantly, what does this say about the cognitive value Bruno attributes to this method of invention by means of verbal places, and, by extension, to a seal like *Proteus*?

According to Aristotle, persuasion is the function of the rhetorical discourse[42]. As M. Cambi shows, Bruno generally has a critical attitude in regard to rhetoric. He associates it with opinion and probability, a discourse that dwells on accidental and the apparent, vague or imprecise argumentation, favouring persuasion in the detriment of truth. However, M. Cambi points out, it is not persuasion as such that is condemned by Bruno, as it can also be an instrument put in the service of knowledge and teaching - but the end to which it is often used.[43]

But, even when they are used in the service of knowledge, the cognitive value of the instruments of rhetoric remains limited. In his *Artificum perorandi*, a commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander*, Bruno discusses rhetoric as dealing mainly with issues related to state and public affairs and associates it with the subjects and style Cicero's discourses.[44] In *De lampade combinatoria lulliana*, Bruno suggests that Cicero's eloquence and ornate discourses, adequate for the public and judicial arena, would be useless in the discussion of philosophical matters[45]. In several places, both in the Italian and the Latin works, Bruno contrasts persuasion with demonstration,[46] authentic knowledge[47] and the search for truth.[48]

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[42] Aristotle, "De rhetorica" in *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, vol. II (Venetiis [Venice]: Iunctas, 1562), 3.

[43] Maurizio Cambi, "*Rhetorica*," in *Giordano Bruno. Parole, concetti, immagini*, ed. Michele Ciliberto (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale Superiore di Pisa, 2014): 1652-1654; Id., *La machina*, 3-12; Id. "Giordano Bruno et la rhétorique," in *Art du comprendre* 11–12 (2003): 110–133, 110–116.

[44] Giordano Bruno, "*Artificium perorandi*," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* II, 3, 339, 342.

[45] Bruno, "De lampade combinatoria lulliana," 243.

[46] Giordano Bruno, "Cabala del cavallo Pegaseo con l'aggiunta dell'Asino Cillenico," in *Dialoghi italiani*, ed. Giovanni Aquilecchia (Florence: Sansoni, 1985), 876, http://bibliotecaideale.filosofia.sns.it/gb1PageNavigation.php?workTitleSign=08CabalaGA&indexName=gb1_OO&hideFonsStyle=yes&showNamesStyle=no&pbNumber=876 (last accessed

In the *Artificium perorandi*, Bruno focuses on *elocutio* and *dispositio*, the phases in the composition of a discourse that deal with the ordering of information and with the form of its' presentation. His aim is to provide his reader with instruments that would allow him to produce as many variations as possible of the same discourse, to express the same content or the same meaning with numerous stylistic variations[49]. As M.P. Ellero explains, such variations are not meant to bring anything new in terms of informational content or cognitive value. What they do bring is a higher possibility to adapt the discourse to different kinds of listeners and to produce a more powerful effect on them. According to Ellero, Bruno reinterprets Aristotle's distinction between rhetoric and dialectic in that dialectic addresses a universal or generic public, while the rhetoric takes into account the individual differences and receptivity.[50]

For Bruno, therefore, the instruments of rhetoric are mainly linked to the practice of stylistic variations that are meant to increase the emotional impact and the power of persuasion. From what we have seen in *Proteus* and the other devices using verbal places for invention, this method has obvious consequences in the formal and stylistic aspect of the discourse, which explains why Bruno links it with rhetoric. The question that remains is whether this method is also meant to have an effect on the actual content and cognitive value of the discourse, or is simply a means of stylistic variation, like many of the devices in *Artificium perorandi*.

In *De progressu et lampade venatoria logicorum*, a commentary on Aristotle's *Topics* writte in Wittenberg in about the same period as the *Artificium perorandi*, Bruno discusses the difference between the way the tools of topics are used by the demonstrator (*demonstrator*), that of the dialectician (*dialecticus*) and that of the rhetorician: the fist distinguishes truth from falsity and defends the truth [51], the second discusses both parts of a thesis, having a neutral position in regard to them (just like Bruno does in the second application of Proteus) and the activity of

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04.11.2016); Bruno, "*De immenso et innumerabilibus*," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* I, 2, ed. Francesco Fiorentino (Florence: Le Monnier, 1884), 278.

[47] Giordano Bruno, "*Summa terminorum metaphisicorum*," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* I, 4, eds. Felice Tocco, Girolamo Vitelli, (Florence: Le Monnier 1889), 72; Giordano Bruno, "*Lampas triginta statuarum*," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* III, eds. Felice Tocco, Girolamo Vitelli (Florence: Le Monnier, 1891), 149; See also Aristoteles "*Libri posteriorum analiticorum*," in *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, vol., I pars 2 (Venetiis: Iunctas, 1562), 47r.

[48] Bruno, "*Lampas triginta statuarum*," 148; Bruno, "*Summa terminorum metaphisicorum*," 15; Giordano Bruno, "*De progressu et lampade venatoria logicorum*," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* II, 3, 19, 28.

[49] See Cambi, *La machina,* 123–158; Maria Pia Ellero, *Lo specchio della phantasia. Retorica, magia e scrittura in Giordano Bruno* (Lucca: Maria Pacini Fazzi Editore, 2005), 53–72.

[50] Ellero, *Lo speccio,* 60–63; 71.

[51] Bruno, "De progressu," 19; 44.

the third is associated with the epideictic discourse and the use of polished language[52]. In the same text he distinguishes the *demonstrator* as the one who picks a specific side in a debate from the *topicus*, as the one who looks for arguments in support of both sides, and Bruno mentions that the first of these uses the weapons of dialectic to defend the truth, while the second uses them for whatever end the situation requires.[53] Moreover, the *topicus* or *dialecticus* is associated with the figure of Gorgias the sophist, whose eloquence is compared to poison, as opposed to the *demonstrator* associated with the figure of Socrates.[54]

As M. Cambi has pointed out, Bruno regards the instruments of logic, like those of rhetoric, as neutral in themselves: they can be used as tools in the search for truth, but they can also be used to other ends.[55] But, unlike rhetoric, the instruments of which are associated mainly with the form of the discourse, the tools of dialectic are meant to produce content and information, which is why Bruno attributes to them a higher usefulness in the process of knowledge.[56]

The reference to Gorgias from the title of the second part of *Proteus*, as well as Bruno's demonstration of how to use this device to find arguments in regard to both sides of a debate, link it to the dialectic or topical approach as described above[57]. Even though the method of invention in Proteus is practically the same as the one in the 20th seal from *Explicatio*, the latter is linked to persuasion, while that of the former seems to have been upgraded from rhetoric to dialectic, to which Bruno attributes higher cognitive value and a higher usefulness for philosophy. This is also reflected in the subject matter chosen to illustrate the method in each case (an ethical issue for the seal in *Explicatio*, a philosophical one for Proteus). It is possible that the "upgrade" of this method from rhetoric in *Explicatio* to dialectic in *Proteus* is the result of an evolution in Bruno's view on invention and on the possibilities that images have to offer in this context (*Explicatio* was published in 1583 and *De imaginum compositione* in 1591). But, on the other hand, this also speaks to the versatility of this invention device, which is able to integrate both the tools of rhetoric (the stylistic variations afforded by figurative language) and that of dialectic (the production of content for arguments).

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[52] Ibid., 28.

[53] Ibid., 19.

[54] Bruno, "De progressu," 21.

[55] Cambi, *La machina,* 107–109.

[56] Ibid., 17, where Bruno, commenting on Aristotle, Topics I, 2, talks about the usefulness of dialectic for scientific knowledge. See also Maurizio Cambi, "Dialectic" in *Giordano Bruno. Parole, concetti, immagini*, 502–505, where he discusses Bruno' attitude towards dialectic and its' cognitive value, but also the limitations he sees in Aristotelian and humanist dialectic, and his own concept of art and method.

[57] Ibid.

Imaginative logic and the Lullist art

In the next section I want to discuss the possible connections between the model of invention presented in Proteus and some of Bruno's Lullist models of invention[58]. In Proteus, Bruno mentions such a connection, as he points out that this seal could be used to improve and assist the Lullist art:[59] "[...] *with this seal and art we have also assisted the Lullist (art), and we have delivered from contempt the other divine type of invention that flies with the wings of nature."*[60]

S. Clucas argues that the improvement brought by the methods described in Proteus to the Lullist art consists in "Bruno's use of the Lullist rotae to combine images representing arguments."[61] He also points out an application for invention, from Bruno's "Animadversiones circa lampadem lullianam",[62] that may give an indication about how Proteus was meant to be used in connection with a method of invention derived from the art of Lull.

In the application indicated by Clucas, Bruno uses Lull's first figure, that of the absolute predicates, to develop an argumentation on the eternity of the world. Lull himself presents the first figure as useful for the finding of arguments or middle terms.[63] In Bruno's application, the arguments are derived from Lull`s absolute predicates in a combinatorial exercise using the first figure of the art,[64] and the resulted arguments express Bruno's own view on the eternity of the world, which is

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[58] The texts I shall consider have all been written and published in the period of 1587–1588, during Bruno's stay at Wittenberg and upon his arrival in Prague: *De lampade combinatoria lulliana*, *Animadversiones circa lampadem lullianam* and *De specierum scrutinium*. The first is a commentary on Lull's *Ars magna*; the second one is a text that was never published and that, M. Cambi assumes, was either meant to be introduced in another work or was made up of Bruno's teaching notes (Cambi, *La machina*, 59); the third was published as an introduction to the republication of *De lampade combinatoria lulliana* a year later (1588) in Prague. These have been written and published in the same period and in the same context as the *Artificium perorandi* and *De progressu et lampade venatoria logicorum*, discussed above. See Vincenzo Spampanato, *Vita di Giordano Bruno con documenti editi e inediti* (Messina: G. Principato, 1921), 425–426, 431; Felice Tocco, *Le opere latine din Giordano Bruno esposte e confrontate con le italiane* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1889), 8–19.

[59] See Clucas, "'Illa est mater'", 59; 62–63; 67, on Bruno referring to his art as the descendent of the art of Lull and on his ideas concerning the improvements he brought to it.

[60] Bruno, "*De imaginum compositione*," 293: "[...] *hoc sigillo et arte Lullianam adiuvimus, et a contemptu divinum naturaeque alis supervolitans illud alius inventionis genus liberavimus.*"

[61] Clucas, "'*Illa est mater*'", 67.

[62] On this text and its use in connection with *De lampade combinatoria lulliana*, see Cambi, *La machina*, 59–90.

[63] Raimundus Lullus, *Ars brevis* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999), 8.

[64] Bruno, "*Animadversiones in Lampadem Lullianam ex codice Augustano nunc primum editae,*" in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* II, 2, 364: "*Posito D in centro, quod significat coelum et mundum, primo fiat deductio per novem principia simpliciter.*" See Cambi's discussion on this device in *La machina*, 81–90.

consistent with the one he expresses in the poem elaborated in *Proteus* from the words of the *Aeneid*. For example, the argument derived from the absolute predicate corresponding to G – *Voluntas*, goes as follows: "in the world there is the desire and the drive to be forever; however, the material things' desire to preserve their being is foolish, because, indeed, if that desire is cheated in the individual things, it doesn't have to be cheated in nature as a whole, in which we find the most excellent movement"[65]. The individual things perish while the whole is preserved – it is the same idea expressed in the poem discussed above through the image of the sea, suggested by terms like "to wander" and "shores".

The images are introduced as Bruno adds a mnemonic technique[66] meant to help one memorise the first four meanings corresponding to each of the nine letters of the Lullian alphabet[67], by associating them with images. For example, the 9 subjects of the art will each be represented by a well-known male character, whose name begins with that letter and who is depicted in a posture that reminds one of that subject. For instance, the subject angel, corresponding to the letter C is represented by a character named Cesar depicted as an angel. The purpose of this artifice is to help the practitioners of the art have all meanings ready at hand so they can use them to form arguments swiftly and promptly[68]. In *De specierum scrutinio*[69], Bruno suggests an alternative method for the retention of the subjects of the art and their related meanings. The four meanings corresponding to each letter of the alphabet are memorised by means of a complex picture composed of: a male character and his office (standing for the subjects), an instrument belonging to or related to the male character (for the absolute predicates), an action that he performs (for the relative predicates) and an object placed near him (for the questions).

Bruno doesn't give any direct indication about what part, if any, these images might play in the process of invention described above, but if they do have a role, as S. Clucas suggests, I don't think it can be more than a mnemonic one, similar to the one words and images play in the application for "invention in general" from the 20th seal in *Explicatio*. In Bruno's demonstration of how the first figure can be used in the invention of arguments on the eternity of the world, these images play

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[65] Bruno, "*Animadversiones*," 365.

[66] Ibid., 363–364.

[67] Lullus, *Ars brevis*, 4.

[68] Bruno, "*Animadversiones*," 363 : "*Iam quia pro usu praesentis artis haec non solum debent memoria teneri, sed illi etiam promtissima esse, ut promtissima desideratur ab eo, qui artem exercet, conceptionum et argumentationum executio; ideo brevem hanc rationem instituimus, qua quisque promtissime perquisita concipere possit, quia promte oportet habere alphabetum [...].*"

[69] Giordano Bruno, "*De specierum scrutinio*," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* II, 2, 354–355.

no part in the finding or in the elaboration of arguments; they influence neither the content nor the form of the discourse in any way. It appears that, at least in these cases, Bruno's association of the Lullist categories with images is meant to be useful in the practice of invention, but only to help one memorise and access the categories of the Lullist art with ease. We can conclude that the use of images in these exercises is more similar to their use in the application for "invention in general" from the 20th seal of *Explicatio*, than to the model of invention corresponding to Proteus.

Both *Animadversiones* and *De specierum scrutinio* treat, among other issues, mnemonic instruments that are to be used to facilitate the learning and use of the Lullian art as presented by Bruno is his commentaries.[70] According to M. Cambi, what most attracted Bruno in the Lullian art was the possibility of generating and multiplying information and infinitely increasing one's capacity for learning, the encyclopaedism and the promise of an all-encompassing knowledge[71]. Another important benefit that Bruno saw in the Lullian art is, I believe, is the promise of certitude. For Bruno, the art of Lull, due to the universal value of its principles[72] (and to their correspondence to the structure of reality[73]) is capable of generating *certain* knowledge about any subject. For him, this art has a cognitive value similar to the one Aristotle attributes to scientific demonstration – the most certain way of acquiring the truth[74].

As we can see, there is a significant difference in the role attributed to images these exercises of invention based on a method that has, for Bruno, the highest cognitive value, as compared to the "imaginative logic" in *Proteus* or the 20th seal in *Explicatio*, where images are central to the process of invention, but which Bruno assimilates to the arts of probable argumentation – rhetoric and dialectic. It is

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[70] Cambi, *La machina*, 59–62.

[71] Ibid., 38–40.

[72] Giordano Bruno, "*De lampade combinatoria lulliana*," 242: "*Quoniam vulgatum satis est in arte Lullii eiuscemodi universalia principia contineri, ut iis iactis veluti fundamentis, de quolibet scibili omnibus numeris examinando, confirmando et defendendo, apte inquirere, copiose invenire, maiorique certitudine iudicare possimus*."

[73] Giordano Bruno, "De compendiosa architectura et complemento artis Lullii," in *Iordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta* II, 2, 7–8: "*Subiectum considerationis est universum, quod veri, intelligibilis rationabilisque rationem subire valet; adeo quippe generalia vera, necessaria atque primitiva principia praetenduntur […].Conveniens nimirum est atque possibile, ut eum in modum, quo metaphysica universum ens, quod in substantiam dividitur et accidens, sibi proponit obiectum, quaedam unica generaliorque ens rationis cum ente reali […] complectatur.*"

[74] In fact, Bruno attributes to the principle of the Lullist art a higher value than to those of Aristotelian logic: Ibid., 61: "*Veruntamen profuit Lullii observantia, quia notitia categoriarum, ut ad nos per manus Aristotelis devenit, est admodum confusa, ut ad nullum finem esse videatur.*"

understandable that a method of invention using words and images alone as places cannot have the same cognitive value as one in which the places are universal principles similar to those of the art of Lull.

If we consider all the devices discussed so far, we can see different degrees to which images are integrated and given a role in the process of composition. The mnemonic role is the most superficial one, in that it doesn't actually allow images to influence in any way the form or content of the text composed. However, this use of images is also linked with the method of invention that has the highest degree of certainty, the one presented in the Lullist commentaries. The method using images or "verbal places" as places of invention allow images an obvious effect at least on the form of the discourse, but is associated with dialectic and rhetoric, forms of discourse with a lower cognitive value but with an added persuasive effect. In the applications discussed up to this point, the ones with a higher cognitive value seem to coincide with a lower involvement of images.

But how about Bruno's claim that the method of invention from Proteus, using images and verbal places as places of invention, could be used to improve the Lullist art? I believe that this upgrade has not yet been accomplished in the rather superficial use of mnemonic images in relation to Lullian devices described in the *Animadversiones* or *De specierum scrutinium* – or at least not to the full extent. However, it will be realised in the more complex system of places based on the 30 statues in *Lampas triginta statuarum*. It is possible that this is the art that Bruno alludes to in the passage quoted above, as *"the other divine type of invention that flies with the wings of nature."*

An application for invention of the thirty statues

As both M. Cambi and L. Vianello point out, Bruno presents his "Lampas triginta statuarum" as bringing improvements to all of the other aspects of his art treated in different works, including the Lullian commentaries, the 30 seals and his works on the topics and rhetoric.[75] The method of the 30 statues is presented by Bruno as an *ars inventive,*[76] conceived to "define all things according to general and in the same time proximate reasons, and to verify and demonstrate everything according to the same reasons".[77] The thirty statues illustrate and explain thirty general principles that have a cognitive value comparable to that of the principles of the Lullian art.[78]

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[75] Bruno, "*Lampas triginta statuarum,*" 217–218; See Cambi, *La machina,* 163–168; Vianello, *Una lampada*, 65, 106.

[76] Bruno, "*Lampas triginta statuarum,*" 216; 258.

[77] Ibid., 224: "*Praepositis ita se se habentibus, nunc deveniendum est ad ultimum totius apparatus scopum, qui est triplex: definiendi omnia sub generalibus, proximis tamen rationibus, verificandi omnia, et demonstrandi omnia iisdem rationibus.*"

[78] Ibid., 7: "*Haec quidem constat triginta statuis, in quibus triginta intentiones continentur, et quo videbitur modo explicandae. Sunt quidem generales ut esse debent,*

Bruno explains that this art contains, in a more detailed and developed form, the same subjects and predicates of the Lullist art discussed in *De lampade combinatoria lulliana*, and suggest that the thirty statues are the "proper reasons" (*rationes propriae*) of the relative and absolute predicates.[79]

The system of the thirty statues is structured as a complete "ladder of nature", that includes all the levels of being: the first six statues represent the absolute simple realities, absolute matter and absolute form, that cannot be represented in images. The statues in the next class correspond to the causes and principles of natural things, and those in the last class, to all the realities that depend on a cause.

Each statue is composed of thirty meanings (*intentiones / rationes / conditiones*) of the central principle, and each of these is associated to one of the elements that make up the statue: different scenes or images involving a central god – his attributes, his physical appearance, his vehicle, his emblematic animals, other characters that have some relation to him, from the mythology or literature familiar to Bruno' readers.

Bruno explains that the role of the images in the description of the statues is to help expose and organise the material so that it can be more easily retained, to facilitate understanding, to help reveal the meaning of a content otherwise difficult to grasp. These "images" are characters (*typis*) and similitudes (*similitudines*), "sensible, visible and imaginable statues", but also stories (*fabulas*).[80]

The statues are first described in detail, after which Bruno proceeds to showing their different applications. Compared to the basic mnemonic use of images in the *Animadversiones*, in the exposition of the thirty statues they play a more significant role in explaining and clarifying the content, by presenting it in a figurative

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speciebus autem specialissimis magis applicabiles quam principia (Architica) Aristotelica et Lulliana; [...] Existimamus nullam esse proponibilem quaestionem, quae subterfugere possit unam saltem ex istis ideis [...]." For a detailed treatment of the order and composition of statues, their litterary and iconographic sources, their conceptual content, aspects that I shall only be touching upon in the discussion bellow, see Vianello, *Una lampada*.

[79] Ibid., 217–218: "*Utilitas huius Lampadis ad alias. [...] Perficit Lampadem Lullii eadem ratione, quia definita, formata et distincta dat subiecta et praedicata, quae illa indefinita dedit. [...] Habetur etiam hic non modo series absolutorum praedicatorum et respectivorum, verum etiam eorundem per singula triginta rationes [...].*"

[80] Ibid., 8: "*[...] arcana naturae eiuscemodi typis et similitudinibus velare consueverunt non tantum, quantum declarare, explicare, in seriem digerere et faciliori memoriae accommodare. Statuam quippe sensibilem, visibilem, imaginabilem, cum eadem ratione sensibilibus appositis facillime retinemus, fabulas effictas levissimo negotio memoriae commendamus, mysteria consequenter, doctrinas et disciplinales intentiones per easdem significabiles istorum suffragio [consequenter] considerare et retinere omnem citra difficultatem valebimus.*"

manner or in association with a representative image. For example, in the case of Apollo, which is the statue corresponding to the principle of "unity", "the continuity of Apollo's light" denotes (*designat*) the invariable nature of unity; the choir of the Muses lead by Apollo, dancing around his cart, indicates (*notat*) unity understood as the unity of a community.[81]

L. Vianello argues that the statues are "verbal places", composed in a manner that illustrates the techniques and mental operations described in the seal of *Phidias*: taking over conceptual and iconographic materials from other authors, and recombining them into a new system expressing Bruno's own philosophy.[82] The statues appear indeed to have been "constructed" in a manner similar to the one exemplified in *Proteus*, in which the content is derived from the images, or conceived in relation to them, in terms of "modifying one term in order for it to adequately represent another". As a consequence, in the exercise of invention it will not be easy to separate the conceptual content form the images or myths that convey and explain it. Although in many cases the arguments derived refer to the conceptual content without being in any way modified by the images, there are also cases when the image proves more useful, or when the whole construction is used – the image and the content it conveys.

The applications of the 30 statues are many and much more complex than the one I chose to discuss, which is the last application in the book, and is similar to the ones I have discussed so far: using the 30 statues and each of their meanings as places in the composition of an argumentation. The thesis Bruno chooses to prove is "The soul is not an accident".[83]

He derives arguments relevant for this issue from each of the statues, therefore from each of the different meanings that make up each statue. Let us take as an example the statue named "The workshop of Vulcanus", that contains the different meanings of the concept of "form". The second of these meanings is the form understood as the essence of a thing, that which makes a thing what it is. In the description of this statue, form as essence is represented by the instruments placed around the table in the workshop of Vulcanus, used for painting or sculpting the images (*simulachra*) of the ideas in the eternal mind. In the exercise of invention, when he has to derive from this part an argument for proving the thesis that "the soul is not an accident", Bruno finds it more useful to refer to the notion of instrument, which is related to the image rather than to the meaning it is supposed to convey, that of essence. Bruno derives his argument in the following way: an accident is like and instrument in relation to its substrate, but the soul is not an instrument of the body; rather, the soul is the one that acts using the body as an instrument. In other words, his argument does not refer at all to the concept of form

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[81] Ibid., 63, 65.
[82] Vianello, *Una lampada*, 93–94, 103–107.
[83] Bruno, "*Lampas triginta statuarum*," 238.

as essence, but only to an aspect of the image used to illustrate it. For the next argument, derived from the third term of the statue of Vulcanus, Bruno uses both the abstract concept – the fact that the form is generated from within matter – and the part of the myth associated with it – Vulcanus being born without a father – which allows him to talk about "parents" or causes in relation to the soul.[84]

Although, as I have mentioned, in many cases the arguments are derived exclusively from the conceptual content, examples like the ones above can show the similarity between the way Proteus works as an exercise of invention and this particular application of the thirty statues. Moreover, in regard to the application for invention just described, Bruno mentions that it can also be used to construct false arguments, "in the manner of the sophists",[85] which brings it even closer to Proteus, that was also used to construct arguments both for and against a given thesis.

While the "exemplaristic"[86] value of the Lullist principles might work as a guarantee for validity of this art, and of those derived from it, as instruments of generating true and certain knowledge, their generality, praised by Bruno even above the exemplaristic value, has an even more interesting effect. Allowing one to consider all the aspects of reality in all possible relations and from all possible perspectives definitely adds to the value of these arts as instruments of learning. But it also has a secondary effect in expanding its possibilities outside the boundaries of the truth, into the realm of the counterfactual.

Bruno argues that the thirty statues can be used to improve many of his other methods concerned with invention, either logical, rhetorical or Lullist: he alludes to *De lampade venatoria logicorum*, *Artificium perorandi*, *De lampade combinatoria lulliana*, and also to *Explicatio triginta sigillorum*. An art based on both images and general principles comparable to those of the Lullist art encompasses both the characteristics of an art of knowledge and those of an art of invention opened to all possibilities and applicable to all forms of discourse.

Conclusions

The model of invention in Proteus is representative for the possibilities of the imagination to play a part in the operations involved in the processing of information. On the other hand, this „imaginative logic" as a form of invention that derives the arguments form words and images alone seems to be limited to the forms of probable argumentation of rhetoric and dialectic, and I believe this is

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[84] Ibid., 242–243.

[85] Ibid., 239.

[86] See Rossi, *Logic*, 83; also Stephen Clucas, "Simulacra et Signacula: Memory, Magic and Metaphysics in Brunian Mnenmonics," in *Giordano Bruno, Philosopher of the Renaissance*, ed. H. Gatti (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 259–272, on the metaphysical substrate of the "higher and more general form" of Bruno's art.

precisely because it is a method of inventions mainly based on the imagination's power of representation.

In the seal from *Explicatio*, Bruno points out the difference between the limited value of the invention based on words and images and a "more general" type of invention that only uses images as mnemonic. As we have seen in Lampas, the general character of this *ars inventiva* based on principles described by Bruno as his own development of the Lullist ones, is reflected both in its value as an art of learning and as an art of invention that covers all forms of discourse.

While on its own the model of invention in Proteus might have a limited cognitive value, Bruno points out its importance in his project of improving the Lullist art. While in exercises of invention form the Lullist commentaries, in which arguments are derived from the universal principles of the Lullist art, images are used only as mnemonic devices, without any indication about allowing them a role in the development of the argumentation, in Lampas Bruno finds a way to integrate the method of invention from Proteus in a form of invention using general principles with a similar value to those of the Lullist art.

THE BOOK CULTURE OF THE DOMINICAN ORDER IN TRANSYLVANIA

MÁRIA LUPESCU MAKÓ[*]

Abstract To treat the significant historical and cultural role of the Dominican Order which celebrated 800 years of its existence last year, one must reach back to its beginnings. The Dominicans trained preachers already from the 13th century in their special university system called *studium generale*, independent from the organization of secular universities, providing them with a thorough theological background and proficiency in argumentation. However, books and libraries were also needed for education, and the Dominican friars had always paid great attention to the development of these. The subject of the present study also lies within this field of research, offering a review of the libraries of the medieval Transylvanian vicariate of the Dominican Order, with a short excursus on the development possibilities of the book collections and the storage and recording of books.

Keywords Dominican friars, libraries, medieval Transylvania

> "Whoever therefore claims to be zealous of truth, of happiness,
> of wisdom or knowledge, aye, even of the faith,
> must needs become a lover of books."
> Richard de Bury[1]

To the centenary of the birth of Zsigmond Jakó

The significant historical and cultural role of the Dominican Order, which celebrated 800 years of its existence last year, is treated in several works of research both in Hungary and abroad. Excelling mainly in the love and practice of science, Dominican

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[1] Richard de Bury, *Philobiblon*, trans. Thomas Ernest Chester (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1966), 18.

friars became some of the most outstanding representatives of learning all throughout the Middle Ages. The *studium* meant the vitality of the Order, the means to acquire *sapientia*, therefore the structure of learning was always designed very carefully. This was also strongly linked to the aims of the Order, for the followers of heretic teachings could only be countered with professionalism, therefore the thorough training of the friars was a priority. And since preaching is the most direct form of the education and conversion of the masses , the aim was to educate preacher-friars skilled in persuasion and refutation, best expressed by the Latin name of the Order (*Ordo Fratrum Praedicatorum*). Taking this into account, it may not be farfetched to accept another definition of the Dominican Order, namely that it had been organised from the start for the study of theology.[2] The decisions taken at the general chapters of the Order already in the first half of the 13th century envisaged the learning of this discipline at the highest possible level. In this respect, each convent had to appoint a person to organise the theological studies within the friary, to engage in debates and guide the readings of the friars. The results are well known. The system of multi-level education was rapidly developed and greatly facilitated by the Order's unitary organization and centralization. Each province had to send three members to the University of Paris to study theology, and these measures soon gave the Order first-class preachers with excellent theological training, skilled in the art of persuasion and refutation, and a university system called the *studium generale*, independent from the secular university system.[3] In this respect, the Dominicans created a more stable system of higher education than any other created in Western Europe.[4] Education of course also needs books and libraries. Friars of Dominican convents had always taken great care of the development of their book collections, rich in scholastic theology and the literature of mystical movements. In what follows, the article will review the situation of the libraries within the Transylvanian vicariate of the Dominican Order, treating also the development possibilities of the book collection and matters of storage and recording of the books. In this endeavour I was assisted by Zsigmond Jakó's still valid

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[2] R[ichard] W[illiam] Southern, *A nyugati társadalom és az egyház a középkorban* (Western society and the Church in the Middle Ages) (Budapest: Gondolat, 1987), 366.

[3] The term "secular university" should not be taken literally, for it is well known that, although not all of the members were ordained, and the number of lay professors was constantly increasing in these medieval educational institutions, universities were primarily ecclesiastical bodies. The students and their masters were all members of the clergy, subordinated to the church or directly to Rome. By "secular", I meant to differentiate it from the *studium generale*, the higher education institution of the Dominican Order.

[4] According to Southern's opinion, no other system has been created which was ruled by one single authority, and which connected the international body of students who studied with a clearly defined purpose. Southern, *A nyugati társadalom*, 366.

views on the history of books and libraries, and his advice addressing the reader, the researcher and the librarian alike.[5]

Convent libraries

One of the earliest Dominican convents founded in Transylvania is the Holy Cross friary in Sibiu (Nagyszeben/Hermannstadt, today's Romania). The friary, which had already suffered from the 1241 Mongol invasion, remained one of the decisive ecclesiastical and cultural institutions of the town until the 1540s.[6] The library of the convent, one of the oldest monastic libraries not only of the Order, but also of Transylvania, greatly supported the high intellectual standards of the two- or three-level education system of the monastery (*studium conventuale*, *studium particulare*[7]

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[5] Zsigmond Jakó, *Írás, könyv, értelmiség. Tanulmányok Erdély történelméhez* (Writings, books, intellectuals. Studies on the history of Transylvania) (Bucharest: Kriterion, 1977), 138–304., mainly 138–168.

[6] More on the history of the friary in Béla Iványi, "Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Siebenbürgen und der Moldau," *Siebenbürgische Vierteljahrsschrift* 63 (1940): 25–40.; Mária Lupescuné Makó, "A Domonkos Rend középkori erdélyi kolostorainak adattára" (Records of the medieval Transylvanian friaries of the Dominican Order), *Történelmi Szemle* 46 (2004): 377–380.; Mihaela Sanda Salontai, *Mănăstiri dominicane din Transilvania* (Dominican friaries in Transylvania) (Cluj-Napoca: Nereamia Napocae, 2002), 209–224.

[7] *Studium conventuale* existed for certain in the monastery. Divergent opinions exist on the mid-level Dominican educational institution, the *studium particulare* or *maior schola*, in Sibiu. Harsányi's argument was the number of friars with high educational degrees in the convents, which, in his opinion, indicated that *studium particulare* existed on the territory of the Hungarian Dominican province most probably in Cluj (Kolozsvár/Klausenburg), Sighişoara (Segesvár/Schässburg) and Sibiu. András Harsányi, *A Domonkos rend Magyarországon a reformáció előtt* (The Dominican Order in Hungary before the Reformation) (1938; repr., Budapest: Paulus Hungarus and Kairosz, 1999), 241. Elemér Mályusz linked the lower level *studium particulare* with the *studium generale*, therefore he considered that a *studium particulare* on the territory of Transylvania existed in Sibiu. Elemér Mályusz, *Egyházi társadalom a középkori Magyarországon* (Ecclesiastical society in medieval Hungary) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971), 283. According to Beatrix Romhányi, two factors betray the existence of *studium particulare*: the convents where the friars who attended the *studium generale* came from, and the number of students who came from a particular convent. Accordingly, *studium generale* probably existed in Braşov (Brassó/Kronstadt), Cluj and Bistriţa (Beszterce/Bistritz). Beatrix Romhányi, "A koldulórendek szerepe a középkori magyar oktatásban" (The role of the mendicant orders in medieval Hungarian education) in *A magyar iskola első évszázadai. Die Ersten Jahrhunderte des Schulwesens in Ungarn (996–1526)*, eds. Katalin G. Szende and Péter Szabó (Győr: Sylvester János Kiadó, 1996), 35. Since the main purpose of the *studium generale* is to provide the younger friars with the knowledge needed as a prerequisite for higher education, I think a *maior schola* must have existed in Sibiu as well. The rich library also supports this opinion. Mária Lupescu Makó, "Domonkos iskoláztatás a középkori Erdélyben" (Dominican schooling in medieval Transylvania), *Református Szemle* 96/ 6 (2003): 844–853., esp. note 15.

and *studium generale*[8]). Many of the manuscript codices and *incunabulae* of the friary have been preserved, and are now housed by the library of the Brukenthal Museum in Sibiu.[9] During the Reformation, the library of the Dominicans of Sibiu was taken over by the town. The collection, united with the library of the gymnasium in 1592, was stored in the Saint James Chapel, and the enlarged collection soon began to be called Kapellenbibliothek because of its storage place. In 1879, the library of the Brukenthal Museum took over the custody of the joint collection of the Dominicans, the town of Sibiu and the Lutheran gymnasium.[10]

It is an endeavour almost impossible to collect all the books of the Dominican Order's libraries throughout Hungary before the Reformation. Even if the Dominican provenance of some of the books can be established, the convent they came from is extremely rarely noted. The library of the Dominican convent of Sibiu belongs to this extremely rare category. The book collection of this convent, abolished in the time of the Reformation, is relatively easy to identify due to the possessor notes on (usually) the first page of the books, mostly with the text: "Iste

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[8] Although the leaders of the Order decided in 1525 to establish the *studium generale* in Sibiu, we have no clear evidence on its functioning. According to the constitutions of the Order, for such an important decision to take effect, three consecutive general chapters had to accept it. We know it was approved in 1530, the second step of the three, when it was ordered to continue the efficient preparations for establishing and maintaining the *studium generale*. This proved that the organization work had not finished yet. The third step of the approval, the confirmation, was no longer mentioned in the reports of the general chapter. The organization works were probably stopped, as also confirmed by the vicissitudes of the friars in the Dominican convent of Sibiu at the end of the 1520s. Iványi, "Geschichte des Dominikanerordens," 35–37. Cf. note 47. Another viewpoint belongs to Wysokiński, who connects the existence of the *studium generale* in Sibiu to the autonomy attempts of the Transylvanian vicariate. Ireneusz Wysokiński OP, "A középkori magyar domonkos rendtartomány felbomlása," (The dissolution of the medieval Hungarian province of the Dominican Order) in *A Domonkos Rend Magyarországon* (The Dominican Order in Hungary), eds. Attila Illés Pál and Balázs Zágorhidi Czigány (Piliscsaba–Bp.–Vasvár: Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem and METEM, 2007), 79–80.

[9] G[ustav] A[dolph] Schuller, "Die älteren Handschriftenbände des Baron Brukenthalischen Museums," *Mitteilungen aus dem Baron Brukenthalischen Museum* 3 (1933): 13–31., 4 (1934): 16–36., 5 (1935): 43–49., 6 (1936): 22–31.; Csaba Csapodi and Klára Csapodiné Gárdonyi, *Bibliotheca Hungarica. Kódexek és nyomtatott könyvek Magyarországon 1526 előtt* (*Bibliotheca Hungarica*. Codices and printed books in Hungary before 1526), A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtárának Közleményei 31 (106), new series, 2 vols (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára, 1988–1993 (henceforth: *BiblHung*); Veturia Jugăreanu, *Catalogul colecţiei de incunabule* (Catalogue of the *incunabulae* collection) (Sibiu: Biblioteca Muzeului Brukenthal, 1969).

[10] Zsigmond Jakó and Radu Manolescu, *A latin írás története* (The history of the Latin writing) (Budapest: Európa Kiadó, 1987), 112.

liber est conventus Cibiniensis ad sanctam crucem ordinis fratrum predicatorum",[11] "Iste liber est conventus Cibiniensis fratrum predicatorum",[12] "Iste liber pertinet ad Conventum Cibiniensem ad Sanctam crucem"[13], or "Liber fratrum predicatorum conventus Cibiniensis ad sanctam crucem".[14] This way the Dominicans of Sibiu also kept the regulations of the Order, as the General Chapter of 1254 in Buda issued a series of decrees concerning the entire organization of the Order, including the monastic libraries and studies. Humbert of Romans, personally present and elected as Master General at the general chapter, wrote a commentary to the "Statutes of Buda", where he detailed the duties of a librarian. "[The librarian] must write on the spine of each volume what book it is, whose writing or writings it contains. […] It is also his [the librarian's] duty to have all the books of the convent registered on a parchment [charta] and to mark all the increase and decrease in the collections, as is the case. He must pass this record on to his successor when leaving his office, and take it over from his predecessor when taking up his office, so that he can account for the books at any time if his superior wants him to. Thus it may not happen that books get lost because of forgetfulness."[15] Although the leaders of the Order did require the inventory of books, not all the librarian-friars of every convent observed these regulations. In the absence of these records, it is difficult to clarify which volume belonged to which dispersed library collection of the Order. Fortunately there were exceptions as well, such as the library of the Dominican friary of Sibiu. The best basis for research are the places where, due to a mix of fortunate circumstances and good chance, the books of the Dominican friary dissolved in the first half of the 16th century remained in place and were incorporated into the school

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[11] Vincentius Ferrerius, *Sermones de tempore et de sanctis, pars hiemalis, de sanctis et estivalis* (Nuremberg, 1492), in Brukenthal National Museum in Sibiu, Brukenthal Library (henceforth: Brukenthal Library) Inc. 275. (P. 3), f. I.

[12] Thomas de Aquino, *Summa Theologica II. Liber secundus, secundae partis* [Basel, Non post 1474], Brukenthal Library, Inc. 103., note at the end of the index.

[13] Nicolaus de Ausmo, *Supplementum Summae Pisanellae* (Nuremberg, 1478), Brukenthal Library, Inc. 100., note on the inner title page.

[14] Johannes Cassianus, *De institutis coenobiorum* (Basel, 1485), Brukenthal Library, Inc. 186. (T. 1-2 in 1 vol.), f. aʳ.

[15] Humbertus de Romanis, *Liber de instructione officialium ordinis fratrum praedicatorum necnon constitutiones sororum eiusdem ordinis et tractatus de initio et fundatione regulae fratrum et sororum de poenitentia B. Dominici. Cap. XIII. De officio librarii*. http://monasticmatrix.osu.edu/sites/monasticmatrix.osu.edu/files/cartularium/primary_texts/3577Text.pdf (accessed 22 March 2016.) Hungarian translation of the librarians' instruction: Máté Kovács, ed., *A könyv és a könyvtár a magyar társadalom életében az államalapítástól 1849-ig* (Books and libraries in Hungarian society from the foundation of the state to 1849) vol. 1 (Budapest: Gondolat, 1963), 79–81. Details in Zs. Jakó, *Írás, könyv, értelmiség*, 147.

library which turned Protestant. Such are the cases of the books from Sibiu and Brașov (Brassó/Kronstadt) as well.[16]

The oldest manuscript collection of the Dominicans of Brașov was inherited by the Saxon Lutheran gymnasium founded by Johannes Honterus during the Reformation. Although this library was destroyed in the great fire in 1689, the inventory from 1575 was preserved and it reveals that the medieval library of the Dominicans contained more than 100 manuscript volumes.[17] In addition to the works of highly respected (Thomas Aquinas) and popular (not only with the Dominicans, like Jacobus a Voragine) authors, there were also liturgical books specific to the Dominicans (*gradualia magna predicatorum*, *antiphonaria magna predicatorum*). There is also other direct and indirect evidence on the existence of the Dominican library of Brașov. In 1461 in Vienna, Tamás Székely, prior of the Saint Peter and Paul Dominican friary, takes over the books of the late Jakob Roderbach, confessor of the Saint Laurentius monastery.[18] Tamás Székely is known to have been the *deffinitor* of the Hungarian province at the chapter held two years before, in his position as *lector* of the Brașov friary. In 1461 he was not only a prior, but also the vicar of the Dominicans of Transylvania.[19] This book legacy contained especially works connected to the spiritual activity of the Dominicans, serving a practical purpose. Such were the various kinds of sermonaries, handbooks for confession, and the *Quadragesimale* sermon collection.[20] In addition to them, other products of medieval literacy also

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[16] Carl Göllner, "Din istoricul unor biblioteci feudale ale sașilor din Sibiu" (From the history of some feudal libraries of the Saxons of Sibiu), *Studii și cercetări de bibliologie* 5 (1963): 221–229. A summary on lost late medieval Transylvanian libraries (among which the Dominican libraries of Sibiu and Brașov), in Adinel Dincă, "The Lost Libraries of Transylvania: Some Examples from the 15th and 16th Centuries" http://www.ifla.org/files/hq/papers/ifla75/78-dinca-en.pdf (accessed 07.04.2016).

[17] Julius Gross, "Zur ältesten Geschichte der Kronstädter Gymnasialbibliothek," *Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 21 (1887): 591–708, mainly 622–625.; Konrad Gündisch, *Siebenbürgen und die Siebenbürger Sachsen* (München: Langen Müller, 2005), 2–81. passim. More details on the catalogue in Ádám Dankanits, "Az 1575-ös brassói katalógus," (The 1575 catalogue from Brașov) *Könyvtári Szemle* 14 (1970): 177–179.

[18] *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, vol. 6, eds. Gustav Gündisch et al. (Bucharest: Verlag der Akademie der Sozialistischen Republik Rumänien, 1981), 103–104 (henceforth *Ub*).

[19] Harsányi, *A Domonkos rend*, 141.; *Ub*, vol. 6, 103.

[20] On the role of sermon collections in the Hungarian province of the Dominicans, see András Vizkelety, "A Domonkos rend tudományközvetítő szerepe Magyarországon a 13–14. században" (The scientific role of the Dominican Order in Hungary in the 13th-14th century), in *Régi és új peregrináció. Magyarok külföldön, külföldiek Magyarországon* (Academic peregrination old and new. Hungarians abroad and foreigners in Hungary) ed. Imre Békési et al., vol. I/2 (Budapest–Szeged: Nemzetközi Magyar Filológiai Társaság and Scriptum, 1993), 473–479.

appear, first of all the Bible as the most significant book of theology.[21] The donator also stipulated that, in addition to the friars, the books should also be used by the secular clergy. The further fate of Roderbach's book legacy handed down to Tamás Székely can only be assumed. In 1464 the friary was granted Papal indulgence upon completing some construction works. These works might have been related to making a suitable storage place, a library room for the book donation received three years before, since the partly preserved charter, in addition to the equipment of the Dominican church, also refers to the condition of the books which are not properly stored.[22] As we know, the 13th century regulations of the Order required a "good and safe room" for the library, "in a place protected from wind and rain […] but still airy enough, as the preservation of books requires." In addition, depending on the number and value of books, these were also stored in book chests or cases in the sacristy of the convent church or in the special niches of the cloister which were highly suitable for meditation and common reading.[23] According to Humbert of Romans's careful commentary, book cases are the most suitable for storing books, which "should be made of wood, so that books should be best protected from rotting and moisture. It should have many shelves […]." Another concern was to organise the books according to subjects:

> the different books belonging to different disciplines should be ordered on these [shelves] so that the ones belonging to the same discipline [*facultas*] should not be dispersed but placed next to each other, marked with the appropriate reference cards. The shelves must also be marked so that we may easily find what we are looking for. The key to the bookcase or the library must be kept by the librarian, who will open or close it at the right time. […] He must keep the bookcase open in due time or at least be close

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[21] "*Ego frater Thomas Siculus ordinis praedicatorum vicarius in Transsiluania ac prior immeritus conventus sancti Petri iamdicti ordinis et fratrum in Corona situati regni Vngariae recognosco ... me recepisse ... quosdam libros ... videlicet sermones magistri Nicolai Dynkelspyl de tempore et de sanctis, item volumen, quod continet decem praecepta septem vitia octo beatitudines, tres partes poenitentiae, pater noster aliquos sermones super epistolas magistri Nicolai Dynkelspyl, item primam partem Byblye, item secundam partem Byblye, item novum testamentum cum uno quadrigesimali, item manuale confessorum cum lepra morali, item aliquos sextenos variorum doctorum nondum ligatos, qui ligari debent de pecuniis quas praefatus dominus Jacobus sanctimonialibus ad sanctum Laurentium legavit, item Omelye beati Gregorii cum aliis bonis tractatibus, item super officium missae cum quinque sensibus, item laudes Mariae , item quatuor libros dialogorum beati Gregorii*": *Ub,* vol. 6, 103–104.*
[22] Ibid., 164.
[23] Although not from a Dominican, yet still Transylvanian source, we know of a niche used for such purposes in the northern wall of the cloister of the Cistercian monastery of Cârța (Kerc/Kerz).

to it, so that, if anybody might want to take a glimpse in some of the other books or borrow some book for a short time, then they could do so.

It was not by chance thus, that the prior who defined the tasks of the librarian suggested that

the study (cella pro studio) of [the librarian] should be either the library itself, if the room is suitable for it, or somewhere close to it, so that he may be found easily if people are looking for him in a matter connected to his office.[24]

The location of the *librarius* in Brașov is not known, but the statutes of the Order also support that fact that a library room was established in the 1460s. The General Chapter of Montpellier in 1456 made it compulsory for monasteries to have libraries, which had only sporadically existed before, and ordered the building or designation of library rooms.[25]

While only suppositions exist about the library room of the Dominican friary of Brașov, there is much more evidence on the one in Cluj (Kolozsvár/Klausenburg). Although the monastic library of the Dominicans of Cluj fell victim to the Reformation, the written sources clearly speak about a room built especially for the storage of books in the second half of the previous century, describing it as nice and spacious.[26] The location of the former *librarium* within the convent comes up once in a while in the works of experts in the history of the Dominican friary of Cluj, mainly art historians and architects. As expected, there are various points of view in this regard. The literature claims that the library and the *scriptorium* were usually located on the upper floor of the eastern wing of the friary, above the chapterhouse or the sacristy.[27] Other opinions claim that the library could have been situated on the upper floor of the northern wing or in the wing opposite the church, and we also know of Dominican libraries located in separate buildings.[28] These ideas of spatial

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[24] Kovács, ed., *A könyv és a könyvtár*, vol. 1, 79–81.

[25] Benedictus Maria Reichert, ed., *Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, 9 vols (Rome: Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 1898–1904), vol. 3, 263 (henceforth *ACGOP*).

[26] "… *edificarunt domum librarie pulcram et amplam pro librorum conservacione*": János Eszterházy, "A kolozsvári Boldog-Asszonyról czímzett domonkosok, jelenleg ferencziek egyházának történeti és építészeti leírása" (The historical and architectural description of the monastery of the Dominicans of the Virgin Mary, now of the Franciscans), *Magyar Sion* 4 (1866): 584–585.

[27] Edit Madas and István Monok, *A könyvkultúra Magyarországon a kezdetektől 1800-ig* (Book culture in Hungary from the beginnings to 1800) (Budapest: Balassi, 2003), 23.

[28] Edgar Lehmann, *Die Bibliotheksräume der deutschen Klöster im Mittelalter* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), 8–14.

organization can be found also for the Dominican convent of Cluj. Salontai considers that the library room created on the upper floor of the eastern wing, above the chapterhouse, was part of the reconstruction works in the second half of the 15th century,[29] Géza Lux places the library room on the second floor of the western end of the northern wing,[30] but the latest archaeological research has revealed that even the separate building north of the convent can be imagined to have had this purpose.[31] The inventory from 1509 indicates that the library room was needed indeed, because the Virgin Mary Dominican friary had already possessed a significant number of books by then. In addition to liturgical books and missals not listed by title, there were manuscript missals, breviaries (books of hymns), large musical score books (antiphonaries), graduals, ritual books (*agendae*), and cantors' books of songs. The anonymous friar justifies the circumstances of the creation of the library: since all the respectability of the Dominican Order depends on the pure life of the friars and on the sciences, great attention must be paid to the Biblical lessons. They intended to list the books as well in the Inventory, with the exception of liturgical books. Unfortunately, the catalogue was never completed. This differentiation is explained by the fact that the liturgical books were stored in the sacristy, in order to always have them at hand for the service. We have no other precise data on the further fate of the Dominicans' library in Cluj.[32] However, its afterlife was entwined with the events of the early- and mid-16th century which reshaped Transylvania's spiritual and political image. For instance, when the news of the death of György Martinuzzi reached the town in December 1551, in the following days two preachers who were followers of the new religious teachings incited the crowds to such an extent that they sacked the friaries of the Dominicans and the Franciscans and drove out the friars from the town, then plundered the library of the Dominicans. Although the Estates meeting in Târgu Mureș (Marosvásárhely) in December 1551 distanced themselves from the violation of the decrees of 1550 regarding the mutual tolerance for denominations, and ordered that the town must receive within its walls the Dominicans and Franciscans, and reach an agreement with them about the damages

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[29] Salontai*, Mănăstiri dominicane*, 164., 181. Cf. Idem, "O restaurare în spiritul doctrinei unităţii de stil. Claustrul mănăstirii dominicane din Cluj" (A restoration in the spirit of the doctrine of stylistic unity. The cloister of the Dominican friary of Cluj), in *Arhitectura religioasă medievală din Transilvania. Középkori egyházi építészet Erdélyben. Medieval Ecclesiastical Architecture in Transylvania*, eds. Imola Kiss and Péter Levente Szőcs (Satu Mare: Editura Muzeului Sătmărean, 1999), 121–134., 126–127.

[30] Géza Lux, "A kolozsvári ferencrendi, egykor dominikánus kolostor," (The Fransiscan, formerly Dominican friary of Cluj), *Szépművészet* 3 (1942): 117.

[31] Based on recent researches of Adrian Andrei Rusu and Radu Lupescu (oral communication).

[32] Despite the destruction of the sources, we can still imagine the book culture of the Dominicans of Cluj by analogy. A good example for this, also methodologically, is Zsigmond Jakó's, "Várad helye középkori könyvtártörténetünkben" (The place of Oradea in Hungarian medieval library history), in Idem, *Írás, könyv, értelmiség*, 146–149.

caused,[33] unfortunately our sources do not reveal yet how much of the plundered library was recovered. We assume that the restoration could have been successful to a certain extent, for it is hardly an accident that the Diet of 1557 wanted to organise one of the three Protestant colleges precisely in the friary of the Dominicans of Cluj. The Dominicans' *studium particulare* and the fame of their library must have had a role to play in it. The further fate of some of the books is suggested by the fact that many leafs of medieval liturgical manuscripts and religious books sometimes turn up elsewhere, due to their different kind of usage. For instance, the 17th-century account books of Cluj were often bound in the leafs of former Catholic writings or books.[34] Lajos Kelemen's notes contain concrete examples of this practice: "The binding is a 15th-century religious book with musical notation", or "the binding is the leafs of two smaller ritual books with decorative initials", or "codex-binding, a girl with a headpiece holding flowers". A note in the account book *Mázsás Tamás és Schmeltzer Lőrinc számadása a harmincadról* (Tamás Mázsás and Lőrinc Schmeltzer's account on the thirtieth) reads: "the truncated parchment binding is a musical score book with fine initials."[35] It can be assumed that the other pages of the codex may have come from the ransacked library of the Dominicans of Cluj, the later Jesuit college.[36] The apparently rich Catholic book collection that remained in Cluj after the Reformation is known to have been donated in 1580 by Prince István Báthory to the Jesuits who moved to the new school building.[37] It must have included the library of the Dominicans, because due to the research of Klára Jakó we know of two volumes which had previously belonged to the Dominican convent.[38] When the Jesuits had to leave Transylvania in 1589, they most likely took their library as well; with it, the books of the Dominicans – except for the abovementioned two – also left Transylvania, and their further fate is unknown.[39]

Library rooms existed not only in the larger town friaries, but also in smaller, provincial convents as well. The archaeological research conducted in Vințu de Jos (Alvinc/Unterwinz) in the period of 1990 to 1998 revealed the one-storied building of

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[33] Lupescuné Makó, "A Domonkos Rend," 368.

[34] Zs. Jakó, *A latin írás*, 111.

[35] The notes of Lajos Kelemen are quoted by Péter Sas, *A kolozsvári ferences templom* (The Franciscan church from Cluj) (Kolozsvár: Erdélyi Ferences Rendtartomány, 1999), 76.

[36] Zs. Jakó, *A latin írás,* 111.

[37] Klára Jakó, *Az első kolozsvári egyetemi könyvtár története és állományának rekonstrukciója 1579–1604* (The history of the first university library of Cluj and the reconstruction of its collections 1579–1604),Erdélyi Könyvesházak I. (Szeged: Scriptum, 1991), 14.

[38] Ibid., entries 1. and 315.

[39] Gyöngyi Bíró, "A kolozsvári unitárius egyházközség könyvtára a XVI–XVII. században," (The library of the Unitarian parish in Cluj in the 16th-17th century) in *Kolozsvár 1000 éve* (1000 years of Cluj), ed. Tibor Kálmán Dáné et al. (Kolozsvár: Erdélyi Múzeum-Egyesület and Erdélyi Magyar Közművelődési Egyesület, 2001), 142–143.; cf. K. Jakó, *Az első kolozsvári egyetemi könyvtár*, 17–19.

a friary attached to the southern side of the hall church. The researchers assume that one of the rooms may have been a library room, an assumption based on a remarkable number of metal clasps and plates found in that place.[40]

Collection development

Several different factors played a role in the creation and development of Dominican libraries in Transylvania, there were several ways that books could get into the possession of friaries. Although they did not differ from other orders in their methods of book acquisition, one difference existed nonetheless: the Dominicans, as already mentioned, regulated the duties of a librarian and prescribed that his job was also to acquire new books:

> he must seek, during his office, to enlarge the library of the community, either – if possible – by the means of alms collected to this purpose, or through the novices who have books when they join the order, or making sure that some of the books of the deceased brothers should go to the library, and he must seek this by any other means. He must strive to acquire the books which are missing from various disciplines. If there are second and third copies which the friars do not really need, the best one should be kept and the rest sold, and the income should be spent for the acquisition of other, missing books. The same should happen with the old ones or those which are worth little.[41]

As a first step, the newly founded friaries were supplied with the most important liturgical books, and then later they copied what they needed from borrowed sample copies, as copying was the most ancient means of book development. Codices copied by Dominican friars are extant even today. These show that – except for their liturgical books – they paid less attention to the aspect of the manuscript, in favour of the content. They copied in the first place works that satisfied their own needs, such as sermons or guidebooks for confession. Because of the objectives of the Order, they led an active life, where they had little time left, besides learning and pastoral work, to copy books, like contemplative monks did. The Dominicans' scribal activity could not rival that of the old, contemplative orders. We dare assume that such work was carried out in the Virgin Mary Dominican convent in Sighișoara (Segesvár/Schässburg), for we know of a missal from 1506 with an initial that was not painted, which can perhaps hint to the existence of a

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[40] Adrian Andrei Rusu, *Gotic și Renaștere la Vințu de Jos (Documente de cultură materială din Transilvania secolelor XIII-XVIII). Gotik und Renaissance in Unter-Winz (Dokumente der Sachkultur in Siebenbürgen im 13.-17. Jh.)* (Cluj-Napoca–Satu Mare: Editura Muzeului Sătmărean, 1998), 4, 16.

[41] Kovács, ed., *A könyv és a könyvtár*, vol. 1, 79–81.

scriptorium.[42] Fabri's notes also reveal that they received some blank parchment as donation at the beginning of the 16th century. The widow of the donator, Stephan Pistor, also conditioned that the Dominicans of Sighișoara should use the parchment to copy a gradual and an antiphonal.[43] We also have indirect evidence of a *scriptorium* in the convent of Brașov. The account books of 1553 record a bookbinding workshop in the Dominican friary, probably next to the scriptorium. At this time the town registers were bound by Brother Laurentius.[44]

Another possibility for book acquisition was purchase. After the spreading of bookprinting, the Dominicans of Transylvania also took up the habit to purchase books from book traders, developing their libraries. It betrays a fairly significant amount of book acquisition that in 1488 Master Ádám Kolozsvári paid 22 and a half ducats to printer Octavianus Scotus as the price of the books he bought from him.[45] Similar evidence exists for the library of the convent of Sibiu. In 1532, Prior Vitalis paid 75 denars for Nicolaus Perotti's work published in 1513.[46] Prior Vitalis was the same person who was arrested some years before, together with two of his peers, in the town of Sibiu because the Dominican friars had been expelled from the town and refused to leave.[47] In order to cover the costs of book purchase – but exclusively for this reason – the prior(ess) was allowed to sell less necessary works or the extra copies of certain works.[48] This happened probably in Cluj in 1450, when the prior of the Virgin Mary friary, Brother John, appeared as a mediator in the case of books sold to vice-voivode Márk Herepei by the local Dominican nuns. In the name of the Saint Aegidius nunnery, Prioress Gertrud and Sister Elisabeth sold three books not used for the mass, a gradual, an antiphonal and a secular missal, to vice-voivode of Transylvania Márk Herepei, for 24 golden florins.[49] This was quite a significant sum of

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[42] Arnold Ipolyi, "Adalékok a magyar domonkosok történetéhez I." (Data on the history of the Hungarian Dominicans I.), *Magyar Sion* 5 (1867): 494–495.

[43] K[arl] Fabritius, "Zwei Funde in der ehemaligen Dominikanerkirche zu Schässburg," *Archives des Vereines für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde, Neue Folge* 5 (1861): 15–16.

[44] *Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Kronstadt,* 7 vols (Kronstadt–Brassó: 1886–1918), vol. 2, 293.

[45] Béla Iványi, "Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Siebenbürgen und der Moldau. Hauptsächlich unter Benützung des Zentralarchivs des Dominikanerordens in Rom," *Siebenbürgische Vierteljahrsschrift* 62 (1939): 384., 388.

[46] Possessor note: "*Liber presens pertinet ad conventum Cibiniensem ordinis fratrum Praedicatorum emptus per fratrem Vitalem tunc priorem. 1532 pro LXXV. d*." Quoted in: Karl Fabritius, "Misszellen," *Blätter für Geist, Gemüth und Vaterlandskunde* 47 (1858): 179.

[47] Fabritius, "Zwei Funde," 28.

[48] The general chapter of Paris in 1236 prohibited the book trade of Dominican friars: "Fratres nostri non faciant negociones librorum" *ACGOP*, vol. 1, 9.

[49] Zsigmond Jakó, ed., *A kolozsmonostori konvent jegyzőkönyvei (1289–1556)* (Protocols of the convent of Cluj-Mănăștur) A Magyar Országos Levéltár Kiadványai II: Forráskiadványok 17., 2 vols, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990), vol. 1, no. 828.

money, taking into account that in the very same age a poorer student could cover his two-year studies for baccalaureate in Vienna without any extra expenses for 19 golden florins.[50] A similar case is that of Antal, parish priest of Sânmiclăuş (Szászszentmiklós/Klossdorf), who, by last will and testament, left his treasured books, which he did not list in detail, to the Virgin Mary Dominican friary of Sighişoara. He also made the wise decision to leave a nice sum of money for buying books, for the friars knew best what they needed.[51]

A special chapter was the acquisition of books through almsgiving. Learning abroad was expensive, the convent probably covered travel expenses and a part of the taxes, but the student-friar had to cover his own daily expenses and the equipment needed for learning. Therefore the final clause of the assignations abroad often contained the permission of receiving alms. Márton Frigh, Dominican friar from Cluj, became a theology student in Cologne in 1478, and in Padua in 1479. On both occasions he was granted permission to ask for and receive alms for buying books.[52]

In addition to copying, another means to acquire books was donation or inheritance. The donators were in the first place the friars themselves. It was customary that a new member of the order, upon entering the friary, gave his previously acquired books or at least one volume as a gift to the library. In this case the new friar had to be granted permission to continue using the books he kept. In 1479, there is a mention of Bertalan, friar of the Holy Cross Dominican convent of Bistriţa (Beszterce/Bistritz), who was permitted by the Master of the Order to use his Bible, breviary and his printed Antoninus, which he had bought in Rome.[53] The deceased members also had to leave their books to the library unless they got an exemption from this general obligation. This was the case of Johannes de Ungaria, a friar in the Cluj convent, who studied in Cologne in 1462–1463 and later became the provincial prior of the Hungarian Dominican province. In this capacity, in 1477 he was granted permission to leave his books acquired before, and to be acquired during his office as a provincial prior to his original convent of Cluj or any other convent of his choice.[54] It must be noted that all the friars who had books in their possession were members of the clergy, as lay brothers were not allowed to possess books. Of course, exceptions existed in this case as well, as was for instance the case

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[50] Sándor Tonk, *Erdélyiek egyetemjárása a középkorban* (The academic peregrination of Transylvanians in the Middle Ages) (Bucharest: Kriterion, 1979), 114–116.

[51] Fabritius, "Zwei Funde," 6–7.

[52] Tonk, *Erdélyiek egyetemjárása*, 165–166., cf. Ibid., no. 1447.

[53] The permission also indicates that Brother Bartholomeus had other books as well. The permission was necessary because the statutes of the order only allowed a friar to possess books with the permission of their superior. See Harsányi, *A Domonkos rend*, 290.

[54] The data is valid only if Harsányi's assumption is correct and "Johannes de Ungaria" and "magister Johannes Episcopi" is the same person. See Harsányi, *A Domonkos rend*, 244.

of Balázs Erdélyi, a lay brother from Sighișoara, who was exempted from this rule in 1497 and allowed to keep books.[55]

The book collections of Transylvanian Dominican friaries enlarged during the Late Middle Ages primarily thanks to the book donations of lay priests and members of the congregation. Although most clerics who left their belongings to monasteries usually donated church equipment or smaller immovable estate assets, the late medieval testaments often also contained book donations. A special outstanding example is that of Nicasius, parish priest of Vulcan (Volkány/Wolkendorf), who earlier acted as a preacher in Cluj, Bistrița and Sighișoara, and was therefore a great opponent of the Dominicans, in the words of the early 16th-century Fabri, "in principio maximus emulus et persecutor ordinis". However, at the end of his life he changed his mind, gave up his parish, and moved to the Virgin Mary friary of Sighișoara, leaving all his fortune to it. He left the tithes to which he was entitled to the Dominican friars, a chasuble ornate with a "nicely and nobly worked" cross for the sacristy, and ten books not listed by title. Then he asked for the forgiveness of the Dominicans with great penitence and humility, and had himself be buried in the habit of the order in front of the Saint Dominic altar in 1505.[56] The mass services and the hope to remain in the memory of the living were the motivation of Johann Muress and his wife Katharina to leave a chalice and a valuable manuscript parchment missal to the convent of Sighișoara around 1465. The friars remembered their names and noted them for posterity in the book of the dead.[57]

Whatever way they acquired them, the new owners often wrote their names in the books. From the point of view of book history, it was even more fortunate if one noted not only the possession but also from whom and when he inherited the book, or to whom and when he left it. Humbert of Romans's previously mentioned rules also stress that if "[a librarian] would see it fit to make note of the donator of the book, he should add [upon inventory]: 'donated by N. for the salvation of their soul' […]." The Dominican friars of Sibiu observed this regulation as well. The extended possessor's notes reveal that they enlarged their collections via purchase,[58] pious donation[59] and last will.[60]

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[55] Ibid., 293–294.

[56] Fabritius, "Zwei Funde", 14.

[57] Ibid., 6.

[58] "*Iste liber est emptus per fratrem Georgium de Medies ad suum vsum incertum I fl. cum sermonibus Anthonij de Bitonto anno 1502:*" *Corona Beatae Mariae Virginis* [Strasbourg: Non post 1488], Brukenthal Library, Inc. 5., f. a¹.; "*Frater Nicolaus de Beuthom comparauit:*" *Speculum exemplorum* (Strasbourg, 1490), Brukenthal Library, Inc. 147., note on the title page; two notes in the work of Paulus Venetus, *Expositio in Analytica Posteriora Aristotelis* (Venice, 1491): "*Pertinet ad Lucam Baccalarium alias fratrem de ordine predicatorum*", Brukenthal Library, Inc. 51b., f. a²ʳ. The second clarifies the first: "*Iste liber pertinet ad Magistrum Lucam post mortem autem pertinebit ad conventum*", Brukenthal Library, Inc. 51b., on the title page.

Máté Kőhalmi (Matheus de Rupe), parish priest of Dealu Frumos, who wrote his last will on his valuables and fortune in 1502, stands out among the donators.[61] The donator is mentioned in 1488 at the University of Vienna as the newly elected procurator of the Hungarian nation. This office implies a magister's degree in the humanities, which suggests that Máté Kőhalmi studied at one of the higher classes, probably canon law. His schooling and education helped him become a priest of a profitable and privileged parish.[62] All this was clear from his testament. In addition to his money in cash, a part of which was kept by the Dominicans of Sibiu, his bequest included household goods, immovable assets, some valuable luxury products (gilded chalices and cups, glass, silver spoons, tapestry), and objects of his profession (chasubles, birettas, chalices, crosses, etc.). However, he spent the majority of his income, as opposed to other clergymen, not for worldly goods (like land, vineyards, meadows or houses – he only made a fishpond on the land of his parish), but for books. The former university student collected a library that counted as large and valuable in his age, listing 14 of his books by title in his will. Among these, there is the Bible, a large book in itself, then works of theology as the basis of a Scholastic education in the age (the works of Thomas Aquinas), and books of canon law (the entire corpus of canon law with commentaries, the *Institutiones*, that is, a significant part of the *Codex Iustinianus*, or the *Vocabularium iuris*, a collection of the incipits of canons and chapters of canon law, rendered in alphabetical order.). His library also

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[59] The widow of magister Miklós donated in 1488 the work of Leonardus de Utino, *Sermones aurei de sanctis* (Venice, 1475) to the Dominicans of Sibiu for the salvation of the soul of her deceased husband and two sons, János and Mihály: "*Iste liber datus est ab uxore quondam magistri Nicolai ex parte anime eiusdem et duorum filiorum eius Johannes et Michaelis conuentui Cibiniensi ordinis predicatorum 1.4.8.8. ita quod per registrum animarum satifiat pro ipsis*", Brukenthal Library, Inc. 10., f. I. http://www.brukenthal-digital.ro/incunabula/LeonardusDeUtino-SermonesAureiDeSanctis-Inc10.htm (accessed 11 .03.2016)

[60] "*Iste liber testamentario provenit Conuentui Cibiniensi fratrum ordinis predicatorum ad sanctam crucem a venerabili viro domino Sigismundo quondam plebano Appoldie Inferioris*." This is how the Dominicans of Sibiu got in the possession of Aurelius Augustinus's *Epistolae* printed in Strasbourg before 1471 (Brukenthal Library, Inc. 220., f. Iª.) or through Márton Brassói to Conradus de Brudelsheim's *Sermones de sanctis: "Iste liber est conventus Cibiniensis ordinis fratrum predicatorum ad sanctam crucem legatus testamentaliter per venerabilem virum dominum. Martinum de Corona magistrum artium et protunc praedicatorem Cibiniensem Anno domini 1490*", Brukenthal Library, Inc. 162., f. Iª.

[61] National Archives of Hungary, Diplomatic Archives collection, DL 21 091., published: Karl Fabritius, "Das Testament des Schönberger Plebans Mattheus von Reps aus dem Jahre 1502" *Archiv des Vereines für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 12 (1874): 372–378.

[62] Lesses (Pulchromons/Dealu Frumos/Schönberg, Cincu (Nagysink) seat, Sibiu county) was a village that belonged to the Cincu-Sibiu chapter, as one of the four Saxon chapters subordinated to the Archbishop of Esztergom. Its parish priest had thus a very favourable situation.

contained relatively new sermon books (such as the *Sermones de tempore* and *Sermones de sanctis* of the famous Thomas Ebendorfer von Haselbach[63] of the University of Vienna, or the collection of sermons on the Virgin Mary of the reformer of the Franciscan Order, Bernardino of Siena[64]), as well as the old and well-established handbooks of a good parish priest (eg. the ritual book *Rationale divinorum officiorum* and Rainerius Pisanus *Pantheologia*). These works were not his whole collection. He did not list all of his books of theology and canon law, only mentioned in general that their titles are all contained in a register.[65] However, the list has not been preserved, and the exact number of his books is unknown. Although this list cannot be completed, the previous list can, due to his piety and care: apart from three works, Máté Kőhalmi left his library as his most valuable asset to the Holy Cross Dominican friary in Sibiu. His library, collected with great sacrifice and passion throughout his lifetime, was not dispersed, but got into the possession of one single institution, and with the help of possessor notes five more books of this library can be identified, which were not listed by title in his last will. The almost identical possessor notes written on the last page of the *incunabulae* housed today in the library of the Brukenthal Museum also reveal that Máté Kőhalmi must have died soon after he had written his will, because in 1503 the Dominicans of Sibiu already prayed for his salvation: "*Hunc librum cum omnibus ceteris libris dominus Matheus plebanus de Pulcromonte contulit fratribus ordinis predicatorum sancte crucis ad Cibinium pro memoria perpetua. Cuius anima requiescat in pace sancte. 1503. O mater dei memento mei.*"[66] This note is written in a treatise of the famous Spanish Dominican Torquemada. The treatise, which defended the use and healing effect of holy water in church ceremonies, was probably a great success among the Dominicans of Sibiu. The Italian Franciscan Angelus de Calvasio's *Summa angelica* is

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[63] Rector of the University of Vienna in the first half of the 15th century, who also visited Hungary. Johannes Seidl, "Thomas Ebendorfer, Enea Silvio Piccolomini und Johannes Hinderbach. Geistliche im Umkreis Friedrichs III," *Beiträge zur Wiener Diözesangeschichte* 34 (1993): 39–43.

[64] This book, entitled *Mariale eximii viri Bernardini de Busti*, and printed in 1506, was acquired by the Franciscan friary in Sighişoara in 1511 from Moldavia, as proof of the viability of the Latin book market beyond the Carpathians. Zs. Jakó, *A latin írás*, 109.

[65] "*Item omnes libros meos videlicet totum corpus iuris positum cum scriptis super libros decretalium, practicam novam, Vocabularium iuris, Instituciones, Margaritham deoce et alios libros iuris canonici , item bibliam , sumam Reyneris , que alias Pantheloya intitulatur ♩ ♩ continentem Sancti Thome Racionale Divinorum, Mariale Bernardini ordinis Minorum et alios duos libros videlicet Thomam de veritate et Contra gentiles et plures alios libros Tam in Theologia quam in Jure Canonico, prout in registro continentur, pro monasterio sancte Crucis taliter...*" – DL 21 091; Fabritius, "Das Testament," 375–376.

[66] Johannes de Turrecremata, *De efficacia aquae benedicte* [Augsburg: cca. 1476 (?)], Brukenthal Library, Inc. 61.; *BiblHung*, vol. 2, no. 2242.; Jugăreanu, *Catalogul de incunabule*, no. 353.

a casuistic work of the type that treats the moral issues of theology. It was a handbook used as a guide for the priest on the one hand in how to establish the type of a sin, and on the other hand in establishing how far his authority extends.[67] Jacobus de Jüteborg's *De apparitionibus animarum*, a popular treatise published in seven editions, analysed the state of the human soul after death.[68] The *Legendae sanctorum regni Hungariae* is in fact the Hungarian completion of the famous medieval legend collection, the *Legenda aurea*.[69] Another book, the *Decretales*, commented by the early 15th-century canonist Nicolaus de Tudeschis, known as *Abbas modernus* or *Panormitanus*, betrays Máté Kőhalmi's legal training and interest in canon law.[70]

By leaving his purchased or copied books to the Dominican convent of Sibiu, maintaining the right of his nephews István and András to borrow books, Máté Kőhalmi successfully combined two important ideas of his age. On the one hand, it expressed his wish that his books collected with great sacrifices should not remain hidden treasures, inaccessible for those who wanted to learn; on the other hand, the hope that his donation would gain him the grateful readers' prayers in the afterlife. The parish priest could indeed hope to receive prayers for the salvation of his soul in return for his donated books, as he indeed did from the Dominican librarian who wrote "*Requiescat in pace*". In addition, he also wanted the members of his family to partake in the spiritual fruits of his library. Therefore he allowed them to borrow the books he had left to the friary for the purpose of learning, and also that, if any of them ever became a priest, to use his purple chasuble, his chalice, his silver jugs, with the condition that they returned them again to the Dominicans. He wanted to make sure that they had their church equipment if any of them was ever ordained a priest. Due to his disposition for learning, Máté Kőhalmi, who clearly used his entire property, directly or indirectly, for clerical purposes, came in close contact with the Dominicans, adepts and developers of scholastic theology. Another evidence for this is that he left 18 forints for the learned theology doctor Jakab (not clear whether he

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[67] Angelus de Clavasio, *Summa angelica de casibus conscientiae* (Nuremberg, 1488), Brukenthal Library, Inc. 87.; *BiblHung*, vol. 2, no. 2178., Mathias de pulchro(!)monte - wrongly read Mathias instead of Matheus , cp. Jugăreanu, *Catalogul de incunabule*, no. 17.

[68] Jacobus de Jüterbog, *De apparitionibus animarum post exitum earum a corporibus* (Burgdorf, 1475), Brukenthal Library, Inc. 62.; *BiblHung*, vol. 2, no. 2243.; Jugăreanu, *Catalogul de incunabule,* no. 183.

[69] *Legendae sanctorum regni Hungariae in Lombardica Historia non contentae* [Strasbourg, cca. 1484–1487], Brukenthal Library, Inc. 63.; *BiblHung,* vol. 2, no. 2244.; Jugăreanu*, Catalogul de incunabule,* no. 205.

[70] Nicolaus de Tudeschis, *Lectura super quinque libros Decretalium* (Nuremberg, 1485–1486), Brukenthal Library, Inc. 211. (P. 1–6.); *BiblHung*, vol. 2, no. 2156.; Jugăreanu, *Catalogul de incunabule*, no. 351. (in both catalogues incorrectly referred to as 'Mathias plebanus pulchromontis' instead of 'Matheus').

was identical with Jakab, the Dominican prior of Cluj, mentioned later in his will), and also left some money for the studies of three other young men.[71]

The evidence presented above makes it possible to imagine the book culture and the ways of handling and enriching the libraries of medieval Transylvanian Dominican friaries. The analysis of single volumes and their place in book tradition would require more detailed treatment in separate studies. Although this paper did not set out to treat problems of literary history or the history of ideas, it can nevertheless be a good starting point for the analysis of Dominican book culture. Still, based on the sources, it can be claimed that this culture of ecclesiastical literature satisfied the needs of its users, the friars, on all levels. The majority of its products were written with a practical purpose, whether speaking about original works or copies. Even the works bought from abroad were meant to meet the needs of the readers. This claim needs no further evidence in case of liturgical books. The most literary of works, such as legends, were also created due to a practical interest. The authors' aims were not the ambition to entertain or be recognised as a writer, but to establish the cult of saints and set them as models. The distribution of the books by subject also mirrors the selection of books available on the book market which had suffered serious changes due to the spreading of book printing. Taking into account the rules of the order as well, the friars tried to organise their libraries so that they would serve the spiritual education of the students attending the *studium* of the friary and their preparation for a monastic or clerical profession with the help of the foremost European scholars of their "discipline".

Translated from the Hungarian by Emese Czintos

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[71] DL 21 091.; Fabritius, "Das Testament," 376–377.

SUÁREZ'S INFLUENCE ON DESCARTES: THE CASE OF EPISTLE CDXVIII (AT IV 348–350)

FLORIN CRÎȘMĂREANU[*]

Abstract This paper discusses the influence of Suárez's *Disputationes Metaphysicæ* on Descartes as can be discerned from one of the latter's little researched letters: *CDXVIII* (AT IV 348-350). The French philosopher is not only clearly influenced by scholastic ideas but he also heavily employs the scholastic terminology as systematized by Suárez. Descartes gives the reader the feeling that, even when he wants to distance himself from the scholastic thought, he nevertheless does this by using its language.
Keywords Suárez, Descartes, Letter CDXVIII, *a priori* argument, *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ*, *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*

The paradigm of medieval thinking can be best understood if taking into account the "history of effect" (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) that it generates, similarly to how the reception of the fundamental subjects of modern thinking is more solid if taking into account their sources. Regardless of the paradigm to which one or the other author belongs, I tend to believe that at least sometimes we can better understand their intentions from their epistles rather than their treatises. René Descartes is one of such authors. Although the French philosopher explicitly claimed to be disappointed with the educational programme of the Jesuits that he attended,[1] Mersenne's letter to Descartes, dated 1 August 1638, proves that Descartes was quite familiar with

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[1] René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, I (AT VI 4–5). On the other hand, in another letter to a yet unidentified recipient, Descartes also says that "il est très utile d'en avoir étudié le cours entier, en la façon qu'il s'enseigne dans les Ecoles des jésuites […]. Et je dois rendre cet honneur à mes maîtres, de dire qu'il n'y a lieu au monde où je juge qu'elle s'enseigne mieux qu'à La Flèche" (Lettre CXLV, Descartes à ∗∗∗ [12 septembre 1638]; AT II 378); see also Grigore Vida, "Colegiul din La Flèche și formarea lui Descartes," in René Descartes, *Corespondenţă completă* (Complete correspondece), vol. I, trans. Vlad Alexandrescu et. al. (Iași: Polirom, 2014), 719–733.

scholastic philosophy (AT II 287).[2] In another letter of Descartes to Abbot Picot, also acting as a preface to the French translation of the *Principles of philosophy* (AT IX 1–20), the French thinker speaks about a tree whose roots are metaphysics, trunk is physics, and branches are the other sciences (AT IX 14).[3] The very use of this metaphor shows a certain "rupture" from a significant part of the scholastic paradigm. Undoubtedly, for most scholastic thinkers the starting point (the root) was physics. For Descartes, the root was metaphysics (in a letter to Mersenne, Descartes claims that "je n'eusse jamais su trouver les fondements de la Physique, si je ne les eusse cherchés par cette voie 'métaphysique'" (AT I 144). This statement favours the *a priori* evidence in examining the idea of God. Such an evidence is also the so-called (by Immanuel Kant) *ontological argument* put forth by Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109). The scholastics rejected this argument.[4] The authors of modernity, Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff and others were those who rehabilitated it.

This *a priori* evidence of God's existence could also be found in one of Descartes's letters (CDXVIII – AT IV 348–350), examined in the following lines. Before presenting this hypothesis, I must make some historical and exegetical clarifications I arrived at while reading this letter. Identifying and delimiting certain subjects in this short, and for some perhaps insignificant, text of Descartes will help us better understand the influence that scholastic teachings had had on his thinking.

I.   We do not know the question asked by his interlocutor that Descartes answered; it is not clear whether it is about the distinction between essence and existence in God or in the creations, or he tried to answer with reference to both cases. In tend to believe that the terminology used in this letter explains to a certain extent what it was that Descartes tried to clarify.

At the beginning of the letter he also claimed, quite strangely, that he had forgotten where he had treated this fundamental distinction previously,[5] a subject

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[2] Étienne Gilson, *Index scolastico-cartésien* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913).

[3] It should also be noted that universal mathematics and its singular disciplines like arithmetic, geometry and astronomy are missing from the tree of science described by Descartes in the preface to the *Principles*.

[4] Like, for instance, Thomas Aquinas in *Summa theologica* I, 2, 1. and *De veritate*, q. 10, art. 12.

[5] René Descartes, *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, V (AT VII 66). In the few places where Descartes distinguishes the essence of a thing from its existence (AT III 297; VII 66; VII 244; 383; VIII 10), he seems to take into account the work of Suárez DM XXXI, sec. 5, §§ 13–15; see É. Gilson, *Index scolastico-cartésien* (Paris: Vrin, 1979), 105–106. For the distinction between essence and existence at Descartes, see, *inter alia*, Jacques Maritain, "Le conflit de l'essence et de l'existence dans la philosophie cartésienne," in *Études cartésiennes*, vol. I, ed. Raymond Bayer (Paris: Hermann, 1937), 38–45; and *Descartes'* Meditations: *Background Source Materials*, eds. Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 45–46.

ardently debated by earlier generations. The situation is even more bizarre as he quotes very accurately, just a few lines below, article 60 of Part I of the *Principles of philosophy*.

The roots of distinction between essence and existence lie at the very basis of the origin of metaphysics. Ancient philosophers made no such distinction; however, Aristotle is the first author in whose work there is a passage that can be interpreted in this sense: "what human nature is and the fact that man exists are not the same thing".[6] Filtered by the translations of Boethius,[7] this distinction became one of the most important issues of the High Middle Ages in Western Europe. Even for one of Descartes's contemporaries, the distinction between essence and existence meant the structure of metaphysics as a whole: "Metaphysica entis scientia est. Essentiam ab existentia sola mens distinguit".[8]

Although some of its elements had been found earlier in the Aristotelian tradition, the clear distinction between essence and existence appeared first at Avicenna, who presented in chapter XII of his *Metaphysics* his concept on the real distinction of the two.[9] Avicenna's teaching had a decisive influence on Thomas Aquinas.[10] There was a certain tradition that defended the idea that Thomas claimed there was a real distinction between essence and existence. However, to the best of my knowledge, the Dominican theologian never treated this problem *ex professo*. Neither in the *De ente et essentia*, nor elsewhere does he speak about a real distinction between essence and existence. This treatment can be found nevertheless at another Thomist author, Ægidius Romanus (1243-1316). Duns Scotus explicitly placed himself against the thesis of the Thomist tradition saying that "nec verum est a in quantum a esse idem essentiae, nec a in quantum a est aliud ab essentia"[11] The Franciscan theologian claims that the concept of *ens* is prior to the distinction between infinity (God) and finiteness (creations).

Most probably, Descartes was not directly familiar with the details of the changes about this distinction, he did not read the works of classical scholasticism, but a systematization of these doctrines in a handbook, which became the main

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[6] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, II, 7, 92b.

[7] Pierre Hadot, "La distinction de l'être et de l'étant dans le *De Hebdomadibus* de Boèce," *Miscellanea Medievalia* 2 (1963): 147–153.

[8] Antoine Arnauld, *Textes philosophiques*, trans. Denis Moreau (Paris: PUF, 2001), 22–23.

[9] Amélie-Marie Goichon, *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sînâ (Avicenne)* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937).

[10] See mainly his work *De ente et essentia*, the only systematic presentation of Aquinas's ontology, in chapter IV; É. Gilson, *L'être et l'essence* (Paris: Vrin, 1981) and Alain de Libera & Cyrille Michon, *L'être et l'essence. Le vocabulaire médiéval de l'ontologie. Deux traites* De ente et essentia *de Thomas d'Aquin et Dietrich de Freiberg* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1996).

[11] *Opus Oxoniense*, I, d. II, q. 4.

source of information for him. In matters of scholastic metaphysics[12], Descartes referred to the authority of the Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), his work *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (DM), "sind wohl die ausführlichste systematische Darstellung der Metaphysik, die es überhaupt gibt".[13] Suárez presents an excellent summary of the entire teaching of this school, which placed itself at the crossroads of all major traditions of Latin scholasticism.[14] In the opinion of a contemporary researcher, "il a une connaissance très précise d'Aristote qui, outre évidemment la lecture directe, s'appuie sur les travaux des grands érudits de son ordre, comme Fonseca. Il n'a pas seulement lu les plus célèbres des docteurs scolastiques, saint Thomas, Duns Scot et W. Ockham, mais aussi Buridan, Gerson, Pierre d'Ailly et beaucoup d'autres parmi lesquels tous les commentateurs de saint Thomas, des espagnols Soto et Bãnez aux italiens Cajetan et Sylvestre de Ferrare. A cette culture scolastique s'ajoute la formation initiale de F. Suárez qui fut celle d'un juriste. Il est donc familier du Digeste, de tous ses commentateurs et plus particulièrement des juristes de la Renaissance; c'est pourquoi l'on trouve sous sa plume des citations de Covarruvias, de Tiraqueau, ou de Paolo de Castro. Mais si F. Suárez recueille ce très riche héritage, il est loin de se contenter de le commenter, il élabore une synthèse personnelle qui se transmettra à toute la philosophie scolaire allemande jusqu'à la révolution kantienne. Ses *Disputationes Metaphysicae* forment un fonds commun que C. Wolff, G.W. Leibniz ou A. Baumgarten partagent, alors que son *De legibus* sera lu et utilisé par H. Grotius et T. Hobbes".[15]

Suárez analyses the distinction between essence and existence mainly in DM XXXI, section VI, §§ 13-15 (but also elsewhere, such as DM XXIX, section. III, §§ 1-2). As proved below, there are certain similarities between the concepts of Descartes

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[12] See: É. Gilson, *Index scolastico-cartésien* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913); Jean-Luc Marion, "A propos de Suárez et Descartes," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 1 (1996): 109–131; Idem, *Questions cartésiennes* II (Paris: PUF, 1996); Joël Biard, Roshdi Rashed, eds., *Descartes et le Moyen Âge* (Paris: Vrin, 1997); Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell, eds., *Descartes'* Meditations: *Background Source Materials* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Marleen Rozemond, *Descartes's Dualism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 4–8; 40–45; 88–109; 128–149.

[13] Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scolastik und Mystik* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1926), 535. É. Gilson, *Index…*, p. IV : "les *Metaphysicæ disputationes* étaient pour la métaphysique le «livre du maître» des professeurs de Descartes". Martin Heidegger, in *Les problèmes fondamentaux de la phénoménologie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), says that "les concepts ontologiques fondamentaux de Descartes sont directement tirés de Suárez" (156).

[14] José Pereira, *Suárez*: *Between Scholasticism and Modernity* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006); Victor M. Salas and Robert L. Fastiggi, *A Companion to Francisco Suárez* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

[15] Michel Bastit, "Interprétation analogique de la loi et analogie de l'être chez Suárez: de la similitude à l'identité," *Les études philosophiques* 3–4 (1989): 430.

and the Jesuit. For the former, it is clear that God "est aussi bien auteur de l'essence comme de l'existence des créatures " (AT I, 152); the same idea also appears at Spinoza: "Deus non tantum est causa efficiens rerum existentiae, sed etiam essentiae" (Spinoza, Etica, I, prop. XXV). Even so, the question is: is this distinction real, modal, or rational?

II. In the Aristotelian tradition, there are only two types of distinctions: real or rational. Apart from these two, *tertium non datur*.[16] Duns Scotus introduced a third (*tertia*), intermediary (*media*) distinction between the real and rational one, known as the formal distinction, *ex natura rei* (of the nature of things), or the formal non-identity which proposes to make a perfect correspondence between conceptual forms elaborated by the intellect and forms existing in reality: *omni entitati formali correspondet adæquate aliquod ens*.[17]

In *Replies I*, Descartes mentions the formal distinction, making reference to Duns Scotus (AT VII 120). Interestingly, Descartes does not distinguish between the formal and modal distinction; however, he distinguishes both from the real distinction (AT IX, 94–95). Not long before, Suárez also defended a similar position in DM VII, section I, § 16, where he included a third distinction in addition to the classical two, real and rational, namely the *ex natura rei*. This must be understood as a modal distinction, as it is established between a thing and one of its modes.[18] Descartes explicitly refers to Duns Scotus, but his source of inspiration is not the Franciscan Scotus, but the Jesuit Suárez who analyses these types of distinctions.

In DM XXXI, section I, Suárez discusses the *real distinction* between essence and existence in the creations. For him, the essence of a creation is conceived starting from an efficient cause,[19] while existence is a thing different in a real mode from essence (DM XXXI, § 3). In the second section of this dispute, Suárez speaks

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[16] André de Muralt, *L'enjeu de la philosophie médiévale*: *études thomistes, scotistes, occamiennes et grégoriennes* (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 64–70.

[17] Ibid., 65.

[18] Kim-Sang Ong-Van-Cung, "Substance et distinctions chez Descartes, Suárez et leurs prédécesseurs médiévaux," in *Descartes et le Moyen Âge*, 217–218.

[19] This aspect also connects Descartes's concept to that of Suárez. Of the four causes that Aristotle theorized about, he only kept one: the efficient cause, and Suárez seemed to be the most important source for it, mainly DM XII, section III, § 3 (Gilles Olivo, "L'efficience en cause: Suárez, Descartes et la question de la causalité", in *Descartes et le Moyen Âge*, 94–102). For the problem of causality at Suárez, see also *Suárez on Aristotelian Causality,* ed. Jakob L. Fink (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2015). It is true that in the delicate question of *Deus causa sui*, Descartes admits a formal or quasi-formal cause (*Replies IV*), but, in the opinion of certain exegetes, "la cause équivaut à la raison, la causalité efficiente à la causalité formelle ou même à l'absence de cause – chaque attribut étant démontré a priori, à partir de la seule intellection de l'essence infinie de Dieu" (Laurence Devillairs, *Descartes et la connaissance de Dieu* [Paris: Vrin, 2004], 42).

about a *modal distinction*, starting from nature, created or non-created, between essence and existence. This distinction claims that the essence of creation is contingent. As it is a modal distinction, it cannot be a real distinction between essence and existence, as long as the existence of the colour white cannot be separated by the white itself (similarly to how the accidents depend on the substance in the Aristotelian tradition). From the point of view of Christian teachings, this distinction is very important, because it argues that the entire creation exists in God, its Creator *ex nihilo*. In Suárez's terms, before being brought to existence, essence is absolutely nothing (DM XXXI, section II, § 1). In section three, the Jesuit speaks about the *rational distinction* between essence and existence, a thesis he embraced: "Tertia opinio affirmat essentiam et existentiam creaturæ, cum proportione comparata, non distingui realiter aut ex natura rei tamquam duo extrema realia, sed distingui tantum ratione » (*ibid.*, I, § 12). As he explicitly states, this is a distinction of the intellect, and does not involve reality in any way. There is thus no real distinction between essence and existence, as traditionally attributed to Thomas Aquinas.[20] This thesis, also adopted by Suárez, with regard to not only what is real, actual, but also to what may exist, in potentiality, seems to also justify his option for the object of metaphysics.

Before it becomes actual, the essence possesses nothing real, it is nothing (*purum nihil* – DM XXXI, section II, § 1).[21] For Suárez, existence is the fact to be actual, real (*ibid.*, sec. IV, § 4). As Descartes would also claim (AT I 152), for Suárez God is the author of the existence of the entire creation, for he can make a creation pass from the stage of nothing (*purum nihil*), pure essence to real, actual existence (DM XXXI, section IV, § 4); in the absence of existence, essence cannot become actual, and thus existence is what makes the difference between potentiality and actuality.

Suárez establishes a semantic identity between essence and existence, as long as actual essence becomes the equivalent of existence. Consequently, "l'existence n'ajoute rien à l'essence en acte : elles sont une seule et même chose ").[22] Suárez continues this reasoning, concluding that essence and existence are only separated by a rational distinction, rejecting, in a famous passage in DM, the real distinction between essence and existence: "existentiam et essentiam non distingui in re ipsa" (DM XXXI, sec. I, § 13).

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[20] Jean-Paul Coujou, *La distinction de l'étant fini et de son être, Dispute métaphysique XXXI* (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 13–15.

[21] J.-F. Courtine, *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris: PUF, 1990), 246–293; see also Idem, "Le projet suarézien de la métaphysique. Pour une étude de la thèse suarézienne du néant," *Archives de Philosophie* 42 (1979), 235–274.

[22] Jean-Paul Coujou, *La distinction de l'étant fini et de son être,* 34.

III.   Descartes, a keen reader of Suárez's work on metaphysics, had in mind the image described above. In accordance with manuals of scholasticism, he discussed three distinctions: "Realis, Modalis et Rationis" (AT VIII 28); elsewhere he speaks about the distinctions "Realem (…) Modalem, et Formalem sive rationis ratiocinatæ" (AT IV 350); he considers that "distinctio formalis non differre a Modali" (AT IV 349; VII 120; the identity of modal and formal distinction could come from: DM VI, section IX, § 6: "formali seu modali"). The "novelty" that the French philosopher brought regarding these distinctions lies in the associations and reconfigurations he achieves; actually, as proved by this letter, Descartes managed to suppress the triad introduced by the tradition of Scotus, speaking only of two distinctions: the real[23] (as an umbrella term encompassing the *modal*, *formal* and *reasoned rational* distinction) and the rational (AT VII, 49; a distinction he took over from DM VII), or more precisely the *reasoning rational* which he rejected. (AT V 270; 343; VII 103; 143).[24] Descartes rejects thus the reasoning rational distinction (which is not anchored in things), but not the distinction of reason, as long as it is a distinction of reasoned reason.

When speaking about the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* and *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*, Descartes uses the example of the name of Peter. Suárez uses the same example in a similar context (DM VII, section I, § 4, and DM V, section 1, § 5). The fact that he mentions even the example from DM can be an indication to support the idea that the recipient of the letter, most probably a Jesuit, was familiar with Suárez's work. Suárez's example of Peter became canonical (DM VII, 1, § 5; LIV, 6, § 5)[25] with regard to the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* and *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*. Therefore, it is understandable that Descartes also used it, proving this way that the person to whom he wrote was well aware of this tradition.

Normally, as we have seen, philosophers after Aristotle differentiated the real distinction of two objects that can be distinguished in the surrounding world from the rational distinction which only happens in the human mind starting sometimes from a given reality, in which case it is a reasoned rational distinction

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[23] For Descartes, the *distinctio rationis* (AT I 153 *et passim*.) is a distinction *per abstractionem intellectum* (AT III 421). He only asks in two instances in his work whether the distinction of essence and existence is real. (AT III 435; IV 348).

[24] Following Suárez, Descartes claims that *ens rationis* is not a real being (AT V 343–344; VII 103; 134). For Suárez, "*ens in quantum ens reale esse objectum adaequatum hujus scientiae*" (DM I, sec. I, § 26), only the *entia rationales* are excluded from the objects of metaphysics, because they are not beings in themselves (Ibid., § 4: "*Objectum hujus scientiæ esse ens reale in tota suo latitudine, ita ut directe non comprehendat* entia rationis". For *entia rationes* see DM LIV). Even if for Suárez metaphysics has primacy over logic, the two fields are equally important. The rational being, the object of logic, is just as important as the real being, because it is due to this, to our ideas and reasoning, that we understand the real.

[25] Sven K. Knebel, "Entre logique mentaliste et métaphysique conceptualiste: la *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*," *Les Études philosophiques* 61 (2002)*:* 157–158.

(*distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ*) according to which, following Aristotle's example, the road from Thebes to Athens is the same as the road from Athens to Thebes (*Physics*, III, 202b 13). Therefore, even if it is a spiritual product, the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* has its roots in the object itself; however, the situation is different in the case of the reasoning rational distinction (*distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*) (AT IV 349).[26] Descartes only rejected the *reasoning rational distinction* which Spinoza equated to a *verbal distinction* (*distinctio verbis* – *Cogitata metaphysica*, I, 1), a chimera, as it exists neither in the intellect nor in the imagination, and it can only be expressed through words.[27]

The roots of the difference between *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* and *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* go back to the Franciscan tradition at the end of the 13th century, which had initially distinguished the *distinctio intentionalis* of Henri de Gand (1217–1293) and *distinctio rationis*.[28] Petrus Aureoli (cca. 1280–1322) was one of the first authors who proposed a dichotomy of *distinctio rationis*: "distinctio rationis quædam oritur ex ipso intellectu…, et quædam oritur ex natura rei".[29] According to Sven K. Knebel, around 1500 the Dominican school also started to adopt this differentiation of the *distinctio rationis*, that has since become canonical: "Thomistæ…aliqui iterum subdividant distinctionem rationis, scilicet vel rationis ratiocinantis, vel rationis ratiocinatæ".[30]

The phrase *distinctio rationis* is frequently seen in Thomas Aquinas's works; however, the terms *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* and *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* belong to late scholasticism, appearing, as A. de Muralt claims, in the period between Suárez and Jean de Saint-Thomas, for the first time probably in the writings of Gabriel Vásquez.[31] This is a false claim nonetheless, as long as this distinction is already formulated in DM: "Hæc autem distinctio duplex distingui solet: una, quæ

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[26] For the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* and *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* at Descartes see Justin Skirry, "Descartes's Conceptual Distinction and its Ontological Import," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 42 (2004): 121–144; Kim-Sang Ong-Van-Cung, "Substance et distinctions chez Descartes, Suárez et leurs prédécesseurs médiévaux," 216–217; Norman Welle, "Descartes on distinction," *Boston College Studies in Philosophy* 1 (1966): 104–134; É. Gilson, *Index…*, 86–90.

[27] Spinoza, *Cogitata metaphysica* I, III: "*Chimæram, quia neque in intellectu est, neque in imaginatione, a nobis ens verbale commode vocari posse*".

[28] Sven K. Knebel, "Entre logique mentaliste et métaphysique conceptualiste: la *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*," 145–168.

[29] Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, dist. 8, s. 23, n. 124; quoted in Knebel, "Entre logique mentaliste et métaphysique conceptualiste: la *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*," 148.

[30] Bartholomæus de Castro, *Quæstiones pro totius logice prohemio*, Salamanque, 1518, f. 28 *r* b, quoted in Sven K. Knebel, "Entre logique mentaliste et métaphysique conceptualiste: la *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*," 148, n. 7.

[31] André de Muralt, *L'enjeu de la philosophie médiévale,* 47–89.

non habet fundamentum in re et dicitur rationis ratiocinantis, quia oritur solum ex negotiatione et operatione intellectus; alia, quæ habet fundamentum in re et a multis vocatur rationis ratiocinatæ" (DM VIII, section I, § 4), and the term *rationis ratiocinantis* (*rationis ratiocinatæ*) has several occurrences; see mainly DM VII (treating various distinctions), section I, § 4 (this paragraph is actually dedicated to this distinction - *Distinctio rationis*), § 5; section II, § 28; LIV, section VI, § 5.

IV.   The two occurrences of the term *objective* in the letter are not completely random, but they belong to a wider discourse which is only suggested, but not elaborated in this text. Descartes treated it in detail on another occasion, as we shall see below. Even if not explicit, the reference in this text is to the scholastic distinction between *conceptus formalis* and *conceptus obiectivus*.

The roots of this distinction are also found in the Franciscan tradition, which takes over from Henry of Gand the idea that *esse intentionale* is another name for *esse objectivum*. Ever since, even if moved to a second level, intentionality has never left *esse objectivum*. For Duns Scotus, *esse intelligibile* (or *esse cognitum*) equals *esse objectivum*.[32] The theory of *esse obiectivum* as proposed by Duns Scotus changed the connections of the intellect to reality. It transforms the knowledge of things in themselves and constitutes an object of thought. Instead of a direct relationship with the essence of the thing, knowledge becomes the production of a representative image.[33] In his turn, Ockham uses the term *esse cognitum* (*esse obiectivum*) in I *Sententiae*, d. 2, q. 8. when speaking about non-existing entities, especially universals. In short, it is an objective existence in the mind of the subject, a mode of being of the object in question. For other scholastic authors, such as for instance Johannes Capreolus (1380–1444), the object forged by the intellect is objective, a term identical with intentional.

The Dominican Capreolus introduced the distinction between the *formal concept* and the *objective concept* in order to reject Duns Scotus's univocality. For him, "le *concept formel* est une réalité noétique intramentale, une forme produite par l'intellect dans l'acte de l'intellection. Du point de vue subjectif, le concept formel est un accident, une forme - qualité subjectivée dans l'intellect. Du point de vue objectif, il représente et il exprime de manière intelligible l'objet connu. Le terme – trop polyvalent – *ratio* peut exprimer ce dernier aspect du concept formel. Quant au *concept objectuel* – expression évidemment mal choisie, parce que vu que ce concept n'a rien d'un concept au sens habituel du terme -, il n'est autre que l'intelligible situé devant l'intellect qui forme le concept (formel). Par exemple, la nature humaine est le concept objectuel de l'intellection par laquelle on comprend

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[32] Duns Scotus, *Quæstiones in Primum Librum Sententiarum*, d. 36, n. 10.
[33] Olivier Boulnois, *Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe - XIVe siècle)* (Paris: PUF, 1999), 130.

l'homme en tant que tel. Dans cette perspective, il est le fondement de la vérité du concept formel".[34]

Capreolus's terminology (using the very same examples) is also found in Suárez's DM. At the end of the 16th century, Suárez introduced the distinction between the *formal concept* and *objective concept* as a *vulgaris distinctio*: "Supponenda imprimis est vulgaris distinctio conceptus formalis et obiectivi" (DM, II, sec. I, § 1). Similarly to Capreolus, the Jesuit rejected at first the univocality of Duns Scotus, referring also to the distinction between the *formal* and *objective concept*. For him, the *formal concept* is the action of the intellect through which it gets to know a thing or a *ratio communis*; the *objectual concept* is the thing or *ratio communis*, which is (in)directly perceived via the formal concept (*ibid*., II, § 1).[35] Suárez is so "scholastic" that he takes over the very example that Capreolus uses: the *concept of man* (DM II, section I, §1).

Although this distinction between the *formal concept* and the *objective concept* is a rational one, Suárez still gives the impression (*ibid*., § 1) that this *objective concept* is capable of identifying, at least occasionally, with the singular and individual thing. J.-F. Courtine seems to have understood this when saying: "le concept objectuel n'est pas seulement le substitut des choses individuelles et concrètes, mais ce qui constitue leur essence même".[36] There is a nuance (often avoided) that must be mentioned here, about the subjective or objective nature of such a concept. At this point it can be claimed that Suárez is once again influenced by Capreolus: „l'unité du concept objectif peut être de deux formes. Un première forme d'unité est obtenue par la participation des diverses réalités incluses par le concept à une forme ou à une nature non-divisée : *Attenditur penes aliquam formam vel naturam quae participatur a multis, qualis est unitas generis vel speciei*. La deuxième forme d'unité: *Potest intelligi de unitate attributionis, eo modo qua multa, habentia attributionem ad unum, dicuntur unum attributive*. Cette deuxième unité est plus faible que la précédente. Elle peut être suffisante pour la fondation d'un concept formel ".[37]

Descartes also borrows the distinction between the *conceptus formalis* and *conceptus obiectivus* most probably from DM II, section I, § 1: *Conceptus formalis et*

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[34] Jean Capréolus, *Defensiones theologicæ Divi Thomæ Aquinatis*, eds. C. Paban, T. Pegues, Tours, 1900-1908, *Def*. I, dist. VIII, qu. 2, a. 2 B (t. 1, 375 a), quoted in Serge-Thomas Bonino, "Le concept d'étant et la connaissance de Dieu d'après Jean Cabrol," *Revue thomiste* I (1995): 109–136.

[35] J.-P. Coujou, *Suárez et la refondation de la métaphysique comme ontologie*. Étude et traduction de *l'Index détaillé de la Métaphysique d'Aristote* de F. Suárez (Louvain–Paris: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1999), 14–15.

[36] J.-F. Courtine, *Suárez et le système…*, 193.

[37] Serge-Thomas Bonino, "Le concept d'étant et la connaissance de Dieu d'après Jean Cabrol," 109–136.

obiectivus quid sint, et in quo differant. Descartes's use of this distinction is one more evidence for the continuity between scholasticism and modernity.[38] Whereas for Suárez the concepts were formal and objective, ideas for Descartes presuppose this duality, a way of thinking (the formal being of the idea) and a representation (the objective being of the idea). He states that ideas, from the point of view of formal being, cannot be distinguished: "je ne reconnais nulle différence ou inégalité entre elles" (AT IX 31). From the point of view of the objective being, that is, the representation of ideas, not only are they distinguished, but they can also be hierarchical (*ibid*., 32).[39] Still, when Descartes refers to reality, he does not stop at the objective–formal distinction, but discusses a triple perspective: first, reality is *objective*, "quatenus est in intellectu", then it is a *formal* reality, as long as he speaks about "*res ipsa*", and thirdly, it is an *eminent* reality[40] when it becomes an actual reality which exceeds formal reality and reclines on objective reality.[41]

What interests us here is only the distinction formal–objective, with special emphasis on the objective: "res est objective in intellectu per ideam" (AT VII 41), that is, "une chose est objectivement (ou par représentation) dans l'entendement par son idée." The objective reality always comes from the formal reality, which represents the former's conditions of possibility. For J.-L. Marion, who comments on this fragment, "la réalité objective reste, de plein droit sans quoi elle ne réclamerait aucune cause, un *esse objectivum*".[42] Another commentator, F. Alquié, states that in order to define objective reality, we speak about a represented reality rather than the representation of reality.[43] "Étant une forme *représentative*, l'idée est une chose pensée et, à ce titre, une *réalité*".[44] Thus the Cartesian idea appears as a thing, even if it is a thought thing, a *res cogitata* (AT VI 559).

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[38] Marco Forlivesi, "La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif: Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri," *Les études philosophiques* 1 (2002): 3–30.

[39] See: Descartes, *Œuvres philosophiques*, ed. Ferdinand Alquié, vol. II (Paris: Éd. Classiques Garnier, 2010), 587; É. Gilson, *Index...*, 49; Roland Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la théorie cartésienne de l'être objectif," *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie* 3 (1929): 464–472; T.J. Cronin, *Objective Being in Descartes and Suárez* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); Norman J. Wells, "Objective Being: Descartes and his Source," *The Modern Schoolman* 45 (1967): 49–61; Kim Sang Ong-Van-Cung, *L'objet de nos pensées. Descartes et l'intentionnalité* (Paris: Vrin, 2012).

[40] On Descartes's concept of eminence, most probably taken over from DM XXX, section 1, see André Robinet, "Descartes: critère logique de l'éminence et cause de soi (Sources hispaniques et françaises)," *Revista de Filosofía* 25 (2001): 7–22.

[41] Ibid., 8 ; see also Josiane Boulad-Ayoub et Paule-Monique Vernes, *La révolution cartésienne* (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2006), 111–112.

[42] Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes* (Paris: PUF, 2004), 99.

[43] Descartes, *Œuvres philosophiques*, II, 438, n. 1.

[44] Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, text and commentary by Étienne Gilson (Paris: Vrin, 1987), 320–323.

It has already been noted that "the objective reality of ideas plays an important role in the Cartesian system, for upon it rests the whole force of his demonstration of the existence of God".[45] *Esse obiectivum* is for Descartes the reality represented in the idea I have in my mind, which is not a simple *ens rationis*, but a specific mode of being of the object. One can see here a nuance in comparison with the majority of scholastics, who considered that *esse obiectivum* is an *ens rationis*, non-real. Descartes's interpretation helps, to a certain extent, to "demonstrate" the existence of God, because leaving from this objective reality of the idea of God, he reaches to God himself, the only possible cause of the idea I have. In Descartes's terms, I cannot be the cause of the objective reality of the idea of finite substance, "parce que je suis fini" (AT IX 36).[46] For Descartes, there are two ways to prove the existence of God: through his effects or through his essence. In his opinion, theologians only admit the proof through effects (AT VII 120; 167; 244). One may conclude that they, to whom Descartes referred, did not admit any other evidence than *a posteriori* (used by Descartes in *Meditation* I and II), based in a certain sense on analogy. Even if we only had in mind the metaphor of the tree of knowledge, mentioned by Descartes in his letter to Abbot Picot (AT IX 14), which overthrows the scholastic paradigm largely grounded on analogy, we can say that Descartes privileges *a priori* evidence (*Disputatio* XXIX - *De Deo primo ente et substantia increata, quatenus ipsum esse ratione naturali cognosci potest*). Another interpreter claims that "la reformulation de la preuve *a posteriori*, à partir de la notion de *causa sui*, est identique à la preuve *a priori*, où c'est l'essence de Dieu qui commande la détermination des attributs. S'appuyant sur la définition anselmienne de Dieu, la preuve par les effets convertit l'argument du *Proslogion* en preuve *a priori*, où c'est la nature de Dieu, sa puissance ou son essence, qui donne le pourquoi de son existence et de toutes ses autres perfections".[47]

As it is well known, in *Meditations* III and V, Descartes proposes two (or according to some interpreters, even three) arguments as evidence for the existence of God. For a historian of philosophy, it is possible to prove the existence of God starting from the perfection contained in the idea of God, "for existence is itself one of the perfections of God and belongs to the divine essence".[48] Moreover, an author who did research into Cartesian arguments claims that "grâce à la notion de *causa*

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[45] T.J. Cronin, 1.

[46] A discussion on this matter is also found in Devillairs, *Descartes et la connaissance de Dieu*, 35. Moreover, "Dieu est connu comme *causa sui*, alors que j'ai conscience de ma dépendance et de mon incomplétude" (Ibid., 39).

[47] Ibid., 42.

[48] Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophie*, Volume IV: *Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Leibniz* (New York: Doubleday Image, 1960), 112.

sui, la preuve dans *Meditatio III* est devenue une preuve *a priori*, comme l'argument d'Anselme est devenu, dans *Meditatio V*, une démonstration *a priori*".[49]

Still, even some of his contemporaries considered the construction of Descartes's arguments too weak, such as for example Arnauld, who criticised the circularity of the argument in *Meditation* III (AT IX 160-167): there is the idea of God, which presupposes that God must exist in order to produce that idea. Another criticism refers to the origin of the idea of God. Where does this idea come from? The inneism embraced by Descartes, which claims that ideas are all *mentibus nostris ingenitæ* (AT I 145) seems to solve the problem, but not all agreed to such a hypothesis. Also, the principle of causality involved in the construction of this argument also raises several questions.

As far as I know, the concept *causa sui*[50] appears only twice in Descartes's works: in *Replies* I (AT VII 109) and in *Replies* IV (AT VII 242).[51] In his answers to Caterus, Descartes distinguishes a positive and a negative meaning of the term *causa sui*: in the negative sense, God has no cause (AT VII 110), in the positive sense, God relates to Himself as the efficient cause relates to its effect (AT VII 110). Caterus brings in the authority of Thomas Aquinas, who repeatedly states in *Summa theologica* (I, q. VII, art. 2; q. VIII, art. 1 and 3) that *Deus est prima causa, non habens causam; Deus non habet causam*, and also that of Suárez, who claims, at the single occurrence of this terms in his work (DM I section V, § 38) that *Deus non habet causas*, reproaching Descartes that he thinks of God starting from the cause. Marion claims that the Cartesian innovation (*causa sui*) is only intelligible in a Suárezian horizon.[52] A prime text that could have determined Descartes to use *causa sui*[53] was the *Disputatio* XXIX, section III, § 1: "non posse demonstrari a priori Deum esse, quia

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[49] Emanuela Scribano, *L'Existence de Dieu* (Paris: Seuil, 2002), 128.

[50] Most probably, this term appeared in the 12th century in the works of Alain de Lille, but it does not apply to God, who was called, throughout the entire period of scholasticism, *principium sui* and not *causa sui* (R. Eucken, "Cause", in A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* [Paris: PUF, 1960], 128).

[51] For an interpreter, "l'*ego* cartésien ontologise d'une façon anselmienne cette autocausalité en Dieu" (Yvan Morin, "Le rapport à la *causa sui*: de Plotin à Descartes par la médiation du débat entre Ficin et Pic," *Renaissance and Reformation / Renaissance et Réforme* XXVI/2 (2002): 56). Contrary to the opinion of J.-M. Narbonne and J.-L. Marion, the author of the mentioned study claims that Descartes borrowed the idea of *causa sui* via the orator Gibieuf, from Marsilio Ficino, who used in his Commentary to Philebos the formulation "sui ipsius esset causa" (Marsilio Ficino, *The Philebus Commentary*, ed. Michael J. B. Allen [Tempe, Arizona: MRTS, 2000], 318).

[52] J.-L. Marion, *Questions cartésiennes II* (Paris: PUF, 1996), 160 *sqq*; see also V. Carraud, *Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause de Suárez à Leibniz* (Paris: PUF, 2002), 103–167.

[53] Spinoza, the philosopher who is usually associated with this concept, claimed that "*per* causam sui *intelligo id cujus essentia involvit existentiam sive id cujus natura non potest concipi nisi existens*" (Spinoza, *Etica*, I, *definition I*).

neque Deus habet causam sui esse per quam a priori demonstretur, neque si haberet, ita exacte et perfecte a nobis cognoscitur Deus, ut ex propriis principiis (ut sic dicam) illum assequamur. Quo sensu dixit Dionysius, c. 7, de Divinis nominibus, nos non posse Deum ex propria natura cognoscere". According to Marion, the phrase *neque Deus habet causam sui esse* is not much different from the *causa sui* used by Descartes.[54]

In the case of the second argument, Descartes gives up causality, but not the innate idea of God, that he finds in his mind besides the idea of the figure (such as a triangle) or the number (AT VII 65). Therefore, Descartes uses the comparison between the idea of the triangle and the idea of God, both existing independently from a subject. The idea of God, or the "new idea of God"[55] which is there in my mind completely differs from God Himself, which is beyond my ideas. In a Cartesian language, God is infinite, but the idea of God is not infinite; on the contrary, it is "finita et ad modulum ingenii nostri accomodata" (AT VII 114). The balance of this Cartesian construct seems rather fragile to me, and favours a unidirectional interpretation. This is, I think, Heidegger's way of interpreting *causa sui* as the principle of a strictly rationally founded onto-theology.[56]

The proofs of the existence of God failed to convince even Descartes's contemporaries, or many of the later exegetes. For instance, Blaise Pascal seems to capture this excellently when saying about Descartes that he is "ridicule, car cela est inutile et incertain et pénible".[57] But as long as „la connaissance sans Jésus Christ est inutile et stérile " (*Pensées*, § 556), Descartes is "useless" with regard to salvation, for he attributed to God only the role of giving a "chiquenaude" to this world, and then was content to just watch, distancing Himself thus from the Living God of Christian tradition (*Pensées*, § 77). And if Descartes is useless, it is really not important if he is or is not "uncertain" or anything else.[58]

For some contemporary researchers, "even as a philosophical supreme cause, the God of Descartes was a stillborn God. He could not possibly live because,

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[54] J.-L. Marion*, Questions…*, 160.

[55] É. Gilson, *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien* (Paris: Vrin, 1984), 224; see also P. Guénancia, *Lire Descartes* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 168 *sqq*.

[56] M. Heidegger, "Identité et Différence," in *Questions* I et II (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), 294 *sqq*.; see also F. Crîşmăreanu, "*Causa sui* et sa postérité. Réflexions critiques en marges de quelques moments de la métaphysique," *Analele ştiinţifice ale Universităţii „Alexandru Ioan Cuza"*, Iaşi, LIX (2012): 51–64.

[57] B. Pascal, *Pensées,* § 77: "Descartes… est inutile et incertain et pénible"; and § 702: "Descartes *inutile et incertain*"*;* see also Michel Le Guern, *Pascal et Descartes* (Paris: Nizet, 1971), 164–167.

[58] One clarification must be made here: Pascal does not speak about a rational theology, but a revelative one. However, as we know, Descartes always tried to remain within the field of philosophy or a rational theology. In a letter he admitted modestly and cautiously that the problems of theology exceed the capacity of his mind (Lettre XXI, *à Mersenne*, 15 avril 1630).

as Descartes had conceived him, he was the God of Christianity reduced to the condition of philosophical principle, in short, an infelicitous hybrid of religious faith and of rational thought".[59] For this reason, Descartes's metaphysics is a failure, in agreement with C. Wolff who claimed that it was Descartes who destroyed traditional metaphysics. Kant perfected the Cartesian project, "expelled the methodological concept of God from the theory of science and grounded the universality of natural law and uniformity of nature without it; but its shadow persisted. The concept of God, he argued, is a natural shadow or projection of principles we use to structure nature. The shadow, Kant seems to have claimed, is virtually inescapable. But it is only a shadow".[60]

V.   It can be concluded that this letter of Descartes is decisively influenced by the work of Suárez, especially section I of dispute VII: *Utrum præter distinctionem realem et rationis, sit aliqua alia distinctio in rebus*. This is not the first place where Descartes paraphrases fragments of DM (see, for instance, AT I 148–150).

The core of this text is built on a series of scholastic distinctions undoubtedly taken over from Suárez's DM. In addition to the distinctions mentioned by the author, another essential distinction seems to be between the *formal* and *objective* reality of ideas, which in Descartes's terms could justify the difference between things invented by our minds and those outside our minds. Due to the density of the philosophical ideas seen in this letter, I also tend to believe that F. Alquié's choice not to include this letter with Descartes's philosophical works (*Œuvres philosophiques*) was both regrettable and inexplicable.[61]

Another of these final observations is the fact that the change of language, for which Descartes apologises at the beginning of the letter, does not seem accidental. Firstly, he chose Latin because the subject presupposed a technical discussion, using terms already fixed in Latin, most probably with a partner who also mastered the subject discussed. Secondly, this change may lead one to think that Descartes's correspondence partner was very familiar with Suárez's text, decisive not only for this letter. Descartes's partner may well have been a Jesuit, or a person who had attended a Jesuit college, where the basic text for metaphysics was Suárez's DM (in my opinion, it is possible that the addressee of the text was Descartes's Jesuit confidant, Father Denis Mesland [1615–1672]). Thirdly, the use of Latin, summarising certain ideas of DM, only represents an appeal to the authority in that age of Suárez's teachings, through which Descartes masked his own convictions, in this case about scholastic distinctions. And finally, it must be mentioned that

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[59] É. Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 89.
[60] Amos Funkenstein, *Theology and the scientific imagination from the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 356.
[61] Yannis Prelorentzos, *Temps, durée et éternité dans les Principes de la philosophie de Descartes de Spinoza* (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris Sorbonne, 1996), 123, n. 3.

Descartes's choice of Latin in some cases, or the vernacular French in other cases is also visible in his letter to Marsenne (written around 20 April 1637), when speaking about the *Discourse*, "écrit en langue vulgaire, de peur que les esprits faibles, venant à embrasser d'abord avidement les doutes et scrupules qu'il m'eût fallu proposer, ne pussent après comprendre en même façon les raisons par lesquelles j'eusse tâché de les ôter, et ainsi que je les eusse engagés dans un mauvais pas, sans peut-être les en tirer. Mais il y a environ huit ans que j'ai écrit en latin un commencement de Métaphysique, où cela est déduit assez au long ; et si l'on fait une version latine de ce livre, comme on s'y prépare, je l'y pourrai faire mettre » (AT I 347-351).[62] It is clear therefore that the addressee of the letter in question was not a "feeble spirit".

Descartes's choice to write in Latin is helpful for those who wish to mirror this letter with fragments of DM, especially *Disputatio* VII. It is readily visible that there are several similarities between the two texts. Here are some of them: 1. the Cartesian formulation "Ita figura et motus sunt modi proprie dicti substantiæ corporeæ, quia idem corpus potest existere" could have had its source in DM XXXI, section I, § 2: *Quomodo se habeant ratio substantiæ materialis et ratio substantiæ corporeæ*; 2. the phrase "in Deo iustitia, misericordia" seems to follow DM VII, section I, § 5: "in Deo iustitiam a misericordia"; 3. the discursive sequence "vocari potest Modalis" could have been influenced by DM VII, section I, § 16: "proprius vocari potest distinctio modalis"; 4. in addition to the abovementioned example of Peter, this letter also contains the example of the triangle, used by Descartes in his *Meditation* V: "mon esprit étudie la nature du triangle". In this case it is possibly the influence of DM VII, section I, § 4 (for the same example see also DM XXIX, section 3, § 5; ibid., § 14; XLII, section II, § 6). Rigorously speaking, the example of the triangle comes from Aristotle, used also to demonstrate the difference between essence and existence.[63]

In *Objections* I, Caterus mentions Suárez (AT VII 95). Formulating answers to the objections of the Dutch philosopher, Descartes does not explicitly quote the Jesuit. He only quotes him in his answer to Arnauld, in a very accurate way: "Fr. Suarem, Metaphysicae disput. 9, sectione 2, numero 4" (AT VII 235)[64]. To the best of

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[62] Bruno Clément, "La langue claire de Descartes," *Rue Descartes* 65 (2009): 20–34.

[63] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, II, 7, 92b.

[64] Descartes knew well Suárez's text (DM IX – "*De falsitate seu falso*", section II, § 4), decisive for the discussion on "material falsity" (*Meditation* III). The Jesuit's text on the "deceptive god" ("Deum inducere intellectum ad falsum") and the "evil angel" ("angelus malus", at Descartes the "evil genius") is found in DM IX, section II, § 7. This passage, that É. Gilson missed in his *Index scolastico-cartésien*, was noted by N. J. Wells in 1984 (N. J. Wells, "Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld, and Suárez," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* XXII [1984]: 26, n. 10). See on these matters E. Faye, "Dieu trompeur, mauvais génie et origine de l'erreur selon Descartes et Suárez," Dans *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* 1 (2001): 60–72. In this article E. Faye engages in fact into a polemics with Italian researcher Emanuela Scribano, in her work *Guida alla lettura delle "Meditazioni metafisiche" di Descartes* (Bari-

my knowledge, this is the only place in the entire Cartesian corpus where he accurately quotes Suárez. Fragments of his work are also cited elsewhere throughout Descartes's work, such as in the *Meditations*, *Principles*, *Letter to Marsenne* (6 May 1630), but without mentioning the name of the Jesuit.

Francisco Suárez, this *spiritus rector* of scholastic philosophy, had a significant influence on Descartes. The works of the Jesuit were the interface through which Descartes had access to the synthesis of scholastic doctrine. There are certain attempts in the scholarly literature to indicate and interpret the ideas of Suárez within the Cartesian corpus. Some of these have been mentioned in the pages above, but a thorough research to inventory and analyse the influence of Suárez on Descartes is still a desideratum. The main reason for this hiatus is the insufficient research of Suárez's work, which has only been studied sporadically and fragmentarily as yet.

Translated from the Romanian by Emese Czintos

Rome: Laterza, 1997). At the colloquium *Descartes et la Renaissance* (1996), E. Faye proposed a first study that showed that DM was a source for Descartes when he used in his argumentation the "evil genius" and the "deceptive god" (even if in the latter case he distanced himself from the teaching of the Jesuit). For more details, see E. Faye, *Philosophie et perfection de l'homme, de la Renaissance à Descartes* (Paris: Vrin, 1998), 333–335 and *Descartes et la Renaissance. Actes de Colloque international de Tours des 22–24 mars 1996*, réunis par E. Faye (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1999), 22–26.
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CRITICAL EXPLORATION OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY WITH DIGITAL HUMANITIES TOOLS: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

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Abstract In the last few years, the Digital Humanities have gained more and more attention from the medievalists because of the perceived advantages in encoding and analyzing digital critical editions. But there are many challenges for the scholars working on medieval philosophical texts. We shall try to identify some of these challenges and to discuss some solutions on three subjects: critical editions in digital format, organizing a digital corpus, and computer analysis. A general conclusion emerges from the principles and illustrations discussed here: the issues must be addressed through critical thinking in order to achieve relevant and accurate results.
Keywords Digital Humanities, critical edition, medieval philosophy, semantic encoding, digital text corpus, semantic analysis

Every medievalist nowadays uses a computer. And, at least once, everyone has done a search on the internet for some medieval text, or manuscript, or medieval author. This practice has brought us into a new age of studies, but it also unfolded new challenges, not only regarding the technical difficulties in using a computer, but questions of principle as well. A new research domain was born from the attempt to put the computing technology at work for the humanists, and from the 2000s it is

called Digital Humanities.[1] Its ambitions are high, but it is still in an early phase and it still needs a lot of effort to reach its potential. It seems that even its definition is a point of controversy.[2] Nevertheless, it gained popularity due to its promises and the quick pace of its development.[3]

There are some general controversies concerning the Digital Humanities, and some of them come from reducing the intellectual work in humanities to technicalities and computer-processing standards. Adam Kirsch, in his article "Technology Is Taking Over English Departments. The false promise of the digital humanities"[4], warns about "anti-humanistic manifestations of digital humanities" in the sense that "digital humanities has less to do with ways of thinking than with problems of university administration". Indeed, the initial intentions of the pioneers of this area, that is to use the computer as an aid for text study, were gradually subordinated by the emergence of a domain by itself established and judged through different principles. Firstly, the focus on the technology more than on meaning, with the hidden belief that the computer can produce new knowledge which can be quickly appropriated by an author who does not need to read the texts him/herself. Secondly, the promise that this technical revolution will radically change the humanities, bringing them into the most modern industry standards in order to accommodate the current paradigm of corporate project-based research which can be economically quantifiable and bureaucratically manageable. Thirdly, the dream of a universal device which can unravel all the major issues of the human intellect: historical incompleteness, plurality of meanings, objective knowledge, and so on. If we try to summarise these arguments, they all claim the ignorance of critical thinking, which is the foundation of humanistic studies. Therefore, I shall try to approach this subject from the point of view of the modern medievalist, who is, first of all, an intellectual, a critical thinker. It is her or him who (still) has the lead in using the new technology to produce meaningful knowledge.

In order to be more explicit, I shall illustrate the generic approach on these issues with some of the challenges from my current project. The project intends to explore the political content of the late medieval university discourses from the Central European universities. These speeches (*recomendationes*, *sermones*) often

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[1] *A Companion to Digital Humanities*, ed. Susan Schreibman, Ray Siemens, John Unsworth (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

[2] Fred Gibbs, "Digital Humanities Definitions by Type," in *Defining Digital Humanities: a reader,* eds. M. Terras, J. Nyhan, E. Vanhoutte (Farnham–Burlington: Ashgate 2014), 289–297.

[3] There are at least 191 Digital Humanities centers in the world today, according to CenterNet, https://dhcenternet.org/centers (accessed on 10.01.2017).

[4] Adam Kirsch, "Technology Is Taking Over English Departments. The false promise of the digital humanities," in *New Republic*, May 2, 2014, https://newrepublic.com/article/117428/limits-digital-humanities-adam-kirsch (accessed on 10.01.2017).

contain references to authoritative texts in order to argue points of view on current events or disputes on ideas. They have the role of reception and reinterpretation of the political thought tradition, and of propagation of these ideas to a broad audience. Because they have been less studied and because most of them survive only in manuscripts, the main challenge is to go from the discovery of manuscripts, through procurement, critical editing and analysis, towards building a general representation of this phenomenon. Given the fact that the number of the preserved discourses is quite large (in terms of hundreds), the Digital Humanities approach seems the most suitable. But, as we shall see, this too raises problems, and demands a critical treatment.

1. Critical editions in digital format
For some, producing a digital edition represents the end of Digital Humanities. There are a lot of projects on the internet whose only goal is to reproduce works in digital format in order to reconstitute, preserve and disseminate certain texts considered worthy of this action. But the critical thinker may simply ask: why? Of course, it is a meritorious effort to make available such texts which may be of crucial importance for the history of thought, or which may be endangered by their material degradation. However, the fact that they exist does not directly enrich our knowledge, unless they are read, analysed and interpreted. At this point, there seems to be an unequal race between the production and the interpretation of these texts: more and more become available (some through careful editing efforts, some just through machine recognition), but some are understudied, even ignored by those who should integrate them in a renewed view of the subject (and sometimes the histories taught in schools or popularised elsewhere only refer to the "classical" few).

In terms of new media, we should ask ourselves: how do we connect the resources with the consumers? How do we bring these texts to the attention of the specialists? For my project, the question took the form: how do I know which texts are more relevant for my research?

It is primarily for this reason that the semantic encoding was invented. Basically, it explicitly exposes the meta-textual content in a way that machines and humans can unequivocally identify certain meaningful elements in a standardised way. The semantic encoding makes the difference between a simple text document and a digital edition. Therefore, we must clearly differentiate between digital edition and computer typesetting, because computer typesetting has the goal of producing visual content, namely printed pages, while a digital edition is an electronic document semantically encoded.

The signification of a text is conveyed through the text itself (characters, words) and meta-textual elements (formatting, position etc.). In the visual (physical) format, the meta-textual signification is inferred from general or local rules. These rules are sometimes explicitly indicated: by general known conventions (e.g. the title

is larger, centred, separated from the text), by an explicit label (e.g. *Notes*, *Index*, *Contents*), or by an explicit declaration (e.g. typographic conventions described in a *Preamble*). But other times the conventions are unclear and they are inferred from the context (e.g. italics may be used for foreign words, short quotes or expressions, referenced titles, emphasised words etc.) Sometimes the conventions vary so much that they can induce ambiguities in reading. And this does not happen only to us, but also to medieval scholars (there are a lot of examples of foreign marginal notes integrated in the texts by copyists who mistakenly took them for the author's text, or notes written by authors but left out by copyists). Therefore, in the semantic encoding, every meta-textual element should be clearly and unambiguously labelled.

From the beginnings of the Digital Humanities in late 40s until late 80s there were many efforts to establish a standard for digital critical editions. From the elaboration of the first draft of the TEI Guidelines[5], a *de facto* standard emerged and reached general acceptance[6]. The Text Encoding Initiative is a collaborative project maintained by TEI Consortium which aims to develop guidelines for the digital encoding of literary and linguistic texts. It is merely a structured documentation for standardised annotation of texts in XML (Extensible Markup Language) format which tries to address every possible usage of digital semantic encoding: text structure, manuscript description, critical apparatus, bibliography, graphics etc. For example, instead of implying that italics indicate a title and small caps indicate a name in a fragment like "quod scribit KATHO in libello suo *De doctrina morali*", we note this in TEI XML as: "quod scribit <name ref="#Cato">Katho</name> in libello suo <title ref="#Cato-Disticha">De doctrina morali</title>" and, besides clearly and abstractly indicating the meaning of these words, we can also add more meta information like, for example, links to standardised reference lists where we can further enrich the data with bibliographic details, perhaps even references to full text electronic sources. This allows developing an arborescence of metadata (or, in information science terms, an ontology) which is unattainable in printed format, due to its limitations. In its abstractness, this semantic markup does not have a visual representation, but documents can be easily transformed into visual formats (standard printed editions or web page) by applying a certain styling to the elements globally.

All of these are merely technical aspects. The challenge for a scholar here is to decide what types of metadata are relevant for annotation and how they should be annotated, which is the critical usage of digital instruments. At one end, there is the desire to include every possible detail of the text, from philological and material details to complete external references for everything connected to the text: citations, geographic data, biographies etc. At the other end, there are the resource

[5] *Text Encoding Initiative*, http://www.tei-c.org/About/ (accessed on 10.01.2017).
[6] *A Companion to Digital Humanities*, eds. Susan Schreibman, Ray Siemens, John Unsworth (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

limitations: working time, deadlines, computing limits, and limited purpose of the project. Therefore, one should decide what should be annotated and how. Furthermore, these decisions must be clearly stated so that the scientific community may judge the quality and usability of the work.

Coming back to my project, I am limited by two goals: to produce some critical editions for a selected number of unedited texts and to expose the textual sources referenced by the authors. Consequently, I decided to encode the critical apparatus and the references to other works. But one should not forget that other users of these digital editions may have different goals. As a result, I set some principles for myself which may be useful for other scholars working in this field. I do take into account and adhere to other general principles proposed by other scholars, especially the four put forward by J.C. Witt in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, 3rd volume[7]. Here are my own principles for developing an editing application for medievalists:

1. Parallel aligned segmentation method. Each word should be considered a text segment and this may correspond to different readings in the manuscript copies and there are at least two possible readings: the presence of the word and its omission. This method poses problems for those texts which differ substantially, but may be treated as block omissions and block additions. With the aid of external scripts, the similar events in consequent segments may be collapsed into a single critical note.

2. Headless edition. The advantage of digital editing is that the variants of the text can be encoded without the need to establish the 'right' version of the text. This speeds up the editing and avoids long suspensions of work awaiting the consultation of missing manuscripts. It may seem peculiar for the classical humanist, but it is implied by a postmodern view of the text in which every instance of this text is merely a witness, a version. Therefore, even modern prints and what is known as 'definitive' editions may be regarded as just manifestations of the same source and may be studied with the same principles, identifying differences, mistakes, additions, grouping of variants, sources and so on. And, in this sense, our work in progress on new digital editions produces only a new manifestation of the text. What we think is the 'original text' is most of the time lost and what we reconstitute is based only on surviving witnesses, so the 'prototype' is a reconstruction which is the result of our sources, tools and conceptions. That is why, instead of concentrating on early restoration of the sense with many possible afterthoughts and revisions, we can represent the sources in an adequate manner and, when doubts are clarified, we can add a new, virtual witness or manifestation, which is our critically established text. For us, this would be the 'head edition', but for further work this may be considered

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[7] Jeffrey C. Witt, "Texts, Media, and Re-Meditation: The Digital Future of the *Sentences* Commentary Tradition," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, vol. 3, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2015), 511–514.

to be just a recent manifestation, and, if new sources and principles occur, a new head edition may be elaborated with minimal effort.

3. Reusable semantic encoding. As I have said before, the goals of the editor may differ from other intentions further developed regarding the same text. Therefore, in order to avoid repeating the electronic effort for further usage, the resulting edition should be reusable. This is done firstly through the careful observation of the standards, for example the TEI Guidelines. The result is an interchangeable file format which can be integrated in other tool chains and procedures. For example, a critical edition may be used for linguistic analysis, or for generating structured diagrams. This may complicate the decisions of the editor who is limited by the assumed goals, but it ensures the compatibility with other software. It may happen that at a certain point the researcher discovers that there is a new tool suitable for his work; having a compatible edition means that he or she can immediately use the new tool.

4. Nonlinear workflow. For the classical procedure of critical edition, there is a typical workflow in which each step must be completed in order to pass to the next one. In short, one should gain access to all the manuscripts, transcribe one which is considered better (but this is of course a subjective decision), collate the others, elaborate the *stemma codicum*, establish the edition based on stemmatic decisions, identify the sources, prepare the apparatus, write the introduction. In a digital edition, these steps may be attained in almost any order. An example is the headless edition principle, by which a critical apparatus may be prepared before establishing the head edition, but this can go further. One can work on a short sample of text in order, for example, to establish the *stemma codicum*, or one may do the collation of available manuscripts without waiting to obtain others difficult to reach. At any point, the work done may be continued towards further steps, because what is done in a standard way may be easily integrated with the rest. Furthermore, the nonlinear workflow allows early access to the text through other instruments, e.g. partial online publication, statistical analysis, computer aided searching. This workflow is also convenient for collaborative projects where different persons may work on different editorial aspects and their contributions are continuously integrated in the project, no matter their state of progress.

5. Computer-aided editing. The benefits of computer-aided editing are generally visible from the other principles above, but there are certain points which must be emphasised. First, automatic data validation may be carried out in the background or when a step is finished; this ensures the integrity of the data, the conformance to the language specifications, the completeness of the structures and the overall compatibility. Thus, typing mistakes can be signalled early, references are verified and nonstandard annotations are normalised. Secondly, computation statistics may be performed on the differences between manuscripts; this may be used to highlight the rapport between manuscripts, elaborate a provisional *stemma codicum* (I was even able to develop some algorithms to calculate an approximated

stemma by counting manuscript differences), and to single out some peculiar situations which are due to editing mistakes. Thirdly, automatic comparisons may be performed both inside the text and with external sources, for example to identify textual references, copied fragments or recurring expressions. The advantage is that, since an electronic annotated text already exists, these instruments and procedures are directly available and require no effort to access.

6. Intuitive graphical interface. For those ones who worked in TEI, the first difficulty is to learn and read computer encoding. Even if the XML subset used by TEI is intended to be both human friendly and computer compatible, writing XML code is complicated, redundant, prone to human errors and visually awkward. That is why there is a need for visual interactive editing in a simple graphical interface with maximum control and minimal interaction. There are some complaints that the TEI Initiative was too focused on document encoding and it left out the human readable representation of the data. There are several projects aiming to surpass this difficulty[8], but every one of them lacks some aspects, because of one of the two following reasons: by aiming to be a universal tool, they ignore specific usage; by aiming at specific usage, they miss all the other practices. From my point of view, universal tools, as desirable as they are, may not be easily imposed and the reason comes from what I discussed earlier: the critical usage of electronic instruments. There are indeed encoding standards, but there are no standard goals. The originality of a scholar should not only come from the casual discovery of interesting texts, but also from new ways of questioning the texts. Therefore the interface should be modelled after the principles of reading the texts. One of the projects created by me for this purpose, provisionally called Collexy[9], was developed step by step from the needs of collating manuscripts. Therefore, the most commonly used functions have simple access by a single click or a keyboard shortcut; those used less often are accessible through menus or attached to other tools; finally, there is an integrated XML editor for any other encoding which does not have an interactive interface. The incompleteness of this application (and consequently its only beta version) is the result of rising and solving punctual problems and a balance between automating functionalities and manual editing complex structures. But it serves the mentioned principles by providing the functionalities for segmented, headless edition, TEI compatibility, nonlinear workflow, aiding tools and a graphical interface.

As we have seen, the critical thinking is not only necessary for establishing the edition of a medieval text, but also for choosing the standards and the instruments for editing. The general aim is not only to produce the edition, but also to make this process transparent. This way the editor's work may be criticised by

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[8] For example, the "Author" mode of the oXygen XML Editor, in https://www.oxygenxml.com/. Other editors are listed on *TEIWiki*, http://wiki.tei-c.org/index.php/Editors (accessed on 10.01.2017).

[9] *Collexy*, http://collexy.mihaimaga.ro/ (accessed on 10.01.2017).

others, errors may be corrected, further discoveries may be integrated and new questions may be answered.

2. Organising a digital corpus and additional information

The work of medievalists focuses not only on isolated texts, but on subjects, periods, authors, places of intellectual development and so on. Therefore, there is a desire to be able to access all the texts from a particular set. Furthermore, most of the institutional projects target a number of sources composing a defined set. By organising a set of digital sources, a digital corpus is created.

The usefulness of text corpora in general is obvious: anyone can have access to a standardised version of every text in a corpus and the entire collection is available. The usefulness of digital text corpora goes beyond that: text searches can be quickly performed on the whole collection, statistical analyses may be achieved fast, it may be used in hypotheses testing or in automatic linguistic analyses. The labour of many years and many people working on paper some time ago in order to produce tables of indices and concordances can be carried out in milliseconds by computers and is less prone to human error.

But how do we organise a digital text corpus? It must be structured in such a way that it is simultaneously adapted to the specificity of each text and to the demands of the users. At the same time, it must start with something and end by comprising all the available texts and details. In information science terms, it must be organised as a dataset in a tree-like structure. But, for predictability and compatibility, the structure must be homogenous, which means that every division must follow the same principles. This may seem redundant, but when we try to apply these principles strictly, we remark how often we admit exceptions and heterogeneity.

For example, there is still a debate about how the corpus of the *Sentences* commentaries and other scholastic corpora should be organised. A workshop on this subject was held at Basel[10] and a proposal was made. The point was that there is no consensus about how to interchange the data representing digital editions and digital information on scholasticism. Every project has its own principles in organising the data and when someone wants to reuse data from another project (e.g. to integrate an external digital text in its own functionality), he or she must deal with its different principles and work on data conversion, which is futile. For example, someone may build the tree on the assumption that its levels are: author, work, chapter, paragraph. But this structure fails on several instances: the identification of the author may be problematic (is 'Anonymous' a single author, or a different author for each work? what about works proven or suspected to be written by the same anonymous author?); the work may have several different versions (is it

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[10] *Linked Data and the Medieval Scholastic Tradition*, University of Basel, August 17–19, 2016, organized by Jeffrey C. Witt and Ueli Zahnd.

still the same work if it differs a lot? is an abbreviation by some other author considered the same work or should it be assigned to the abbreviator? what about a heavily altered copy?); the work may be divided differently than in chapters (how to deal with multi-level divisions and how much of them is to be stored?) These issues lead to some quite philosophical questions: what is an author? what is a work? There are proposals to abstract this,[11] but for some projects it may seem redundant. In addition, the digital humanist must avoid inventing information for the sake of the dataset structure (e.g. forcing items into categories where there is no scientific motivation for their inclusion).

Concerning my project, I faced the same questions on data modelling. Not only that I had to put all the discourses and information about them together, but I had to put them in such a way that they may be easily interrogated. I had no intention in solving the tree problem, so I took a somehow different approach: different types of data are stored separately, but they are put together by means of pointers and a tree is dynamically generated by the computer. There is a testing website called RecommDB[12] for illustration. There are several TEI documents containing data tables: manuscripts, authors, discourses, sources etc. Each entry points to other entries, for example a discourse points to one or several manuscripts, to one author, to several sources. By accessing any table we may consider that we are on a first level of a tree, having the other linked data as descendants. Accordingly, when we access the authors list, we may traverse the tree by going to their discourses, then from discourses to manuscripts and so on. For the purpose of analysis, I also encoded geographical places and chronological data (for manuscripts, for discourse authors, for ancient source authors) so that I can generate maps and timelines. The advantage is that the corpus can be easily extended through adding new datasets and pointers. When a consensus about the structure of datasets is reached, it should hopefully be just a particular case of traversing the corpus through a specific tree model. Therefore, we could also abstract the model design.

From what we have seen, the building of a digital corpus needs important critical decisions. It does not only pertain to the specificity of the data, but to the interrogation possibilities as well. A corpus which is inadequate to certain interrogations may produce false results when these interrogations are still performed. But the work will not, or should not rely only on the computer[13]. We already have the historical experience of organising text corpora: the libraries. Every

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[11] Jeffrey C. Witt, *A Distributed Text Service Modeling Proposal – case study of the scta ontology and api*, http://lombardpress.org/2016/06/12/DTS-modeling-proposal/ (accessed on 10.01.2017).
[12] Mihai Maga, *Recommendaciones Database*, http://www.mihaimaga.ro/recommdb/ (accessed on 10.01.2017).
[13] See Jerome McGann, "Information Technology and the Troubled Humanities," in *Defining Digital Humanities: a reader,* 49–65.

time when someone is in doubt about a digital edition, she or he must be able to check the edition, the manuscript, the catalogue in the library.

3. Computer analysis and interpretation

A computer does nothing with the data unless instructed so. Thus it needs software and commands in order to process the data, but this is also a complex situation. While the file format standards are developed for general compatibility, hence a TEI well-formed file should be processed with any TEI aware software, the reality is different. Firstly, because of the decisions made at the encoding level, which we discussed earlier, and by which only a selected subset of instructions is used. Secondly, because each software application assumes that the file contains certain data and structure and only relies on processing it. For example, there are at least three very different ways of linking the critical apparatus to a text in TEI,[14] but the applications usually only deal with one of them (the parallel segmentation method seems to be the most used). The software available may be divided into two categories: generic software which it happens to also process TEI (most of the advanced XML processors can validate a TEI schema), and specific software, built for a certain project, corpus or analysis. The first one may be difficult to use in specific semantic interrogation; the second one may be incompatible with other encoding strategies.

For a beginner in Digital Humanities, the practice may be quite discouraging: most of the scholars who work in this domain have at least medium level knowledge and training in programming. The situation may be explained intuitively by mentioning the early development of this field, the scarcity of easy-to-use tools, or the conflicting approaches of encoding and processing data. But there is a more profound reason: after putting the texts in computer files, any question on these must be formulated in computer language. Consequently, for a simple text search, the retrieval of results must be aware of the semantics embedded in the file and of the document structure (for example, if the complete titles mentioned by a work are not stored within the work, but pointed to a different location, one will not find them by searching in the work). Therefore, a medievalist who wishes to use the electronic texts to their maximum potential must learn some computer language. The alternative is to research the available tools, to wait for new ones to be developed, or to support and advise the colleagues with proper training in order to achieve his own goals. Otherwise, he should be familiar with the fact that a question like "Which works belong to the author X?" should be reformulated as "SELECT `title` FROM `bibl` WHERE `author`="X"" (in MySQL) or "//bibl/author[.="X"]/../title" (in xQuery). By reformulating the questions in computer language, they seem more

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[14] *The TEI Guidelines*, "12.2. Linking the Apparatus to the Text,": http://www.tei-c.org/release/doc/tei-p5-doc/en/html/TC.html#TCAPLK (accessed on 10.01.2017).

objective, but we should keep in mind that this translation does not surpass the subjective thinking[15].

Nevertheless, for most users of a digital corpus a small number of usage scenarios are the most prevalent. The text search functionality is probably the most commonly used. It may seem trivial for users, but a lot of effort must be put into a good search functionality, not only through programming, but also through linguistics and mathematics. Because the user will be happy to find the most relevant results even if they have different spellings, or different grammar inflections, or the word order differs, the developer must invest in language processing and algorithmic computing. Thus, the text must be lemmatised and the application must compute the relevance of results. Yet, the application should make its computed decisions visible to the knowledgeable user while keeping a clear interface for the unaware one.

From my experience, there is quite a thin line between the needs and the possibilities. For example, by implementing full lemmatization and complex search algorithms based on score computing and semantic aware, the resulting data storage is huge and the requests cause a high usage of computing power to the extent that a medium sized server may take minutes to return the results for certain complicated requests.

This is why the general usage in computer programming is to separate and to abstract the processing applications from the data model. This way, the integrity of each part can be ascertained, the same data may be consumed by different applications, and the same application may be fed with data from any other project. At a certain point in the future we may envisage a complex network where a constellation of different applications can perform specific tasks on big datasets gathered together from different sources. Consequently, if an application is unsatisfactory, one can access the same data through another one; at the same time, each developer can focus on what he does best, leaving other tasks to other projects connected to the network. But all these tools and resources should not be left unattended: there are many caveats in using the computer for scientific research in the humanities.[16]

Conclusion

I tried to illustrate here some of the challenges of the Digital Humanities for a medievalist and to identify some possible solutions. Some of them may be common to other humanistic fields, some are specific for medieval philosophy. There are

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[15] See Leighton Evans and Sian Rees, "An Interpretation of Digital Humanities," in *Understanding Digital Humanities*, ed. David M. Berrry (Houndmills–New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 21–41.
[16] See Bernhard Rieder and Theo Röhle, "Digital Methods: Five Challenges," in *Understanding Digital Humanities,* 67–84.

some fundamental questions behind the technical aspects which demand an investigation of our mind and of the human-computer interaction: what is a text? what is semantics? do computer results have any creative value? can programming be an expression of humanistic research? is there a new philosophy behind Digital Humanities? These are open questions and they should be left open while this scholarly area is still under development. Yet the developer must have some answers for themselves, and any user of their products must know about its fundamental assumptions, else she or he may be led into the temptation of universality and objectivity.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHRISTOPHE GRELLARD and FRÉDÉRIQUE LACHAUD, eds. *A Companion to John of Salisbury* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

The *A Companion to John of Salisbury*, edited by professors Christophe Grellard and Frédérique Lachaud, is a collective work involving over ten specialists, who had either previously touched upon or had mainly focused their scientific writings on the life and works of John of Salisbury. The list of contributors includes names such as David Bloch, Clare Monagle, Cary J. Nederman, the two chief editors, and many others. *A Companion to John of Salisbury* was published in 2014 by Brill Publishing House and it aims at offering a global perspective upon the twelfth century philosopher and bureaucrat.

Despite having a wide range of contributors, the *Companion* maintains a sense of cohesion throughout its contents. From a structural point of view, it is split into four parts and twelve chapters of varying length. There is a constant back and forth motion from John of Salisbury's life, with its impact upon his writing, to his works. The first and the third parts are focused on John as a historical figure. They trace the context in which John was educated and moulded at the court of Henry II, trying to account for certain ideas or traits which can be found in John's work. The second and fourth parts focus on John's work, both his main philosophical treatises, the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus*, and on his less popular works, the *Entheticus*, the *Historia Pontificalis*, the lives of Anselm and Thomas Becket, and the *Letters*. Each work is analysed both on its own and in relation to the others. John's writings are also placed in connection with his life and their history after John's death is analysed as well.

The first part of the *Companion*, "Historical Context", focuses on John of Salisbury's biography. The three chapters that compose this first part follow John's evolution in chronological order, from his school years to his time as Becket's secretary, and ending with his years as Bishop of Chartres. His relations to the archbishop Thomas Becket and to King Henry II stand out from the system of John's connections. These two main figures mark John's permanent oscillation between the lay and the clerical context.

The second part of the *Companion*, "John of Salisbury as a Writer", revolves around John's style of writing. It compiled of three chapters that trace John's sources and the manner in which he chose to tackle certain subjects.

The third part, "John of Salisbury and the Intellectual World of the 12th Century", returns to John's biography, in an attempt to identify the sources of John's preoccupation for his main topics, but also his knowledge of those subjects. This is the most extensive part of the *Companion*, comprising five chapters and over one hundred pages. The subjects considered include law, politics, science, ethics, and theology.

The fourth and last part of the *Companion*, "John of Salisbury and His Readers", is the shortest, made up of only one chapter. It traces the "afterlife" of the *Policraticus*, in the centuries following John's death. One can see in this chapter how the ideas of the treatise outlive the knowledge about its authorship, serving as an inspiration for the political thinkers of the Renaissance, in terms of ideas, as well as also in terms of style.

The *Companion to John of Salisbury* gives an accurate insight on John of Salisbury and his writings. It details John's life, his knowledge on the subjects he handled in his works, as well as on the main topics of these works, their sources, and their legacy. However, the *Companion* can by no means be considered an exhaustive analysis of John of Salisbury's work. It remains to be completed by the authors' individual works on the subject, but it also leaves space for further perspectives to be developed.

To conclude, *A Companion to John of Salisbury* represents a consistent and accurate approach to John of Salisbury and his work. It offers competent insight from the experts on this subject, some of whom have been involved in the translation (completed or ongoing) of John's works into different languages. At the same time, the *Companion* is not self-sufficient, leaving room for previous and future articles and books on the topic, giving a serious starting point to those interested in John of Salisbury, but permitting them to develop their own perspective of it.

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MARCIA L. COLISH, *Faith, Fiction and Force in Medieval Baptismal Debates* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014).

In the history of the Latin church, the sacrament of baptism, described as the *vitae spiritualis ianua* (the gateway to the spiritual life) according to the first article of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (Città del Vaticano, 1992), is undoubtedly one of the defining elements of Christianity and one of the fundamental episodes within Christian life. Despite having long been a central part of the traditional Christian

practices, several aspects of baptismal theology were in fact much debated, lacking doctrinal consensus.

The recently published contribution of Marcia Colish succeeds in illuminating three such controversial features of the Catholic baptismal debate. As implied in the title itself, the volume is of great use in understanding the medieval debates on baptism by desire, fictive baptism and forced baptism. The author's thorough examination of these three baptismal questions which are at the core of the volume aims at nuancing the alleged long-standing consensus of the Catholic church on these matters, by arguing that the medieval western church was far from sharing a common understanding of these three areas of baptismal thought and practice. The well balanced volume is divided into three chapters, each one corresponding to one of the three baptismal questions, which are all treated from a chronological perspective. The study concludes with an afterword, a rich bibliography and a practical index.

One first element that draws our attention is the chosen timeframe established by the author of the study. Colish ends the investigation not at the end of the medieval period, as one would be tempted to infer from the title, but at the early fourteenth century. The author motivates this methodological choice by stating that she mainly follows "what was added to the debates". However, given that the inquiry is limited in particular to only those texts available in print, as stated in the preface, it should be emphasised that the chosen *ante quem* does not imply that anything of note had happened within the baptismal debates in the period that followed the early fourteenth century. This would be impossible to determine as long as there are still unedited manuscripts that might contain relevant texts for these debates, such as the questions on baptism treated in the commentaries on Book IV of the *Sentences*, commentaries which continued to be composed as late as the 16th century. In other words, the temporal limit of the volume does not determine the actual ending point of the transformations of these debates, which could still vary. There are in fact many questions left open, as Colish acknowledges, particularly due to the unavailability of critical editions. One such case is that of William of Ware's commentary on the *Sentences*, of which only fragments have been edited, making it unclear what his position was on the controversial issue of the date when ritual baptism was instituted by Christ.

In the first section of the volume, dealing with baptism by desire, Colish starts the investigation at the patristic period, which is followed by a time gap (between the 5th and the late 11th century) when the topic seems not to have been discussed, with two exceptions which are not overlooked: Bede and an anonymous Carolingian. The question regarding the baptism by desire is whether a convert with a true desire of being baptised genuinely receives the baptism if the administration of the sacrament is ritually inaccessible, a situation which was first formulated and defended by Ambrose of Milan in *De obitu Valentiniani*, one of the most important sources for the medieval discussions of the topic.

In fact, the gradual multiplication of various types of baptisms, some of which were inherited from the patristic texts while others represented new terminological refinements (*e.g.* Alain of Lille's distinction between *baptismus fluminis*, *sanguinis* and *flaminis*), provoked a diversity of approaches in assessing their status and importance. Colish shows that the lack of unanimity in the discussions was a result of the various distinctions brought into the debate. One of the much debated topics was the ability of each of the three forms of baptism to impart the baptismal character. While, for instance, William of Auxerre insisted on reducing the importance of baptism by blood in contrast with the two other forms of baptism, his younger contemporary, Alexander of Hales, attempts at rehabilitating the same type of baptism, and later we see that Scotus simply dismisses the topic of baptism by desire and focuses on arguing for the universal necessity of ritual baptism. Concerning the debate around the baptism by desire, Colish points to its "virtual disappearance from the scholastic agenda at the end of the thirteenth century".

The second chapter of the volume addresses the history of fictive baptism, *i.e.* the question of whether baptism emulated by children's play or actors interpreting a role on stage can be held valid if it involves a genuine baptismal intention. Colish also examines two other related hypothetical situations that raise the issue of re-baptising: the fictive or valid status of the baptism performed by heretics or schismatics and the baptism received by unfaithful candidates who enter the font. As was also the case with baptism by desire, in the 12th century the doctrine of fictive baptism was revived while receiving a more refined conceptual apparatus, built around the idea of the sacramental character and the distinction between *sacramentum* and *res sacramenti*. One distinct and original treatment of this distinction belongs to Thomas Aquinas, who discusses it from the point of view of causation (*i.e.* the Holy Spirit as the first cause of baptism, Christ's passion as the efficient cause of baptism).

The third chapter explores the issue of forced baptism and the question of the validity of the baptism of the unwilling candidates forced into the font. The issue of the forced baptism of Jews is indeed a well documented topic and is taken under examination in the last section of the volume. However, given that the major attempts of forced baptism date from the late fourteenth century, such as the policy in Iberia which is briefly mentioned in the afterword, a treatment of this subject does not fall within the time span of the volume.

One of the strong points of this volume is the fact that the author constructs a broad picture and a comprehensive survey of the development of baptismal debates, taking a large range of sources into account, including Anglo-Saxon and Carolingian exegetes, chroniclers, theologians, canonists, lay and ecclesiastical authorities. Naturally, the author acknowledges the fact that she does not treat all authors who wrote about the three debated baptismal questions, which is otherwise an impossible task for the given number of pages. Thus, the author intends to paint a

picture of "the major changes" that occurred within the rich Catholic doctrine of baptism, an image which obviously does not fully meet the actual transfer of knowledge assured by those lesser known authors who maintained and transmitted the tradition through their writings.

Nonetheless, the author still pays special attention to connecting the doctrines of later authors with the elements they had inherited from previous writers. For instance, the arguments of Alexander of Hales for the parity of all three forms of baptism (by blood, by desire and ritual baptism) are much indebted to Bernard of Clairvaux's and Peter Lombard's treatments. Parenthetically, as one may expect from a scholar with previous research background on the influential *Sentences* composed by Lombard, one of the strong points of Colish's analysis are the subchapters devoted to Peter Lombard's support of the baptism by desire and fictive baptism. Moreover, Bonaventure inherits much of the stance shared by the three aforementioned authors regarding the issues related both to baptism by blood and baptism by desire, while he is in turn followed by his Franciscan successors (Richard of Mediavilla, William of Ware *et alii*).

From the standpoint of intellectual history, the high quality of the volume is assured by the broad picture constructed by employing a large range of primary sources. Despite not exploring new manuscript material or editing previously unedited texts, the author manages to compose a synthetic volume, paying considerable attention to the historical context of the discussions. Colish's substantial research testifies to the complexity of the baptismal question which has long received a multitude of divergent treatments, often unfairly concealed by the more recent teachings of the Catholic church, which claim that the church has always admitted only one position on all three of the baptismal questions.

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CATHERINE KÖNIG-PRALONG, *Médiévisme philosophique et raison modern: de Pierre Bayle à Ernest Renan* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2016).

Presenting the evolution of reception levels in a certain period in the history of thinking involves a critical attitude in evaluating the field's possibilities of development. This is the subject covered in Catherine König-Pralong's recent book, *Médiévisme philosophique et raison moderne*, ed. J. Vrin, Paris, 2016. The author narrates a history of the discovery of medieval philosophy as an academic discipline in the 16th–19th century. Such approaches were not completely absent from the field of medieval studies even before the book of the distinguished professor from Fribourg (see for example the important collection of studies on this topic published in 1989, compiled by R. Imbach and A. Maierù). So far, they have led to the idea that

the research of medieval philosophy took place within the Catholic tradition, partly shaped by Counter Reformation, and was usually directed against Protestantism and the rationalism of modernity. Due to the arguments presented in this book, this approach can be considered outdated.

The book explains how medieval philosophy research appeared within the German historicist school of the 18th century and how it had multiple levels of reception, both in German and French culture. Still, the evolution of this discipline in these cultures (the book does not make references to Anglo-Saxon culture, which could nevertheless provide a third level of reception, in itself highly distinctive) is intimately linked to their ideologies of identity and it varies according to their reorientations. The book analyses the way in which the identity mythographies of these cultures try to find themselves in the intellectual history of the 9th–15th centuries, often portraying certain medieval figures just in order to write a history that would favour some ideology of the moment. Actually, in its four chapters, the book presents precisely this mythographic logic and analyses it through four distinct cases: the first theme focuses on the very discovery of medieval philosophy studies; the second tackles the different credits given to the input of Arabic philosophy to medieval thinking; the third focuses on the avatars of the distinctions between "mystical" and "scholastic", terms used by historians to distinguish, precisely in the field of medieval studies , the self-representations of German and French modernity; the fourth is an excellent case study regarding the figure of Abelard, rediscovered and edited by Victor Cousin in the 19th century, in order to extend to the Middle Ages the agenda of the 19th-century French university rationalism of Cousin's time.

Therefore, the initiative of the Papal encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, which at the end of the 19th century re-launched the (predominantly Thomistic) research of medieval philosophy, merely turned into the outcome of a three centuries long French–German debate during which medieval philosophy took on various forms based on the changing opportunities and historical contexts of the times. While J. Brucker (around 1731-1736) was still strongly indebted to the depreciative ideas regarding medieval philosophy deriving from Petrarch's or Boccaccio's humanism, this view evolved into a French anti-scholastic era (in order to promote rationalism) and into a German anti-scholastic era (in order to reject Catholicism). However, the abandonment of these views caused a rediscovery of medieval philosophy in French culture (through excitement with Pierre Abelard's rationalism) and German culture (with Herder's apology of the Arabs as an Arian race from which medieval Europe borrowed so much and Tenemann, among others, putting forth the idea of a mystical vein in medieval philosophy, separate from the university tradition, representing a root of German identity). Of course, as in any two contiguous traditions, the terms are mutually borrowed; Mme de Stael and later Renan transmitted the ideas of the philosophy of culture from Germany to France, just like the German divisions of this period were often indebted to the periods of French development of university scholastics.

The entire book is a profound opportunity to reflect on the status of this field of study, on its central position in how we perceive Greek philosophy, the modern self-identity, and our irrepressible instinct to focus on novelties and separations in areas where documents show nothing but continuity. I imagine that, at some point, someone will write a wonderful chapter on the reception of medieval philosophy in Romanian culture, taking this book into consideration: a chapter that would show how much Brucker and other philosophy historians have been read in Romania, how much they have been referenced, that is: read, edited and transmitted, proving how much Romanian culture is indebted to the French and German passions for the construction of identity.

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SANDU FRUNZĂ, *Fundamentalismul religios şi noul conflict al ideologiilor* (Religious fundamentalism and the new conflict of ideologies), 2nd revised edition (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Şcoala Ardeleană, 2015).

Fundamentalismul religios şi noul conflict al ideologiilor (Religious fundamentalism and the new conflict of ideologies), written by Professor Sandu Frunză (Department of Communication, Public Relations and Advertisement, Faculty of Political Science, Babeş-Bolyai University) was published in 2015 and it represents a revised and enlarged version of the 2003 edition. It offers a very exciting debate regarding two key concepts of contemporary society: "religious fundamentalism" and "spiritual regeneration movement".

The study is structured in six parts, each with its adjacent chapters and subchapters. It begins by defining myth, religion and ideology in order to discuss not only the religious fundamentalist movements in the context of global relations, but also the way in which religion relates to ideology by pointing out the critical issues created by this relation: violence as a religious discourse, but also tolerance and multiculturalism.

Understanding religion as "a manifestation of the sacred", Sandu Frunză analyses the way in which, in the contemporary world, it tends to transform into a rather "laicised cultural discourse" and even more so into a political one. Today, the ideological discourse greatly contributes to the individual's "construction of identity" and to society's "cultural memory". The research thus pertinently shows that, in today's society, there are two parallel tendencies: on the one hand, the phenomenon through which ideology transforms into a "secularised religion", in which case the author offers Marxism as an example and, on the other hand, the process through which religion is given an ideological connotation that creates

fundamentalism, especially in the case of radical groups that define themselves as "religious regeneration movements".

Today, this study represents an unprecedented attempt to define "fundamentalism" by answering the major questions the concept raises: 1. Which would be the correct term and status of religious traditions outside Christianity? 2. Would an "essentialist" definition of fundamentalism be legitimate? 3. Can there be a transcultural application of the term? Through his analyses, the author makes an ideal theoretical and applied endeavour and offers carefully documented case studies.

Due to modern man's known need for recovering his mythical symbolic conscience, Part I ("Mit, religie, ideologie. Aspecte ale construcţiei simbolice a identităţii"[1]) focuses on the revalorization of "the myth" and on its "rediscovery" within a "de-mythicised" culture, on the dialectic relation between myth, religion and culture.

Part II ("Ideologia ca religie secularizată şi religia ca ideologie"[2]) assesses the way in which religion becomes ideology and the way in which our century compels a redefinition of identity by substituting religion as an ideology. Starting with humanity's three great religions, Part III ("Aspecte ale fundamentalismului iudaic"[3]), Part IV ("Aspecte ale fundamentalismului creştin"[4]) and Part V ("Aspecte ale fundamentalismului islamic"[5]) analyse the ideological component of both a fundamentalist religious mentality and the way in which religious ideology can take the extreme forms of intolerance and violence.

Part VI ("Identităţi religioase, multiculturalism şi ideologie în context global"[6]) contains one of the most interesting discussions in the book and it starts by offering as an example the relation between the institutions that the Romanian society considers most trustworthy: the church and the army. In a highly original manner, the author analyses the relation between religion and the religious discourse on the one hand, and the state and nation on the other, considering, for example, the connection between the Orthodox Church and the army within the Romanian society throughout history and the consequences of such a connection: sacred violence, self-identification and nationalist ideology. In this last part of the book, the author also analyses the relationship between politics and religion in the context of globalization, due to the complex nature of this theme; it is presented as an active participant in the construction of identity and in the validation of both the majority and the minority groups. The provocative reading of this book raises the

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[1] Myth, religion, ideology. Aspects regarding the symbolic construction of identity.
[2] Ideology as a secularized religion and religion as an ideology.
[3] Features of Judaic fundamentalism.
[4] Features of Christian fundamentalism.
[5] Features of Islamic fundamentalism.
[6] Religious identities, multiculturalism and ideology in a global context.

question whether, in today's "new conflict of ideologies", there should be more emphasis put on how the mass-media, cinematography and technology in general can influence society's fundamentalist tendencies.

The author stresses the fact that a crisis of modernity also implies a crisis of identity and he is well aware of the difficulty of approaching such a subject from the viewpoint of religious ideologies. Throughout the discussion, Sandu Frunză constantly uses concepts and examples based on the dichotomies sacred / profane, synchronic / diachronic, religion / ideology, individual / nation, Marxism / fundamentalism, physical space / virtual space in order to show that, in the end, fundamentalism is "violence with religious motivations".

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